“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.” — unenlightened

Yes, I am aware of that view. How does it follow that Dawkins (or scientists generally) believes that persons are nothing but the expression of genes?

Yes, I am aware of that view. How does it follow that Dawkins (or scientists generally) believes that persons are nothing but the expression of genes? — Arkady

I'm not interested in Dawkins' beliefs, but in his writings. There is no science of persons, because science is concerned only with mechanisms. You suggested that my characterisation was unfair, I gave you a quote to support it. I dare say the man is humane enough to his wife, but that is not what he writes about.

I'm not interested in Dawkins' beliefs, but in his writings. — unenlightened

His beliefs as expressed in his writings do not support the contention that he believes that persons are nothing but the expression of genes.

From The Selfish Gene (underlining mine):

As an analogy, think of the influence of a fertilizer, say nitrate, on the
growth of wheat. Everybody knows that wheat plants grow bigger in the
presence of nitrate than in its absence. But nobody would be so foolish
as to claim that, on its own, nitrate can make a wheat plant. Seed, soil,
sun, water, and various minerals are obviously all necessary as well. But
if all these other factors are held constant, and even if they are allowed to
vary within limits, addition of nitrate will make the wheat plants grow
bigger. So it is with single genes in the development of an embryo.
Embryonic development is controlled by an interlocking web of
relationships so complex that we had best not contemplate it. No one
factor, genetic or environmental, can be considered as the single 'cause'
of any part of a baby. All parts of a baby have a near infinite number of
antecedent causes. But a difference between one baby and another, for
example a difference in length of leg, might easily be traced to one or a
few simple antecedent differences, either in environment or in genes. It is
differences that matter in the competitive struggle to survive; and it is
genetically- controlled differences that matter in evolution. — Selfish Gene

There is no science of persons, because science is concerned only with mechanisms. You suggested that my characterisation was unfair, I gave you a quote to support it. I dare say the man is humane enough to his wife, but that is not what he writes about.

As I said, the notion of defining personhood is a philosophical question, but it doesn't follow that empiricism can't study or evaluate claims pertaining to persons, including whether or not they exist. Julius Caesar (as described in historical sources) was undeniably a "person," and yet a historian, employing the methods of empiricism, is perfectly poised to study whether or not Julius Caesar actually existed, or whether he was a mythic figure, etc.

If science is concerned only with mechanisms, then by your lights science also cannot study fruit flies, because a scientist is in no position to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions of what is a fruit fly.

Kin to Un's point is that there is no scientific definition of divinity. Therefore divinity is not a scientific issue.

Kin to Un's point is that there is no scientific definition of divinity. Therefore divinity is not a scientific issue. — Mongrel

Firstly, even if divinity is not a matter for the natural sciences, it doesn't follow that they idea can't be at all critiqued by empirical investigation, e.g. historically.

Secondly, in following Un's reasoning to its conclusion, science cannot study anything, as science can apparently study only what it can define, and, as it is concerned solely with mechanisms, it cannot define anything.

Do you believe that it is generally accepted that plumbers qua plumbers are artists when they exercise creativity? — Arkady

Sorry, I was rushed and didn't explain myself well. Let me just clarify what I mean. The plumber, qua plumber, is not an artist, because they are taught to follow specific techniques, building codes, and practises dictated by the union. Trades people qua trades people, are not artists, for the very reason that they must follow specific dogma to be accepted as part of that trade. But if a plumber is in a particular situation which requires creativity, I think it is generally accepted that in this particular instance the plumber is acting as an artist.

I can't see how the whole question of what is or isn't art has anything to do with this thread... — Wayfarer

The issue is with how we, as human beings approach the unknown, and seek to bring the unknown into the realm of the known, what is called in Arkady's words the "knowledge generating endeavor". I believe this is a purely subjective activity best described as art. Arkady clearly denies art from this process, but does not offer anything else as a replacement.

..'one criterion might be that an artistic work serves no other purpose than to satisfy an aesthetic, whereas a piece of trade-craft, such as plumbing or whatever, has a utilitarian purpose. — Wayfarer

I was hoping I might get to this point in discussion with Arkady, because this brings us to the metaphysical divide between "beauty" and "good". If we ask, what is X good for, in a pragmatic sense, we are looking for the end, "that for the sake of which", is how Aristotle is commonly translated. This produces a chain of causation (final causation), X is good for Y which is good for Z etc.. So in his ethics, Aristotle argues that there must be an ultimate end, something sought for the sake of itself, and the other goods are sought for the sake of the ultimate good, which acts as an end to the chain. He proposed happiness.

Other philosophers have proposed that we can avoid this chain of final causes, "goods", by assuming "beauty" as the ultimate end, that which is sought for the sake of itself. From this point, it appears like we have a division between aesthetics and ethics. But exactly how this division exists depends on how we define "beauty". And, if "beauty" is proposed as the ultimate good, the end to the chain of final causes, we need to demonstrate a relationship between "beauty" and "good". If we maintain a pure division, that some things are sought for beauty, and some things are sought for good, then we have an ethical dilemma because unless we can show that "good" is higher than "beauty" we have no means to bring ethical principles to bear upon activities which are carried out for the sake of beauty.

Argument by assertion. — Arkady

Wow, what a retort, coming from someone whose entire engagement with me has been nothing but argument by assertion. First, I gave you the dictionary definition of "art". Then you asserted that we shouldn't go by dictionary definitions, and you knew of some other way that "art" was used. All you have done is continuously assert your believe that there is a difference between the creativity of an artist, and the creativity of a scientist. I ask you for principles to define this division, but all you do is repeatedly attack my definition which is well justified by the dictionary, asserting that I am wrong.

Sorry, I was rushed and didn't explain myself well. Let me just clarify what I mean. The plumber, qua plumber, is not an artist, because they are taught to follow specific techniques, building codes, and practises dictated by the union. Trades people qua trades people, are not artists, for the very reason that they must follow specific dogma to be accepted as part of that trade. But if a plumber is in a particular situation which requires creativity, I think it is generally accepted that in this particular instance the plumber is acting as an artist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. I believe I understand your position, and you give a good account of it, but I just don't think we're coming from the same place on this issue.

Ok. I believe I understand your position, and you give a good account of it, but I just don't think we're coming from the same place on this issue. — Arkady

Yes I see we're definitely not coming from the same place. That's why I brought to your attention, how absurd your opinion appears from my perspective. Your claim is that art does not take part in the knowledge generating endeavour. From my perspective, the knowledge generating endeavour can only be described as art, being a creative act. My opinion is that you really need to take a good look at the knowledge generating endeavour, and adjust your perspective accordingly.

I think that it is an important point epistemologically, because objectivity, is what we seek in knowledge, but it does not naturally inhere with the principles of knowledge. Objectivity is created by the human beings who create knowledge. When the act of creating knowledge is seen as an art form, then subjectivity is seen as inherent within knowledge. Then generating objective knowledge is a matter of ridding knowledge of subjectivity. But as I described already, we have a distinction between pure, true objectivity, and inter-subjective objectivity, the latter being objectivity by convention, is inherently subjective itself.

Yes I see we're definitely not coming from the same place. That's why I brought to your attention, how absurd your opinion appears from my perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Know that your opinion appears equally absurd from mine. X-)

That worries me. So, I'd better think about something else right now. Bye, Arkady.

As I said, the notion of defining personhood is a philosophical question, but it doesn't follow that empiricism can't study or evaluate claims pertaining to persons, including whether or not they exist. — Arkady

This is a herring the colour of ripe strawberries in good light. Whether Julius Caesar existed or not is an entirely separate issue from what it means to be a person. The method of science is to eliminate the subjective and personal; it does not and cannot take account of them. Dawkins mistakes a methodological assumption for a proven fact, and your quote simply adds a little 'complexity' to the mechanistic reduction of the person. Empiricism cannot evaluate claims pertaining to persons unless it recognises the existence of persons as something other than the existence of bodies and mechanisms. But it cannot do that.

This is a herring the colour of ripe strawberries in good light. Whether Julius Caesar existed or not is an entirely separate issue from what it means to be a person. — unenlightened

And? You made the non-sequitur claim that, because defining personhood is best left to philosophy, that therefore science can't study claims pertaining to persons. That doesn't follow.

The method of science is to eliminate the subjective and personal; it does not and cannot take account of them.

One can speak objectively about persons, including whether or not they exist. Whether Caesar was a real person is a question for science to answer (with "science" broadly construed to mean empiricism), and is about as objective as anything else.

Dawkins mistakes a methodological assumption for a proven fact, and your quote simply adds a little 'complexity' to the mechanistic reduction of the person.

In other words, you made an erroneous claim about what Dawkins believes (i.e. that persons are solely a result of their gene expression), I refuted that by means of a quote, and you toss that off as it merely adding "a little complexity." Please feel free to admit your error.

Empiricism cannot evaluate claims pertaining to persons unless it recognises the existence of persons as something other than the existence of bodies and mechanisms. But it cannot do that.

Sure it can. Julius Caesar was a person. Science can evaluate, for instance, the historicity of his existence. Ergo, science can evaluate claims pertaining to person. QED.

And, as I point out above (and which you seem to have ignored), by your criterion science cannot study anything, because science is merely concerned with elucidating mechanisms, and defining an object doesn't qualify as such, and science is supposedly unable to study what it can't define.

Julius Caesar was a person. — Arkady

What is a person?

But this is where I came in, and so this is where the argumentative circle is complete, and since you nor Dawkins have an answer, there is no content to your pontifications, and this is where i leave you to it.

What is a person?
— unenlightened

But this is where I came in, and so this is where the argumentative circle is complete, and since you nor Dawkins have an answer, there is no content to your pontifications, and this is where i leave you to it.

Again a non-sequitur. Your claim boils down to: it is not within the domain of science to define X, therefore science cannot study X. At the very least, you need to provide some argumentation for this position.

You might also address my point that, given your criterion, science can study nothing at all.

You might also address my point that, given your criterion, science can study nothing at all. — Arkady

I might, but I won't. Your boiling is a straw man. Science can study causes, mechanisms, bodies, and jolly good it is for doing so. It does so by methodically eliminating the subjective, which is personhood. This method disqualifies it from talking about persons, as distinct from bodies.

If Dawkins and you are claiming that there cannot be a god that is a complex expression of genes and environment plus whatever other mechanisms you wish to add, then there is probably not a theologian on the planet that would disagree.

I might, but I won't. Your boiling is a straw man. Science can study causes, mechanisms, bodies, and jolly good it is for doing so. It does so by methodically eliminating the subjective, which is personhood. This method disqualifies it from talking about persons, as distinct from bodies. — unenlightened

This is non-responsive. As I pointed out, by your criteria, science cannot study anything at all, as it is in the business of only elucidating mechanisms, not in offering definitions, and it cannot study what it cannot define. Ignoring this reductio won't make it go away.

Likewise, you have failed to deal with my point that one can make objective claims about persons. The fact that persons are subjects doesn't render the very concept of personhood subjective (if it were, there would be little point in philosophers arguing over it). Julius Caesar was purportedly a person, complete with consciousness and its attendant subjectivity, and yet it's perfectly possible to make objective claims about him.

If Dawkins and you are claiming that there cannot be a god that is a complex expression of genes and environment plus whatever other mechanisms you wish to add, then there is probably not a theologian on the planet that would disagree.

Dawkins says that, on the balance of the evidence, there is probably no God.

Likewise, you have failed to deal with my point that one can make objective claims about persons. — Arkady

One can make objective claims about bodies.

This is non-responsive. As I pointed out, by your criteria, science cannot study anything at all, as it is in the business of only elucidating mechanisms, not in offering definitions, and it cannot study what it cannot define. — Arkady

I have not talked about definitions, that was you. Whenever I ask about persons you point to bodies, because science can recognise bodies but not persons. I haven't defined persons myself, and I have not asked you to.

1. If persons are bodies or bodily processes, then science can study persons.
2. If persons are not bodies or bodily processes, then science has a problem studying them.
3. So science necessarily assumes that persons are bodies or bodily processes.

And then after much study of the evidence, and some complex theorising, it concludes that persons are bodies or bodily processes. And from that circularity, we proceed, to announce that there can be no personal god. Which is true IF persons are bodies or bodily processes, but untrue if they are something else.

Now how about you try to engage a little with my points rather than your re-boiling of them into your points.

Firstly, even if divinity is not a matter for the natural sciences, it doesn't follow that they idea can't be at all critiqued by empirical investigation, e.g. historically. — Arkady

Yes. If you ask a religion scholar what the word means, he or she will probably first want to identify what culture and what time period you're interested in.

Secondly, in following Un's reasoning to its conclusion, science cannot study anything, as science can apparently study only what it can define, and, as it is concerned solely with mechanisms, it cannot define anything. — Arkady

Science is a community endeavor. Terminology has to be pinned down for obvious reasons.

Why do you say science can't define anything?

I'm not sure how my view is simplistic. My worldview distinguishes between "art" and "non-art." Yours claims that virtually everything is art, and is thus more parsimonious and thus simpler. — Arkady

Again, you are committing a simplistic reading of my view. I am not claiming that "virtually everything is art", just that all human activities exemplify elements of art. I also do not deny a valid distinction between art and non-art; any product of human activity which does not find itself in a context where it is claimed to be art is therefore, in that very definite sense, and by mere definition, non-art. However even here, what constitutes art is a controversial question; and many critics question the idea that something is art simply by virtue of being presented as such in an appropriate context (gallery, museum, etc). And here I am also somewhat narrowly speaking only about the plastic, visual arts.

In any case this question about the status of objects as art is not relevant because the discussion has been concerned with whether human activities qualify as partly art or not, and not concerned with the question as to which products of human activity genuinely constitute art. So, the question is much more complex and multi-layered than you are attempting to paint it as being, and my position is also more complex and nuanced than you are attempting to portray it.

If you claim not to know what it means for a portrait or painting to resemble its subject, then yes, you are playing games. — Arkady

No, I know very well what the words "this portrait resembles its subject" mean, because I have of course experienced seeing portraits that I thought resembled their subjects. But I have also heard others deny that those very same portraits did resemble their subjects. I have been involved with painting and drawing through my childhood and adolescence and all my adult life, so I have heard a wide range of other's opinions about art works. So, I know very well what it means for me to think that a portrait resembles its subject. And I know it is always a subjective experience and opinion. Can you explain what it means for a portrait to resemble its subject beyond such subjective opinions; in other words can you give an explanation in purely objective terms?

I have merely denied that creativity is a sufficient condition for an activity qualifying as "art" (I believe that it is a necessary condition). — Arkady

Again you merely display your narrow view on the meaning of the term 'art'. This is going around in circles now, and you have attempted to answer none of the difficult, more salient questions I posed for you; so I'm done with this 'conversation'.

I can't see how the whole question of what is or isn't art has anything to do with this thread, however, one criterion might be that an artistic work serves no other purpose than to satisfy an aesthetic, whereas a piece of trade-craft, such as plumbing or whatever, has a utilitarian purpose. — Wayfarer

It's just the way the discussion has evolved; discussions often show a creative tendency not to remain within the narrow confines of imposed ideas concerning what they should stay focused on or be about. There will be a connection with the OP if you go back and look for it.

So architecture is not one of the arts, then?

In other words, you made an erroneous claim about what Dawkins believes (i.e. that persons are solely a result of their gene expression) — Arkady

The Selfish Gene says something perilously close to that, although Dawkins qualifies it by saying we are obliged to struggle against it. But the problem is that he and his confreres have methodically dissolved the alternative templates for human nature in the acid of biological reductionism; he doesn't seem to understand that at all. (But then, his acolytes will say, 'he's only a biologist'.)

So architecture is not one of the arts, then? — John

Interesting. I would say not. Built structures may or may not have artistic merit, but unless a building is designed solely as an artwork, i.e. serves no other purpose, then I would say not. Of course, the Sydney Opera House is high art, but it serves as more than an artwork. So overall, more artisanship than art per se.

And then after much study of the evidence, and some complex theorising, it concludes that persons are bodies or bodily processes. And from that circularity, we proceed, to announce that there can be no personal god. Which is true IF persons are bodies or bodily processes, but untrue if they are something else. — unenlightened

Arkady linked to a blog page, with a quotation from Alvin Plantinga (here), which I said I found anthropomorphic

God is the kind of being who is conscious and enjoys some kind of awareness of his surroundings (in God’s case, that would be everything). Second (though not second in importance), a person has loves and hates, wishes and desires; she approves of some things and disapproves of others; she wants things to be a certain way.

My interpretation is that such descriptions are only true by analogy, i.e. God is like a person. I understand the classical theological view to be that all statements about the attributes of the divine are analogical.

A further explanation of the notion of 'ground of being'.

Tillich felt that, if God were a being, God could not then properly be called the source of all being (due to the question of what, in turn, created God). As an alternative, he suggested that God be understood as the “ground of Being-Itself”. (This however is not a doctrinal innovation, as it is quite in keeping with the tradition of 'pseudo Dionysius' who had a profound influence on the formation of classical theology, incorporating many ideas from neo-Platonism.)

Tillich believed that, since one cannot deny that there is being (where we and our world exist), there is therefore a Power of Being. He saw God as the ground upon which all beings exist. As such, God precedes “being itself” and God is manifested in the structure of beings. [ I would add that the scientific or naturalistic account of the Universe doesn't and maybe cannot ever disclose the first cause or ground of being itself, as it can only ever proceed in terms of chains of efficient and material causation - that is precisely why it is natural philosophy as distinct from metaphysics.]

To give contrast to the common image of God as a being, Tillich used the term “God Above God”.

Tillich appreciated symbols as the only way to envision something as meaningful and abstract as God. He saw God as a symbol, and appreciated the image of a personal God as a way for people to relate or respond to the ground of being. Likewise, he felt that, by re-envisioning stories that had been previously been accepted literally, major themes in Christian imagery could remain meaningful.

Tillich saw the root of atheism as rejection of the traditional image of God as a being.

...

The God of theological theism is a being beside others and as such a part of the whole of reality. He certainly is considered its most important part, but as a part and therefore as subjected to the structure of the whole. He is supposed to be beyond the ontological elements and categories which constitute reality. But every statement subjects him to [those categories]. He is seen as a self which has a world, as an ego which is related to a thou, as a cause which is separated from its effect, as having a definite space and an endless time. He is a being, not being-itself… God appears as the invincible tyrant, the being in contrast with whom all other beings are without freedom and subjectivity. He is equated with the recent tyrants who with the help of terror try to transform everything into a mere object, a thing among things, a cog in the machine they control. He becomes the model of everything against which Existentialism revolted. This is the God Nietzsche said had to be killed because nobody can tolerate being made into a mere object of absolute knowledge and absolute control. This is the deepest root of atheism.

I contend that this is the 'image of God' that is in the sights of the so-called 'new atheists'. That is why I can affirm that I too don't believe in the God that Dawkins doesn't believe in, but that it doesn't make me atheist. (Frustrating, I know.)

Edward Feser has a very thorough analysis of Tillich's 'God beyond God' in this blog post (athough he finds him too muddleheaded, too modernist, and at times beyond the pale of Christian orthodoxy.)

One can make objective claims about bodies. — unenlightened

One can also make objective claims about minds, on which the entire science of psychology is based.

I have not talked about definitions, that was you. Whenever I ask about persons you point to bodies, because science can recognise bodies but not persons. I haven't defined persons myself, and I have not asked you to.

1. If persons are bodies or bodily processes, then science can study persons.
2. If persons are not bodies or bodily processes, then science has a problem studying them.
3. So science necessarily assumes that persons are bodies or bodily processes.

As you said above, science can study causal processes. If the person known as God has interacted with the world in a causal manner (say, to drown the sinful in a great deluge, answer intercessory prayers, or help the Patriots win the Super Bowl), then there ought to be evidence of such interactions. Your talk about "bodily processes" is a red herring.

And then after much study of the evidence, and some complex theorising, it concludes that persons are bodies or bodily processes. And from that circularity, we proceed, to announce that there can be no personal god. Which is true IF persons are bodies or bodily processes, but untrue if they are something else.

Now how about you try to engage a little with my points rather than your re-boiling of them into your points.

If I am failing to engage with your points, perhaps we are talking past each other because the argument you summarize above is quite puzzling, and doesn't seem to bear any resemblance to what I am claiming.

Aagin you merely display your narrow view on the meaning of the term 'art'. This is going around in circles now, and you have attempted to answer none of the difficult, more salient questions I posed for you; so I'm done with this 'conversation'. — John

I agree that this has not been the most productive conversation. Perhaps the fault is mine. No hard feelings.

Arkady linked to a blog page, with a quotation from Alvin Plantinga (here), which I said I found anthropomorphic

God is the kind of being who is conscious and enjoys some kind of awareness of his surroundings (in God’s case, that would be everything). Second (though not second in importance), a person has loves and hates, wishes and desires; she approves of some things and disapproves of others; she wants things to be a certain way.

My interpretation is that such descriptions are only true by analogy, i.e. God is like a person. I understand the classical theological view to be that all statements about the attributes of the divine are analogical. — Wayfarer

I'm not qualified to comment on the nature of God. It doesn't look like it's intended analogically though. But I seem to recollect that it was said that we were made in His image, rather than the other way round, so perhaps we are analogical rather than Him.

If the person known as God has interacted with the world in a causal manner (say, to drown the sinful in a great deluge, answer intercessory prayers, or help the Patriots win the Super Bowl), then ought to be evidence of such interactions. — Arkady

Well if God wanted to intervene in this discussion, to get His message across perhaps, He might do it by inspiring one of the participants to post something intelligent, rather than bothering to register and contribute on His own behalf. Hard to detect that sort of thing, but even harder if He chose to make an intervention such that we did not after all blow ourselves to kingdom come in 1969. Even Dr Who is hard to spot when he meddles with history, and he's not even trying to be inconspicuous.

Decades ago, I saw a news feature on a US evangelical who travelled to Turkey because he believed the remains of Noah's Ark could be found on Mt Ararat. At the time, I believed the attempt was sadly deluded, that Noah's Ark was a mythological narrative and hadn't literally happened. I think I probably still am of that view, although I might be wrong. But the broader point about whether Biblical narratives are to be interpreted as literally true remains.

Personally I see the Biblical narrative as a mixture of myth, legend, and history, with some eyewitness testimony, but I have also come to believe that the term 'revealed truth' really does mean something. However I don't believe the 'inspired word of God' ought to be interpreted to mean that the Bible is literal truth, as much of it is plainly symbolic.

There's an interesting book on this very topic, The Bible Made Impossible: Why Biblicism Is Not a Truly Evangelical Reading of Scripture, Christian Smith:

Biblicism, an approach to the Bible common among some American evangelicals, emphasizes together the Bible's exclusive authority, infallibility, clarity, self-sufficiency, internal consistency, self-evident meaning, and universal applicability. Acclaimed sociologist Christian Smith argues that this approach is misguided and unable to live up to its own claims. If evangelical biblicism worked as its proponents say it should, there would not be the vast variety of interpretive differences that biblicists themselves reach when they actually read and interpret the Bible. Far from challenging the inspiration and authority of Scripture, Smith critiques a particular rendering of it, encouraging evangelicals to seek a more responsible, coherent, and defensible approach to biblical authority.

You know, sometimes I push too hard, especially when I think, rightly or wrongly, that the other person is misreading, or being stubborn, pedantic or evasive, and I admit I'm not always as objective about those things as I could, and should, be, so it's probably as much my fault as yours. Perhaps each of us has simply been talking past the other.

In any case, certainly no hard feelings!

Interesting. I would say not. Built structures may or may not have artistic merit, but unless a building is designed solely as an artwork, i.e. serves no other purpose, then I would say not. Of course, the Sydney Opera House is high art, but it serves as more than an artwork. So overall, more artisanship than art per se. — Wayfarer

You seem to be contradicting yourself here by saying both that architecture is not art and that the Sydney Opera House is "high art". Is it the only case of architecture that is high art, or even art? Also what is artisanship if not craftsmanship? It is certainly undeniable that all arts rely on various forms of craftsmanship.

However I don't believe the 'inspired word of God' ought to be interpreted to mean that the Bible is literal truth, as much of it is plainly symbolic. — Wayfarer

It's ironic, but there is no such thing as "literal truth". "Literal truth" can only be taken metaphorically, because all literature needs to be interpreted, and any interpretation is just that, an interpretation. There is no such thing as "the objective interpretation", because every interpretation is produced by a subject, and therefore there is no such thing as the literal truth, because no interpretation is "the interpretation". Every interpretation is subjective. We can all read Biblical stories, and get some meaning out of them. Whether you look at them as true stories or not depends on your interpretation. But it is nonsense to ask if the Bible is the literal truth, only because "literal truth" is a nonsense notion.

You seem to be contradicting yourself — John

It's more that it's not an open and shut judgement. But some architecture is obviously of higher artistic merit than others.