...consciousness of our own subjectivity, — Joshs

It's not at all clear what this might be.

Being-for-itself is defined by choice rather than experience. Being-for-itself is found in the decision to turn right or Left at Oak Street. Perhaps "consciousness of one's own subjectivity" is just an obtuse way of talking about making a choice, in which case we would be better served by talk of freedom and decision than of subjectivity. After all, consciousness consists in the capacity to act.

All this by way of yet again questioning the usefulness of talk of subjectivity.

“you can always make something out of what you've been made into”

...consciousness of our own subjectivity,
— Joshs

It's not at all clear what this might be. — Banno

“As Sartre also once wrote, “pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion of self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness” (Sartre 2003: 100). Indeed, as he points out in the chapter
“The self and the circuit of selfness” in Being and Nothingness, consciousness is by no means impersonal
when pre-reflectively lived through. Rather it is characterized by a “fundamental selfness” (Sartre 2003:
127). As I read Sartre, his proposal is that rather than starting with a preconceived notion of self, we should let our understanding of what it means to be a self arise out of our analysis of self-consciousness.
Put concisely, the proposal is to identify the self with the subject of experience, and to conceive of the subject, not as an independent, separable entity, but as the subjectivity of experience, which is then claimed to be something no experience can lack, neither metaphysically nor phenomenologically.

To use a formulation of Strawson’s, if experience exists, subjectivity exists, and that entails that subject-of­experience-hood exists (Strawson 2009: 419). On this construal, the self is something that is essentially present in each and every experience. It is present, not as a separately existing entity, i.e., as something that exists independently of, in separation from or in opposition to the stream of consciousness. Nor is it
given as an additional experiential object or as an extra experiential ingredient, as if there were a distinct self-quale, next to and in addition to the quale of the smell of burnt hay and roasted almonds.

No, the claim is that all experiences regardless of their object and regardless of their act-type (or attitudinal character) are necessarily subjective in the sense that they feel like something for someone. In virtue of their inherent reflexive self-consciousness, in virtue of their self-presentational character, they are not anonymous, but imbued with a fundamental subjectivity and first-personal character, and the proposal has been to identify this first-personal presence, this experiential for-me-ness, with what has been called the minimal self (Zahavi 2005, 2014). To deny the existence of this for-me-ness, to deny that we have a distinctly different acquaintance with our own experiential life than with the experiential life of others
(and vice versa), and that this difference obtains, not only when we introspect or reflect, but already in the very having of the experience, is to fail to recognize an essential aspect of experience.“

As I read Sartre, his proposal is that rather than starting with a preconceived notion of self, we
should let our understanding of what it means to be a self arise out of our analysis of self-consciousness. — Joshs

Well, I don't quite agree with this reading of Sartre; but I might be misapprehending what you are saying. For Sartre, the self (the subject in subjective) is not found through introspection, but is manifest in the fact of choice and the presence of the other.

Cross- fertilising with Wittgenstein, the self is not private.

Now that's a huge advance over what I understand of other phenomenologists.

For Sartre, the self (the subject in subjective) is not found through introspection, but is manifest in the fact of choice and the presence of the other. — Banno

From what I’m reading, Sartre makes a
distinction between positional and non positional , and between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness.
Pre-reflective consciousness is pre-supposed by introspection, and accompanies rather than is for me strobing choice and the presence of the other. Only positional consciousness is determined by the other, consistent with Husserl.



“Of course, Sartre describes this self-awareness as an immediate relation to my interiority rather than a special kind of perception directed towards the inner; however, the difficulty, here, is exactly the same Husserl was trying to avoid when he criticized Brentano’s distinction between inner and outer perception in the appendix to the Logical Investigations. Sartre’s reasoning lies on a metaphysical rather than a descriptive distinction between on the one hand an immediate and non­intentional access to myself, and on the other hand a mediated and intentional access to objects, among which is to be located the empirical ego.”

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pierre-Jean-Renaudie/publication/257620150_Me_Myself_and_I_Sartre_and_Husserl_on_Elusiveness_of_the_Self/links/579da60b08ae5d5e1e14c74d/Me-Myself-and-I-Sartre-and-Husserl-on-Elusiveness-of-the-Self.pdf?_sg%5B0%5D=QL6CcHrC190dNoNl0DP4zTwStecV7FFHmbxq02vTvO7jHVs_PvLF1Z4PODn5beu6tT957ul1-nfGhxnh9C6Dkw.3_-yLxT1VW3lCqukwsfo3foY2GPfnbR5zCID1hTCo5InCRSBugzt3K6-ncGct7EyJMnCyaBiTa0Ck7W7YX-crQ.s6zdDZusqwj02MU_oo0Rz1yGbF7fLZPOfbOyBUpveFrQN9yRmLTuqeDFWCLfGLCdeRi2DnlwbiQj5Pfelp1Bbw&_sg%5B1%5D=1MiSbLg0KODtUig5qYd0oz5Yu8CBxvGkzhQrsscJ0Zir0dKe0PLWY4oYqGgHZ4ac0CeyNouw7LCxWmpszs2a-8pahGUaXmHD1WCunzNt6SrJ.3_-yLxT1VW3lCqukwsfo3foY2GPfnbR5zCID1hTCo5InCRSBugzt3K6-ncGct7EyJMnCyaBiTa0Ck7W7YX-crQ.s6zdDZusqwj02MU_oo0Rz1yGbF7fLZPOfbOyBUpveFrQN9yRmLTuqeDFWCLfGLCdeRi2DnlwbiQj5Pfelp1Bbw&_iepl=

From what I’m reading, Sartre makes a
distinction between positional and non positional , and between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness.
Pre-reflective consciousness is pre-supposed by introspection, and accompanies rather than is for me strobing choice and the presence of the other. Only positional consciousness is determined by the other, consistent with Husserl. — Joshs

Hmm. That's not what one sees in No Exit, nor in The Look. Notice that transcendence of the ego is early work. Perhaps you find Husserl because you are looking for him.

But even if that were an accurate account of Sartre, it is open for us to still reject that part of his account while accepting the other...

Notice that transcendence of the ego is early work. Perhaps you find Husserl because you are looking for him.

But even if that were an accurate account of Sartre, it is open for us to still reject that part of his account while accepting the other... — Banno

I think the paper I linked to draws from Being and Nothingness, too. I should mention that I dont agree with those who talk about a pre-reflective self-awareness as some kind of feeling of for-meness or what its like-ness. I don’t think there is such a constant self dimension lurking in the background of all expereinces of objects. And I think Zahavi misinterprets Husserl as holding such a view. For Husserl the pre-reflective ego is nothing but a zero point of experiencing, the intersection of the streaming of retentions, primal impressions and protentions. It has no content in itself, no feeling of what it’s likeness or anything like that. I don’t believe there is a for-itself for Husserl, at least not one opposed to an in-itself. His whole approach is based on associative synthesis, the way a sense of meaning is created on the basis of similarities with respect to previously formed meanings. Empirical objects , as well as our concept of the self, are constructed out of such syntheses of similarity.

Sartre strikes me as far clearer in his analysis and more astute in his arguments than Heidegger. But then Sartre could write. — Banno

:up:

(I prefer what little I've read of Gabriel Marcel.) — Wayfarer

:cool:

But you say that that because of materialist ontology, which inverts the relationship between mind and matter, making matter fundamental and mind derivative from it. — Wayfarer

Your 'dualistic' caricature of my monism demonstrates a profound misunderstanding (or dogmatic misrepresentation) which says more about you, Wayf, than the topic or argument at issue.

That is of course the universal assumption of philosophical materialism.

:roll:

Philosophical materialists assume ontological monism and not ontological (i.e. substance) dualism like e.g. Cartesians, Platonists ... supernaturalists / spiritualists.

But what are the putative 'fundamental entities' which you propose are the ground or basis for rational beings?

The same (groundless) "ground" as for all beings: "Being" (i.e. atomists' void, spinozists natura naturans) as I wrote ... "Ontological difference" is only a conceptual distinction – being of beings (which includes Dasein) – and not a Cartesian postulate of separate substances of "being" and "beings". After all, SuZ is explicitly anti-Cartesian in this regard (and though greatly influenced by Heidi, Sartre returns to Descartes' mind-body (mind-matter) duality with "being-for-itself" versus "being-in-itself" and describes the former as "consciousness is the nothingness" in the latter being, thus the title: Being and Nothingness.)

Philosophy is 'anamnesis', un-forgetting or recovering this fundamental reality. — Wayfarer

This gnostic-conceit may be the case (Beyng forgive me!) in the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition but it's also irrelevant to the daily reflective ("spiritual") exercises for cultivating eudaimonia which I describe as unlearning self-immiserating habits – reducing the frequency and scope of foolery and thereby also its oblivious forms of self-harming/sabotage aka stupidity – which inversely optimizes agency. We become our habits (capabilities, practices) which are ineluctable (real) to sentience. Re: aponia, ataraxia, apatheia (wu wei), ekstasis (moksha) ... scientia intuitiva ... amor fati ... beatitude (jouissance) ... :death: :flower:

So Heidegger represents for you a morally flawed personality , and any wider sociological analysis is seen by you as excuse making. — Joshs

We were both raised Roman Catholic, and it seems in similar economic circumstances. He stayed with the faith quite a bit longer than I did, though, and apparently took it quite seriously; studied theology for a time at Freiburg. I'd maintain this tells us little or nothing about either of us, however. No doubt he felt angered and betrayed by the Treaty of Versailles as did many Germans. Again, though, what does this tell us about the person that's beyond supposition? Romanticism and a peculiar sense of German worth and superiority (and a belief in "secret missions" of being) characterizes his writings that I've read (not Being and Time, which I don't think I can read). Perhaps this tells us as much about him as any German of his time, but unless we're to consider individuals as part of a collective in judging their worth, it isn't a basis on which to do so. Such factors may provide insight into one's character but provide no rationale (or justification) for one's conduct.

I mentioned your legal background because we all tend to choose a profession that reflects our ways of understanding the world. I chose psychology and philosophy as consonant with my belief system. It seems to me that you view personal behavior primarily from the vantage of character and individual responsibility and choice — Joshs

I've always maintained that the law is, quite simply, the law, and nothing else. It's not morality; it's not justice. I'm a sort of legal positivist. If someone violates the law, it isn't necessarily the case that an immoral act has taken place. We lawyers are often accused of seeing things as grey rather than black and white. Someone famous, I forget who, condemned lawyers who said that nobody is guilty of a crime until the law (a court) decided they were. But that's merely the case. Someone who murders someone isn't guilty of the crime of murder until convicted of murder. Someone who's convicted of the crime of murder isn't necessarily a murderer.

So a legal background doesn't necessarily mean that a lawyer sees all as matters of responsibility and individual choice. A Catholic might do so, however.

So, I think, would an aspiring Stoic or any other adherent of virtue ethics, and perhaps other kinds of ethics as well. Much as we're influenced by psychological and sociological factors, there are certain things which are substantially, at least, within our control. We can make judgments for good reasons and bad. Joining the Nazi party wasn't forced upon Heidegger. He wasn't forced to praise Hitler so extravagantly. He wasn't compelled to treat Husserl so shabbily. His condemnation of the Jews as being calculating hustlers without Dasein isn't something that issued unthinkingly from his brain and pen. he made judgments and choices and bears responsibility for them.

I've read his essay called (in English) The Question Regarding Technology and thought it so Romantic as to approach silliness. I've read his What is Metaphysics and am inclined to agree with Carnap's view of it. I think I'd feel the same about those works even if he had been a saint instead of a Nazi. I doubt I'd be impressed by Being and Time.

So every philosopher has a cult following? — Xtrix

Not all of them, no. I think there are conditions which must be met to acquire cult status. Not all of them are satisfied by the philosopher alone.

Obscurity is needed. The philosopher must sometimes seems to be deliberately unclear. The philosopher's must be difficult to understand, even difficult to read. The fact that others, in despair, give up the effort to read the works of the philosopher is taken by the philosopher's adherents to establish the greater worth of the writings and those who read them to the end.

The writings of the philosopher must be interpreted, translated in effect, for the benefit of those unable to read them. Interpretations and translations may differ, with some claiming preference for one over another. Esoteric pronouncements of seemingly profound and vast import must be made. The philosopher takes on the aspect of an oracle.

Sometimes, the obvious is made to appear of titanic significance; sometimes the mundane is the subject of contempt. Claims are made regarding what is "really" the case. The fact that we experience the rest of the world exactly as humans must experience it, being the kind of creatures we are, is declared to be a colossal insight, for example--sometimes more by the philosopher's adherents than the philosopher. The fact that a pine tree will look different to someone 15 feet away from it than it will to someone 100 feet from it leads some to question whether we're capable of knowing anything.

Which is to say that the extent to which a philosopher's adherents believe him/her to be surpassingly insightful is significant in determining whether a cult exists.

Which is to say that the extent to which a philosopher's adherents believe him/her to be surpassingly insightful is significant in determining whether a cult exists. — Ciceronianus

Or maybe the philosopher happens to be surpassingly insightful and claims of deliberate obscurity and unclarity are rationalizations on the part of those who simply don’t have the philosophical background to read them.
Xtrix and I both think Heidegger is a profound thinker. We don’t interpret him exactly the same way , which is as it should be , but we agree on the most important general
features. of his work. Is this because we have both drunk the Kool-aid? Or is it because there really are key insights Heidegger contributed that a large community of philosophers can agree on, and can also agree that these insights are not delivered ( at least in his work up through Being and Time) in a particularly obscure manner. Rather , the style reflects the originality of the ideas. It is almost a guarantee that he will come across as deliberately unclear if the reader has failed to comprehend a host of necessary precursors. This includes Hegel, Nietzsche. Wittgenstein and Husserl ( a background in Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard wouldn’t hurt either ).

Why don’t you let Xtrix and I show you why ‘The Question Regarding Technology’ is not “so Romantic as to approach silliness”, and in fact has nothing to do with Romanticism.

I've always maintained that the law is, quite simply, the law, and nothing else. It's not morality; it's not justice. I'm a sort of legal positivist — Ciceronianus

One might think that positivism of any sort is the farthest one can get from morality. But in actuality , positivism presupposes a moralism. Positivism believes it can separate the knower from the known, and as a result it fails to see that all empirical facts are value-laden, leading to a perpetuation of the status quo. This is why positivism tends to be associated with a certain range of political views.

As John Austin said, legal positivism merely provides that:

The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.

Whether a law or system of law exists, therefore, has nothing to do with whether it's good or bad, or whether it should be modified, or amended or repealed, or perpetuated. I'm not sure what you mean by "value-laden" but suspect that it's the equivalent of saying everything that human beings do is value-laden because human beings are human beings, and everything which human beings do is necessarily value-laden, which doesn't strike me as a useful insight.

It's the point of view of a practitioner, not a moralist, not a liberal, or conservative, or Marxist or anarchist. or revolutionary. Physicians don't seek to perpetuate the "status quo" of a person. Lawyers don't seek to perpetuate the "status quo" of the law.

By this he meant that only human Dasein could be said to experience a world in terms of a present that was informed and guided by a past. — Joshs

Incomprehensible verbiage.

I'm not sure what you mean by "value-laden" but suspect that it's the equivalent of saying everything that human beings do is value-laden because human beings are human beings, and everything which human beings do is necessarily value-laden, which doesn't strike me as a useful insight. — Ciceronianus

Are you familiar with the fact-value distinction in analytic philosophy, and the critique of it by Quine, Putnam, Sellers and others? Or the myth of the given?
These were the beginnings of a recognition that facts only exist within accounts , and there is no fact of the matter that can settle differences between accounts. This contributed to the downfall of positivism. An account is another word for value-system, a scheme of meaning that interprets and makes sense of phenomena in a certain way.

Here’s an example of fact-value inseparability:

“To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.

A point in space seems to be perfectly objective. But how are we to define the points of our everyday world? Points can be taken either as primitive elements, as intersecting lines, as certain triples of intersecting planes, or as certain classes of nesting volumes. These definitions are equally adequate, and yet they are incompatible: what a point is will vary with each form of description. For example, only in the first "version," to use Goodman's term, will a point be a primitive element. The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length:

If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.”

Here is another argument against positivism:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

It is almost a guarantee that he will come across as deliberately unclear if the reader has failed to comprehend a host of necessary precursors. This includes Hegel, Nietzsche. Wittgenstein and Husserl ( a background in Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard wouldn’t hurt either ). — Joshs

I try to imagine saying the same thing regarding other philosophers. Does Aristotle come across as deliberately unclear if we haven't read Plato; does Hume if we haven't read Hobbes; does James if we haven't read Peirce? I don't think so. Perhaps it's merely a personal preference, but if I philosopher can't even produce sentences one can read without referencing the work of other philosophers as a kind of dictionary or thesaurus, I don't think that speaks well for the philosopher.

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures...” — Joshs

Hence the designation, "being".

Does Aristotle come across as deliberately unclear if we haven't read Plato; does Hume if we haven't read Hobbes; does James if we haven't read Peirce? I don't think so. Perhaps it's merely a personal preference, but if I philosopher can't even produce sentences one can read without referencing the work of other philosophers as a kind of dictionary or thesaurus, I don't think that speaks well for the philosopher. — Ciceronianus

If we dont intuitively understand the philosophical background to a set of ideas, it will appear incoherent. Today we don’t need Plato to read Aristotle , although it would help. The reason is the social , technological and intellectual foundation of our contemporary Western culture is based on two thousand years of philosophical insights, all of which i’m turn are founded on the Greeks. So a member of our culture already implicitly understands the philosophical background to Aristotle without having to read Plato. The same cannot be said of philosophy of the past 100 years. Our wider culture is really subcultures within subcultures . The philosophical background that most far right social conservatives have does not go beyond 18th century authors.This is why Breitbart and the right-wing Claremont institute pointed to essentially all philosophy after Hegel ( Marx, postmodernism, critical theory, etc) as being wrong-headed.

Much of what is produced in the art world today is difficult to appreciate without background in the philosophical , institutional and cultural framework that it arises out of and speaks to.

When I read Being and Time , I had not read Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl or Wittgenstein. I was able to understand it because I had assimilated the ideas that these other authors put forth from other sources, mainly psychology, which had been influenced indirectly by Heidegger and Husserl through the human potential movement, client centered therapy, Sartre , gestalt and existential psychology. After all, philosophy is just one mode of expressing a worldview. One can find parallel ideas in the social sciences and the arts and literature. So what is key to understanding the work of a particular writer isn’t necessarily having read previous authors in their field , but having assimilated the background ideas in some from from one’s culture.

I wonder to what extent these views, if accurate, matter to us in our day-to-day lives--what Goodman calls our "everyday world." There may be instances where they're significant, in which case they should be considered and accounted for, but in others I think they're what James (supposedly) called differences which make no difference (that may be a paraphrase).

How often are we disturbed by, or do we even contemplate, "the myth of the given"? Are we fearful the chair we sit in will turn out "really" to be something deadly to us, something utterly unlike a chair? Do we wonder while driving whether the highway we drive on may really be a river? When has it turned out to be one, or a lava flow? Do we find it difficult to communicate with each other or understand what's taking place when confronted with a plate of ravioli? Do we hesitate to piss, wondering what the urinal-in-itself really is? Not at all. We have more important things to baffle and frustrate us.

Certainly there are cases where we disagree, and for various reasons. Those become problems we may or may not be able to solve. But if we can't resolve them chances are it won't be because what we think is something we use every day turns out not to be real.

Certainly there are cases where we disagree, and for various reasons. Those become problems we may or may not be able to solve. But if we can't resolve them chances are it won't be because what we think is something we use every day turns out not to be real. — Ciceronianus

I don’t think it’s a question of meanings not being real but of meanings not being fully shared, being perspectival.
What we call physical objects are intersubjectively constructed. No two people ever see the exact same ‘object in the same way, so we say that each of us perceives a different appearance of the ‘same’ object. In everyday life this leads to no major misunderstandings because the objects we interact with are defined in very general terms. The problem with positivism comes to the fore when we deal with each other every day in social situations. Every misunderstanding, frustration, annoyance, disappointment we experience in dealing with one another reveals the fact that we are not living in the same world, but interpret according to different vantages and perspectives. When we rely on positivism here, we assume a person-independent reality, and attempt to explain other persons’ intransigence or failure to meet our expectations as a result of irrationality, stubbornness, malicious intent. etc. , rather than an outlook on the world which we are unfamiliarity with.

When we rely on positivism here, we assume a person-independent reality... — Joshs

I think that's true across a much wider spectrum than simply positivism.

As expected, you cannot answer direct succinct replies to your derivative babble and so, of course, you find "incomprehensible" what you disagree with while incorrigibly holding on to banal truisms (& woo) like crutches :sweat:

:100: :fire:

I think that's true across a much wider spectrum than simply positivism. — Wayfarer

Back to that blind spot :party:

:smirk:

I don't drink anymore, but I still have Muddy Waters. Right now - Electric Mud; song; Tom Cat. Some salacious blues helps to remind me that being is a state of flux and arousal.

Yeah you know I'm a tomcat and you's my kitten
And I'm scratching around in your windowpane
Yeeeah you know I'm a tomcat and you's my kitten
And I've been scratching around in your windowpane
Let me in let me in baby
So I can feel good all over again

No two people ever see the exact same ‘object in the same way, so we say that each of us perceives a different appearance of the ‘same’ object. In everyday life this leads to no major misunderstandings because the objects we interact with are defined in very general terms. — Joshs

I see a mouse. You see a mouse. What is the different appearance I see, compared with the different appearance you see? Do I see if from the side, and you see if from the front? Why does this indicate we see a "different reality"? Why doesn't it merely indicate I'm seeing the mouse from the side, and you're seeing it from the front?

Every misunderstanding, frustration, annoyance, disappointment we experience in dealing with one another reveals the fact that we are not living in the same world, but interpret according to different vantages and perspectives — Joshs

Can't we have different vantages and perspectives and yet live in the same world? When I look at a mouse from the side, am I living in a different world than the world you live in while looking at it from the front? Does someone looking at the mouse from the back inhabit yet another world?

Our differences arise from the fact that we live in the same world but have different desires, different thoughts, different resources which sometime conflict or provide some of us with advantages or disadvantages others don't possess in competing with one another for resources or opportunities existing in the same world we all inhabit. If we lived in different worlds, there would be no conflicts. If they conflict, how would they be different from one another?

Our differences arise from the fact that we live in the same world ... If we lived in different worlds, there would be no conflicts. — Ciceronianus

:up:

:cool:

Hence the designation, "being". — Wayfarer

See if you can understand this for now the 100th time:

Being in ontology does NOT refer exclusively to sentient entities.

But feel free to go on ignoring this over and over and over again. You’re truly a dead end.

Being in ontology does NOT refer exclusively to sentient entities. — Xtrix

I understand that perfectly well, but I think it's a fault with the modern usage of the word. I think there's a legitimate and fundamental distinction to be made between beings and objects, and that the loss of this distinction signifies an absence or shortfall in modern thinking, generally.

Note also the context in which I made that remark. It was in response to this:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” — Joshs

Notice the scare quotes around "reality". I think the requirement to enclose that term in quotes, actually points to the issue that the quote highlights. That is: what we take to be real, independently of any act of judgement or perception on our part, is actually 'suffused with mind-dependent structures'. And this is part of the meaning of 'being' - humans are called 'beings' because they inhabit a 'meaning-world', not simply a world of objects and forces. And that understanding is basic to the phenomenological analysis which Joshs is pointing towards.

Whereas, as Joshs went on to say, the 'positivist' attitude is that the 'objective domain' is in its real nature 'mind-independent'.

So there's actually a profound issue lying at the bottom of this.

'Blind spot?!? What Blind Spot? I don't see any goddamm blind spot' :grimace:

but I think it's a fault with the modern usage of the word — Wayfarer

It doesn't exist in any ancient useage of the word either. In fact outside of your fringe fabrication, it doesn't exist at all. You're of course welcome to your eccentricities, so long as you don't falsely project them onto fake histories.