I understand that if Newton supposed some events to be caused and some not, and if Kant supposed that all events must be caused, and if modern physics supposes that no venets are caused, then the truth of those suppositions will not be questioned. But that is not the same as to claim that they are neither true nor false. — Janus

The point is that they were - are - all true in the sciences for which they are absolute presuppositions, and that meaning neither more nor less than that they are absolutely presupposed. I, myself, take that to mean that in the particular science for which each was absolutely presupposed, it not only made sense, but made the fundamental sense that the rest of the science was grounded in. Thus the truth or falsity irrelevant to their "efficacy," such questions coming from outside of the thinking.

I think modern math provides an example: that 2+2=4, aside from, or in addition to, being a provable theorem in, e;g., standard arithmetic, it also stands as an (expression of an) absolute presupposition. Except that we now have non-standard maths where 2+2 either does not equal 4, or does nor have to equal 4. Thus within, not questioned but absolutely presupposed, but from outside even turned upside down! And math seems one area of thinking that seems to push its roots deeper and deeper by questioning all those that it can identify. I imagine, for example, that number itself is an absolute presupposition of both standard and non-standard maths, although I have to wonder how the non-standardists would define it.

That is obviously what you believe has happened to you, but beyond that it just sounds like more "dogmatic nonsense". — Janus

Your mistake. The idea isn't to be free of them - for that is impossible - but rather to know them for what they are.

The point is that they were - are - all true in the sciences for which they are absolute presuppositions, — tim wood

I don't think 'true' is the right word; useful or valid would be better.

Your mistake. The idea isn't to be free of them - for that is impossible - but rather to know them for what they are. — tim wood

I am not convinced that you or Collingwood do "know them for what they are". You certainly haven't demonstrated that you do.

I am not convinced that you or Collingwood do "know them for what they are". You certainly haven't demonstrated that you do. — Janus

You could attempt to read and understand his book. But you've made me your target. What is it that you suppose I do not know?

I have read Collingwood's book and I still don't really understand what it could mean to say that metaphysical propositions or axioms are not true or false — Janus

I'd like to try to run through a thought experiment. I'm not trying to set you up for anything. I'm not even going to try to convince you of anything. I just want to see if I can get to the heart of our disagreement.

How would you characterize your philosophical understanding of the nature of reality? Realism, materialism, idealism, physicalism? Is objective reality all there is? Is reality just information? Is it just an illusion that only exists in our minds? For me it's easy - I'm a pragmatist, which means you can't tie me down to anything. When I was young, though, I was a strong materialist. Wore the label proudly. It seemed self-evident to me that the world is just the physical stuff that we interact with.

Now - is there a philosophical understanding that you reject strongly? For me it was always idealism. The idea that basis of reality existed on some sort of higher plane not accessible to us seemed deluded.

I guess by your way of seeing things, your chosen philosophical viewpoint is true and the one you reject is false. Is there any objective or even convincing way for us to resolve the issue and prove that one is correct? Obviously, from where I stand there isn't.

I don't really see that running through this will resolve the disagreement we have, but I thought it might be interesting.

I don't think 'true' is the right word; useful or valid would be better. — Janus

This is the way I would say it too - Not true or false, useful or not useful.

I have read the book, and I believe I have understood it. Must I then agree with it? I agree that all systems of thought have their founding or grounding presuppositions, the truth of which cannot be questioned from within the system. But I don't understand that to be the same as to say that those propositions are incapable of being true or false tout suite.

How would you characterize your philosophical understanding of the nature of reality? Realism, materialism, idealism, physicalism? Is objective reality all there is? Is reality just information? Is it just an illusion that only exists in our minds? For me it's easy - I'm a pragmatist, which means you can't tie me down to anything. When I was young, though, I was a strong materialist. Wore the label proudly. It seemed self-evident to me that the world is just the physical stuff that we interact with. — T Clark

I don't have a settled ontological view. If you ask me whether the universe existed prior to human beings I would say yes. Does it follow that the universe is mind-independent? It would seem so, but it depends on what you mean by "exist". That we cannot definitively answer such questions I would agree, but that there is no truth of the matter I don't have a settled opinion about.

I don't really see that running through this will resolve the disagreement we have, but I thought it might be interesting. — T Clark

I'm not even sure we are disagreeing. Remember that I said I don't know what Collingwood means by saying that absolute presuppositions are not capable of being true or false. If all he means is that their truth cannot be questioned from within the systems that they are foundational then I would agree. Do you think he wants to claim more than that?

Anyway it has been interesting and somewhat (which is probably the best we can hope for) clarifying; so thanks.

I don't believe your understanding that all mental phenomena are considered metaphysical is consistent with any generally accepted definition of the word. — T Clark

I agree. That's why I went back (meta-), beyond medieval theologians, to see what Aristotle was talking about in his second volume. The first volume, Physics, was about physical things (Quanta ; Science), but the second volume, "Metaphysics", was about non-physical concepts (Qualia ; Philosophy), such as abstractions, wisdom, ideas, meanings, attitudes, relationships, primary causes, etc . . .

Yes, I know Aristotle didn't use that term, but when spelled with a hyphen, "Meta-Physics" denotes the practical distinction between material Science and mental Philosophy : that which is beyond the scope of physical examination, but is amenable to rational scrutiny. So, that's how I derived a unique non-dictionary definition of "Meta-Physics" for my Enformationism thesis :cool:


What is metaphysics according to Aristotle? "
Summary Metaphysics. What is known to us as metaphysics is what Aristotle called "first philosophy." Metaphysics involves a study of the universal principles of being, the abstract qualities of existence itself.
https://www.sparknotes.com/biography/aristotle/section7/

That we cannot definitively answer such questions I would agree, but that there is no truth of the matter I don't have a settled opinion about. — Janus

I'm not even sure we are disagreeing. — Janus

So I guess here's the real difference in our views - As I see it, if we cannot definitively demonstrate the truth of a proposition, even in principle, then it has no truth value.

If all he means is that their truth cannot be questioned from within the systems that they are foundational then I would agree. Do you think he wants to claim more than that? — Janus

Good question. I think he means that but also more than that. I'll have to think about it some more.

Anyway it has been interesting and somewhat (which is probably the best we can hope for) clarifying; so thanks. — Janus

It has been more than somewhat clarifying for me.

I think you and I have taken this as far as we can for now.

So I guess here's the real difference in our views - As I see it, if we cannot definitively demonstrate the truth of a proposition, even in principle, then it has no truth value. — T Clark

I don't hold the opposite view to that; I think that whether or not something whose truth value is undecidable nonetheless may be true or false, is itself undecidable. Purely logically speaking it would seem it would, but logic is not always enough to be convincing.

Anyway, it's been a good conversation and when I said it has been only somewhat clarifying, that does not reflect on the conversation in particular, but reflects the fact that for me everything is only somewhat clear.

I think that whether or not something whose truth value is undecidable nonetheless may be true or false, is itself undecidable. — Janus

My, aren't you clever. Nicely put.

I think that whether or not something whose truth value is undecidable nonetheless may be true or false, is itself undecidable. — Janus

I think I may want to start a new thread just for this statement.

Ha, thanks. I could introduce another (faux) wrinkle in the fabric by saying that I can't decide whether the question as to whether propositions that are undecidable for us can nonetheless be true or false is itself undecidable or not, but I think that would be verging on the perverse.

It reminds me of a line that always stuck with me from the Two Ronnies, where one of the Ronnies says to the other: " I couldn't possibly fail to disagree with you less".

I am left with the strange feeling that I should apologize. :chin:

I have read the book, and I believe I have understood it. Must I then agree with it? I agree that all systems of thought have their founding or grounding presuppositions, the truth of which cannot be questioned from within the system. But I don't understand that to be the same as to say that those propositions are incapable of being true or false tout suite. — Janus

If you read the book, you remember RGC's example of the pathologist, challenged by being asked, "But how do you know everything that happens has a cause?" And his civil answer, if he is civil, is, "That is a thing we take for granted in my job. We don't question it. We don't try to verify it. It isn't a thing that anyone has discovered, like microbes or the circulation of the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted" (31). And RGC clarifies it is an absolute presupposition that, once made in all the sciences, is now made only in a few, medicine being one of them (32), c. 1935. So to you the question, does everything that happens have a cause? And if you think that's true, then maybe you can prove it. Or if you like you can presuppose it, locating yourself within the history of science somewhere from 350 to 100 years ago.

Will one of you logicians write out in English the defining expressions for abstract objects at the beginning of this article from Stanford? This seems to form the basis of Stanford's Metaphysical Laboratory.

Theory of Abstract Objects

Edit: OK, it looks like there is an explanation of sorts in the article. If you don't feel it's worth the effort I might agree.

I think you and I have taken this as far as we can for now. — T Clark

I'm sorry that you are frustrated by the lack of progress on this perennial philosophical stalemate. But, this topic is labeled "what is metaphysics. yet again". So, I think it's essential that we at least agree on a clear distinction between "Physics" and "Metaphysics". Otherwise, we'll never find any common ground for a rational discussion. And "physical" versus "mental" seems to be the closest to a black & white dichotomy. Of course, in philosophy, the setup is seldom that simple. But, if we can begin there, perhaps we can chip away at any other obstacles to mutual understanding.

I just read an article in Philosophy Now magazine, reviewing a book about four "linguistic" philosophers, including Wittgenstein and Heidegger. The reviewer said that they had one thing in common : "the belief that mistaken assumptions about language are the wellsprings of error in philosophy". And I think most dictionary definitions of the term "Metaphysics" mainly reflect medieval Christian theologian usage of that word --- not Aristotle's original intention for his "first philosophy". That's why I contend that most dictionaries simply repeat those "mistaken assumptions" derived from blending Greek philosophy with Christian theology.

The article goes on to quote Heidegger : "we cannot he argues, reduce philosophy's biggest question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?" to any system of knowledge, because it is a question that informs every such question". Note the word "informs". Does it refer to a physical phase change. or to a non-physical transfer of Meaning rather than Matter? That is the distinction underlying my personal definition of "Meta-Physics". Although I like the hyphenated term, for it's symmetrical metaphorical implications, I also sometimes substitute "Non-Physics" in order to avoid the theological baggage of "metaphysics". Do you accept that there are non-physical aspects of the world? If not, this thread will be at an impasse.

I harp on the not-physical implications of "Meta-Physics" in order to distinguish a Philosophical concept from a Scientific topic. Empirical Scientists don't usually concern themselves with abstract concepts, such as Being and Ontology. But posters on this forum often try to place "metaphysics" under the umbrella of physical science, in order to avoid its spiritual implications. Which is why I point-out the second dictionary definition : "abstract theory with no basis in reality." ___Oxford. Can we simply agree that "abstractions" are not Real, but Ideal --- existing only in abstract Minds instead of concrete Brains? :cool:

Abstract and concrete :
In metaphysics, the distinction between abstract and concrete refers to a divide between two types of entities. Many philosophers hold that this difference has fundamental metaphysical significance.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_and_concrete

I'm sorry that you are frustrated by the lack of progress on this perennial philosophical stalemate. But, this topic is labeled "what is metaphysics. yet again". So, I think it's essential that we at least agree on a clear distinction between "Physics" and "Metaphysics". — Gnomon

I'm not frustrated, I just think your understanding and use of the word "metaphysics" is too different from mine for us to have a fruitful discussion now. As I've said previously, I came to metaphysics with a specific interest in the difference between the idea of objective reality, which I understand as the basis of western science, and the Tao, as described in the Tao Te Ching. Looking at that and similar issues convinced me that the difference between metaphysical positions is not a matter of truth or falsehood, but rather of usefulness in a particular situation. When I came across Collingwood's work, I found it very helpful in finding the right words to describe those differences in a way that I find satisfying.

I guess I don't see any good way to resolve the differences between your way of seeing things and mine.

So to you the question, does everything that happens have a cause? — tim wood

A cause? Everything that happens, as we understand it, has a multitude of causes or conditions, doesn't it?

No it doesn't mean "outside physics".
That would be the term "υπερφυσικός" or supernatural (beyond nature).
The term Metaphysics from the Greek "μετα"(Αfter) and "φυσικά" (physika) was first coined by Andronicus of Rhodes who was organizing and publishing Aristotle's work.(~100 years after the death of Aristotle).
He stumbled upon Aristotle's thoughts on the implications his work "Physika" had in his philosophy, so he literally labeled that work "Meta/After (Aristotle's) Physika".
Now the term Physika(φυσική) back then was synonymous to "επιστήμη"/science since the study of Nature(Φυση) was literally the first discipline. When more disciplines were created Physika/physics took its place as one of them.

So in plain words "Metaphysics" just means: The philosophical work we do AFTER we have finished doing our scientific investigations. Its labels our philosophical efforts to understand what those new scientific data mean for our understanding and what are the implications on our current epistemology and the world.
This is why Aristotle included Physika(Science) as the second most important step in any philosophical inquiry. He knew that our philosophy should include our epistemology and our science in order for any of our hypotheses to be meaningful or reasonable.

Any hypotheses of science is nothing more than Metaphysics. Only after we verify or falsify them, they either become Theories(part of our Epistemology) or they are dismissed.

I'm not frustrated, I just think your understanding and use of the word "metaphysics" is too different from mine for us to have a fruitful discussion now. — T Clark

Yes. But such misunderstandings are the fodder for Philosophy. Only in Politics would it lead to retreat or attack.

That's why I suggested that we switch to some alternative words, such as "non-physical". Does a distinction between Physical and Non-physical compute in your Reality? Or do you lump Qualities and Properties together under the heading of Physical? Are such notions Natural or Supernatural (or Artificial) ; are they Real or Ideal, or what? What synonyms of Metaphysical would you prefer? :smile:

PS___See the post by Nickolasgaspar above

So in plain words "Metaphysics" just means: The philosophical work we do AFTER we have finished doing our scientific investigations. Its labels our philosophical efforts to understand what those new scientific data mean for our understanding and what are the implications on our current epistemology and the world. — Nickolasgaspar

This is an interpretation of the meaning of "metaphysics" I've never heard before. Based on the limited amount I have read, I don't find it very convincing.

Any hypotheses of science is nothing more than Metaphysics. Only after we verify or falsify them, they either become Theories(part of our Epistemology) or they are dismissed. — Nickolasgaspar

Even for a word such as "metaphysics," where there is such confusion and disagreement about it's meaning, this seems clearly wrong to me. Your argument sounds a lot like the one @Gnomon was making previously in this thread.

Those are examples of ideas & opinions, which are by definition : Meta-Physical. — Gnomon

Yes, I know Aristotle didn't use that term, but when spelled with a hyphen, "Meta-Physics" denotes the practical distinction between material Science and mental Philosophy : that which is beyond the scope of physical examination, but is amenable to rational scrutiny...

What is metaphysics according to Aristotle? "
Summary Metaphysics. What is known to us as metaphysics is what Aristotle called "first philosophy." Metaphysics involves a study of the universal principles of being, the abstract qualities of existence itself. — Gnomon

I harp on the not-physical implications of "Meta-Physics" in order to distinguish a Philosophical concept from a Scientific topic. Empirical Scientists don't usually concern themselves with abstract concepts, such as Being and Ontology. But posters on this forum often try to place "metaphysics" under the umbrella of physical science, in order to avoid its spiritual implications. Which is why I point-out the second dictionary definition : "abstract theory with no basis in reality." ___Oxford. Can we simply agree that "abstractions" are not Real, but Ideal --- existing only in abstract Minds instead of concrete Brains? — Gnomon

I disagreed with him also.

PS___See the post by Nickolasgaspar above — Gnomon

Yes, I just responded to it. I included some links to your posts. As I told him, 1) I think there are similarities between your positions and 2) I disagree with both of you.

But such misunderstandings are the fodder for Philosophy. Only in Politics would it lead to retreat or attack. — Gnomon

I don't think there is any way to find agreement between our two positions. I'm certain you won't convince me of your position and I strongly doubt I will convince you of mine. It just doesn't seem likely to be a very fruitful discussion.

No it doesn't mean "outside physics".
That would be the term "υπερφυσικός" or supernatural (beyond nature). — Nickolasgaspar

On this forum, I've been struggling to separate "Metaphysics" from its "Supernatural" heritage in Western Religion. That's why I have suggested going back beyond (meta-) Christian Theology to see what non-religious Aristotle was actually talking about. As you noted, it certainly wasn't about anything supernatural or spooky, but about making a philosophical distinction between Qualia & Quanta, between Potential & Actual, and betwixt Cause & Effect. Unfortunately, to this day we still portray Mind metaphorically as a Brain, which leads some to think that only Matter matters for thinking.

His metaphysical category could be interpreted as "more comprehensive" or even "transcendent", in the sense that he thought of Philosophy as going "beyond" the Space-Time & Thermodynamic boundary of Physics into the realm of Mind & Ideas, that are only limited by Logical laws. Thus, adding Philosophical science to Physical science. Aristotle even tried to fit Plato's ideal Forms into physical Shapes, by insisting that Forms do not exist independently of Things.

And that is equivalent to the notion -- common among Information scientists -- that what we now call "Information", is physical, in the sense of embodied ideas. But, in my holistic view, Information is both Physical (effect) and Meta-Physical (cause). That's a delicate distinction, but it could clear-up millennia of misunderstanding in Philosophy and Science. :nerd:

Meta- :
Original Greek meaning — Meta (from the Greek μετά, meta, meaning "after" or "beyond") is a prefix meaning "more comprehensive" or "transcending."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta

Potential :
Aristotle describes potentiality and actuality, or potency and action, as one of several distinctions between things that exist or do not exist. In a sense, a thing that exists potentially does not exist, but the potential does exist. .
Note -- even physical science finds the meta-physical notion of not-yet-real Potential to be useful in the Real world. For example, the Voltage of a battery is nothing-but Static Potential, until it is actualized into Active Amperage. We can't see or touch meta-physical Potential with our senses, but we can imagine it with our minds.

MIND and/or MATTER?
EITHER / OR divisive (reductive)
BOTH - AND comprehensive (holistic)

I don't think there is any way to find agreement between our two positions. — T Clark

So, there's no such thing as Meta-Physical? Hence no need for philosophical terms like Qualia and Quanta? If so, why do we keep trying to split Nature into two different philosophical categories? Are philosophers just frustrated scientists, trying to make their wordy theories seem applicable to the real world? Why then is Dualism so attractive to most non-philosophers? :cool:

PS__my worldview is ultimately Monistic, not Dualistic. If we could agree on that Unity, all disagreements would disappear.

PPS__ I apologize for not just going away quietly, but I think this topic is essential. Plus, I really get into this unreal stuff. :joke:

PPS__ I apologize for not just going away quietly, but I think this topic is essential. Plus, I really get into this unreal stuff. — Gnomon

I've laid out my whole metaphysics schtick over the previous six pages, not counting all the other places in the forum I've discussed it. I have no desire to go back over the whole thing again. Your understanding and mine are just too different to reconcile. I agree that it's essential, but I've thought about this a lot and I'm comfortable where I stand.

-"This is an interpretation of the meaning of "metaphysics" I've never heard before. Based on the limited amount I have read, I don't find it very convincing.''
-Well this is the official meaning of the word in Philosophy. The philosophy that projects beyond our current epistemology.
There is good metaphysics, where one reflects on the new findings of science and tries to puzzles together our previous epistemology and the new implications and there is bad metaphysics where one starts from unfounded assumptions/ existential claims (theism, idealism) and ends up with more unfounded assertions.

-"Even for a word such as "metaphysics," where there is such confusion and disagreement about it's meaning, this seems clearly wrong to me. Your argument sounds a lot like the one @Gnomon was making previously in this thread."
-Its not an argument. I describe facts. I came in Greece in an early age. Here they have an obsession with the legacy of their classical Philosophers so from early age we start learning the basics.
I understand that people and time tend to distort words and common usages but that usage is the original, official and only useful, since for almost any other usage we already have words for them.

There is a great talk by Richard Carrier on why philosophy isn't stupid and why most scientists think it is. In order to build his case he provides definitions on many basic terms. There you will find a clear definition of this word.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLvWz9GQ3PQ

I agree and disagree in many points.

-"On this forum, I've been struggling to separate "Metaphysics" from its "Supernatural" heritage in Western Religion. That's why I have suggested going back beyond (meta-) Christian Theology to see what non-religious Aristotle was actually talking about."
-Correct The first word refers to claims that are beyond our current knowledge and the second refers to claims that are Above nature.

-"As you noted, it certainly wasn't about anything supernatural or spooky, but about making a philosophical distinction between Qualia & Quanta, between Potential & Actual, and betwixt Cause & Effect."
_Well metaphysics is ANY claim that makes hypotheses beyond our current knowledge.It isn't limited to any specific philosophical distinction. Those are conversations based on metaphysical hypotheses on the differences in the ontology of those phenomena.
-the big bang cosmology before its verification was metaphysics.
-Germ theory was metaphysics and it was assumed a supernatural one (Agents in addition to nature)
-Continental drift theory was metaphysics until we measured the shifting of tectonic plates.
etc.

-"Unfortunately, to this day we still portray Mind metaphorically as a Brain, which leads some to think that only Matter matters for thinking."
-Well that is not metaphysics for Neuroscience. The Mind is what the brain produces. Its like. Material structures and their function are Necessary and Sufficient explanations for the emergence of mental properties and states. The total sum of all those mental properties are labeled "Mind".
Metaphysics (working hypotheses) are the frameworks that are tested in order to find how symbolic thinking, or specific consicous states or pattern recognition abilities emerge.

"His metaphysical category could be interpreted as "more comprehensive" or even "transcendent", in the sense that he thought of Philosophy as going "beyond" the Space-Time & Thermodynamic boundary of Physics into the realm of Mind & Ideas, that are only limited by Logical laws. Thus, adding Philosophical science to Physical science. Aristotle even tried to fit Plato's ideal Forms into physical Shapes, by insisting that Forms do not exist independently of Things."
-Today we identify such "transcendent" type of metaphysics as pseudo philosophy when our new data do not offer evidence for such hypotheses. We have a decent amount of epistemology and a constantly verified Scientific Paradigm to evaluate claims that are in conflict with what we currently know and can verify. Any claim that is

And that is equivalent to the notion -- common among Information scientists -- that what we now call "Information", is physical, in the sense of embodied ideas. But, in my holistic view, Information is both Physical (effect) and Meta-Physical (cause). That's a delicate distinction, but it could clear-up millennia of misunderstanding in Philosophy and Science.
PHilosophical science already exists in Science. Science began its life as Methodological Naturalism. In its core it is just Philosophy on Naturalisitc principles with an empirical set of methodologies.
The problem of Philosophy starts every single time one decides to either ignore our current epistemology, go against it or use Non naturalistic principles.
Then we are dealing with Pseudo philosophy

Meta- :
Original Greek meaning — Meta (from the Greek μετά, meta, meaning "after" or "beyond") is a prefix meaning "more comprehensive" or "transcending."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta
-Well "beyond" in Greek is 'Πέρα από". "Beyond" is implied. i.e. After two exits you turn left....so your destination is beyond those two exits.
The main confusion is with the word Physics.It refers to our work in science (Physika is the actual word) Aristotle did his "physika" (studied the world) and after he reflected on the new findings. The philosophical endeavor that tries to understand and glue new data, old epistemology or philosophy with new philosophical frameworks through reasoning is labeled Metaphysics.

Potential :
"Aristotle describes potentiality and actuality, or potency and action, as one of several distinctions between things that exist or do not exist. In a sense, a thing that exists potentially does not exist, but the potential does exist."
-I don't find such ideas useful because we humans have shown that we are really bad in our ontology.
Great examples are Alchemists wasting resources for ages to chemically produce valuable metals, Chemists delaying the evolution of atomic physics by insisting in the existence of Phlogiston, People conned or dying while believing in Miasma and Panacea....and Biology refusing to tackle for ages emergent phenomena like Life or Mind.

Note -- even physical science finds the meta-physical notion of not-yet-real Potential to be useful in the Real world. For example, the Voltage of a battery is nothing-but Static Potential, until it is actualized into Active Amperage. We can't see or touch meta-physical Potential with our senses, but we can imagine it with our minds.
-It isn't a metaphysical notion from the moment it is observed and can be quantified in everyday phenomena. Stored energy is the potential to produce work...so its nothing metaphysical about it. i.e. As a cyclist I understand the potential energy I gather when climbing a hill.
Again Physics (physika) in Metaphysics has nothing to do with Physical properties(spatial). It refers to our epistemology gathered and refined by science.

Its not an argument. I describe facts. I came in Greece in an early age. Here they have an obsession with the legacy of their classical Philosophers so from early age we start learning the basics.
I understand that people and time tend to distort words and common usages but that usage is the original, official and only useful, since for almost any other usage we already have words for them. — Nickolasgaspar

Well metaphysics is ANY claim that makes hypotheses beyond our current knowledge.It isn't limited to any specific philosophical distinction. Those are conversations based on metaphysical hypotheses on the differences in the ontology of those phenomena.
-the big bang cosmology before its verification was metaphysics.
-Germ theory was metaphysics and it was assumed a supernatural one (Agents in addition to nature)
-Continental drift theory was metaphysics until we measured the shifting of tectonic plates.
etc. — Nickolasgaspar

I must say, I have never come across this usage. Perhaps it is specific to Greece? (But don't tell me that Greeks own "metaphysics.")

It's funny though that the examples of usage that you give here exactly fit a word that we already have - a word that you use yourself: hypothesis.

Its specific to Philosophy and Science. Using Hypotheses is how we do Metaphysics. We hypothesize.