Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be distinguished both from consciousness generally, from the internal sense, and from pure apperception. Any cognition is a consciousness of the object as represented; by self-consciousness is meant a knowledge of ourselves. Not a mere feeling of subjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personal selves. Pure apperception is the self-assertion of THE ego; the self-consciousness here meant is the recognition of my private self. I know that I (not merely the I) exist. — CP 5.225, 1868
"All experience implies a subject of experience" sounds a bit like
"I am able to see objects, therefore I must have eyeballs" — sime
Peirce's take was that... — aletheist
“The intellect remains so much excluded from the real resolutions and secret decisions of its own will that sometimes it can only get to know them, like those of a stranger, by spying out and taking it unawares: and it must surprise the will in the act of expressing itself, in order merely to discover its real intentions.”
"All experience implies a subject of experience" sounds a bit like
"I am able to see objects, therefore I must have eyeballs"
— sime
None of what you say refutes or comes to terms with the issue of 'the subject of experience'. A deaf, dumb and blind subject remains a subject. And Robinson might be a singlularly un-self-aware subject, but he remains a subject nonetheless. — Wayfarer
For this thought of the empirical ego as "someone else situated in front of me" is plain nonsense if it is intended to imply the existence of a literal hidden onlooker of my empirical ego. — sime
the "third-person" and "subject of experience" surely have identical uses, do they not? — sime
To relate this to the OP - the problem I see with panpsychism is the attempt to 'objectify' consciousness or to locate it as an attribute of external objects without fully grasping its elusive nature even within our own experience. — Wayfarer
If you only have access to your own personal experiences then that is solipsism. — m-theory
For this thought of the empirical ego as "someone else situated in front of me" is plain nonsense if it is intended to imply the existence of a literal hidden onlooker of my empirical ego.
— sime
That is referred to as the 'homunculus fallacy'.
the "third-person" and "subject of experience" surely have identical uses, do they not?
— sime
Clearly not. If I burn my hand, I don't say 'that hurt him'. I say 'that hurt me'. And that pain is a first-person experience, even though it can be described to some extent in third-person terms. — Wayfarer
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