That concern [the sense of avoidance of something true] is not irrelevant to the discussion.... — Srap Tasmaner

"When I have a headache, I know I have a headache."
@TheMadFool

I agree. There is something true in this expression, but it is not what this reaction to the skeptic wants it to be. I have not avoided the truth of what that is saying, I am showing a counter-example of when we have a sensation, but do not know it (when I do not attend to it, or repress it), but also to see the truth in the statement is that I know my experience and sensations when I take ownership of them, admit them (even to myself), stand ready to answer for them, as if some things are movements and some expressions, and the difference is in the fact that they express me, reveal me, make my pain open to be known, rejected or ridiculed. An injustice is to have one's expressions become only words of information--to pass over the person in pain to know the headache.

1. I'm experiencing this particularly unpleasant throbbing sensation in my head, H.
2. H is, from my interaction with others, an ache.
Ergo,
3. I have a headache.

Statement 3 is a proposition, which in this case, is justfiably true. Therefore, I know I have a headache. — TheMadFool

Except that you could be lying, and we may never know; or, we might see your pain, and reject it/you as dramatization, posturing. Or you have expressed your trauma to others, who acknowledge your pain by reacting to it (its claim on them), by accepting what is essential for you and I in your pain (within the conditions and criteria of sensation).

The difference in the picture of them (or me) taking my expression of pain as "justifiably true", is to want to skip over "me", and be able to know my pain as not only true but justified (certain), presumably by something other than my expression. But can I not postulate and accept that my pain is aching, throbbing, rather than, say, flashes of pain, for myself? what is it the "interaction" then does? Define, identify, locate? Until we (or even I) can do these things, am I not having the sensation of being, e.g., hot, though unclear to what extent, how close to heat exhaustion, and so whether I have to express my discomfort, which may be alarming, or taken as merely rude (depending on your acceptance or rejection). What is essential to pain about being true, and justifiable?

TMF's statement does not need a context--that's been the point (above). Every word has a meaning, so no context is needed — Antony Nickles

That is not what I wrote. Try and pay attention, I hate repeating myself. I said that TMF's comment already had a context: that in which the comment was made. There was no need to try and find another context for it, other than you wanting to avoid dealing with TMF's point, that feeling is knowing.

Tylenol? Aspirin? Pain medication. They seem to work for everybody as if everybody's pain is the same. — TheMadFool

Very good point. If aspirin works against your headache and also against my headache, maybe yours and mine are not that different.

We can generalize this. Physical sensations (such as of headaches, or of red things) are mental events that have biological underpinnings with an evolutionary history. If aspirin works for you and me, it is supposedly because our biochemistries are quite similar. But if our sensations are based on our biology and if your and my biologies are very similar, then your sensations and mine (say, of something red) cannot be that different.

I said that TMF's comment already had a context: that in which the comment was made. There was no need to try and find another context for it, other than you wanting to avoid dealing with TMF's point, that feeling is knowing. — Olivier5

Why is context the point of debate here?

What does the context in which @TheMadFool made the statement 'add' in this case? You agree with TMF that when someone has a headache, they know it; would you disagree if he had said it in another context? I think what you're actually saying is that the truth of his claim is not dependent on the context in which it is uttered. It's just true.

If we're only interested in truth-value, then we're done with that claim. But if we hope to use that sentence to make a point, in a philosophical discussion, we do need a little more. It proposes a relation between pain and knowledge; we would like to know more about how that relation works.

Is the statement "when I have a headache, I know it" informative? If so, is it because our understanding of pain changes or is it our understanding of knowledge? (Scientific statements can work like this, I think.) If it's not informative, then what's it doing? How can an uninformative statement be useful when doing philosophy? (None of these questions are rhetorical, if that's not clear.)

@StreetlightX "I'm surprised no one commented on your comment ["I know I have a headache! You don't need to remind me!"... the point of the rebuke [is] not an affirmation of my cognitive understanding of my state of being] which is very important in terms of the use of the word know. Moreover, the negation of, "I know I have a headache" - is an important juxtaposition that points to something important about how we go about affirming that we DO know. — Sam26

I'm interested in how we affirm that we do know sensations (me mine, you mine). Of course there is not always a opposite direct negation of an epistemological claim. Maybe its just that we do not have a context in which to say: "I don't know I have a headache" (or is it: "I know I do not have a headache."? )Or could we say "I don't know I have a headache, it may be coming from my back injury", as if to express a lack of confidence it our ability to adequately express ourselves.

You can of course say, "I know I have a headache" - but are you saying something about knowing? — StreetlightX

That knowledge (of me) is acceptance of myself and in being able to admit it to others, as in: 'I know I have an addiction problem." I "know" this in the sense of know that I agree with your critique of me, the pain I was not dealing with but that you saw clearly on my face, or my lack of emotion, given my knowledge of your history, habits, and defenses.

TMF's statement does not need a context--that's been the point (above). Every word has a meaning, so no context is needed
— Antony Nickles

That is not what I wrote. — Olivier5

I was not paraphrasing what you wrote. I am pointing out the lack of necessity of a context--all that is needed is a definition of pain and of knowledge; so I provided a counter-example. Do we feel the "context" of TMF's statement is complete? that the implications do not need to be spelled out more because of our ability to see that it could be a sense of knowledge?

There was no need to try and find another context for it, other than you wanting to avoid dealing with TMF's point, that feeling is knowing. — Olivier5

The question is, what does that lead to? imply? do we understand how that is meaningful? I gave a counter-example of not knowing (being aware of) our pain. In response to another post above, I gave a reading of his claim as a grammatical claim about our ownership of our pain--our "having" it.

I will attempt to make another sense of it. TMF's claim could be in the sense that: when I have pain, I [can't help but] know that I have pain--I am pierced through with it. But we could simple ask, why does he feel he has to make this statement? (other than as a defense to what is perceived as my threat "But surely another person can't have THIS pain!" Witt, PI #253).

Is "When I have a headache, I know I have a headache" more than: when I am in pain, I know I am in pain. How is this not tautological? Couldn't "I am in pain" be all that is necessary? but what then do we "know"? Isn't "I am in pain" simply to say (to myself) I am aware that I am in pain? How else is this knowledge? What else is it knowledge of? As I said before, I can express my pain: "I have a scratchy throat" and you can say: "Oh, I know what that is like", and you can object "No, its not a a regular sore throat, it's like fire at the bottom", and then: "Oh, yeah that's happened to me." And you can begin again, but at what point is your knowledge not just your expression? In what context does something remain that you "know" apart from your expression? How is it more than your expression so as to be known?

But, yes, there is a truth to what TMF is saying. It is the expression of a desire for knowledge of a certain kind. I grant that it is not awareness, it is not repression, it is more than just working out my relationship to my pain and your reaction to it; it is the kind of knowledge that is important. None of my examples satisfy the criteria of a certain, constant, specific sensation. Before we even look at what my pain is, much less how pain is meaningful/how it works, we want to be sure I cannot fail to know myself, that there is something essential in my experience, so we manufacture a picture that can meet those requirements. This is the creation of Plato's forms, Descartes' god, Marx's proletariat, Ayer's statements that are only true or false, and positivism's correspondence picture of the world (in response to which Wittgenstein is trying to find out in the PI why we are driven to think this way). But the truth is there is no fact about my pain that will save me from the threat of being unknown, to ourselves, rejected by others. The response to this is the desperation of the interlocutor for knowledge to bridge that gap (to make our separateness a problem of knowledge), but all we have is the true yet empty statement that: "When I have a headache, I know I have a headache."@TheMadFool

Try and pay attention, I hate repeating myself. — Olivier5

I don't think name-calling got us anywhere previously, and I also think condescension is inappropriate. That's two.

Language-games

I believe that Wittgenstein’s methods in the PI are important, and at least for me, I see him applying his methods in OC. He points out subtleties that are very difficult to apprehend (which is seen in various interpretations), and very difficult to use.

That said, what I’m trying to convey here is based on the conversation I had with @StreetlightX earlier in this thread.

Most of us agree that W. puts forward the idea that meaning is derived from use in social settings; which is the setting where rule-following takes place. So, use and rule-following are two sides of the same coin; and they form the basis of the language-game. The corresponding analogy is the game of chess, i.e., the pieces move, but they move in accordance with the rules of the game. If you’re not moving the pieces in accordance with the rules, then obviously you’re not playing the game. By analogy, if you’re not using your words in accord with the rules of the language-game, then you’re not doing anything with your words – your words lack meaning. And moreover, not just any use conveys meaning, which brings me back to what I said originally to TMF, viz., the notion of correct use, which seems to be trivial, as @StreetlightX pointed out, but is it?

Aren’t many of our arguments over the correct use of a word? Even those of us who claim to understand Wittgenstein, argue over what the meaning of knowledge is. In fact, philosophers have created all kinds of language-games to convey what the word means. However, language-games are only language-games if they are language-games proper. Not every use of a word that occurs in a social setting can be said to be a language-game. Again, the analogy being, just because you’re playing what looks like a game of chess, that doesn’t mean you are. However, this analogy breaks down (as many analogies do), because the rules of chess are very explicit, and easy to understand. But, understanding which language-games are THE language-games, i.e., those language-games that are language-games proper, is what’s most difficult to discern. In terms of our use of the word knowledge there are many different language-games that convey how the word know is correctly used. There is no one language-game that will give you the correct use, i.e., the essence of the word know. And, this corresponds to what W. said about the definition of the word game, i.e., there is no exact definition that will convey every possible use in our language.

The real question is, how does one know if a particular language-game is correct or not. It’s easy enough to say that meaning occurs in language-games, but there is no easy method for determining what looks like a language-game from that which IS a language-game. There has to be some criteria by which we judge correctness here. And yet, nothing is definitive. Obviously, some cases are clearly not being played by the rules of the game, but language is much more complicated. There doesn’t seem to be any firm ground that isn’t slippery in some setting.

It seems to me, to say, that X isn’t a language-game, so there is no correct use in this context, begs-the-question, doesn’t it? Maybe there just isn’t any precision here. It’s just like the command, “Stand here!” There is no X that marks the spot, but this response can’t be satisfying, at least not to me.
So, is there a problem in what Wittgenstein is saying? Are there insurmountable problems in what W. is trying to communicate? I’m not sure, just thinking out loud.

Tylenol? Aspirin? Pain medication. They seem to work for everybody as if everybody's pain is the same. The beetle, in this case at least, each of us has in our private box is identical...or not? — TheMadFool

To the extent my pain goes away with the same medication, my pain is the same as your pain (as it were, essentially--a grammatical claim on the sense of "sameness" as it relates to sensations). They are the same pain but in two separate bodies (as color can be the same on two separate objects)--this is the fundamental fact that makes expression and acceptance the grammar of sensations.

To the extent my pain goes away with the same medication, my pain is the same as your pain (as it were, essentially--a grammatical claim on the sense of "sameness" as it relates to sensations). They are the same pain but in two separate bodies (as color can be the same on two separate objects)--this is the fundamental fact that makes expression and acceptance the grammar of sensations. — Antony Nickles

I guess so but I have a feeling the word "grammar" has a rather unconventional meaning in your post and Wittgenstein's writings if he ever uses it.

I guess so but I have a feeling the word "grammar" has a rather unconventional meaning in your post and Wittgenstein's writings if he ever uses it. — TheMadFool

Well yes, it's a technical term the way he uses it. He is getting at what expresses the essence of a particular "concept" (another technical term, but just a grouping of activities and things, like knowing, believing, pointing, playing chess, guessing at thoughts, following rules, etc.). And the essence of something is how we identify it from something else, what matters about it to us, how we judge whether it is done appropriately, how it can go wrong, etc. These are the ordinary criteria that are implicit in how things have come together in our lives over all this time, so they embody our interests and judgments and conditions--what is essential to us (our culture) about each thing. And each thing has a different grammar, even different senses of the same concept, like knowing--as being aware, acknowledging, knowing your way about, etc., which are really only able to be figured out in the context of something happening because of the possibilities of a concept, its "uses" (which is another term of Witt's, for saying in which sense).

there is no exact definition that will convey every possible use in our language. — Sam26

Words have definitions; sentences do not, concepts do not. How they are meaningful is not a matter of definition; that is not how they work. The fact that words can have definitions makes sentences like @TheMadFool's sentence about knowing a headache you have, appear to have (or be able to have) a clear meaning.

there is no easy method for determining what looks like a language-game from that which IS a language-game — Sam26

The method Witt employs is to look at the history of our expressions (or imagined expressions) as data to make explicit a claim about the implications of what we say, how (in what way) they are meaningful to us when we imagine them in different contexts (their different uses, possibilities). The response to the skeptic is to remove any context, any criteria--Witt is bringing us back to our ordinary criteria.

There has to be some criteria by which we judge correctness here. And yet, nothing is definitive. — Sam26

There are some things that can be done correctly: measuring, a wedding vow; there are also things where it might be overkill to say we do them "correctly": pointing, doubting; and there are things were "correctness" does not apply--where there is no measure of having met a predetermined standard (say, a rule) that would ensure it was right: a call for justice, artistic expression, the extension of a concept into a new context, etc. That is not to say these things do not have any criteria (anything essential about them), but just that correctness is not the way they work (though we desire to have meaning work one way--word here and essence there).

You've missed my whole point. I guess I didn't explain it well enough. :lol:

You've missed my whole point. I guess I didn't explain it well enough — Sam26

I believe we just disagree. I was making a different claim about "use" and showing the limitations of correctness (and rules; as if to say: there are all kinds of coins)--that rules are not essential to what is meaningful.

not just any use conveys meaning — Sam26

If it is a use of a concept it is a meaningful sense of the concept. It is not my use (say, as if intended); a use is a possibility of the concept (although concepts may be extended into new contexts and then the use and the meaningfulness is of course tested--this is where our responsibility comes into play).

Maybe there just isn’t any precision here. It’s just like the command, “Stand here!” There is no X that marks the spot, but this response can’t be satisfying, at least not to me. — Sam26

As Witt will say about vagueness (~#98) and blurriness (#71), an imprecise expression can sometimes be better than an exact one. The unsatisfying part may be that rules do not apply to vague statements--that our desire for completeness and certainty is unfulfilled. But to say "Stand roughly there!" (#71) and point is all that is essential in my expressing this to you; it makes a distinction from down the street, and there is no reason (given the context Witt provides) to take this as anything except a use of a command--why "must" (#101) we have something exact? how exact (exactly) in this case?

Well yes — Antony Nickles

Then it's no longer language language is it? This is one of my complaints against Wittgensteinization of philosophy. It seems to rely wholly or a lot on equiovaction. When I read the word "grammar" in Wittgenteinian philosophy I immediately think language but when I dig deeper it's got a technical meaning that has nothing to do with grammar in the linguistic sense. I fear the so-called linguistic turn, true to Wittgenstein's own pronouncements, is in name only.

Then it's no longer language language is it? — TheMadFool

That's a bit harsh. He changes the direction of philosophy and he isn't entitled to a term to generally refer to what takes him a whole book to set out. No forms? no thing-in-itself? no means of production?

When I read the word "grammar" in Wittgenteinian philosophy I immediately think language but when I dig deeper it's got a technical meaning that has nothing to do with grammar in the linguistic sense. I fear the so-called linguistic turn, true to Wittgenstein's own pronouncements, is in name only. — TheMadFool

People calling it "the linguistic turn" is, of course, a misnomer (as if Austin just wanted to label "speech-acts"). He is not looking at language itself (although meaning is one of the concepts he investigates). He is looking at our expressions to learn about the structure of different things in our world. The claims he makes are based on the fact that our criteria and the conditions of our concepts are part of us, what we say reflects how we actually work in the world; when we ask: "What do we mean (imply) when we say 'I know I am in pain' " we learn about the implicit workings (essence) of our lives.

He is not looking at language itself — Antony Nickles

@Wayfarer

This, I suspect, is your interpretation. From what I read from SEP, no one seems to have a handle on what Wittgenstein really meant to convey.

Here's my own thoughts on the linguistic turn:


Firstly,

Don't mistake the finger pointing at the moon for the moon. — Some Guy

Philosophy is not about "moon", it's about moon.

Secondly,

mayhaps there is no moon or possibly the moon is irrelevant.

That Wittgenstein's philosophy has something to do with philosophy of mind (private language) is telling. For some reason I think of idealism.

why does he feel he has to make this statement? — Antony Nickles

You were proposing that sensations are felt, but not known, and he thought that it was incorrect, so he told you...

at what point is your knowledge not just your expression? — Antony Nickles

Before I express it.

I don't think name-calling got us anywhere previously, and I also think condescension is inappropriate. — Antony Nickles

What's leading somewhere though, is paying attention to what others are saying

Before we even look at what my pain is, much less how pain is meaningful/how it works, we want to be sure I cannot fail to know myself, that there is something essential in my experience, so we manufacture a picture that can meet those requirements. This is the creation of Plato's forms, Descartes' god, Marx's proletariat, Ayer's statements that are only true or false, and positivism's correspondence picture of the world (in response to which Wittgenstein is trying to find out in the PI why we are driven to think this way). — Antony Nickles

Any positive theory proposes a certain explanation for why things and/or people behave the way they do (or the way we think they do). From Popper, such theories are almost always false, but that does not mean that they are useless. They help us think the world, even if imperfectly. Descartes' god and Marx's proletariat are useful concepts (or theories) inasmuch as they help us think metaphysically or politically, inasmuch as they solve certain problems.

So the biggest error in your para above is the one I bolded. We will always fail at understanding ourselves completely. But just because absolute certainty and truth is beyond grasp does not mean that we cannot approximate truth here or there.

That's the insight Popper gives, that lacks in the logical positivists and Wittgenstein: our knowledge is always approximative, tentative, will never be perfect, etc. We are not absolute gods, we are relativistic, approximative animals.

However, language-games are only language-games if they are language-games proper.... But, understanding which language-games are THE language-games, i.e., those language-games that are language-games proper, is what’s most difficult to discern. .. how does one know if a particular language-game is correct or not. — Sam26

I don't think there is any authorization for this line of thought in Wittgenstein.

I have no doubt about that, but I'm wondering if it's a problem. It doesn't seem to be easily resolvable.

It doesn't seem to be easily resolvable. — Sam26

But is it a problem with Wittgenstein or with this way of reading him?

This [that Witt is not looking at language itself], I suspect, is your interpretation. — TheMadFool

Nothing I can say will tell you anything so that you won't have to see for yourself.

From what I read from SEP, no one seems to have a handle on what Wittgenstein really meant to convey. — TheMadFool

Can everyone please stop thinking philosophy is like facts; that we can just sum it up in a couple sentences and put it in a box and we've, what? learned something? have the popular answer? reached a consensus?

why does he feel he has to make this statement?
— Antony Nickles

You were proposing that sensations are felt, but not known, and he thought that it was incorrect, so he told you... — Olivier5

Is this the "context" in which he said it? Saying it is incorrect doesn't even say how it is incorrect, much less why this is the statement that he feels he needs to make, such as that, say, my categorizing our relationship with pain as expression takes away having something fixed and constant about ourselves.

at what point is your knowledge not just your expression?
— Antony Nickles

Before I express it. — Olivier5

The question was asked in response to a back-and-forth were I was expressing my pain and it was being accepted as known; the reason for the question was because if our language can reach any depth of pain, than there is nothing leftover to know except what is unexpressed. But to address your taking it as a point on a chronological line, yes, there is a time before which we express our pain to others (or ourselves), but this is just to say that we are aware of it, which we may not be.

What's leading somewhere though, is paying attention to what others are saying — Olivier5

You mean like saying "You were proposing that sensations are felt, but not known", when I said we have pain, we are aware of it (or repress it), we express it (or suppress it), and it is acknowledged by others (or rejected).

So the biggest error in your para above is ["we want to be sure I cannot fail to know myself"]. We will always fail at understanding ourselves completely. — Olivier5

And here, I was not making a statement or a claim; I was describing why everyone has a desire for certainty--the formulation "we" and "I" is because we all fall prey to this temptation.

But just because absolute certainty and truth is beyond grasp does not mean that we cannot approximate truth here or there. — Olivier5

And this is the tipping point, when we realize we cannot know something with certainty, completely. We do not then abandon true/false statements, or rules, or knowledge, or word-referent and let the thing tell us how to grasp it with its ordinary criteria. We cling to the aspiration for the ideal but simply accept that we only "approximate" it, are "relativistic" to it.

why this is the statement that he feels he needs to make, such as that, say, my categorizing our relationship with pain as expression takes away having something fixed and constant about ourselves. — Antony Nickles

I suppose it's taking away or not mentioning self-awareness, or more precisely in this specific case of pain, it takes away or does not mention our capacity for interoception (conscious perception of sensations from inside the body) of pain. In short: pain is an MIS for the body, a carrier of information that can be reliably acquired, consciously examined and thus in some measure known and recognised as such by the subject.

We cling to the aspiration for the ideal but simply accept that we only "approximate" it, are "relativistic" to it. — Antony Nickles

What else can we do than try and approach truth?

Ideals are ideals not because they can be achieved, but because they are desirable even in small measure, even when they can only be approached or approximated. It's good to tend towards them.

By analogy, if you’re not using your words in accord with the rules of the language-game, then you’re not doing anything with your words – your words lack meaning. — Sam26

If I say: "bad means good", is that in accord with or contrary to the rules of the language game? That depends on the language game is being played. A musician might understand what it means if someone says "that guy's a bad mofo", but someone unfamiliar with the language game might well think it means something very different.

Is that a proper or improper use of the word 'bad'? Someone who is "hip" will understand, but someone who is not might be confused by what a part of the body has to do with any of this. Dig?

let the thing tell us how to grasp it with its ordinary criteria — Antony Nickles

The word "its" there is odd, though, isn't it? Why isn't it, "our ordinary criteria"?

We cling to the aspiration for the ideal — Antony Nickles

I'm not convinced by this "clinging" image, or by pointing the finger at our "desire" for certainty, as if the trouble is some psychological quirk. I think language is inherently idealizing, and when we talk about it, we're idealizing the idealizing already there, but--- language is also strangely open-ended, and in coming up with new uses (@StreetlightX, @Joshs) we are not only idealizing anew but undermining older idealizations.

What Wittgenstein is able to show, when he describes the language-game in which an Important Word has its 'original home' (was that the phrase?), is not a use devoid of idealization, but how idealization works, and how it can be used to do work. For a novel use to be useful, we need to understand how older usages manage to be successful, and that's what language-games are supposed to make apparent.

If I say: "bad means good", is that in accord with or contrary to the rules of the language game? That depends on the language game is being played. A musician might understand what it means if someone says "that guy's a bad mofo", but someone unfamiliar with the language game might well think it means something very different. — Fooloso4

Of course it depends on the language-game being played. The meaning of a word IS its use in a language-game. Obviously there are various kinds of language-games that can occur with the same word, and even though this is the case, we still say meaning occurs within those specific language-games.

Moreover, not every use of a word has to accord with a rule, no more than every action in a game accords with a rule. For example, (Searle uses this e.g.) there is no rule that governs how high a ball is thrown when serving in tennis.

That said, no one seems to be following my point about language-games. It's been said that there are only language-games, not incorrect and correct language-games. Wittgenstein doesn't talk this way, supposedly, and this may be correct, but I'm not sure just yet about this. It seems weird to refer to language-games without reference to correctness, and it seems self-sealing. I can always say someone else's language-game isn't a language-game, because the word is not doing anything. And, in many cases this can be demonstrated, but in other cases, it's not an easy thing to do. Does this mean that there are cases that will never be resolved? Maybe that's just what it means. Is that just the nature of language. It seems to be. This is the point about my post.

I'll just say again that, it seems to me unlikely that Wittgenstein had the same understanding of "language-game" as someone inclined to ask, 'Is such-and-such a language game?' or 'Is such-and-such really a language-game?' or 'Is such-and-such a proper or correct language-game?' since he himself never seems to ask such questions. Rather than think such obvious questions didn't occur to him, I'm inclined now to think maybe "language-game" is not an ontological category at all, but a sort of analysis.

Maybe. But then it's still odd that he didn't foresee what in some ways is a very natural and apparently widespread misreading, and preemptively warn against it, so I don't know that my idea isn't in the same boat.

Statement 3 is a proposition, which in this case, is justfiably true. Therefore, I know I have a headache. — TheMadFool

You don't need a justification in order to conclude that you have a headache. it is not the end product of a process of ratiocination.

As if you could justify to us your claim to have a headache by producing for us your pain - as if the pain were not itself the headache.

The objection here is not that you do not have a pain - that, for you, is certain. It's that "I know I am in pain" is like "I know I have an iPhone".

Words have definitions; — Antony Nickles

You so sure? Perhaps, so long as you don't mistake the definition for the use, or for the meaning.

The objection here is not that you do not have a pain - that, for you, is certain. It's that "I know I am in pain" is like "I know I have an iPhone". — Banno

Or 'I remembered my own name again,' when filling out a form.

Grant that it is pointless to say, 'i know I have a headache'; is there also something wrong with saying that? Is it, as some suggest, having read LW, a misuse of the word 'know'?