I meant to say ‘I WOULDNT SAY’ — Joshs

Well thank you for that. I still don't understand the "therapy" label--I mean I barely get what it is actually supposed to mean, but I do see it as a condescending, dismissive term and also don't see how my reading has anything to do with that interpretation, as I sorta see it.

We don't learn how to employ tokens, or use words (I don't teach you all the things to say). — Antony Nickles

You may not have taught me all the things to say, but some person or people did. “It takes a village.” Or, at least, they taught me up to the point where “Now I know how to go on”.

the goal of Philosophical Investigations was to understand our desire for seeing everything in one way (word-object). — Antony Nickles

That sounds like the goal of a psychologist. 'If you want to know why the word-object thing was so cool back in the way, read PI.' Does that sound right?

still don't understand the "therapy" label--I mean I barely get what it is actually supposed to mean — Antony Nickles

Stuff like this:

Yes, there are mistakes, lies, empty words, descriptions that fall short, but that is why there are excuses, the endless depth of language; it is not that our words systematically fail us as much as we fail them, to continue to be responsible for them, answer to make ourselves intelligible. — Antony Nickles

Not saying it's bad.

You may not have taught me all the things to say, but some person or people did. “It takes a village.” Or, at least, they taught me up to the point where “Now I know how to go on”. — Luke

:up:

Might be worth mentioning a proto-Wittgenstein whose ideas in around 1764 were:

Thought is essentially dependent on, and bounded in scope by, language—i.e., one can only think if one has a language, and one can only think what one can express linguistically.

Meanings or concepts are—not the sorts of things, in principle autonomous of language, with which much of the philosophical tradition has equated them, e.g., the referents involved (Augustine), Platonic forms, or subjective mental ideas à la Locke or Hume, but instead—usages of words.

Conceptualization is intimately bound up with (perceptual and affective) sensation. More precisely, Herder develops a quasi-empiricist theory of concepts that holds that sensation is the source and basis of all our concepts, but that we are able to achieve non-empirical concepts by means of metaphorical extensions from the empirical ones—so that all of our concepts ultimately depend on sensation in one way or another.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/herder/#PhilLangLangThouMean

I think this needs to be updated so that we take a detour around "sensation" and think instead of uncontroversial worldly objects. In epistemological terms, that's uncontroversial assertions (the temperature read 93°, the witness said "I shot the fucker.") Empiricism shouldn't base itself on (private) sensation, which leads to solipsistic games, but start immediately in 'language."

Then 'conceptualization is intimately bound up with(perceptual and affective) sensation.' bodies interacting in/with a world. 'Sensation' points outside of the body. That's what it gets right. We know what it gets wrong. It can be read as an inarticulate shorthand for life in the world.

Perhaps you'll agree that anyone can emphasize the destructive or constructive mode in Wittgenstein and cherrypick quotes to that purpose. Folks will connect the dots he left behind differently. — hanaH

If that is to say people have different interests in the work, I agree, though Heidegger would suggest setting that aside and letting the object approach on its terms (What is Called Thinking?). I also agree there is destruction and construction, though I might call it diagnosis (of our desire for certainty) and uncovering (our ordinary criteria from behind that need).

Though I believe it is very possible (even tempting) to take quotes out of context and draw a conclusion along our own lines, I don't believe Witt left simply "dots", and I've worked very hard to see from each passage to an overall context. I would think that is the goal. That's not to say Witt only had one point, but that the themes are all related and more open-ended than people see who just want a novel solution or conclusion to a problem, instead of a philosophical revolution.

How does it come about that this arrow >>>––> points? Doesn’t it seem to carry in it something besides itself?—”No, not the dead line on paper, only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that." —That is both true and false. The arrow only points in the application that a living being makes of it. — Witt, PI #454 - hanaH

So it is false that only the meaning can make the arrow point, as it takes a person to apply the arrow as "pointing", but what is true? and about which sentence?

As in an animal, you or me, being trained to look to the right when we see this token. — hanaH

This may seem minor, but aren't we indoctrinated in pointing? and then learn that we can apply that in the case of this sign? (Couldn't we take it as the start of a drawing of weapon? be confused as to what 1992 DOS emoji this was supposed to be?); that there is something important about application/employment (given the number of index references). "The meaning of the brackets lies in the technique of applying them." (#557) I only say this rhetorically (not for an answer) as this is not under discussion here, but also I have not reviewed all the references.

the goal of Philosophical Investigations was to understand our desire for seeing everything in one way (word-object).
— Antony Nickles

That sounds like the goal of a psychologist. 'If you want to know why the word-object thing was so cool back in the day, read PI.' Does that sound right? — hanaH

Witt only saw meaning as representational in the Tractatus; so he wrote the PI to figure out how and why he was locked into that way of thinking. It's an investigation into the human condition--the constant threat of skepticism and the effect on our thinking in reaction to it. This issue has affected philosophy from the start and is a continuing shortcoming of humans in everyday life. Labeling this as psychology is the same fear that causes philosophy to want to work outside the involvement of the human.

still don't understand the "therapy" label--I mean I barely get what it is actually supposed to mean
— Antony Nickles

Stuff like this:

Yes, there are mistakes, lies, empty words, descriptions that fall short, but that is why there are excuses, the endless depth of language; it is not that our words systematically fail us as much as we fail them, to continue to be responsible for them, answer to make ourselves intelligible.
— Antony Nickles

Not saying it's bad, just that you like me have a flavor, a vibe. — hanaH

I get that it is a tad poetic, but that is not just stylistic, those are grammatical claims, logical claims as it were--I'm saying that's the way our relationship to our expressions works. I make them in all seriousness, and to take them as merely therapeutic seems trivializing.

This may seem minor, but aren't we indoctrinated in pointing? and then learn that we can apply that in the case of this sign? — Antony Nickles

I'd say that we are trained to respond to -----> by looking to the right and <------ by looking to the left. arrows.

(Couldn't we take it as the start of a drawing of weapon? be confused as to what 1992 DOS emoji this was supposed to be?); — Antony Nickles

Yes, in my view. A mistake is always possible, and we have all kinds of signs for dealing with an initial failure of signification.

there is something important about application/employment (given the number of index references). "The meaning of the brackets lies in the technique of applying them." (#557) — Antony Nickles

This 'technique of applying them' is just what I'm trying to cash out in terms of social organisms in an environment. Conversation, by mouth or keyboard, is still physical, organic, ..the contraction of muscles, the disturbance of a medium. What role does this or that token play in the world, as a type of (material) object? The temptation toward the immaterial is understandable. A token is (as I mean it) an equivalence class of actual marks and/or sounds. Our nervous systems ignore irrelevant differences.

It's an investigation into the human condition--the constant threat of skepticism and the effect on our thinking in reaction to it. — Antony Nickles

Is skepticism really such a threat?

I think there's a gap between the game of extreme skepticism (it's fun to play both sides) and a more serious and interesting attempt to pin down what it means to be rational or scientific. For instance, some have earnestly began with sensation, others with infinitely intimate ideas ...both constructing the world as we know, if possible, from there. Others (myself lately) take the ordinary world ('material') shared with other humans and all the rest as given, and derive "ideas" and "sensations" from that.

I get that it is a tad poetic, but that is not just stylistic, those are grammatical claims, logical claims as it were--I'm saying that's the way our relationship to our expressions works. I make them in all seriousness, and to take them as merely therapeutic seems trivializing. — Antony Nickles

Your good at what you do, in my book. The difference is focus, emotional tone. The issue I'm focused on is relatively dry. How do words get their meanings? Or, better perhaps, what constrains any reasonable theory about how words get their meanings? I take for granted bodies in nature that need one another and that don't get to cheat by using ESP. Then we have beetles in box and inverted color-qualia spectra to show us what doesn't make sense.

This is related to spiritual issues such as WTF do or even can people mean by 'God'?

Labeling this as psychology is the same fear that causes philosophy to want to work outside the involvement of the human. — Antony Nickles

I'm not anti-psychology, by the way. I just read you as focusing on the psychological, as you do in the passage above.

It's not unreasonable to suspect fear or distaste in the 'positivist.' And the same charge can be leveled by the 'positivist' against the 'sentimentalist' or the 'believer.'

They might all be right.

A torch in the darkness, a 'lie' to light the chaos.

I think philosophy has tried to become more rational which includes providing a theory of science. Imagine dismissing philosophy's attempts to become more rational. — hanaH

If philosophy provides a theory of science, and then tries to, I don't know, 'measure up' to that theory, then philosophy is trying to meet a standard it has set itself.

If philosophy attempts to become more rational, does that mean that it accepts, from outside itself, a standard of rationality that it tries to meet, or, as above, does it set the standard itself?

And what discipline is responsible for holding philosophy to this standard, for measuring its progress, for determining 'how rational' it is? Is that, again, philosophy itself?

Excellent questions!

Let me play with them a bit.

If philosophy provides a theory of science rationality, and then tries to, I don't know, 'measure up' to that theory, then philosophy is trying to meet a standard it has set itself.

If philosophy humanity attempts to become more rational, does that mean that it accepts, from outside itself, a standard of rationality that it tries to meet, or, as above, does it set the standard itself?

And what discipline is responsible for holding philosophy humanity to this standard, for measuring its progress, for determining 'how rational' it is? Is that, again, philosophy humanity itself?

How does a moonwalking monkey evolve from a germ?

Do we need a God to get better at thinking, better at living? We can think of the species and its durable cultural artifacts (dusty old books, skyscrapers, seeds) as an old organism still increasing in power.

How can it do so? By the light of what superior entity?

Is moral progress possible? Intellectual progress?

The claim that we cannot get between pain and its expression (#244-245) is to show us that the structure (the grammar) of our sensations is not that they are known, but that they are expressed or not. That they are meaningful to me is in releasing them into the world (or hiding them); that they are meaningful to you is the extent to which you accept them, that you accept me as a person in pain. "If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me." (p. 223 3rd.)(emphasis added) I do not know their pain (use a "criterion of identity" #288), I reject them, or I help them--as it were, beyond knowledge (Emerson's reliance, Nietzsche's human). This is the essence of experience/sensation. ( TheMadFool ) The picture of a word-referent mistakes this limitation of knowledge as the vision that no one could know me (my "sensation"/"experience"); that I am essentially, always unique/special--that the only failure/solution is a matter of epistemology. — Antony Nickles

:ok:

1. Yes, I agree. We can't talk about so-called private experiences can either be considered a limitation of language itself or that the sign-referent sense of meaning falls short of the mark.

2. I'm at a loss as to what exactly could be considered private experiences. Wittgenstein seems to have zeroed in on emotions (pain). Pain, it seems, has external/observable/public correlates ( :cry: :grimace: ) but then, if Wittgenstein is right, it must have a private component. What is it? The quality of pain? There's a certain character pain has that I can't put into words. Qualia? Is this exactly what Wittgenstein is referring to? The fact that I can't seem to speak/write about qualia is proof enough, won't you agree?, that Wittgenstein hit the bullseye - language is social in the sense it's domain is restricted to the public.

What's ironic is that there are (exclusively) private experiences has now become public knowledge. Now we can talk about it!

About qualia

We have a word viz. "qualia" that's now entered the social dimension. It refers to private experiences.

Can we now claim that language has made its first tentative steps into our private worlds which until now had been hidden and beyond the reach of language?

Yes and No.

Yes because "qualia" does mean something, it refers to the ineffable, the inexpressible. We can now have a intelligible conversation about our private experiences.

No because "qualia" doesn't tell us what these private experiences actually are. It's kinda like knowing that a person A has something they call a beetle and person B also has something they call a beetle. So we know there's something (qualia) but what that somethong really is is still hidden.

That's part of why I give the reference theory hell. — hanaH

I am aware of an English tradition criticizing correspondance but it never really went anywhere, from what I know, never crossed the channel in particular.

A few Cambridgeans and Oxfordians notwithstanding, words do refer to something, otherwise we would have no use for them whatsoever. They do NOT usually refer directly to particular objects but they refer to categories or sets of things. Like an "elephant" is (in first, literal meaning) a member of a certain mammal species. To my knowledge this is the current scientific (linguistics) view, it's not pre-scientific at all.

Of course the word "elephant" can be used for many other things, such as naming a London neighborhood, symbolising the Republican party in the US etc. Concepts have great plasticity.

directly but privately experienced. — hanaH

What is so shocking or strange about a private experience? It's what our life is made of. In addition, intimate thoughts, feelings and perceptions are the basis for all human knowledge. Discard them, and philosophy and science disappear. Witt should have read Husserl a little more. It would have grounded him better.

I appreciate all this effort.

Yes, I agree. We can't talk about so-called private experiences — TheMadFool

Well... maybe you just mean talking about Witt's attempt to imagine an experience that I would know but that no one else could (that being the made-up quality/criteria of "private"), but the takeaway is not: that we do have personal experiences but that language just can't reach them, or that we have no experience that is not public. The point is that being known is not how our experience works--we can not get between a sensation and its expression for there to be the opportunity for knowledge (#245). That is not to say we can't talk about it, but only that we express our experience/sensations (even to ourselves, or repress them).

I'm at a loss as to what exactly could be considered private experiences. — TheMadFool

Witt's scenario is an imagined one (like the builders), so we can release ourselves from the Gordian knot of picturing an experience that is private in the way Witt was attempting. Again the lesson is not that we do or do not have our own experiences. As I quoted Witt earlier (#243), our ordinary criteria for a private experience is just something personal, secret: a sunset, a trauma, what I focused on in seeing a movie. And we are able to draw out (express, "give voice to" Witt says) and discuss our inner experiences (or hide/repress them).

There's a certain character pain has that I can't put into words. — TheMadFool

Well expressions of pain of course can be more than words (thus, opera). In imagining a quality (a thing? a referent?) we are here, again, searching for knowledge of something certain, of ourselves, for the other's reaction to us. The feeling that pain is inexpressible is the fact that the other may reject my expression of pain, that I may be alone with my pain.

Wittgenstein hit the bullseye - language is social in the sense it's domain is restricted to the public. — TheMadFool

The other part of retaining something of pain within me is that I can remain unknown, untouchable, not responsible, special without having done anything, a unique person without differentiating myself.

"qualia" does mean something, it refers to the ineffable, the inexpressible. We can now have a intelligible conversation about our private experiences. — TheMadFool

Irony aside, the idea of "qualia" still imagines our experience as a thing (the MacGuffan of neuroscience); it is a noun (you even have a word to refer to it)--we can "know" a thing (or can not!). Ineffable is an adjective as a qualification of our experience--too much to be expressed; not as if words leave some "thing" left over, but that our experience overflows our words.

"qualia" doesn't tell us what these private experiences actually are. — TheMadFool

In fact, we could simply say, "words can not express", "it's just a sense of awe", "I don't know what to say except I feel alive". These are not to tell us (know) anything about our experience, but express that there is nothing to be told (even when singing, crying, or violence can't).

Well... maybe you just mean talking about Witt's attempt to imagine an experience that I would know but that no one else could (that being the made-up quality/criteria of "private"), but the takeaway is not: that we do have personal experiences but that language just can't reach them, or that we have no experience that is not public. The point is that being known is not how our experience works--we can not get between a sensation and its expression for there to be the opportunity for knowledge (#245). That is not to say we can't talk about it, but only that we express our experience/sensations (even to ourselves, or repress them) — Antony Nickles

Indeed. Something to ponder upon.

Witt's scenario is an imagined one (like the builders), so we can release ourselves from the Gordian knot of picturing an experience that is private in the way Witt was attempting. Again the lesson is not that we do or do not have our own experiences. As I quoted Witt earlier (#243), our ordinary criteria for a private experience is just something personal, secret: a sunset, a trauma, what I focused on in seeing a movie. And we are able to draw out (express, "give voice to" Witt says) and discuss our inner experiences (or hide/repress them). — Antony Nickles

Right!

Well expressions of pain of course can be more than words (thus, opera). In imagining a quality (a thing? a referent?) we are here, again, searching for knowledge of something certain, of ourselves, for the other's reaction to us. The feeling that pain is inexpressible is the fact that the other may reject my expression of pain, that I may be alone with my pain. — Antony Nickles

Yep.

he other part of retaining something of pain within me is that I can remain unknown, untouchable, not responsible, special without having done anything, a unique person without differentiating myself. — Antony Nickles

A way of looking at it, yes.

rony aside, the idea of "qualia" still imagines our experience as a thing (the MacGuffan of neuroscience); it is a noun (you even have a word to refer to it)--we can "know" a thing (or can not!). Ineffable is an adjective as a qualification of our experience--too much to be expressed; not as if words leave some "thing" left over, but that our experience overflows our words. — Antony Nickles

I guess so. All words refer to our experiences. The converse, it appears, isn't true.

In fact, we could simply say, "words can not express", "it's just a sense of awe", "I don't know what to say except I feel alive". These are not to tell us (know) anything about our experience, but express that there is nothing to be told (even when singing, crying, or violence can't). — Antony Nickles

Spot on!

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

:zip:

Update

I have nothing to say vs. I have something to say but I can't find the words. A person with a limited or no vocab is very much like a person who's a master wordsmith trying to express that which is essentially inexpressible. Take a rock, it has nothing to say, it remains silent. Take a person, has something to say but can't:

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Can we now claim that language has made its first tentative steps into our private worlds which until now had been hidden and beyond the reach of language? — TheMadFool

Our 'private worlds' are what people talk about all the time, what poetry and literature have been about for several thousands years. I will never understand expressions of stupor or bewilderment at the most familiar stuff of all: our own thoughts. How alienated from oneself can one pretend to be?

I still don't understand the "therapy" label--I mean I barely get what it is actually supposed to mean, but I do see it as a condescending, dismissive term and also don't see how my reading has anything to do with that interpretation, as I sorta see it. — Antony Nickles

I assumed you were comfortable with the therapy’ label because it seems to have been embraced by a community of Wittgenstein interpreters that I associate with your approach.


“ The central claim of  the so called therapeutic turn of Wittgenstein, articulated by Stanley Cavell (1979), Cora Diamond (1991) and James Conant (1991), consists in finding Wittgenstein’s originality not so much in his philosophical arguments but – performatively – in the effects his philosophy is supposed to have on its readers. Not by chance Cavell calls philosophy “education for grown ups”, an activity aiming not at growth but at change or transformation (1979, p. 125).”


“The New Wittgenstein (2000) is a book containing a family of interpretations of the work of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. In particular, those associated with this interpretation, such as Cora Diamond, Alice Crary, and James F. Conant, understand Wittgenstein to have avoided putting forth a "positive" metaphysical program, and understand him to be advocating philosophy as a form of "therapy." Under this interpretation, Wittgenstein's program is dominated by the idea that philosophical problems are symptoms of illusions or "bewitchments by language," and that attempts at a "narrow" solution to philosophical problems, that do not take into account larger questions of how the questioner conducts his life, interacts with other people, and uses language generally, are doomed to failure.”

I only meant ‘therapy’ in the way that it is being used by these writers. Would you agree that in their hands it is not meant as condescending and dismissive?

Do not be proud on account of your knowledge
But discuss with the ignorant as with the wise
The limits of art cannot be delivered
There is no artist whose talent is fulfilled
Fine words are more sought after than greenstone
But can be found with the women at the grindstone

-- The Teaching of Ptahhotep

Attributed to the Vizier Ptahhotep who lived around 2375–2350 BC, the Instructions or Teaching of Ptahhotep are didactic wisdom literature belonging to the genre of sebayt (teachings).

Our 'private worlds' are what people talk about all the time, what poetry and literature have been about for several thousands years. I will never understand expressions of stupor or bewilderment at the most familiar stuff of all: our own thoughts. How alienated from oneself can one pretend to be? — Olivier5

Self-deception is a real possibility. As we are to ourselves is either incoherent (private language argument) or incoherent (beetle-in-the-box).

Why does it got to be coherent in the first place?

Why does it got to be coherent in the first place? — Olivier5

Don't ask me. I'm just following the herd.

I assumed you were comfortable with the therapy’ label because it seems to have been embraced by a community of Wittgenstein interpreters that I associate with your approach. — Joshs

Just because "a community of Wittgenstein interpreters" disagree with what it means for traditional answers to skepticism, doesn't mean they can say that Witt, or Cavell, are outside the analytical tradition and not using "philosophical argument" or that their work is merely "performative".

Would you agree that in their hands [calling this work "therapy"] is not meant as condescending and dismissive? — Joshs

It's bald-face condescension, attempting to pigeon-hole and minimize the impact of the PI (it's not "linguistic" either; it's revolutionary). I think the desire to misinterpret this work comes from a modern (and old) philosophical desire that it is better if philosophy doesn't involve humans at all; that it is supposed to work out like math or science, were it doesn't matter who is doing it. But philosophy from Plato on has been to change the way we think and to become a better more insightful version of ourselves. There is a reason we see language and the world the way we do in the Tractatus and the opening quote, and the PI is an examination of how and why we get there (over and over) and how we work our way out (in each case); it's not by "therapy", it's a method of thinking and is about knowledge and truth.

In fact, we could simply say, "words can not express", "it's just a sense of awe", "I don't know what to say except I feel alive". These are not to tell us (know) anything about our experience, but express that there is nothing to be told (even when singing, crying, or violence can't).
— Antony Nickles

Spot on!

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
— Ludwig Wittgenstein — TheMadFool

I can't help but think we've lost the thread here, because the point of PI is that the conclusion of the Tractatus was wrong. We can talk about all kinds of things (just not when we first require that the outcome be certain). Just because there are times when we feel like we can't put an experience into words does not mean that we must be silent. We can try again, we can bring someone along with us as far as we can (we are not alone); and those examples above were things we can actually say--something that expresses our "ineffable" experience. The fact we do not want to accept that as enough is because we want there to be some thing that is unique and special about us, but there very well may not be. You may not exist if you are a ghost of yourself, one of the herd, if everything you say is propaganda, quotation---you can be empty inside. This is the desperation of the person who wants to "strike himself on the breast and say: 'But surely another person can’t have this pain!' " (Witt, PI, #253) It is this fear that compels the idea that there must be a private experience in the sense Witt explored.

I can't help but think we've lost the thread here, because the point of PI is that the conclusion of the Tractatus was wrong. We can talk about all kinds of things (just not when we first require that the outcome be certain). Just because there are times when we feel like we can't put an experience into words does not mean that we must be silent. We can try again, we can bring someone along with us as far as we can (we are not alone); and those examples above were things we can actually say--something that expresses our "ineffable" experience. The fact we do not want to accept that as enough is because we want there to be some thing that is unique and special about us, but there very well may not be. You may not exist if you are a ghost of yourself, one of the herd, if everything you say is propaganda, quotation---you can be empty inside. This is the desperation of the person who wants to "strike himself on the breast and say: 'But surely another person can’t have this pain!' " (Witt, PI, #253) It is this fear that compels the idea that there must be a private experience in the sense Witt explored. — Antony Nickles

There must be private experiences?

Don't ask me. I'm just following the herd. — TheMadFool

Wittgenstein himself was incoherent, from what I can tell, so he can't help you out.

Wittgenstein himself was incoherent, from what I can tell, so he can't help you out. — Olivier5

So it seems, so it seems.

There must be private experiences? — TheMadFool

The fear of being empty, not unique, creates the idea there must be some "thing" beyond language which is mine, that I can know. Now it's not that there is nothing there, it's just that experience isn't known, it is expressed or denied (by me)' it's accepted or rejected by you. So to say "It was amazing" is to express our ineffable experience (however poorly). So there are personal experiences but they don't work the way Witt tried to imagine (as the skeptic would like them to).

The fear of being empty, not unique, creates the idea there must be some "thing" beyond language which is mine, that I can know. Now it's not that there is nothing there, it's just that experience isn't known, it is expressed or denied (by me) — Antony Nickles

My fear = my expression of fear

I don't recall ever expressing a fear of being empty. I don't think I ever have. According to you, if I don't express this fear, I don't have this fear.

So I think you'll need some other explanation for my testimony that I have experiences.

Maybe it's just that I do have experiences that I tell no one about. I do, actually. Sometimes I do tell people about what I've experienced, so it's not private in the sense Witt uses in the PLA.