If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel

We could in the future have f-zombies with mind-uploading. The science fiction book Permutation City explores the concept. Brain scanning and computing has progressed to the point in the 2050s for accurate digital copies to exist in simulated worlds. The question the physical main character wishes to explore is whether a digital copy is conscious, and how manipulating the simulation might distort that consciousness. Most of the copies commit suicide upon finding out their uploads. But the last one is prevented from doing so, and goes on to invent the dust theory of consciousness.

If digital uploads are not conscious, they could still be functionally equivalent and make the same claims about being conscious as we do. They would physically be different, which would mean that consciousness is not functional, and behavior is not a reliable indicator for being conscious.

. He relies heavily on the case of the phenomenal zombie, which is functionally and psychologically identical to him, but has no phenomenal experience. — Pantagruel

Then he must be a phenomenal zombie with phenomenal experience.

Beetle In The Box

It's possible that there's no beetle.

Truly conscious people have something that they call "beetle" but p-zombies have nothing in their boxes but they still call it "beetle". In essence p-zombies are using words (meaning is use) and if Wittgenstein in right, we're also doing the same. :chin:

Truly conscious people — TheMadFool

Are there non-truly conscious people (apart from my wife)?

Are there non-truly conscious people (apart from my wife)? — GraveItty

:lol: Don't say that I laughed at your joke. I really don't want to be in her bad books. :smile:

In essence p-zombies are using words (meaning is use) and if Wittgenstein in right, we're also doing the same — TheMadFool

Yes, as I mentioned earliler, I think this is the sense in which Chalmers suggests that consciousness determines the intension of its own concept.....

If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel

If the zombie is the clone of a liar, ill educated, or mad person.

Person and zombie-clone don't violate the identity of indiscernibles law. They are conceptually discernable - one is conscious and the other one isn't. You just can't tell which is which from the outside. The whole point is that they are conceptually discernible, but physically indiscernible (whatever 'physically' means in this context). And they are actually discernible by the one which is conscious. He knows which one he is.

If the zombie is the clone of a liar, ill educated, or mad person — bert1

I'm more of the opinion that consciousness in this scenario constitutes a nescio quid, such that for a zombie to make a true qualia-claim it would be referring to something to which it in principle does not have access.

I'm more of the opinion that consciousness in this scenario constitutes a nescio quid, such that for a zombie to make a true qualia-claim it would be referring to something to which it in principle does not have access. — Pantagruel

Indeed. Any claim to having an experience must be false if expressed by a zombie, very much a nescio quid for the zombie. But for the human, who has noticed he is conscious, it's more of a, er, conscio quid, or something.

a liar, ill educated, or mad person. — bert1

I am neither mad nor ill-educated.
Neither party is lying. For it to be a lie, each being (the zombie using nothing but physics, and the 'human', as y'all put it) need to spend a moment in each other's shoes to compare. This is what the one is like, and this is the other. Now given that, one can select which most closely matches his experience (or choose to lie about it and claim the other). Until then, there's no lie about it since both have only one experience to compare, and each has learned the vocabulary to describe it from places like this forum. I certainly would never have used the word 'qualia' for instance had I not heard it from others.
So in the interest of not lying, I assert that the experience that I have is just the result of doing it the same way as would any physical device with sensory input and an information processor to make sense of it. There's nothing seemingly inexplicable about it, and hence I conclude that I'm one of the zombies and that I'm missing out on the full inexplicable-by-physics experience.

hence I conclude that I'm one of the zombies and that I'm missing out on the full inexplicable-by-physics experience. — noAxioms

:up:

Neither party is lying. For it to be a lie, each being (the zombie using nothing but physics, and the 'human', as y'all put it) need to spend a moment in each other's shoes to compare. This is what the one is like, and this is the other. — noAxioms

There's nothing it's like to be a zombie. So for us humans switching places is the same thing experientially as being unconscious. It would be like losing time once you switch back.

In keeping with Chalmers approach, I'll offer some metaphysical speculations at this point.

Chalmers eventually examines how information can plausibly link the physical and the phenomenal, since it presents aspects of both (the well-known issue of the two entropies). What I would like to consider is, extending Chalmers approach of supervenience, if consciousness, while not supervenient on the physical, is in fact supervenient on the informational, then consciousness could be translated from one medium to another, exactly as information can be. The only question is, when I am thinking this thought now, is that exhaustively represented by the informational content, or is there something more? Is the thing which is producing or creating information itself a form of information? I'm inclined to think it is...some form of globally coherent informational history maybe. And so, yes, theoretically translatable between mediums.

f zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel

One possible answer, is that the zombie is just programmed to say these kinds of things. If, for example, our reality is a kind of program of sorts, then it's quite possible that some being (what we refer to as a person) might just be part of the program. They act like us, they talk like us, but they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self. It's certainly possible, but unless you were able to remove yourself from the program, it would be difficult if not impossible to tell the difference.

It's hard to see where he's committing a fallacy.

I'm inclined to think it is...some form of globally coherent informational history maybe. And so, yes, theoretically translatable between mediums. — Pantagruel

I believe Chalmers would disagree, because he would say that consciousness is not reducible to information. It does not logically supervene. Rather, there's an additional law of nature that binds conscious experience (or causes it to emerge) whenever there is an informationally rich stream, or whatever the criteria is.

One might object to this new arbitrary law that adds something additional to nature, but I think the even deeper issue is the status of laws making nature be a certain way. If we can allow such laws on the microphysical level, then I don't see what stops them from happening elsewhere. Because laws of nature are deeply mysterious.

Yes, this isn't in scope for Chalmers' theses, but is metaphysical speculation, as I said. I don't know that he disagrees specifically though - it is an extension of his dual-aspect approach but may suggest an overarching monism (of information). He is amenable to such notions.

In which case the claims would be 'caused' by something familiar with the experience presumably....

There's nothing it's like to be a zombie. — Marchesk

I sort of agree, but see bold below. I have no evidence that anything is being me. But that doesn't mean that the zombie cannot function, perceive, etc. like any other automaton.

So for us humans switching places

I didn't really have in mind 'switching places' since lacking something being me, there's nothing to switch. Perhaps the zombie (Phil) can be possessed by something (Bob) being it for a short while. But this only lets Bob know what its like to be Phil (who is for a short while not a zombie), but Phil might not necessarily be aware of it.

the same thing experientially as being unconscious.

I think I follow this, but disagree. A self-driving car, with driver in it, has something 'being' it and the car is 'conscious'. The car is an extension (an avatar) of the driver. Not sure how you're using 'experience' here. A self-driving car is capable of being aware of its surroundings and function on its own. That's 'experience' in my book, as distinct from 'conscious' which is the experience and control of the driver. If you use the word differently, then I need one to describe what a mechanical device does to measure the world.

Point is, the car can cede control to a conscious entity (driver) and become a car/driver system, and if you ask the system if it has phenomenal experience, it would be the driver that answers 'yes'. Perhaps the car still has its own experience and notes that it would have done that lane change better, but it's not in control.
If the same car is driving itself with the same person now acting epiphenomenally as passenger, then there's still something 'being' it, but it's the car in control, and thus the car that answers when asked if it has phenomenal experience. The car is unaware of the passenger, so it truthfully answers yes since it is quite aware of the vehicles around it and such and has no driver-phenomenal experience with which to compare.
There may be no passenger at all, and thus nothing 'being' the system, and the experience of the car is the same. So as long as it is in control, the car is going to answer the same way. If it's under control of an external driver agent, then it is the agent that answers, not the car, and the car cannot convey what that experience is like.

I claim to be the zombie car, not the driver/car system because i have no evidence to the contrary and it seems more plausible than the physics-defying system otherwise posited.

I claim to be the zombie car, not the driver/car system because i have no evidence to the contrary and it seems more plausible than the physics-defying system otherwise posited. — noAxioms

So you see zombie colors, hear zombie sounds, think zombie thoughts, dream zombie dreams?

One possible answer, is that the zombie is just programmed to say these kinds of things. If, for example, our reality is a kind of program of sorts, then it's quite possible that some being (what we refer to as a person) might just be part of the program. They act like us, they talk like us, but they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self. It's certainly possible, but unless you were able to remove yourself from the program, it would be difficult if not impossible to tell the difference. — Sam26

Except the zombie is supposed to be identical to me except for being conscious. I don't talk about my mental states due to any programming; when I talk bout being in pain, say, it's because I want to inform someone about my mental state.

If we're not conscious in the way that philosophers like Chalmers claim we are, then qualia would count as such a word in our universe. Idealism would be another. Platonism would be yet another. Not to conflate those three terms, but it demonstrates that if the world is physical, it doesn't prevent us from coming up with non-physical words. — Marchesk

Doesn't coming up with words for mere possibilities require imagination?

Doesn't coming up with words for mere possibilities require imagination? — RogueAI

So ... p-zombie Chalmers is imagining the redness of red and what it's not like for his zombie twin to lack that red sensation, and it's implications for metaphysical possibility.

When p-zombie Mary leaves the black and white room and sees a red object for the first time, she learns a new fact that isn't a fact, because p-zombie Mary is mistaken about seeing red. In fact, her entire world is colored in combinations of p-red, p-yellow and p-blue. She learns about the p-redness of p-red. We can call that a p-fact. But she already knows all the p-facts. So she learns nothing.

My brain hurts now. I'll admit to having difficulties with the p-zombie argument when it comes time for the zombies to talk about consciousness.

Except the zombie is supposed to be identical to me except for being conscious. — RogueAI

Yes, and this is why I said, "...they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self," which was meant to mean they are not conscious. It's difficult to know if such a zombie would really act like a conscious being. It seems that you could in theory make them respond just like us. It would be like playing a game, say, World of Warcraft, and not knowing if you're talking with a real person or not.

Yes, and this is why I said, "...they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self," which was meant to mean they are not conscious. It's difficult to know if such a zombie would really act like a conscious being. It seems that you could in theory make them respond just like us. It would be like playing a game, say, World of Warcraft, and not knowing if you're talking with a real person or not. — Sam26

I don't think they could act entirely like a conscious being because conscious beings' actions are sometimes caused by their mental states.

I don't think they could act like a conscious being because conscious beings' actions are sometimes caused by their mental states. — RogueAI

The point of course would be, how you could you tell the mental state apart from a programmed response? I don't think, in theory, you could.

The point of course would be, how you could you tell the mental state apart from a programmed response? I don't think, in theory, you could. — Sam26

Maybe not but that's an epistemological point. It seems to me that P-zombies can exist iff there are no actions caused solely by mental states.

So you see zombie colors, hear zombie sounds, think zombie thoughts, dream zombie dreams? — Marchesk

No, I see colors, hear sounds, think thoughts, and dream dreams, but I do it the zombie way without help from the outside, just like the self-driving car does. OK, the car probably doesn't dream, but it does the other things, however reluctant you might be to ascribe such terms to such a device.

If pain hurts, you're not a zombie.

No, I see colors, hear sounds, think thoughts, and dream dreams, but I do it the zombie way without help from the outside, — noAxioms

What's that like?