If this is what leaps to mind as a kind of “default” interpretation of human being, I think it’s just a mistake. — Xtrix
Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.
Both philosophers and theologians claim the authority to evaluate metaphysical principles, but the standards by which they conduct those evaluations are very different. Schopenhauer concludes that philosophers are ultimately in the position to critique principles that are advanced by theologians, not vice versa. He nonetheless recognizes that the metaphysical need of most people is satisfied by their religion. This is unsurprising because, he contends, the vast majority of people find existence “less puzzling and mysterious” than philosophers do, so they merely require a plausible explanation of their role in the universe that can be adopted “as a matter of course” (WWR II 162). In other words, most people require a metaphysical framework around which to orient their lives that is merely apparently true. Therefore, the theologian has no functional reason to determine what is actually true. By contrast, the philosopher is someone whose metaphysical need is not satisfied by merely apparent truths – he is intrinsically driven to seek out actual truths about the nature of the world.
That’s not how I live, nor how anyone I know lives. We can think it and say it, but an “organism trying to survive” isn’t my experience. First and foremost I’m engaged with someone or something, I’m moving towards something, I’m caring about our interested in something. I have a world, not an environment. — Xtrix
Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.
Both philosophers and theologians claim the authority to evaluate metaphysical principles, but the standards by which they conduct those evaluations are very different. Schopenhauer concludes that philosophers are ultimately in the position to critique principles that are advanced by theologians, not vice versa. He nonetheless recognizes that the metaphysical need of most people is satisfied by their religion. This is unsurprising because, he contends, the vast majority of people find existence “less puzzling and mysterious” than philosophers do, so they merely require a plausible explanation of their role in the universe that can be adopted “as a matter of course” (WWR II 162). In other words, most people require a metaphysical framework around which to orient their lives that is merely apparently true. Therefore, the theologian has no functional reason to determine what is actually true. By contrast, the philosopher is someone whose metaphysical need is not satisfied by merely apparent truths – he is intrinsically driven to seek out actual truths about the nature of the world.
It is curious that Schopenhauer is generally cited as a convinced atheist, yet in this respect he differs profoundly from what contempoary atheism often states. — Wayfarer
Might have just something to do with seeing humanity solely through the lens of biological evolution - which, of course, all sensible folk must do nowadays. — Wayfarer
Certain of those characteristics distinguish us from other living organisms, and thus we interact with the rest of the world differently than they do in many cases. — Ciceronianus
We're distinguished in that we're the only entities with a world. Animals don't have worlds, they have environments. — Xtrix
I'm uncertain what this means. They're as much a part of the world as we are. — Ciceronianus
We're peculiar animals, certainly, but animals nonetheless. — Ciceronianus
It's a naturalistic view, as you say, though I have a rather broad view of nature, as I include in it all we think and feel as well as what we do. I think we have much yet to learn about nature (the universe) and it may include more than what it appears to include to us now. — Ciceronianus
:roll: A cognitive defect, or bias, for 'philosophical suicide'. (Zapffe, Camus, Rosset, Brassier). Preferring to be a 'satisfied swine' rather than a sad socratic. To wit:... 'man's need for metaphysics' ... — Wayfarer
(Emphasis added.)The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far — and the ascetic ideal offered man meaning! It was the only meaning offered so far; any meaning is better than none at all ... this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself — all this means — let us dare to grasp it — a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a will! And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man would rather will nothingness than not will. — On the Genealogy of Morals, 3rd Essay, 28.
And I don't see any reason to believe that Nietszche had an insight or training into what ascetic practises are supposed to open up and why anyone would pursue them. — Wayfarer
placing living man at the forefront of everything and human endeavor on a pedestal...now that's conceit. — theRiddler
That’s not how I live, nor how anyone I know lives. We can think it and say it, but an “organism trying to survive” isn’t my experience. First and foremost I’m engaged with someone or something, I’m moving towards something, I’m caring about or interested in something. I have a world, not an environment. — Xtrix
He actually praises it (‘asceticism’), so I gather you both agree and disagree with this. I don’t see how this isn’t about the use of ‘asceticism’. — I like sushi
fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself... — On the Genealogy of Morals, 3rd Essay, 28.
Pierre Hadot on 'Askesis of Desire'
For Pierre Hadot the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research.
However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (Philosophy as a Way of Life p84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done. Hadot’s use of the adjective “spiritual” (or sometimes “existential”) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions, are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life.
For this reason, they call upon far more than “reason alone.” They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order “to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way” and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires (as for instance, in Cynic or Stoic practices, abstinence is used to accustom followers to bear cold, heat, hunger, and other privations) (PWL 85). These practices were used in the ancient schools in the context of specific forms of interpersonal relationships: for example, the relationship between the student and a master, whose role it was to guide and assist the student in the examination of conscience, in identification and rectification of erroneous judgments and bad actions, and in the conduct of dialectical exchanges on established themes. — Pierre Hadot, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
To those who've never been through the mystical looking glass it means nothing; it would be like an alien visitor from a planet where there's no sound arriving on earth and witnessing an orchestra. What are all those people doing? What are those things they're holding?. And how would you explain that to this visitor. 'Well, there's this thing called 'hearing'....' — Wayfarer
That’s not how I live, nor how anyone I know lives. We can think it and say it, but an “organism trying to survive” isn’t my experience. First and foremost I’m engaged with someone or something, I’m moving towards something, I’m caring about or interested in something. I have a world, not an environment.
— Xtrix
This may well be true of humanity today. — I like sushi
I know it’s very speculative but I have found it an interesting premise from which to view social change. Rather than the obsession with the abstract ‘cultural’ exchanges maybe the issue is a matter of physiological changes due to reaching a population threshold. — I like sushi
To those who've never been through the mystical looking glass it means nothing; it would be like an alien visitor from a planet where there's no sound arriving on earth and witnessing an orchestra. What are all those people doing? What are those things they're holding?. And how would you explain that to this visitor. 'Well, there's this thing called 'hearing'....'
— Wayfarer
So what does it mean?
You should be able to explain it to us because we’re not aliens. Even our cultural differences are not that great. You said there is meaning so tell us what that meaning is. What does it mean for you? Make use of simile if need be. I for one am all ears. — praxis
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