If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel

Are we to exclude deliberate deception? If so, how about innocent confusion?

If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel

Brain activity that triggers the vocalization of the expression "I am conscious." There's nothing special about those words. "I am conscious" is no more an indicator of consciousness than "one plus one equals two." They're just sounds that can result from mechanical operations.

He relies heavily on the case of the phenomenal zombie, which is functionally and psychologically identical to him, but has no phenomenal experience. — Pantagruel

Well as long as you say that he relies his case on that. Then don't think there is much to discuss here. He starts his position from a total wrong base. So his outcome can normally only be wrong too.

Functionally and psychologically identical presupposes human phenomenal experience. They come in package. You can't have the one without the other. However convenient would might be for him to built his case on, still can never be right.

However convenient would might be for him to built his case on, still can never be right. — dimosthenis9

But it is still possible to come to the right conclusion for the wrong reason.

Are we to exclude deliberate deception? If so, how about innocent confusion? — bongo fury

I've been thinking along these lines. One difference must be that the actually conscious being can know that it is conscious (in the strong sense); while the zombie that knows it is conscious is wrong. So could you say that this is the exact dividing line between a reductionist and an emergent consciousness?

But it is still possible to come to the right conclusion for the wrong reason. — Pantagruel

By pure luck?

Any number of ways. Perhaps the zombie argument can yield the correct result if the conclusion-begging premise is better analyzed. This is the direction that Chalmers travels when he examines the 'paradox of phenomenal judgements'. I'm curious to see exactly how much consciousness he has to allot to the physical.

For example, if knowledge that one is conscious is the phenomenal judgement sine qua non, then when the zombie effects this judgement, it can either judge correctly "I am not conscious"; or it can judge incorrectly "I am conscious". What this says is that the judgement of/about consciousness (conscious judgement) does not supervene on the physical since, if it did, it would be self-contradictory. Which explicitly contradicts Chalmers' second premise.

"My zombie twin does not have any conscious experience, but he claims that he does" (p. 174). — Pantagruel

Clearly both twins are deceived.

Any number of ways. Perhaps the zombie argument can yield the correct result if the conclusion-begging premise is better analyzed. — Pantagruel

Even if his conclusion is correct it would never be accepted, if the way he tries to prove it is via starting from this false base. Everyone could just push it with the tip of his finger and it would collapse.

So as to be taken serious he would have to choose a different path. More solid one.
We could discuss what could be the appropriate base as to make his conclusion right or seem more reliable at least.

I consider myself idealist and believe that mind is non material but I would never choose such a lame premise as to convince a materialist. I would be easily defeated.

Continuing on, Chalmers does pursue this fine line of division between the phenomenal and the psychological by way of refuting Dennett, who says that his materialistic theory can explain why things 'seem' the way they do. Chalmers says that Dennett is exploiting an ambiguity (equivocating) between two senses of seem, one of which (the phenomenal) is not captured by the other (why we say the things we do). Balancing on the "knife-edge between the phenomenal and the psychological realms" is how Chalmers puts it. I feel that is where this question lies.

If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel

I've always claimed to be the zombie, without lying about it. I don't think I'm conscious, at least not by Chalmers' definition, so no, they don't necessarily lie about it. Sure, I can detect red, but so can the simple mechanical device.

I've always claimed to be the zombie, without lying about it. I don't think I'm conscious, at least not by Chalmers' definition, so no, they don't necessarily lie about it. Sure, I can detect red, but so can the simple mechanical device. — noAxioms

But anyone who takes this view will likely be an eliminativist (or a reductive functionalist) about consciousness from the start. If one accepts that our immediate evidence does not rule out the possibility that we are zombies, then one should embrace the conclusion that we are zombies: it leads to a much simpler view of the world, for a start. But the reason there is a problem about consciousness is that our immediate evidence does rule out that possibility.
Chalmers on the "Irreducibility of Consciousness"

One difference must be that the actually conscious being can know that it is conscious (in the strong sense); — Pantagruel

How does this work? Acquaintance of the head with an immaterial picture inside it?

But anyone who takes this view will likely be an eliminativist — Pantagruel

Well, I've pretty much eliminated the immaterial mind as described by Chalmers, but the stanford page on eliminative materialism describes a 'radical position' which basic monism is not. I think my mental states supervene on physics, making me sort of materialist of sorts, hardly a radical position to take.
Functionalist about consciousness seems closer to the mark, but they don't call themselves zombies, and neither do I except in the context of discussions such as this one.

If one accepts that our immediate evidence does not rule out the possibility that we are zombies, then one should embrace the conclusion that we are zombies

The OP says they're functionally identical, so by definition, immediate evidence does not rule out the possibility.

But the reason there is a problem about consciousness is that our immediate evidence does rule out that possibility.

How is that a problem? It simply leaves it open to interpretation (as does any position without empirical differences).

How does this work? Acquaintance of the head with an immaterial picture inside it? — bongo fury

Well, axiomatically, if the zombie thinks it is not a zombie it is wrong, if a conscious being thinks it is not a zombie it is correct.

I think my mental states supervene on physics, making me sort of materialist of sorts, hardly a radical position to take. — noAxioms

Chalmers does discuss this. One position he explores and admires involves ascribing phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) states to physical entities. And also monism, not of the mental, but of an over-arching variety. I have strong affinities for both these directions also. Both of them are consistent with a systems-philosophical approach.

If a machine with no ghost thinks it has a ghost, it is wrong. Tick.

If a machine with a ghost thinks it is not a machine with no ghost, it is correct. Tick.

If a machine with no ghost thinks it has a ghost, it is wrong. — bongo fury

Does this mean you equate the 'experience of consciousness' as that of 'having a ghost'? That is interesting.....

If a machine with a ghost thinks it is not a machine with no ghost, it is correct. — bongo fury

In that case, it's probably the ghost thinking it's not a machine with no ghost, and the ghost is correct. The opinion of the machine is not given.

Chalmers’ zombie twin is not “logically coherent”, to me. He can only assume, and not prove, that “conscious experience” is missing from the zombie. This is because he assumes, and never proves, that “conscious experience” is a fundamentally natural phenomenon. Of course he can imagine it missing from a zombie because he has long assumed it occurs elsewhere.

I think you’re right. He’s reasoning in a circle.

He [Chalmers] relies heavily on the case of the phenomenal zombie, which is functionally and psychologically identical to him, but has no phenomenal experience. — Pantagruel

"P-zombie" incoherence.

:roll:

Chalmers’ zombie twin is not “logically coherent”, to me. He can only assume, and not prove, that “conscious experience” is missing from the zombie. — NOS4A2

But if he assumes it then that is the case he is examining. A conscious zombie would contradict his example.

Would Chalmer's P-zombie twin also have the same evolutionary history as Chalmers?

Would Chalmer's P-zombie twin also have the same evolutionary history as Chalmer? — RogueAI

Zombies are functionally equivalent to conscious entities. Generically different entities have different evolutionary histories (because "you count to two when you count them"), but given the functional equivalent clause in the definition, any treatment of p-Chalmers as saying something Chalmers says is by definition fair game.

Generically different entities have different evolutionary histories — InPitzotl

But at some point, there'd be a common ancestor, which means that a non-conscious entity bred a conscious one with this new relationship with the external entity.
In other words, what had functioned just fine in the parent (a mind that was self-contained and fit despite the lack of relationship with the 2nd entity) gave birth to one where all those advantages were cast aside, letting the choices be made by the external entity rather than itself as has been done by its parent.

This is probably unfair, since it paints a picture of a very binary, abrupt transition from one way of doing things to a complete new one. The child simply wasn't evolved to take advantage of the external entity, at least not in full, and so I imagine the process to take many generations, with a slow ceding of control to the external choices which for some reason made the phenomenal being more fit.

To me, this sounds like slow possession by a demon, however benevolent.

This also leaves the price paid by the parent (the extra metabolism to support an exceptionally large brain) still being paid by the child despite all the function of that expensive brain having been contracted out to a 3rd party. If the 3rd party is doing all the work, why still cart around a brain whose function can obviously be accomplished by one a 10th the metabolism as is done by other creatures our size.

if zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel

Agree with you. How could a zombie answer the question 'how are you?' or 'how are you feeling?' I don't see how it could. It could be scripted to regurgitate an answer, but surely it couldn't be hard to fool it. 'What was the most embarrasing thing that ever happened to you?' for example - because they allegedly don't have any experience or inner life. They are, therefore, automatons.

Actually I'm reminded of a passage I often quote from Descartes, and bear in mind he wrote this in the 17th Century:

if there were such machines with the organs and shape of a monkey or of some other non-rational animal, we would have no way of discovering that they are not the same as these animals. But if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — René Descartes

:up:

Actually Chalmers touches on this because, if his zombie-twin has an "inverted spectrum" of any conscious experience, for example, (sees blue where the other sees red i.e.) then there necessarily will be different "causal histories" of that type of experience, even if the experiences themselves are the same. So isomorphic mapping of history can be problematic.


:up:

I like Chalmers description of consciousness as something which determines the intension of its own concept.

Actually Chalmers touches on this because, if his zombie-twin has an "inverted spectrum" of any conscious experience, for example, (sees blue where the other sees red i.e.) then there necessarily will be different "causal histories" of that type of experience, even if the experiences themselves are the same. So isomorphic mapping of history can be problematic. — Pantagruel

I'm wondering how P-zombies could have a history that involves the development of words that refer to conscious experiences they don't have.

I'm wondering how P-zombies could have a history that involves the development of words that refer to conscious experiences they don't have. — RogueAI

We have a word like “soul” despite the fact that we have no such thing.

I'm wondering how P-zombies could have a history that involves the development of words that refer to conscious experiences they don't have. — RogueAI

If we're not conscious in the way that philosophers like Chalmers claim we are, then qualia would count as such a word in our universe. Idealism would be another. Platonism would be yet another. Not to conflate those three terms, but it demonstrates that if the world is physical, it doesn't prevent us from coming up with non-physical words.