Two experiencing entities. — Daemon

Alright, I think we're talking past each other a bit. The two (mind you, not one) experiencing entities are a result of corpus callosotomy. The notion that experience is what makes you an entity cannot account for the fact that a corpus callosotomy should make two entities. Agentive integration by contrast explains why you are a single entity. The notion that you are an entity due to agentive integration does account for the fact that a corpus callosotomy should make two entities. Once again, experience is doing no work for you here; it's an epicycle.

But I don't really think the effects of cutting the corpus callosum are as straightforward as they are sometimes portrayed, for example, the person had a previous life with connected hemispheres. — Daemon

No idea what you're saying here. Are you suggesting there are two individuals before the corpus callosotomy?

I don't think the "corpus callosum/AHS" argument addresses this. — Daemon

Quite the opposite; see above. We can take an external view as well:

https://movie-usa.glencoesoftware.com/video/10.1212/WNL.0000000000006172/video-1
From: https://n.neurology.org/content/91/11/527

This person did not have a corpus callosotomy; she had a stroke (see article). It is very obvious that she has AHS. That's also curious... why is it obvious? What behaviors is she exhibiting that suggest AHS?

The two (mind you, not one) experiencing entities are a result of corpus callosotomy — InPitzotl

I don't understand why you are telling me that, as if it was a point against me.

This person did not have a corpus callosotomy; she had a stroke (see article). It is very obvious that she has AHS. That's also curious... why is it obvious? What behaviors is she exhibiting that suggest AHS? — InPitzotl

I don't understand why you are asking me that.

I don't understand why you are telling me that, as if it was a point against me. — Daemon

Because you keep asking about being an entity, but you're not accounting for the number here. But you keep saying that I haven't accounted for things.

I don't understand why you are asking me that. — Daemon

Because we can indeed tell by her behaviors. The subject talking to us is behaving as if her alien hand is a stranger. And you aren't diagnosing her alien hand by counting how many "experiences" there are. Her behavior is distinct from a normative case, but also distinct from someone who has half their body paralyzed after a stroke. There's still agency in there, just not integrated. Apparently you think that's a bad description; but it's kind of definitive of the condition.

It's true that understanding is, from the standpoint of someone intent on conveying (say) a point, restricted to that point. For instance, if I have a certain idea, call it x, that I want to share with you, I would only deem you to have understood when you too have, let's just say, an exact copy of x in your mind. In a sense, then, understanding boils down to minds xeroxing the contents of other minds. What are the ramifications of such an interpretation? Your guess is as good as mine.

However, I don't see why understanding should be limited/constrained in this way. The Buddha, it's said, once saw a pot of gold and exclaimed to his disciples "look, a snake!"