As I said, I was looking at it from a Platonic perspective. Of course the Good is prior to all Forms. I just don't see why the One should be a Form, or a Number.

But maybe we should look into this first:

So this doesn't really make sense to me. The human soul has an intellect as an attribute. And the human soul has a connection to something Divine, the independent Forms. We might even say that the soul uses the intellect as a means toward understanding the Forms. But the connection is between the soul and the Forms, not the intellect and the Forms, and this is why the Forms are so hard for the intellect to understand. Furthermore, the intellect creates its own forms, which are categorically different from the independent Forms, and since they both have the same name "forms", this confuses the matter. So as much as the human soul has a direct connection to, or relation with, something Divine, which we call "Forms", I don't think it's correct to call this Divine reality an "intellect". — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that calling the Divine reality an “intellect” does not seem right. Personally, I think “intelligence” or “mind” (cf. French “intelligence” or German “Geist”) would be preferable. But even better would be to leave the Greek nous untranslated. After all, Plato has been read in the original language for many centuries, and it can’t do any harm to familiarize ourselves with a few Greek words.

Unfortunately, in the English-language literature it tends to be translated as “intellect”, probably under the influence of Latin “intellectus”. Another typical example is translating “phronesis” as “prudence” which not only sounds like cringe-making Victorian nonsense, but in some cases it amounts to an unacceptable distortion.

Having said that, the Greek “nous” itself, as used from the time of Homer and others, has two main meanings that are relevant here. It can mean something like (1) the faculty of “intuition” or “insight” in the sense of direct inner vision or grasp of a thing or situation or (2) the faculty of reasoned thinking.

Plato describes the human soul (psyche) as having three basic aspects:

1. Logistikon: reasoning aspect.
2. Thymoeides (thymos): volitional and emotional aspect, responsible for states like anger; shame; outrage; offended sense of justice; desire to assert oneself and to be effective; self-esteem; courage; sexual passion.
3. Epithymetikon (epithymia): the seat of basic bodily needs and urges such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire.

However, this is not the whole story. There is something missing there and this is that aspect of the soul that is responsible for the five sensory faculties of sight, smell, taste, hearing, and feeling by touch.

There is an additional aspect responsible for motor faculties such as locomotion, etc. But the relevant part here is the sensory or sensual aspect that we may provisionally call “aisthetikon” (from aesthesis, sensation).

And, of course, the nous which is often used interchangeably with logos. Though according to Plato, it is the faculty that perceives the Forms, it can also mean the reasoning faculty.

This suggests that the two are actually one, with the nous as the higher, “spiritual” part, representing the innermost core of the soul, responsible for intuition or insight. This being a more fundamental form of intelligence than thinking, the nous is that part of the soul that could be termed awareness or consciousness.

So, basically, the soul or psyche refers to the whole psycho-mental apparatus with the nous at its very center and therefore inseparable from it. Otherwise said, the nous is the soul proper and reason, etc. are an extension of it.

In terms of Divine Intelligence, it is evident from the Timaeus that the Creator or Maker (ho Poion) of the Universe possesses the powers of consciousness, joy, will, knowledge, and action. This logically makes it an Intelligence in the first place, though it does have some characteristics normally ascribed to the human intellect.

By analogy to the human soul, I think it wouldn’t be wrong to say that the One is something like pure, infinite, and undivided awareness that at the time of creation first becomes consciousness, i.e., self-awareness, as a form of “duality” or pair of opposites (Dyad), followed by multiplicity.

This would correspond to Plato’s Dyad of “Unlimited and Limit” that gives rise to the third principle of “Mixed”, completing the “Intelligible Triad”, i.e., the Creative Intelligence that in turn brings forth the world of multiplicity.

This Intelligible Triad is analogous to “the Same, the Other, and Being” from a blend of which Plato in the Timaeus tells us that the Creator-God made the Soul of the Cosmos, and from a diluted form of which he made the human souls (Tim. 35a, 41d).

The human soul being a creation of Divine Intelligence, it has something of that within itself. And that something is the nous. This means that the soul’s primary connection with Divine Intelligence is the nous.

Naturally, the Forms are another connection. Though they are not the ultimate reality, they may take the soul to the Divine Intelligence that contains them, and from there it may attain a glimpse of the infinite awareness of the Absolute or the One.

Bearing the above in mind, the hierarchy of intelligence may be arranged in the following order:

1. The One or the Good.

2. Nous as Divine Intelligence containing Forms.

3. Nous as human intelligence capable of directly grasping the Forms.

4. Logistikon, “reason” or intelligence capable of conceiving mathematical or ideal objects like the Forms.

5. Aisthetikon, intelligence capable of sensory perception and imagination.

The same human nous that is capable of grasping the Forms is equally capable of recognizing its essential identity with the highest Nous that is its source. It is the essential identity between the two that makes the soul’s return to the One possible: if the Divine Nous contains the Forms within itself, then the human soul by means of its own nous is potentially capable of grasping the Forms - once it has freed itself from the limitations of body, mind, and the material world.

And the path to freedom, that is, the Platonic Way Upward, is dialectic or the art of “dividing and collecting” (dieresis) discussed in the Philebus, that is based on the principles of Sameness, Identity, and Difference, and that elevates the soul to the original Intelligent Triad which is the gateway to the One, the first principle of all.

Placing the One as the first principle is inconsistent with the passage from Aristotle. Aristotle describes Plato as positing the One as the first principle of Number, but Number is in a place intermediate between the Forms and sensible things. So the Forms are prior to the One, and Number. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle says:

From this account it is clear that he [Plato] only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14)

(A) A Cause is prior to that of which it is the cause.
(B) The One is the cause of the essence in the Forms.
(C) Therefore the One is prior to the Forms.

If (A) The Forms are distinct from the Good
and (B) The Forms are the causes of everything else (apart from themselves),
then (C) The Forms are the causes of the Good.

If we take Aristotle’s statement, “the Forms are the causes of everything else” in an absolute sense, then they will be the cause of the Good, not only of the One.

Therefore the Forms are not the causes of absolutely everything else, only of what is posterior to them, i.e., the sensibles.

However, this is not the whole story. There is something missing there and this is that aspect of the soul that is responsible for the five sensory faculties of sight, smell, taste, hearing, and feeling by touch.

There is an additional aspect responsible for motor faculties such as locomotion, etc. But the relevant part here is the sensory or sensual aspect that we may provisionally call “aisthetikon” (from aesthesis, sensation). — Apollodorus

Why do these need to be "aspects" of the soul, and not simply the soul itself which is responsible for these things? Otherwise, we could start naming every activity of a living body, like the heartbeat for example, and ask what is the aspect of the soul which is responsible for this. That's how Aristotle greatly simplified this type of description, in On the Soul, by naming these activities as potencies of the soul. So he lists some of them, self-nutritive, self-movement, sensation, intellection. He argues that the powers of the soul are each one, a potentiality, because each one is not active all the time. Since they are potentialities which need to be actualized, he claims the soul itself as the first principle of actuality, which is responsible for actualizing the various potencies.

Aristotle says:

From this account it is clear that he [Plato] only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14) — Apollodorus

Yes, I saw this, and it is inconsistent with what he said about Plato the very page before, what I quoted. It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man.

If we take Aristotle’s statement, “the Forms are the causes of everything else” in an absolute sense, then they will be the cause of the Good, not only of the One. — Apollodorus

Since Aristotle's statement directly contradicts what he said just the page before, I don't think these statements are reliable in any sense.

Since they are potentialities which need to be actualized, he claims the soul itself as the first principle of actuality, which is responsible for actualizing the various potencies.
Aristotle says:
From this account it is clear that he [Plato] only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14) — Apollodorus

Yes, I saw this, and it is inconsistent with what he said about Plato the very page before, what I quoted. It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man.
If we take Aristotle’s statement, “the Forms are the causes of everything else” in an absolute sense, then they will be the cause of the Good, not only of the One. — Apollodorus — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Aristotle was genuinely struggling to understand as much of Plato as he had read and (mis)understood as well as insisting that one or another of his own reductions was sufficient to explain all. Since Plato was a self-publisher, much as today's bloggers are, he was free to adjust and amend his previous books on the run, as he saw fit. If this was the case, then Aristotle who had divorced himself from Plato and the later books, would have been left in confusion when faced with the Theaetetus' psychology and the Timaeus' atomism and cosmology. With the Parmenides, Plato had already refuted and abandoned his middle-period metaphysics in favor of the much more complex Sophists and Philebus.

Incidentally, this is very like what Platonists have suffered with throughout the ages to varying degrees depending on how deep they are in Aristotelean reductionism, whether that be on the 'universal' or 'material' side. The vast majority (all?) of translations are metaphysically wrong-headed, and interpretation based on Aristotelean mis-translation then become next to worthless. As old as the Cornford works are, they are still invaluable because of their depth, and because he made the fewest gross errors.

That's how Aristotle greatly simplified this type of description, in On the Soul, by naming these activities as potencies of the soul. So he lists some of them, self-nutritive, self-movement, sensation, intellection. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Plato provides his “tripartite division” of the soul by way of explanation and because it serves his purpose of comparing the soul’s three aspects or elements (eide) to the three social classes of the ideal city. Aristotle himself calls them “parts” (moria), which can give rise to all kinds of misunderstandings.

However, we need to use our judgement and see that the soul really is indivisible. We may classify its functions logically, but in reality, they are simply the soul’s powers, or activities of the soul (psyches energeiai), by means of which it perceives and interacts with itself and the world. In other words, they are the means by which human intelligence manifests its powers in the same way Divine Intelligence manifests its own. This is why intelligence in the Platonic perspective is the underlying substratum to look for.

It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, Aristotle definitely needs to be taken with a grain of salt. And the problem is compounded by the fact that anti-Platonists tend to use Aristotle to attack Plato and Platonism, so extra care is needed to avoid being dragged down murky side alleys from where it may be difficult to find our way back to the safety of the main road.

Fortunately, the problem has been taken up by a number of scholars who have thrown a lot of fresh light on Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato, especially his “Theory of Forms”. Gail Fine’s On Ideas, named after Aristotle’s Peri Ideon, is one of the classics that offer a valuable analysis of the subject.

This does not mean that Aristotle’s testimony is valueless, though, only that we need to read him carefully, avoid falling into the trap of questionable translations, and use our own judgement.

After all, even someone who is lying will normally say some things that are true or otherwise provide you with subtle clues that together with other clues may amount to an actionable lead. And I’m not suggesting that Aristotle is lying.

As Socrates puts it, if we want to find the truth we must actively pursue it like a hunter hunting down an elusive quarry - no easy task and requires lots of effort and skills! Sometimes we may have to proceed like a police detective or military intelligence officer. :smile:

In any case, I believe that Aristotle can throw some light on certain aspects of Platonic doctrine, but only to the degree that his testimony is supported by that of other authors.

In the context of what has been discussed, he does make some important statements, e.g.:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some [i.e., the Platonists] say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13)

Here we can clearly see the equivalence of the One and the Good which is supported by other sources showing that the One and the Good are not only identical but prior to nous and ousia. If to this we add statements to the effect that the One is the cause of the essence of Forms and Forms are the cause of everything else, i.e., sensible particulars, then everything begins to fall into place.

We also need to take things in the right context.

For example, the word “one” (hen) can have many meanings. The most important of these is “One in the sense of ultimate principle beyond being”. The second-most important is “One in the sense of Monad as a principle of Number”. The third is “one as a number”, etc.

Obviously, these are not identical meanings. “The One” (to Hen) is not the same as “a one” or “a henad” (he henas).

Numbers may, indeed, be said to be “between Forms and sensibles” but only in the sense of abstract mathematical ideas, i.e., in the domain of reason, which is certainly not what the One as ultimate principle is.

It is true that there are Pythagorean elements in the dialogues but it is important to remember that (1) for Plato everything is a means to an end and (2) he is under pressure to show that his own system is superior to others. So, what Plato is doing is to incorporate from other systems what he thinks is not only the best but also most consistent with his own views, and most useful in enabling the philosopher to attain his goal.

But it is clear that despite the Pythagorean aspects of Plato’s doctrine, numbers are not the key to understanding Plato. The key is intelligence itself, how it works, how individual intelligence mirrors a higher intelligence, and how it makes Plato’s philosophy a practical method of elevating human cognition from the most basic to the highest possible:

And, further,” I said, “it occurs to me, now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge and not for huckstering.” “In what respect?” he said. “Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers [lit. “autoi oi arithmoi”, i.e. “numbers in themselves” that, like Forms, are within the Divine Creative Nous]( Rep. 525c-d)

.
If there are “numbers in themselves”, there must be awareness of them. And that awareness can only be the Divine Intelligence that contains them.

Plato is a very complex writer who uses metaphor, allegory, myth, logic, mathematics, astrology, harmony theory, and even humor to convey a message. But his personality and life show that he also is a writer who is dead serious about his overarching philosophical project. And I think those who take him seriously have more to gain than those who don’t.

In the context of what has been discussed, he does make some important statements, e.g.:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some [i.e., the Platonists] say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13) — Apollodorus

There is no reason for you to insert "the Platonists" here. I see footnotes mentioning Pseusippus in this section, but it's well known that he was not consistent with Plato.

If you read what Aristotle says about this idea, the equivalence of the One and the Good at this part of the text, and also what Aristotle says about how Plato related the One to Number, and to the Forms at other places (like your previous reference), you ought to come to the understanding that this is not a position held by Plato.

For example, the word “one” (hen) can have many meanings. The most important of these is “One in the sense of ultimate principle beyond being”. The second-most important is “One in the sense of Monad as a principle of Number”. The third is “one as a number”, etc. — Apollodorus

It is evident from what Aristotle says, and also from what Plato wrote, that Plato held "One" in the second sense, a principle of number.

Numbers may, indeed, be said to be “between Forms and sensibles” but only in the sense of abstract mathematical ideas, i.e., in the domain of reason, which is certainly not what the One as ultimate principle is. — Apollodorus

Do you see the problem which you are developing here? Plato clearly used "One" in the sense of a principle of number, ("abstract mathematical idea"). And, "ultimate principle" clearly refers to "the good", for Plato. Nowhere do we find Plato using "One" in the sense of "ultimate principle".

Plato is a very complex writer who uses metaphor, allegory, myth, logic, mathematics, astrology, harmony theory, and even humor to convey a message. But his personality and life show that he also is a writer who is dead serious about his overarching philosophical project. And I think those who take him seriously have more to gain than those who don’t. — Apollodorus

This is definitely true.

There is no reason for you to insert "the Platonists" here. I see footnotes mentioning Pseusippus in this section, but it's well known that he was not consistent with Plato. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason for my insertion is the translator's (Hugh Tredennick's) own note:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some 5
....
5 Plato; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 14, section 1091b

Tredennick actually says "Plato".

Do you see the problem which you are developing here? Plato clearly used "One" in the sense of a principle of number, ("abstract mathematical idea"). And, "ultimate principle" clearly refers to "the good", for Plato. Nowhere do we find Plato using "One" in the sense of "ultimate principle". — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said, "one" can and does mean different things in different contexts.

However, the fact remains that Aristotle says that:

1. According to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms the cause of everything else.

2. According to Plato the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One (Meta. 978b).

3. Some (presumably Plato and his followers) say that the One itself is the Good itself. The Greek text is “αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι” (auto to hen to agathon auto einai) = literally, “the One itself is the Good itself”. This sounds very much like Platonic language to me.

Additionally, Plato himself says that the One is without beginning nor end and unlimited:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d)

The way I see it, this can only mean that the One is the first principle of all. Like everything else, the numbers too ultimately derive from the One. The one does not exclude the other.

The problem arises only when we take the One to be the cause of numbers and nothing else. IMO it is a stance that tends to turn everything upside-down and muddle the issue instead of solving anything.

The reason for my insertion is the translator's (Hugh Tredennick's) own note:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some 5
....
5 Plato; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 14, section 1091b

Tredennick actually says "Plato". — Apollodorus

You'll see that your footnote refers to your previous reference. And here, Aristotle discusses the difference between the Pythagoreans, and Plato. When Aristotle says "some", and Tredennick refers back to this part of the text, we must take this "some" to refer to the Pythagoreans rather than Plato, because it is explained that Plato distinguished Numbers from Forms, whereas the Pythagoreans did not. Also, it is explained that for Plato the One is the first principle of Number. Therefore it is clearly a mistake of Tredennick to say that "some" here refers to Plato, because it was the Pythagoreans, not Plato, who did not separate Numbers from Forms, thereby equating the Number "One" with "the good".

Furthermore, consider that "some" is plural, and Plato is an individual. Plato excluded himself from "the Pythagoreans" by proposing a very unique and distinct perspective, so it is impossible that "some" refers to the unique Plato. Your previous proposal, "the Platonists", allows for the reality of "some", but the "Platonists" at that time, taught by Pseusippus, were closer to the Pythagoreans than Plato.

. According to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms the cause of everything else. — Apollodorus

Let's get this straight. At 987b, Aristotle very explicitly says that Plato placed Number as intermediary between Forms and sensible things. Further, Forms are the causes of all things, and from the Form of "One" come the numbers. Then Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things.

The key to understanding Plato's real position is the way that he treats Number, as explained by Aristotle. The infinite is not "one" as a number (Pythagorean), but a multitude, as "great and small". That's how Aristotle explains the important difference. This perspective is a product of Plato's analysis of definition, his dialectics, which the others did not use.


Notice now, that under Plato's dialectical principles, "the infinite" is a Form which transcends "the One", as referring to the multitude of great and small, rather than a unity "one", or "one as a principle of number. Plato then uses the difference between the dyad and the One, to demonstrate that not all things can be produced from Number, "one" for the Greeks was not a number. This places Forms as prior to numbers.

Then Aristotle proceeds at 988a with "Yet what happens is the contrary...", and he proceeds to discuss the problem of creating a multitude of individuals from one Form. But this is a misrepresentation of what he has already stated that Plato said. Plato has placed Forms, represented by "infinite", into the category of the multitude, great and small, not into the category of One. So there is no such problem of creating a multitude out of one Form, because One is not the first principle of Forms, great and small is, which implies a multitude rather than One.

Aristotle then states what you claimed, Forms are the causes of all things, and the One is the cause of Forms. But this is clearly inconsistent with what he has painstakingly described as Plato's position.

Additionally, Plato himself says that the One is without beginning nor end and unlimited:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d) — Apollodorus

You are making the mistake which Fooloso4 made earlier with The Sophist. Fooloso4 presented the argument of the visitor as if it were Plato's argument, when in reality Plato was demonstrating the deficiencies of the visitor's argument, as sophistry. Here, you present the argument of Parmenides as if it is Plato's argument, when in reality Plato is demonstrating the deficiencies of such a sophistic argument.

Your previous proposal, "the Platonists", allows for the reality of "some", but the "Platonists" at that time, taught by Pseusippus, were closer to the Pythagoreans than Plato. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no reason to think that Plato would have held different views at the time.

"The Platonists" is not my proposal. It is in the English translation at 1087b:

But the Platonists treat one of the contraries as matter, some opposing "the unequal" to Unity [or the One](Aristot. Meta. 1087b)

Aristotle himself refers to Plato at 988a25.

Aristotle says that Plato recognizes only two basic causes:

1. The cause of essence which is the One.
2. The material cause which is the “Great and the Small”, a.k.a. the “Indefinite Dyad”.

Aristotle also says that according to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms are the causes of everything else.

I see the character of the sophist differently. My position is somewhere between yours and Fooloso4’s.

Plato deliberately blurs the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist to make a point. And for this purpose, he must reverse some of the characters' claims, in order to show that the philosopher can appear as a sophist and the sophist as a philosopher.

Accordingly, the three basic alternatives in order of correctitude are:

1. Some of the things the sophist says must be right.
2. The philosopher is always right.
3. The sophist is always right.

The art of philosophical discrimination or discernment (diakritike) is to identify the statements that are most likely to be consistent with truth as seen by Plato.

This is what makes the issue as presented in the dialogues appear so complex. However, if we work on the premise that (a) Plato’s philosopher is committed to finding the truth, and that (b) the truth is one, then it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the One is the ultimate truth.

Aristotle himself refers to Plato at 988a25.

Aristotle says that Plato recognizes only two basic causes:

1. The cause of essence which is the One.
2. The material cause which is the “Great and the Small”, a.k.a. the “Indefinite Dyad”. — Apollodorus

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. You also ignore the fact that at the lead in to 988a, Aristotle states without logical support, "Yet what happens is the contrary...". Then he proceeds to state what you say he says about Plato at 988a, which is contrary to what he says Plato said at 987b. This is simply Aristotle's unsupported conclusion of "what happens" according to Aristotle, if we follow Plato's principles. But there is no logical support for this claim of "what happens".

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not ignoring it. I am simply making the point that we cannot automatically dismiss all the statements made in the dialogues or elsewhere on the grounds that they are "not Plato's teachings". After all, Socrates himself often agrees with his interlocutors. So, the latter are not always telling lies or talking nonsense.

This is particularly evident in dialogues like the Sophist and we need to think twice before dismissing something just because it comes from the mouth of a sophist. As I said earlier, ever liars may say some things that are true.

At the end of the day, the actual author is Plato, using his characters to convey a message to his readers. Hence the need to focus on him at all times, not get distracted by the characters or anything else.

The way I see it, Plato’s idea of reducing sensible particulars to intelligible Forms and intelligible Forms to one irreducible first principle makes perfect sense. This idea was taken up by Speusippus, who certainly believed in the One as a first principle of all as acknowledged by Aristotle (though he may have disagreed on other points).

Aristotle mentions Speusippus at 12.1072b and repeats his views several times. At 5.1092a he says:

Nor is a certain thinker [Speusippus, according to the translator and other scholars] right in his assumption when he likens the principles of the universe to that of animals and plants, on the ground that the more perfect forms are always produced from those which are indeterminate and imperfect, and is led by this to assert that this is true also of the ultimate principles; so that not even unity [lit. “to hen auto” i.e. the One] itself is a real thing [i.e. it is above being] (Meta. 14.1092a)

Gerson comments:

So Speusippus evidently takes the One to be the first principle of all and also takes it to be in some sense “beyond being” or “beyond essence,” the position that Aristotle claims Plato holds as well

- From Plato to Platonism, pp. 135-6

When Aristotle says:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some say that the One itself is the Good itself but they consider that its essence is primarily the One (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13-15)

this could well be a view held in the Academy.

I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato.

Once we admit this principle, the main problem that presents itself is the precise relation (1) between the First Principle and Forms, (2) between Forms themselves, and (3) between Forms and particulars (or Being and Becoming).

As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.

He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies.

The Forms themselves first seem to be separate both from the material objects and from each other, but are later said to combine with each other in various ways that are classified under certain groups or genera that are in turn subordinate to a higher principle.

Finally, the principles of Limit and Unlimited are introduced to explain how the material Universe or Cosmos is generated: Limit imposes Ideal Ratios (Forms or Shapes and Numbers) on uninformed or unlimited Primordial Matter (the “receptacle” containing the precosmic elements).

However, this is done “through participation in the One”, which may be interpreted to mean that the One, the ultimate first principle, imposes limit upon itself in order to bring forth the world of multiplicity.

Plato may or may not have explicitly held this position, but his teachings, as far as they are known, seem to point in this direction and they were interpreted in this sense by later Platonists.

The writings of Aristotle and other authors indicate that Plato was a serious philosopher, not a novelist, and that members of the Academy took the wider Platonic project seriously.

At the same time, the apparent plurality of views within the Academy suggests that Plato was not a dogmatic teacher and that he allowed some freedom of interpretation.

Given that Plato’s own teachings were not static but were developed by him over time, there is no reason why they cannot be further developed by Plato’s followers, provided that this is consistent with Plato’s own general views.

Certainly, the people who first domesticated the horse would not have objected to the introduction of saddles and stirrups. The inventors of the wheel (originally a solid disc) would not have objected to the introduction of spokes. The inventors of the stone ax would not have objected to the development of axes made of steel, etc.

What Plato really believed is impossible to know with absolute certitude. But the Way Upward he sketched in his dialogues clearly tells us that philosophy consists in inquiring into truth through a constant transcendence of knowledge and experience, whilst always aiming for the absolute highest.

Plato shows us the way or direction and offers us his philosophy as a vehicle for making the journey. It is for us to learn how to drive it, to make improvements on it as required, and for us to decide how far we travel ....

Gerson also insisted that Plato was an Aristotelian ! (It's a book plus a lecture on youtube)
What does that say about Gerson's credibility as an expert on ancient philosophy?

Since Plato incorporated and synthesized almost all philosophy of his time into an extended multifaceted corpus, he can be claimed by followers any one of those philosophies to be of their own limited persuasions.

Metaphysically speaking, Aristotle's position was looked at and rejected by Plato except in the narrowest sense.

The Cratylus rejects the view that words or the world are the source of the Forms, and the notion that material objects have reality was abhorrent to Plato.

Instead, the basis of Plato's participatory realism is in fleeting appearances that come and go, are and are not, in a moving dynamic world of objects+chora.

Gerson also insisted that Plato was an Aristotelian ! — magritte

Well, he also says that Aristotle was a Platonist.

However, this needs to be understood in the right context. What Gerson is talking about is what he calls "Ur-Platonism".

He argues against some scholars' opinion that there is no philosophical position in the dialogues, and proposes that Plato does have a philosophy, that the dialogues are the best evidence of this, and that Plato's philosophy is part of broader philosophical developments that were already underway before Plato. Hence "Ur-Platonism".

He describes the elements of Ur-Platonism as "antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism", i.e. tendencies that coalesce to form the basis of Plato's own philosophy.

After all, Plato did incorporate and synthesized much of the philosophy available at the time, but he did not do so uncritically or indiscriminately. On the contrary, Plato was widely recognized as a philosopher precisely because he offered a reasoned rejection of some philosophical positions and modified others in a way that made sense to his audience.

Let's not forget that Aristotle himself was a member of the Academy and developed his own ideas of "Unmoved Mover", "soul", etc., that do show Platonic influence despite differences.

In any case, Gerson expressly says that his proposal is a "theoretical framework for analysis" not a history of philosophy.

Plato's Metaphysics? I thought the idea was first thought of and the expression coined by Aristotle. How can someone refer to something that was invented several decades after his death?

You can argue over that.

Because the reason I am joining this conversation is different. I just wanted to find Fooloso4.

This is my question and its explanation:

Socrates in Plato's books always argues with everyone else, and always wins the arguments. (Not so, but that's the the general consensus around here so I'll ride along.) This made me thought: if people argued against his ideas differently; that is, if the arguments were different in their very essence, then would Socrates have developed a different philosophy that would be different from his actual - historical? I mean, if one argues that the grass is blue, then Socrates would need to respond and convince the poor sap who argued, that the grass is yellow; whereas if the sap argued that the grass is red, then Socrates would pounce on his words and make the sap agree that the grass is green. (I honestly believe that the grass is green due to this very effect by Socrates. Even nature knows better than to argue with Socrates.)

So would Socrates' philosophy be different in essence and detail, if people disagreed with him on different grounds than the specific examples described in the books?

Because the reason I am joining this conversation is different. I just wanted to find Fooloso4. — god must be atheist

I am still here, but for reasons that may be obvious to you and some others I have decided not to respond to what has transpired in this thread.

... if people argued against his ideas differently; that is, if the arguments were different in their very essence, then would Socrates have developed a different philosophy that would be different from his actual - historical? — god must be atheist

I don't think Socrates argued in order to be argumentative, but his arguments were at times sophistic and rhetorical. The difference between him and the sophists he was critical of was a matter of intention. His concern was to determine what in each case is best. Unless someone persuaded him that his views on a subject should be changed, the difference in his response to different opinions would not represent a different philosophy, but the arguments he used would be different. As a result, what some took to be his philosophy might be, at least to some extent different.

Thank you for your thoughtful answer, Fooloso4.

I learned more than what I bargained for in your answer. What I learned is that a philosopher may have different overlays of philosophy concurrently. Some overlays in Socrates, as shown in your answer, was for instance the Forms, and the fact that his intention was to find the best outcome of a logical stream. Not just any good outcome, but the possible best outcome.

My philosophy (not that anyone would be interested) is atheistic materialism, and the overlay is strict adherence to logic and reason. I have instances of philosophy, and one that is different from that of others; But I have not have had the chance to test that one out because nobody cares to find fault with my two articles on the development and state of morality.

If I may ask (no intention to argue, just curious) Fooloso4, what are your overlays of philosophy? If too numerous to mention, just name some of your overlays that concurrently effect themselves.

... what are your overlays of philosophy? — god must be atheist

What do you mean by overlays? You give an example of one of your own, strict adherence to logic and reason. While I see them as important, I think they are limited. Perhaps that is an adherence of Socratic ignorance.

Unfortunately, Plato's logic could be renamed early logical or pre-logical argument. Neither the great Sophists nor Plato had sufficient grasp of the logical argumentation they were practicing and teaching. When we read Plato's Dialogues this is good thing to keep in mind before convicting the Sophists (who were the real logicians and rhetoricians of their time) or old Plato of being illogical.

When I cut a pie in half then I have a determinate dyad of slices of the whole pie. No problem.
When I divide a cloud then I have two clouds.
When I split an idea then I have nothing.

Unfortunately, Plato's logic could be renamed early logical or pre-logical argument. — magritte

We are talking about 4th-century BC. I don't think we can apply modern standards to Ancient Greece.

Besides, Plato is using logical argumentation and other devices for the purpose of conveying a moral, political, and spiritual message. If the message gets through to the reader, then the writer has done a good job IMO.

When I split an idea then I have nothing. — magritte

That may be due to the fact that you'd need to catch the idea first before splitting it.

I bet you haven't caught any yet.

As for Plato, I think he is not even trying .... :smile:

Neither the great Sophists nor Plato had sufficient grasp of the logical argumentation they were practicing and teaching. — magritte

Can you give some examples?

We can try this one:

... each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them, then Socrates asked: “Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias greatness and smallness?” — [Phaedo,102b]

This is a crucial problem in the Forms. If the opposites (complements or contraries?) 'greater than' and 'smaller than' are relative terms then everything and everyone participates in each of Greatness and Smallness to some degree. But to what degree? Only in context can this be determined, otherwise these terms and all other Forms are in danger of collapsing.

[Edit] What makes such problems especially challenging is that it is wise to assume that Plato's conception of participation to explain particulars and predication is fundamentally sound. This way, the quest becomes more formal in search of gaps and logical flaws in his model.

I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato. — Apollodorus

The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good".

As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.

He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies. — Apollodorus

To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa.
.

But as Aristotle demonstrated it makes no sense to talk of a being (existent) without a form (essence). so if Plato thought of particulars as beings (existence) without form or essence, Aristotle cleared this up. Matter without form is unintelligible, but form without matter is logically coherent.

What do you mean by overlays? You give an example of one of your own, strict adherence to logic and reason. While I see them as important, I think they are limited. Perhaps that is an adherence of Socratic ignorance. — Fooloso4

Overlays: two or more surfaces or layers of reasoning, imagination or description of observed systems, which are independent from each other, and both can be false or true without affecting the other's false or true nature.

I believe in atheist materialism, and in the usefulness of logic and reason. Logic and reason can be present while atheist materialism is not true, and atheist materialism can be present while logic is faulty, or invalid; but in the world of my own mind, the two are always true and useful together at the same time and in the same respect.

I think the resolution to our disagreement is to see that "the good" as described by Plato, chiefly in The Republic, is not a Form. This places it in another category from the One, which is a Form. If we make the good a Form, we are talking about the Form of Good, and this is something distinctly different from the good itself. But the One cannot be anything other than a Form.

'greater than' and 'smaller than' are relative terms then everything and everyone participates in each of Greatness and Smallness to some degree. — magritte

Greater and smaller are relative terms when describing particular things, not the Forms themselves. Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, but Greatness itself is not greater or smaller.

What makes such problems especially challenging is that it is wise to assume that Plato's conception of participation to explain particulars and predication is fundamentally sound. — magritte

Plato raises serious doubt about this:

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms. — Fooloso4

In the Phaedo Socrates also says that the Forms are an hypothesis.

On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true ...

And:

I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. (100c-e)

See also my discussion of the city at war in my discussion of Timaeus. The static Forms cannot account for a world that is active, a world in which there is chance and indeterminacy.

The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover

As already stated, the word “the One” (to Hen) can have many meanings. Aristotle himself points this out at the very beginning of Book 10.

The way I see it, not just Platonism but philosophy in general as inquiry into truth, must lead to an ultimate first principle or arche which, by definition, is one. Therefore, it is not incorrect to call the first principle “the One”, in the same way it is not incorrect to call the Good “one” or “the One”.

Once an ultimate first principle of all has been admitted, everything else is secondary. The ontological structure from the first principle down and the nomenclature can be debated and in fact it was debated within the Academy and has been debated within the Platonic tradition and among scholars ever since.

However, for the above reasons, the first principle must remain non-negotiable and non-debatable. And I think Plotinus and others are correct in (a) calling the first principle “the One” and (b) in identifying it with the Good.

To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. The Greek terms are einai (“existence”) and ousia (“essence”). The fact that a thing has no essence does not mean that it has no existence.

The Form and the sensible object both exist, but not in the same way. The Form is a thing that is what it is in virtue of itself, i.e., in virtue of being its own essence. The Form is an auto kath’ auto thing, a thing that is just itself.

In contrast, the sensible object is what it is in virtue of participating in a Form’s essence. Therefore, the sensible object is dependent or relative, pros ti.

This is why Forms have ontological and metaphysical priority (and greater reality) in relation to sensibles.

Aristotle’s objections may or may not be valid. If they are valid, then they are so from Aristotle’s perspective, not necessarily from Plato’s.

For example, Aristotle’s objection that if Forms are paradigms (which they are), then they are useless as they cannot act as paradigms of their own accord. But this objection is baseless as it is not the Forms themselves that act as paradigms but the Divine Creative Intelligence that uses them as paradigms to give shape to material objects as suggested in the Timaeus. The agent is the Divine Intelligence, not the Forms.

The objection makes sense and may be valid from an Aristotelian perspective that rejects a Creator-God. From a Platonic perspective that admits a Creator-God/Creative Intelligence, it doesn’t make sense and it isn’t valid.

This is why anti-Platonists use Aristotle to attack Plato, as we have seen. It is a strategy designed to blur the distinctions between Plato and Aristotle and to propagate Aristotle’s misinterpretations of Plato in an attempt to denigrate Plato, Platonism, and Western philosophy in general. I think there is a clear political and ideological agenda there.

Even given that this is your topic I admire your courage to take up something this deep.

Metaphysical issues are strewn about throughout the Dialogues, seemingly after the fact as revisions of the initial publication perhaps to forestall facile reading and criticism (from within the Academy by people who thought they had better ideas). Everything must be read and remembered (haha) or else one must have an index of where relevant suggestions are hidden. To our great fortune, we have online search engines and easy access to professional explorations with bibliographies. With the aid of these, even we can take a stab at some of Plato's deepest thought.

The key to Plato's metaphysics is the Line. One must take seriously all four levels of division which are at a finer resolution than the two that are usually focused on by Aristotelian readings Plato. Four is minimal to allow sufficient intermediate steps required to get from the lowest level to the highest and back again, or as people would have it, the other way around.

It is hard to discover any description of the lowest level other than what Plato says dismissively, but this is the physical world, the one physics studied and studies, (see Kant's noumena). Participation connects this unknowable world to the real absolute Forms to momentarily produce ''objects' as appearances, (see Kant's phenomena). Since this is not logically possible then how can it be? That's the puzzle. Mathematicals can tell us about the Forms or some Forms, and about the physical world, but can they tell us what the connection is and how it might work?

Greater and smaller are relative terms when describing particular things, not the Forms themselves. Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, but Greatness itself is not greater or smaller. — Fooloso4

The Forms are not relative but absolute, Greatness and Smallness. Something greater has more Greatness and less Smallness, that's how Plato's relatives work. The conversion is flawed, as Plato knew, because Forms are point objects outside of space and time while relatives are along a common line. To work, an origin or standard for comparison would also be required. In the passage, Simmias is measured against two competing standards; at different times he is great and small. But if we lined all three up then Simmias would be both great and small at the same time.

Socrates also says that the Forms are an hypothesis — Fooloso4

And so they are. Forms cannot be deduced from any source nor can they be directly observed which leaves only scientific hypotheses by the way of divine inspiration which happen to be the 'likeliest' and therefore should not be doubted. This may seem farfetched until we recognize that modern theoretical science works the same way.

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms. — Fooloso4

A two-tier metaphysics can't work because it is static and too dissimilar to be directly related. The relationship top-down one-many lacks both motivation and mechanism therefore nothing can happen, nothing can be caused. Plato's particulars can be neither static (Aristotle) nor in flux (Heracliteans) but exist momentarily (Bradley).

See also my discussion of the city at war in my discussion of Timaeus. The static Forms cannot account for a world that is active, a world in which there is chance and indeterminacy. — Fooloso4

Agreed. Forms as simples cannot be causative in the world.

The way I see it, not just Platonism but philosophy in general as inquiry into truth, must lead to an ultimate first principle or arche which, by definition, is one. Therefore, it is not incorrect to call the first principle “the One”, in the same way it is not incorrect to call the Good “one” or “the One”. — Apollodorus

Aristotle says philosophy is an inquiry into first principles. And if there is an equality in principles of a hierarchy then it might not be possible to give priority to one "first principle".

I think it might be incorrect to call the good "one", because the good is defined by what is sought, desired, and this is always a complexity rather than something simple. So the good is complex rather than simple.

And if there is an equality in principles of a hierarchy then it might not be possible to give priority to one "first principle". — Metaphysician Undercover

But it isn't necessarily impossible.

The way I see it, in Plato’s metaphysics everything is secondary to intelligence and knowledge which presupposes a subject. Starting with the dictum “Know thyself”, Plato proceeds from the philosopher’s own individual intelligence to that intelligence which encompasses everything and is the cause and source of all knowledge and all intelligence. And this ultimate source and cause must be one. If it isn’t one, the philosopher must carry on his quest until he discovers that which is the ultimate one.

So, I think it is important to understand that despite the originality of later Platonists, they had the highest regard for their master and took great care to make sure that their own developments of Plato’s ideas were in line with the fundamental metaphysical principles found in the dialogues.

Philosophers like Plotinus not only spoke Greek and studied Plato’s works in the original (as did all philosophers in antiquity and even in later times), but also were in close touch with interpretative traditions going back to Plato himself, and, crucially, had access to texts that are now lost.

It would be beyond the scope of this thread to demonstrate that Plotinus correctly identifies the Good with the One, but I think it can still be briefly shown that he is more likely than not to be right. Moreover, Plotinus, following Plato and Aristotle, proposes an integrated metaphysical hierarchy that traces both the “Indefinite Dyad” and the “receptacle” to the One as the ultimate case of all things.

As already stated, Aristotle says:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances [or immovable essences/realities] exist, some say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13)

Personally, I think he is referring here to the Platonists (and Plato) and this is confirmed by a number of scholars. But even supposing that he isn’t, there are other statements that when taken together, amount to the same thing.

Aristotle:

“The One, then, is the first principle of the knowability for each thing” (Aristot. Meta. 5.1016b20)

Socrates (Plato):

You are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power (Rep. 6.509b)

Further evidence is provided by the Parmenides:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d)

It must be remembered that in the dialogue, Parmenides takes young Socrates to task over the Forms (129e-130a). Socrates can’t answer all the questions. It is Parmenides who saves the day by declaring that there must be Forms, because otherwise we will have nowhere to turn our thoughts to and this will totally destroy the power of dialectic (135b-c3).

The discussion eventually turns to the One and comes to the following conclusion:

It is impossible to conceive of many without one.”
“True, it is impossible.”
“Then if One does not exist, the Others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”
“No so it seems.”
“The Others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the One does not exist.”
“True.”
“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the One is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”
“Most assuredly.” (Parm. 166b)

So Plato, through Parmenides, is saying that nothing can exist without the One.

The “Others” are what Aristotle refers to as the “Indefinite Dyad” or “the Great and Small”. In Metaphysics, he says:

Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly, the material principle is the "Great and Small," and the essence <or formal principle> is the One, since the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One … This, then, is Plato's verdict upon the question which we are investigating. From this account it is clear that he only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms. He also tells us what the material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the One in that of the Forms—this is the Dyad, the "Great and Small" (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14)

I think it is obvious that Aristotle here is referring to the Parmenides where the discussion of the participation of “the Others” (hoi Alloi) in the One takes place:

“And yet surely the Others are not altogether deprived of the One, but they partake of it in a certain way.”
“In what way?”
“Because the Others are other than the One by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.”(Parm. 157c)

It follows that Plato sees the One as the ineffable ultimate first principle, followed by the Dyad of the “Unlimited and Limit” a.k.a. the “Great and Small” or “the Others”.

As stated by Aristotle, the One is the essence and formal cause and “the Others” are the material cause.

The Forms, Numbers, and the material universe are derived from the material cause (“Dyad” or “Others”) by participation in the efficient and formal cause (the One) that generates and gives shape and life to all things:

1. The One (= the Good).
2. The Dyad (= “the Others”/”Great and Small”/”Unlimited and Limit”).
3. Divine Creative Intelligence containing Forms.
4. Ensouled Material Universe.
5. Embodied human soul.

I think the confusion or misunderstanding stems from overinterpreting Aristotle, underinterpreting Plato, and failing to see (a) that the criticism presented by characters like Parmenides is ultimately constructive and (b) that Socrates actually agrees with the points made by the critics.

IMO Socrates’ approval and the inner logic of Plato’s philosophy (which is reflected in the solutions proposed) are the key to the correct understanding of Plato’s true message.