This is not even in the ballpark of what I've been posting. Maybe that's why I haven't been able to understand your responses. — Srap Tasmaner
Careful, Fool. Don't confuse mortality as a 'genetic imperative' with ethnic cleasing & mass-murder. That Ought doesn't follow from any Is. — 180 Proof
If you are correct in your OP and reasons for not giving life are basically the only reasons that matter, — ToothyMaw
I don't think that's what I said. My claim, in a nutshell, is that we do not, as a matter of course, need a reason to save a life or create one. Under some circumstances, there may be an obvious and powerful reason not to, and then you can begin to weigh this against that, collect your pros and cons, etc. — Srap Tasmaner
One oddity of my claim is that I've presented it as if our knowledge of self-preservation is itself a reason. That might be true, but it's a little weird. — Srap Tasmaner
Given the instinct for self preservation that all living organisms appear to share, and which can only be overcome by extreme experiences (resulting in suicide or self sacrifice), your actions are exactly the actions the person whose life you preserve would take if they could — Srap Tasmaner
That sounds specious — ToothyMaw
You actually do cite a reason for giving life in absence of of a good reason not to — ToothyMaw
should we not always act for reasons? — ToothyMaw
Not interested. There's plenty of opportunity to have related discussions on their terms — Srap Tasmaner
I think our behavior can be described in terms of reasons or in terms of causes. If someone else talks about my reasons for acting as I did, they're at most reporting what I said; but they can refer to things I may not even be aware of, and that will sound more like a causal explanation than a rational one. (Is that obvious, or do we need examples?) — Srap Tasmaner
To connect that with the talk of "instinct" I've been throwing around: I don't think we experience our instincts as reasons for behaving the way we do; I think we experience them as needing no reason at all for what we do. — Srap Tasmaner
I can come along, as an amateur philosopher, and I can look at the behavior people engage in without thinking, as the saying goes, and I can offer an explanation -- and in this case it's the bit about self-preservation and so on. — Srap Tasmaner
You could look at this thread as an "argument" for starting from different premises. — Srap Tasmaner
Does that conclusion follow from the premises offered by the anti-natalist? — Srap Tasmaner
Right. I'm not defending the instinct for self-preservation. But I am arguing that we can rely on all members of our species having the same instinct. — Srap Tasmaner
I also claim that we already do this, in rendering aid to people in peril without analyzing whether they want it or not, and in most people who decide to have children not considering it a moral issue at all unless there are specific circumstances that raise the issue --- hereditary disease, a parent's personality disorder, extreme poverty. Such circumstances make it an issue; reproducing itself needs no justification. — Srap Tasmaner
“Everything is wrong” also consistently leads to the antinatalist conclusion but also leads to charity being wrong which the antinatalist will disagree with, thus forcing them to re-examine their starting premises. — khaled
Just because there are multiple ways to reach a conclusion, and one of the ways is ridiculous, that doesn't reflect upon reasonable ways of reaching that same conclusion or the conclusion itself — ToothyMaw
I never said so. I was implying that all the ways of reaching the antinatalist conclusion come with ridiculous side effects, and the best way to argue against it is to highlight said ridiculous side effects. — khaled
The inconsistency lies in an adherent’s inability to accept the full consequences of their premises. — khaled
claiming that if it is natural it requires no reason — ToothyMaw
But according to an anti-natalist it does need a justification — ToothyMaw
Ah, no, not really. I'm saying people behaving in this way do not experience themselves as needing a reason to do so, do not experience the need for decision at all. — Srap Tasmaner
On the one hand, I'm claiming that there is a way to construe our behavior as reasonable -- this is the claim that the person affected by our actions would want us to behave that way, because they have the same instinct we do. — Srap Tasmaner
On the other hand, why? Why should it need justification? I claim that this is an assumption of the moral theorist, despite the evidence that most people do not believe these actions require justification. — Srap Tasmaner
That isn't an argument for anything. — ToothyMaw
a person who procreates or saves a life cannot guarantee that the person given life will share their value system - what if they are a Schopenhauer? — ToothyMaw
Then we aren't discussing ethics, because reason is central to any ethical theory — ToothyMaw
You genuinely seem to be ignorant of all of the good anti-natalist arguments. — ToothyMaw
No one can guarantee anything. I claim it is perfectly reasonable to assume, without argument, that people want to live. And I claim that if you reflect upon humanity, then you do also have a reason in support of the premise. And if you think about it a little more, the fact that everyone seems to assume this about everyone else is only more reason to count on it. — Srap Tasmaner
I'm not directly addressing the arguments for AN here. There's always two or three places to do that, if you'd like. I do think it's reasonable to discuss why I don't think I have to address them. — Srap Tasmaner
So what I said remains valid: typical anti-natalist reasoning doesn't have ridiculous side effects like "charity is wrong". — ToothyMaw
You made an argument in favor of an ethical theory, and didn't acknowledge my counter-argument. Why don't you have to address it? — ToothyMaw
AN is a solution to a problem only it believes in: it both asks and answers the question, is it immoral to have children? No one else asks, but AN keeps insisting it has an answer. — Srap Tasmaner
Yes it does. The most popular argument for example, the "it's an unconsented imposition that can be harmful so it's wrong" that I hear very often has the side effect that giving gifts is wrong unless you ask for permission first. It would also prevent you from, say, sending a kid to school. — khaled
Is a philosopher, then, like a troll guarding the bridge to parenthood? He pops up saying, "You may not pass until you have answered my riddle!" — Srap Tasmaner
"But the child might immediately fall into a pit of lava!" cries the troll, as people stream past him.
"What lava pit? There's no lava pit around here." someone calls as they pass by. "Why would I give birth in a lava pit?" asks someone else.
"Well," says the troll, "Life is kind of like a pit of lava."
The crowd is unconvinced. "No it isn't." They keep crossing 'his' bridge.
"But it might be!" responds the troll, sensing an opening. "You don't know for sure that it isn't."
"If life were kind of like a lava pit, I would have kind of caught fire and kind of burned to death years ago," says someone, and gives the troll a little shove so he topples back under the bridge.
It's a bit like the argument from error: because someone, sometime, in some specific circumstances, was 'deceived by their senses', everyone, always, and in all circumstances, must accept the possibility that they are, at that moment, in those circumstances, being deceived by their senses. — Srap Tasmaner
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