Ok, so people peddle in hope-mongering. Buddhism, like all religions offer this. I can agree with that. No one likes the idea of no hope.

Why start the game for someone else to play to begin with? If nothing existed, what is wrong with nothing? Is it just that people conflate that with some sort of darkness or something and this makes them sad and anxioius? — schopenhauer1

Where Buddhism differs from many other philosophies is in the way it deconstructs the very notion of selfhood and the notion of suffering.

But from here on, the discussion would necessarily need to get more techincal.

I just don't think post-facto justifications like "it was worthwhile" justify actually starting those set of harms for someone else. — schopenhauer1

Somebody has to decide. You could say I must have children because they'll be glad I did; I could say you must not because they won't be. Is one of us right?

If I'm buying you a gift, I subordinate my tastes to yours: the question is not whether I would like this, or whether I think you *should* like this, but whether I think you will. With potential children, we have plenty of reason to expect they will think life worthwhile.

The asymmetry argument should be placed here. If we're right in thinking our kids will think life worth it, all good; if we're wrong, we will feel guilty. Reversing that: if we're right thinking, against the odds, that our children wouldn't think life worth it, then we've spared them that experience; if we're wrong, and they would've thought life worth it, we needn't feel guilty because by not existing they don't experience missing out.

Ok. But does Z get to cause X to alleviate Y if Y>X? That's what I'm asking (for the third time).
— khaled

First off, you discount the pain of what happens when one does NOT like aspects of the game, whether or not someone reports "The game was worthwhile". What these setbacks/negatives/pains/harms/sufferings comprise of is what it is, and it is not good. Is starting a series of these plethora of negatives upon someone else good? I think no. It is not right to do to someone whether or not they report that it was worth their while. — schopenhauer1

Is this a no? Because you just don't like being straightforward.

If you knew your child would invent painkillers would it be wrong to have them?

Ok, but when in a position to not start someone else's set of harms, I just don't think post-facto justifications like "it was worthwhile" justify actually starting those set of harms for someone else. Haven't we acknowledged from previous threads, that this is one of the main dividing lines where we both will not budge? — schopenhauer1

Well that's not quite enough, is it? I don't care to convince people to have kids. You care to do the opposite. So you must make a case for why post-facto justifications don't, you know, justify, doing something.

Again, moot if we are discussing whether starting someone else's set of harms is justified in the first place. And of course this will just make you retreat to the one aspect to all aspects one-to-set disanalogy of the surprise party right? — schopenhauer1

Well, no. But I will ask you again to justify your position that justifications don't justify. As you're trying to convince people of that.

Again, you are not able to answer why considerations of pain are justified by worthwhile reports. — schopenhauer1

Remember, I'm not trying to convince anyone of anything regarding having children. So no, I don't need to justify why it's ok to inflict on someone something they'd be fine with. It's an axiomatic difference as you say. But you need to say why it isn't as you're the one pushing an agenda.

"This starts another persons condition for a set of negative experiences" is insufficient, and so to get you to show your ridiculous position by requiring you to use the whole list.
— khaled

A set of negative experiences that comprises life is not a surprise party, so no, I am not letting you make that rhetorical summersault and pretend it is valid.. Sorry. — schopenhauer1

And now you'll protest "But Life is unlike surprise parties". Agreed. This wasn't to show that life is fine because it's like surprise parties, no no. It was to show that "This starts another persons condition for a set of negative experiences" is insufficient — khaled

You take a line out of context to perform a rhetorical summersault where you "bust" me for performing a supposed rhetorical summersault.

I think that enacting positive experiences for someone else is not a requirement, and especially so if they don't even exist. — schopenhauer1

I never disagreed. How did you get that from what I said?

However clearly you find that the existence of positive experiences can justify doing an action, like with surprise parties. So, when most people agree that life is mostly positive, why wouldn't that justify life? They're all wrong about the "human condition" and you know it better than them?

Preventing unnecessary pain is just morally relevant, and creating happiness is not — schopenhauer1

That's not what you think. Surprise parties cause some unnecessary suffering. But create enough happiness to justify it.

"Oh surprise parties are unlike life". I never said they were alike. I was establishing that you clearly think creating pleasure justifies inflicting some unnecessary suffering. I'll repeat it again, since saying it once didn't seem to stick last time: I was establishing that you clearly think creating pleasure justifies inflicting some unnecessary suffering.

If you had a pin that would give whoever you pricked by it a million dollars, but only if you didn't ask for consent beforehand, would it be wrong to go around pricking people? That's unnecessary suffering imposed to create a much greater amount of happiness. No, it's not like life, it's not my goal to say that this situation justifies having kids. I repeat: No, it's not like life, it's not my goal to say that this situation justifies having kids.

You are just going to keep changing the circumstances, because the kind of utopia without suffering is hard to even conceptualize — schopenhauer1

Good thing mine isn't without suffering.

so from the (easier) statistical point of view, we can say there are possibly enough people that experience this to not enact this for someone else. — schopenhauer1

So how big does the percentage have to be? If life was hellish suffering for 50% I'd agree. If it was 30 or 20% I'd probably still agree. What's your number? Because as far as I know, it's in the single digits.

Again, one of our dividing lines. I don't think it has to be hellish suffering to not start for someone else. — schopenhauer1

And again, one you have to bridge as you're the one making the case. Most wouldn't characterize their life as "a lifetime full of suffering". What makes you think this is human condition and not your condition? Everyone seems to disagree with you that it's human condition. What makes you sure you're right despite of that?

The natural world has created us, but we do not seem in the same way "at home" in it in the very fact that since the start of civilizations (and probably since we've had the ability to self-evaluate and use language), we can judge the very process of living itself (or at least aspects in it) and we can judge any action as negative. We don't just experience the negative, but evaluate it, judge it, know it. We can try to pretend we can outwit ourselves, but it is really part of our psyche.. even the "overcoming" of "judging" is itself something that we have to do as an effort, not as an instinct.. So anyways, this is not tangential to the point that there is a "human condition" that is apart from perhaps the more primary/common "animal condition". — schopenhauer1

Agreed. And most have judged life as positive or worthwhile. Most have judged that having kids is ok. And most have judged that the human condition is not doom and gloom. You think they're all wrong. Show your evidence.

You could say I must have children because they'll be glad I did; I could say you must not because they won't be. Is one of us right? — Srap Tasmaner

So my point in the last post is that I don't think post-facto estimations of "worthwhile" reports justifies putting someone through negative experiences in the first place.

If I'm buying you a gift, I subordinate my tastes to yours: the question is not whether I would like this, or whether I think you *should* like this, but whether I think you will. With potential children, we have plenty of reason to expect they will think life worthwhile. — Srap Tasmaner

But it isn't just a straightforward gift, which is why I denied the validity of khaled's surprise party argument. It would have to be a gift where you had to overcome a set of inescapable challenges, and contingent harms.. I don't think any other type of "gift" works that way.

Reversing that: if we're right thinking, against the odds, that our children wouldn't think life worth it, then we've spared them that experience; if we're wrong, and they would've thought life worth it, we needn't feel guilty because by not existing they don't experience missing out. — Srap Tasmaner

True about the asymmetry. Simply speaking, no one misses out, period. Yet no one experiences negative experiences. Win/Win.

If I am to act in such a way that you will be affected by my actions, it is moral for me to consider how you will feel about my actions.

I may not choose to act in a way that you like: my actions may affect another or many others and I might weight their feelings more heavily; I may act contrary to your short-term wishes in furtherance of what I believe are your long-term wishes; and there are many, many other complications.

But not to consider you at all, in fact to refuse categorically to consider how you will feel about my actions, is not to grant you a status equal to my own as a fellow moral agent deserving such consideration, is, in short, not to treat you as a person.

But not to consider you at all, in fact to refuse categorically to consider how you will feel about my actions, is not to grant you a status equal to my own as a fellow moral agent deserving such consideration, is, in short, not to treat you as a person. — Srap Tasmaner

And this is almost exactly the reasoning behind my moral standard in antinatalism. I wrap it all up in the term "dignity". However, where I think giving gifts someone will like is not necessarily moral, I think preventing suffering when one is able, is. By NOT preventing the future person's suffering, one is overlooking the dignity of the person being born. Their suffering is overlooked for other considerations.. Anything that is not suffering (other considerations.. "this will be "good" for them") is simply not moral but other things. It is wanting to see a political agenda (a life being carried out and overcoming all the entailed challenges) and this can be characterized as paternalistic. Either way, the dignity is violated, despite any good consequences.

What makes the negatives especially so bad? All the contingent and systemic harms:
Contingent harms are things likely to happen but are not entailed in a given life including:
1) Individual people's wills and group's will.. Constant jockeying for power plays on when, what, where, hows, social status, social recognition, approval, respect

2) Impersonal wills... Institutions whose management and bottom-line dictate when, what, where.. ranging from oppressive dictatorships to the grind of organizational bureaucracies in liberal democracies.

3) Cultural necessities.. clean-up, maintain, tidy, consume, hygiene

4) Existential boundaries...boredom/ennui, loneliness, generalized anxiety, guilt

5) Survival boundaries..hunger, health, warmth

6) Being exposed to stressful/annoying/harmful environments and people

7) Accidents, natural disasters, nature's indifference (e.g. bear attacks, hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, etc.).

8) Diseases, illness, disabilities, including mental health issues (neurosis/psychosis/phobias/psychosomaticism/anxiety disorders/personality disorders/mood disorders)..

9) Bad/regretful decisions

10) Unfortunate circumstances

11) After-the-fact justifications that everything is either a learning experience or a tragic-comedy.

12) The good things are never as good as they seem

13) How fleeting happy things are once you experience them

14) How easy it is for novelty to wear off

15) The constant need for more experiences, including austerity experiences that are supposed to minimize excess wants (meditation, barebones living, "slumming it").

16) How easy it is to have negative human interaction, even after positive human interaction

17) Craving and striving for more entertainment and "flow" experiences

18) Instrumentality- the absurd feeling that can be experienced from apprehension of the constant need to put forth energy to pursue goals and actions in waking life. This feeling can make us question the whole human enterprise itself of maintaining mundane repetitive upkeep, maintaining institutions, and pursuing any action that eats up free time simply for the sake of being alive and having no other choice.

19) Any hostile, bitter, stressful, spiteful, resentful, disappointing experiences with interperonal relationships with close friends/family, acquaintances, and strangers

20) The classic (overused) examples of war and famine

21) The grass is always greener syndrome that makes one feel restless and never satisfied

22) The need for some to find solace in subduing natural emotions in philosophies that mitigate emotional responses (i.e. Stoicism) and generally having to retreat to some program of habit-breaking (therapy, positive psychology exercises, visualizations, meditations, retreats, self-help, etc. etc.)

23) Insomnia, anything related to causing insomnia

24) Inconsiderate people

25) The carrot and stick of hope.. anticipation that may lead to disappointment..unsubstantiated Pollyanna predictions that we are tricked into by optimistic bias despite experiences otherwise

26) Addiction

etc. etc. etc. ...

1) Systemic suffering includes:
Having to conform to/play a game (like our economic one) that one cannot escape, that one could never have created, and have dire consequences for leaving (death, starvation).

2)Having constant dissatisfactions that can never be full met (the lack game).

3) Human condition as I described above:
Why do humans need to constantly justify their actions? The fact seems to be that we can evaluate and judge life, work, what we are doing at any given time. We don't just do things in a mode of "unthinking" but need reasons, justifications, evaluations, weighing things. This is the feature of being an animal that has evolved (with?) linguistic adaptations. We can't "just be" in the world like other animals. So there is something about being the human animal itself that in a way displaces us from the world, exiles us, in a way no other earthly creature is. The natural world has created us, but we do not seem in the same way "at home" in it in the very fact that since the start of civilizations (and probably since we've had the ability to self-evaluate and use language), we can judge the very process of living itself (or at least aspects in it) and we can judge any action as negative. We don't just experience the negative, but evaluate it, judge it, know it. We can try to pretend we can outwit ourselves, but it is really part of our psyche.. even the "overcoming" of "judging" is itself something that we have to do as an effort, not as an instinct.. So anyways, this is not tangential to the point that there is a "human condition" that is apart from perhaps the more primary/common "animal condition".

The substance of what's in systemic and contingent suffering/harms can be debated but its existence cannot be denied so easily. It is these especially that one is overlooking by not preventing a future person's birth. Anything on the ledger of "good" that is also being prevented, is not immoral to prevent, but neutral. Dignity violation (in the case of people who could be born if you do a certain act), is in the realm of preventing HARMS and NOT preventing goods.

By NOT preventing the future person's suffering, one is overlooking the dignity of the person being born. — schopenhauer1

You don't respect someone's dignity by deciding for them whether their life, and whatever they find of value in it, is worth the suffering they endure for it. People choose to suffer for goals they have set for themselves, train to become athletes, practice to become musicians, study to become scholars; it's for them to decide whether it's worth it.

We teach kids to read before they're capable of deciding for themselves whether reading is worth the trouble. Is that cruel? Is that inflicting needless suffering? You know why we teach kids to read; the ability to read enlarges your world. We want children to have access to those possibilities and opportunities that only reading can provide. It will be for them to decide, later, what to take and what to leave. Do people who can read regret having the ability? There may be one, now and then; I can imagine someone having a spiritual objection to symbolism of all sorts, to language as such. But overwhelmingly people who can read are glad they can, and people who can't read desperately want to. And overwhelmingly people who can read were taught to read because someone else decided for them, when they were young, but that decision has this specific form: you will think later that it was worth the trouble of learning. I don't teach a kid to read because I think it will be worth it; it's not a case of inflicting this suffering on them "for their own good", as I judge it, but because I believe they will think, later, when they're able, that it's worthwhile. It's still their feelings that matter. If I don't teach them to read, on the chance they'll wish I hadn't, I cut them off from countless opportunities for experience they might value deeply, I constrain the possibilities of their life cruelly.

There is a difference between being paternal and being paternalistic.

Why do humans need to constantly justify their actions? — schopenhauer1

We don't. This whole line of reasoning is patently false. No one justifies everything they do. No one thinks they need to justify everything they do. In fact, there's something a lot of people do unthinkingly that you want to convince them they should stop doing unthinkingly and try to justify. You have this so backwards, it's bizarre.

We don't just do things in a mode of "unthinking" but need reasons, justifications, evaluations, weighing things. This is the feature of being an animal that has evolved (with?) linguistic adaptations. We can't "just be" in the world like other animals. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, we can, and we do, all the time. We do some stuff other animals don't, but we're still animals the whole time and we still reproduce just like animals, without justifying this behavior. You want us to stop. If your description of human alienation were anything close to reality, you wouldn't have to convince people to think about whether having kids might be immoral.

You don't respect someone's dignity by deciding for them whether their life, and whatever they find of value in it, is worth the suffering they endure for it. — Srap Tasmaner

Excuse me, but if no person exists to miss out on the goods of life, why is that immoral if no one exists to be deprived? How is missed goods immoral, especially if there is no actual person deprived thus? However by carrying out birth, SOMEONE will suffer, there the moral issue lies. Indeed, procreating forces the hand for someone not procreating literally forced no ones hand.

Do people who can read regret having the ability? There may be one, now and then; I can imagine someone having a spiritual objection to symbolism of all sorts, to language as such. But overwhelmingly people who can read are glad they can, and people who can't read desperately want to. And overwhelmingly people who can read were taught to read because someone else decided for them, when they were young, but that decision has this specific form: you will think later that it was worth the trouble of learning. I don't teach a kid to read because I think it will be worth it; it's not a case of inflicting this suffering on them "for their own good", as I judge it, but because I believe they will think, later, when they're able, that it's worthwhile. It's still their feelings that matter. If I don't teach them to read, on the chance they'll wish I hadn't, I cut them off from countless opportunities for experience they might value deeply, I constrain the possibilities of their life cruelly. — Srap Tasmaner

So I agree with all of this because they are already born. Why did you ignore all my posts describing the need to amerlioate greater with lesser suffering once people are already born vs creating suffering wholesale for someone else unnecessarily and inescapable.

We don't. This whole line of reasoning is patently false. No one justifies everything they do. No one thinks they need to justify everything they do. In fact, there's something a lot of people do unthinkingly that you want to convince them they should stop doing unthinkingly and try to justify. You have this so backwards, it's bizarre. — Srap Tasmaner

Ridiculous and false. When you go to work it’s not instinct it’s decision. Supermarket. Write on philosophy forum etc. Unless you are a p zombie, you do internalize things, even if it’s habit.

Yeah, we can, and we do, all the time. We do some stuff other animals don't, but we're still animals the whole time and we still reproduce just like animals, without justifying this behavior. — Srap Tasmaner

Who said I said we weren’t animals? In my last post I discussed the difference between animal and human condition. They aren’t mutually exclusive.

I'm taking a break from this. Thanks for the conversation.

Sure, any particular reason?

By NOT preventing the future person's suffering, one is overlooking the dignity of the person being born.
— schopenhauer1

You don't respect someone's dignity by deciding for them whether their life, and whatever they find of value in it, is worth the suffering they endure for it. — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly. The concern for the diginity of those who will never be makes for a nonexistent concern for diginity. It's like caring about the dignity of a character in a novel.


EDITED for spelling and grammar.

Exactly. The concern for on the diginity of those who will never be makes for a nonexistent concern for on the diginity. It's like caring about the dignitiy of a character in a novel. — baker

No. It’s caring about not causing harm in a future person. Not hard to tell the distinction between an event that could happen and one that could never happen. In this case you are preventing what could happen.

In this case you are preventing what could happen. — schopenhauer1

And one thing that could happen is that that future person might live a more dignified life than you, and certainly a more dignified life than you imagine they could have. And this is a possibility that you're not only willing to cast away, no, you think it's a must to do so.


This "preventing suffering of future people by not creating them at all" business is all just the antinatalist's ego indulgence, nothing more.

And one thing that could happen is that that future person might live a more dignified life than you, and certainly a more dignified life than you imagine they could have. And this is a possibility that you're not only willing to cast away, no, you think it's a must to do so. — baker

And I ask again,

Excuse me, but if no person exists to miss out on the goods of life, why is that immoral if no one exists to be deprived? How is missed goods immoral, especially if there is no actual person deprived thus? However by carrying out birth, SOMEONE will suffer, there the moral issue lies. Indeed, procreating forces the hand for someone not procreating literally forced no ones hand. — schopenhauer1

Something I have been ruminating on a lot recently are the hoops and ladders that people will go through to justify things. In no discussion of antinatalism have I ever seen an argument for childbirth that was not utterly hair-splitting, counter-intuitive and difficult to understand. Determining the morality of something like this should not be such a mind-numbing matter! The fact that it is so difficult to give a simple and decent argument against antinatalism is prima facie evidence that antinatalism is correct. Like come on, we've had countless threads on this topic, that if it were false, you'd think by now that somebody would have finally vanquished the idea. Yet here we are.

People cobble together these bizarre rationalizations for things that are not rational. The responses we keep hearing against antinatalism seem to me to be fundamentally nothing more than post hoc justifications for emotional attachments to things that would go away if everyone stopped having kids.

Something I have been ruminating on a lot recently are the hoops and ladders that people will go through to justify things. — _db

Very true.

The fact that it is so difficult to give a simple and decent argument against antinatalism is prima facie evidence that antinatalism is correct. Like come on, we've had countless threads on this topic, that if it were false, you'd think by now that somebody would have finally vanquished the idea. Yet here we are.

People cobble together these bizarre rationalizations for things that are not rational. The responses we keep hearing against antinatalism seem to me to be fundamentally nothing more than post hoc justifications for emotional attachments to things that would go away if everyone stopped having kids. — _db

Yes, I agree. So the newest post hoc justification is the idea of "worthwhile". I'd like to know your response to that argument. So the argument goes something akin to this:

"Let us say that we can quantify negatives in some way , and a certain percentage of experiences can be considered negative (I call this contingent suffering). Let us also say there are a set of challenges one must overcome lest dire consequences (more of a systemic type suffering)....It is permissible (or justified) to unnecessarily cause (wholesale) the condition onto another whereby all the negative experiences of life ensue and whereby one is put in a position of being in a game of overcoming a set of challenges, lest dire conditions, as long as the person being affected reports that the negatives are worthwhile".

That is the current debate basically.

So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps I’m mistaken, but the underlying premise that leads you to this conclusion seems to be that the ends do not justify the means. If so, AN appears to violate that premise. The end (a life of essentially unknown potential for pleasure/suffering) is used to justify the means (not procreating).

If so, AN appears to violate that premise. The end (a life of essentially unknown potential for pleasure/suffering) is used to justify the means (not procreating). — Pinprick

But it doesn’t.

Excuse me, but if no person exists to miss out on the goods of life, why is that immoral if no one exists to be deprived? How is missed goods immoral, especially if there is no actual person deprived thus? However by carrying out birth, SOMEONE will suffer, there the moral issue lies. Indeed, procreating forces the hand for someone not procreating literally forced no ones hand. — schopenhauer1

How does it not? Your justification for AN rests on a potential future event; an end. It regards taking action now (the means) to prevent a certain end justifiable. IOW’s the end is so horrible that it justifies taking action now to prevent it.

How does it not? Your justification for AN rests on a potential future event; an end. It regards taking action now (the means) to prevent a certain end justifiable. IOW’s the end is so horrible that it justifies taking action now to prevent it. — Pinprick

So “who” is being used as a means here? An event?

Well, it’s not really about who/what is being used, it’s about how you justify your actions.

But, if you insist, then whomever you’re trying to convince not to have children is being used to further your agenda. Your success in doing so creates the potential for harm.

But, if you insist, then whomever you’re trying to convince not to have children is being used to further your agenda. Your success in doing so creates the potential for harm. — Pinprick

How are they being used? Did I force them? Can they choose another option? Can they walk away? Also it’s about not allowing an injustice to incur, from that perspective, that someone is sad an injustice is being prevented, doesn’t magically justify the injustice. Should I respect the sadness of preventing a bully from enjoying their bullying?

Vegans always face this. To them, it is unjust to kill and hence eat animals for consumption. If someone says they are sad for not eating meat, does that justify the injustice in the eyes of the vegan?

@khaled

What makes the negatives especially so bad? All the contingent and systemic harms:
Contingent harms are things likely to happen but are not entailed in a given life including:
1) Individual people's wills and group's will.. Constant jockeying for power plays on when, what, where, hows, social status, social recognition, approval, respect

2) Impersonal wills... Institutions whose management and bottom-line dictate when, what, where.. ranging from oppressive dictatorships to the grind of organizational bureaucracies in liberal democracies.

3) Cultural necessities.. clean-up, maintain, tidy, consume, hygiene

4) Existential boundaries...boredom/ennui, loneliness, generalized anxiety, guilt

5) Survival boundaries..hunger, health, warmth

6) Being exposed to stressful/annoying/harmful environments and people

7) Accidents, natural disasters, nature's indifference (e.g. bear attacks, hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, etc.).

8) Diseases, illness, disabilities, including mental health issues (neurosis/psychosis/phobias/psychosomaticism/anxiety disorders/personality disorders/mood disorders)..

9) Bad/regretful decisions

10) Unfortunate circumstances

11) After-the-fact justifications that everything is either a learning experience or a tragic-comedy.

12) The good things are never as good as they seem

13) How fleeting happy things are once you experience them

14) How easy it is for novelty to wear off

15) The constant need for more experiences, including austerity experiences that are supposed to minimize excess wants (meditation, barebones living, "slumming it").

16) How easy it is to have negative human interaction, even after positive human interaction

17) Craving and striving for more entertainment and "flow" experiences

18) Instrumentality- the absurd feeling that can be experienced from apprehension of the constant need to put forth energy to pursue goals and actions in waking life. This feeling can make us question the whole human enterprise itself of maintaining mundane repetitive upkeep, maintaining institutions, and pursuing any action that eats up free time simply for the sake of being alive and having no other choice.

19) Any hostile, bitter, stressful, spiteful, resentful, disappointing experiences with interperonal relationships with close friends/family, acquaintances, and strangers

20) The classic (overused) examples of war and famine

21) The grass is always greener syndrome that makes one feel restless and never satisfied

22) The need for some to find solace in subduing natural emotions in philosophies that mitigate emotional responses (i.e. Stoicism) and generally having to retreat to some program of habit-breaking (therapy, positive psychology exercises, visualizations, meditations, retreats, self-help, etc. etc.)

23) Insomnia, anything related to causing insomnia

24) Inconsiderate people

25) The carrot and stick of hope.. anticipation that may lead to disappointment..unsubstantiated Pollyanna predictions that we are tricked into by optimistic bias despite experiences otherwise

26) Addiction

etc. etc. etc. ...

1) Systemic suffering includes:
Having to conform to/play a game (like our economic one) that one cannot escape, that one could never have created, and have dire consequences for leaving (death, starvation).

2)Having constant dissatisfactions that can never be full met (the lack game). — schopenhauer1

What do you make of this Khaled? I've been enjoying your back and fourths on the subject, and would like to know how you would respond. It's true we justify most of what we do "after the fact" or "post hoc" but do you think this really makes a difference for natalism/antinatalism

What do you make of this Khaled? — Albero

It would be just as easy to come up with a 100 positive things. Are you for real with #23? Having kids is wrong because of insomnia? Really? Makes as much sense as "Having kids is ethical because they can eat Kit-Kats"

As it stands it's a pointless list. I'd just repeat this:

So your problem is, when you cite a standard it either:

1- Contradicts your other beliefs by not being sufficiently specific in scope and resulting in things you think are right coming out wrong

2- Is unlike life and so doesn't actually say anything about childbirth.

Of course, you think it's like life, but you don't want to say this, because you know it sounds ridiculous to everyone else. So instead you prefer to have (1) be the case rather than reveal that really, the only reason you're AN, is because you find life: "a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen". — khaled

Shope thinks having kids is wrong because he sees life on earth as hell. The disagreement isn't about ethical values, it's about how bad life is. Most don’t think it’s bad enough for having kids to be wrong. He does, but when it becomes an argument about what is or is not bad enough, it’s very hard to reach consensus.

And I ask again, — schopenhauer1

And I say again,

This "preventing suffering of future people by not creating them at all" business is all just the antinatalist's ego indulgence, nothing more. — baker

There's an old story about the committee deciding what to put on Voyager to represent mankind, and a mathematician said, "We could send some Bach, but that would be bragging."

If you start from the position that there is no cosmic meaning to be found, then the only sort of value we know of is value to sentient beings. In a universe with no sentient beings, Bach is just noise.

In AN terms, my argument here has been that the bias in favor of continuing life, which Benatar acknowledges and does not contest, is and should be relied upon in decisions about starting a life. I see that as forcing the question to remain at human scale; we attach value to our lives and we know almost everyone else, including those we bring into the world, does too. The fact that it is a bias, that it's "only" what humans think, and that most likely we think it because we're wired to, makes no difference if our concern is only the sorts of meaning and value that humans know and care about.

All of moral behavior is predicated on the value we all know we attach to life. If there were no people, there'd be no morality and no point to it anyway. If your moral theory requires that there be no people, it's either mistaken, paradoxical, or not actually a moral theory at all.

How are they being used? — schopenhauer1

By being treated as pawns. They’re a means to an end (an AN world).

Did I force them? — schopenhauer1

This is an interesting question. Most people would agree that if you can reasonably prevent suffering, you should. You should save a drowning person if you’re able. AN’s feel that procreating is harmful, so why wouldn’t you intervene if given the option? Stopping someone from having unprotected sex would be like stopping someone from shooting someone else, right?

Also it’s about not allowing an injustice to incur, from that perspective, that someone is sad an injustice is being prevented, doesn’t magically justify the injustice. — schopenhauer1

You feeling like something is unjust also doesn’t make it so. But my point is that you feel justified on the one hand to cause harm (by trying to convince people not to procreate and making those who have feel like they did something immoral) in order to prevent what you presumably view as a greater harm (a clear case of the ends justifying the means), but on the other hand you don’t feel justified to cause harm in order to bring about enlightenment (a clear case of the ends not justifying the means). I don’t see what’s so different in these two examples that warrants they be treated differently; that an exception be made.

Should I respect the sadness of preventing a bully from enjoying their bullying? — schopenhauer1

I don’t know, should you? Is his suffering somehow less important than anyone else’s? If the drowning person is the next coming of Jeffery Dahmer should you still save him?

If someone says they are sad for not eating meat, does that justify the injustice in the eyes of the vegan? — schopenhauer1

I think in this case the vegan needs to justify why the suffering of animals is more important than the suffering of humans.

Can you come up with an imposition that is less egregious than life that we nonetheless find bad enough that it’s wrong to impose? You’d have a pretty good case then.

On the other hand if anyone can come up with an imposition more egregious than life that you think is ok to impose they’d have a pretty good case to the contrary.

Life can be worthwhile to continue (i.e. finish gracefully), but it cannot be worthwhile to start, for reasons that you and I both know, and that everyone else also knows but doesn't want to admit. For a lot of people, life is only worthwhile if there are ample fresh recruits to the game.

"Everyone else", a phrase that here means "about 100 billion human beings."