As simple as possible, both apply to subjectivity.

I always thought that understanding the nature of qualia is essential to understanding phenomenology.

If you want to branch out and incorporate intersubjectivity, then it seems as though one might as well include common features between participants and isomorphic attributes alike.

But, definitionally it seems to me that the greatest attribute between phenomenology and solipsism are related to subjectivity, qualia, and intension.

In what ways are phenomenology and solipsism alike, in what ways are they different? — baker

Phenomenology (Husserl) is meant as a scientific method of studying consciousness. Solipsism isn’t anything like that at all. Phenomenology does not take the stance that the physical world doesn’t really exist it just ‘brackets out’ that and focuses purely on the experience - to investigate consciousness.

Solipsism is a pure kind of idealism and phenomenology isn’t (although too many pigeon hole phenomenology as idealism).

Interesting question. I'm interested in how phenomenology understands intersubjectivity and how a shared knowledge system such as science works alongside, or in contrast to, say a religious system. Phenomenologists still make decisions and have preferences in the world (politics, spirituality, jobs, family, schools) - how are these made?

I think 'solipsism' results from a misunderstanding of Descartes. Because of his famous idea, cogito ergo sum, it is supposed that the only thing you can be completely certain of is your own being - which if interpreted literally, sounds solipsistic. But I certainly don't think that Descartes intended that, nor do I feel it's a necessary implication of his philosophy.

I often say, empathy is the remedy for solipsism, because through empathy you gain insight into the sufferings of others.

The point about phenomenology, as others have pointed out, is that it is the philosophical analysis of the nature of conscious experience. 'Phenomena' is derived from 'appearance', so phenomenology wants to understand the nature of the appearance of objects as elements of experience. That's where it differs from the natural sciences, which attempt to understand objects as they are in their own right with no reference to the subject. Naturalism is 'what you see out the window', phenomenology is 'you looking out the window'.

Phenomenologists still make decisions and have preferences in the world (politics, spirituality, jobs, family, schools) - how are these made? — Tom Storm

Phenomenology isn’t a ‘philosophy’ in terms of being a way of living life. That is probably why Husserl was quite explicit when framing phenomenology as a ‘science’ rather than a philosophy. There is no real ‘opinion’ involved just a regard for conscious experience upon which various different layers of investigation can take place in an endless task (as with the natural sciences).

Phenomenology isn’t a ‘philosophy’ in terms of being a way of living life. — I like sushi

Yep, I get that - but I ask what it might contribute towards an ordinary life and decisions? How is it of use?

Yep, I get that - but I ask what it might contribute towards an ordinary life and decisions? How is it of use? — Tom Storm

For example, it can radically reconceptualize the way one understands "empathy" and the way one "empathizes".

Normally, when an objectivist/naive realist "empathizes", this is actually a simulation, an imagining of what it would be like to be in another person's shoes.

But, ideally, a phenomenologist could empathize without simulation.

Empathy without Simulation

Philosophical Empathy (in the Style of Merleau-Ponty)

Phenomenologists still make decisions and have preferences in the world (politics, spirituality, jobs, family, schools) - how are these made? — Tom Storm

I wonder about that too.

. Phenomenologists still make decisions and have preferences in the world (politics, spirituality, jobs, family, schools) - how are these made? — Tom Storm

How many of these decisions and preferences are made by use of an objectively causal method of reasoning? For instance, stipulating social or personal conditioning as a basis of political affiliation or child rearing.

Phenomenology replaces objective causality, even the sophisticated reciprocal versions that are emerging in various social sciences, by intentional
motivation. When applied to human cultural domains , it reveals intricate patterns and regularities that causal
models miss.

In what ways are phenomenology and solipsism alike, in what ways are they different? — baker

P & S both concern 'intentionality'.

P differs from S by excluding ontic commitments from its examination of intentionality (i.e. whether or not e.g. dreams, sensations, moods, images, ideas, etc refer to anything actually external to intentions). S, on the other hand, seems to have at least three forms of ontic commitment:

S-1 assumes there is not anything external to self-intentionality; or
S-2 assumes that, even if there is something external to self-intentionality, there are not any intentional-others; or
S-3 assumes that, even if there are intentional-others, whether or not they are intentional is unknowable.

By far, P is less of an egregious offender of lived experience and reason than S.

However, that said, both are conceptual / linguistic artifacts of folk psychology and introspection illusion; in so far as both P and S begin with groundless doubting of the external (non-subjective) world, they are forms of idealism.

It is the same as asking how is science of use. That was kind of my point. Husserl frames phenomenology as a science of consciousness - ask cognitive neuroscientists who use phenomenology in their work why it is of use and I imagine they’d say it helps to categirise and delineate between various cognitive functions by parsing them up via feelings of agency and comparing brains scans to persons subjective appreciation.

As a purely theoretical means of modelling conscious experience it is also useful in that the ‘lab’ is yourself. You cannot get to the ‘essence’ so to speak and it is the thought of an ‘essence’ that is revealing as it tells us something about consciousness - as does attention, awareness and our sense of time and authorship. Time is a very difficult problem to deal with and in the phenomenological sense we’re always talking about items that CANNOT be measured. As in time is not about seconds and minutes, because time is ‘felt’ differently by different people in different circumstances. This is where the phenomenological investigation can explore where the natural/positive sciences cannot.

Note: Husserl was staunchly opposed to psychologism.

It is the same as asking how is science of use. That was kind of my point. — I like sushi

Science? I guess there I can see how it might be of use. Science is an expression of physicalism (for the most part) and (is/ought problem aside) we can decide upon many things based upon this worldview. The use of vaccinations, for instance; considering climate change and/or whether or not to support certain Presidential candidates and their claims/positions.

If, as @180proof has stated, phenomenology is a form of idealism, that raises a range of questions.

As a purely theoretical means of modelling conscious experience it is also useful in that the ‘lab’ is yourself. — I like sushi

I'm not sure that means an awful lot to me. I don't really give a toss about what might be possible in reflecting upon my own conscious experience. Reflecting upon time holds almost no interest either.

Husserl was staunchly opposed to psychologism. — I like sushi

Interesting. Was this because it was uncomfortably close to an objective scientific approach to him? or a form of scientism?

Thanks.

I'm not sure that means an awful lot to me. I don't really give a toss about what might be possible in reflecting upon my own conscious experience. Reflecting upon time holds almost no interest either. — Tom Storm

If you’re not interested in studying consciousness then a science of consciousness is pretty much a waste of time for you then.

Note: phenomenology isn’t really a kind of ‘idealism’ anymore than cognitive neuroscience is. What is different about it from the positive sciences is it deals with the item of experience irrespective of any dualistic notions.

His concern with psychology in general was the atomisation and reduction of psychology’s subjective nature to quantifiable objectivity. The very principle of psychology is that of subjective feel not some measured representation of a subjective experience. The over application of positive scientific method towards psychology was something he felt as a wrong move. If we’re measuring motion fair enough, the positive sciences make sense. When it comes to understanding the very cognitive function that formed the positive sciences he was not as convinced.

I think I’d agree with what someone else mentioned here. That is that in the US anything regarded as ‘continental’ is viewed with the upmost suspicion. That is why I see many categorising Husserlian phenomenology as ‘idealism’.

I’d say proof is off if he has labelled phenomenology as ‘assuming there is nothing external’. It does no such thing. It just isn’t interested in such things as the item under scrutiny is consciousness and ‘intentionality’ is necessarily ‘consciousness of …’ and the ‘thinghood’ of the … is not of any direct concern for the purposes of exploring the conscious experience. That is why Husserl talks about ‘bracketing out’ not ‘denying the existence of’.

Framing phenomenology as solipsism is missing the point. If you can say you are conscious you can explore consciousness through being conscious to some degree. One approach is to go through empirical science with experimentation in a physical setting by taking clear (or the best) measurements you can and the other is to enter a kind of meditative state by which you can articulate items of conscious experience and determine what is and isn’t fathomable. One will necessarily feed off of the other.

Personally I think it is a useful tool for some and something that others have no real concern or interest in. Just like some people will attach themselves to stoicism or morality more whereas others will be wholly consumed by logic or epistemology or something else.

If you’re not interested in studying consciousness then a science of consciousness — I like sushi

Is that what I said? My point was I am not interested in reflecting upon my own consciousness. I can't see how this approach could lead to much more than a self-indulgent manufacturing of meaning. But I could be wrong.

Your other points are interesting ones. I'll keep reading.

P differs from S by excluding ontic commitments from its examination of intentionality (i.e. whether or not e.g. dreams, sensations, moods, images, ideas, etc refer to anything actually external to intentions). — 180 Proof

For Husserl it is not a question of WHETHER there is anything external to intentionality. In one sense there is never anything external to it, and in another sense reference to something external to itself is the essence of intentionality. It consists of an egoic (noetic) and objective ( noematic) pole in an indissociable relation. The noematic pole is what you refer to as the ‘external’, but it is what Husserl calls an imminent transcendence. What Husserl’s method of the reduction does is to bracket off pre-conceived ideas about the nature of worldly objects in order to arrive at the primordial basis of subject-object , internal -external, self-world interaction.

“Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world about which I have always had ideas and spoken about meaningfully, has meaning and is accepted as valid by me because of my own apperceptive performances because of these experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those performances—as well as other functions of consciousness, such as thinking. But is it not a piece of foolishness to suppose that world has being because of some performance of mine? Clearly, I must make my formulation more precise. In my Ego there is formed, from out of the proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my “representation of the world, ” my “picture of the world, ” whereas outside of me, naturally enough, there is the world itself. But is this really a good way of putting it? Does this talk about outer and inner, if it makes any sense at all, receive its meaning from anywhere else than from my formation and my preservation of meaning? Should I forget that the totality of everything that I can ever think of as in being resides within the universal realm of consciousness, within my realm, that of the Ego, and indeed within what is for me real or possible?” (Phenomenology and Anthropology)

My point was I am not interested in reflecting upon my own consciousness. I can't see how this approach could lead to much more than a self-indulgent manufacturing of meaning. But I could be wrong. — Tom Storm

From a Wiki page on Hesse's Siddhartha:

In Hesse's novel, experience, the totality of conscious events of a human life, is shown as the best way to approach understanding of reality and attain enlightenment⁠—⁠Hesse's crafting of Siddhartha's journey shows that understanding is attained not through intellectual methods, nor through immersing oneself in the carnal pleasures of the world and the accompanying pain of samsara; rather, it is the completeness of these experiences that allows Siddhartha to attain understanding.

This is an example of an non-systematic, non-structured approach of reflecting upon one's consciousness, for which, nevertheless, enlightenment is promised as a result. It's a rather popular approach, this freestyle, DIY-enlightenment.


In contrast, Early Buddhism, as well as, to some extent, phenomenology, work with a structured, systematic reflecting upon one's own consciousness. One isn't supposed to just "look within", but to look within in a very specific way. Many will object, of course, that in such a case, one isn't actually looking within at all.


Here an example of "reflecting upon one's own consciousness" in a structured way from the suttas:
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.010.than.html

One isn't supposed to just "look within", but to look within in a very specific way. Many will object, of course, that in such a case, one isn't actually looking within at all. — baker

Interesting and thanks for the reference. (I read most of Hesse back in the 1980's.) Yes, I wonder if we can look within at all too. I also wonder if epoché, can actually be accomplished. Is it really possible to bracket off of block biases and assumptions in order to explain a phenomenon in terms of its own inherent system of meaning?

I would, instead, formulate the question like that:
"If one "looks within" by following someone else's instructions (on how to look within), is then one actually looking within at all? If one is following someone else's instructions (on how to look within), is this not simply a case of internalizing someone else's ideas about one's identity?"

The underlying assumption and concern here (and it seems, in your formulation as well), is that a person's inner life is unique and incomprehensible for other people, to the point that any kind of conceptual systematization of the inner life of humans as such is impossible. In short, that humans are complete strangers to eachother. And what is more, that this is how it should be. That it would be a breach of personal boundaries to assume otherwise. And that it would be an act of self-deception and self-humiliation to consider or worse, accept, someone else's ideas about the structure of (one's) inner life.

I fail to see the point of your reply in light of me not saying anything in particular about Husserl (who is neither the alpha nor omega of phenomenology).

He is literally the founder of phenomenology. The term you use talking about phenomenology (intentionality) is his specific to phenomenology.

Some of the leading ideas of the phenomenological tradition can be traced back to this issue. Following the lead of Edmund Husserl (1900, 1913), who was both the founder of phenomenology and a student of Brentano’s, the point of the phenomenological analysis has been to show that the essential property of intentionality of being directed onto something is not contingent upon whether some real physical target exists independently of the intentional act itself. To achieve this goal, two concepts have been central to Husserl’s internalist interpretation of intentionality: the concept of a noema (plural noemata) and the concept of epoche (i.e., bracketing) or phenomenological reduction. By the word ‘noema,’ Husserl refers to the internal structure of mental acts. The phenomenological reduction is meant to help get at the essence of mental acts by suspending all naive presuppositions about the difference between real and fictitious entities (on these complex phenomenological concepts, see the papers by Føllesdal and others conveniently gathered in Dreyfus (1982). For further discussion, see Bell (1990) and Dummett (1993).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

Although not the first to coin the term, it is uncontroversial to suggest that the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), is the “father” of the philosophical movement known as phenomenology.

https://iep.utm.edu/husserl/

If we're talking about phenomenology then it makes sense to talk about, and refer directly to, Husserl. If you say 'intentionality' and talk about 'phenomenology' you are necessarily involving Husserl just as you'd be talking about Wittgenstein at the mention of language games or beetles in matchboxes.

Husserl was indeed the catalyst for the "movement" but the precursors from which he derived much of his work on phenomenology are thinkers such as F. Bretano (via Anselm's "idea in the mind / reality") re intention; Hegel, Kant, Descartes ... the Neoplatonists (via Plato's "amamnesis") re intuition; and W. Dilthey (via "life-nexus") re: lifeworld.

I don't see how any approach to the study of consciousness which is not rooted in a phenomenological approach can actually be a study of consciousness at all, as a matter of definition.