The reason that this is not logical is that it presumes 'we know how things are' — Wayfarer

Which is a statement about the present. The non-logical part is about what things will be. You give account of this by saying "Then there is". So the problem is not "being" anymore but "becoming". It would be an antinomy to say things were not what they are. More than this, it is purely speculative that things will become something else.

Tickle me, therefore you are. :smirk: — 180 Proof

I'm recognized in my family as a tickler of great dexterity and experience. You'd be surprised. :wink:

:wink: Same here!

If we are parts of the world (universe) along with everything else, including (as I believe) our thoughts, values, feelings, culture, conduct, societies, institutions, biases, prejudices...all being human is...what would that mean regarding "Being" and ontology? Are they, along with other non-ethical philosophical questions, dependent on a belief that we, and what we think, do, feel, etc. aren't parts of the world? A question.

“...Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori....”
(CPR B6) — Mww

What Kant fails to do is to take away his notion of space
as and idealized abstract geometry in order to reveal how it is produced by primordial acts of synthesis.


“The consciousness of its [the object’s] existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present.

The object is “a unity which “appears” continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego.” “The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.”(Husserl, Experience and Judgement).

“If we think of monadic subjects and their streams of consciousness or, rather, if we think the thinkable minimum of self-consciousness, then a monadic consciousness, one that would have no "world" at all given to it, could indeed be thought - thus a monadic consciousness without regularities in the course of sensations, without motivated possibilities in the apprehension of things.”(Husserl, Ideas II)

“Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.”(Heidegger, Being and Time)

“It was long held that what exists must be self-identical. Since self-identical things have space and time locations, it was assumed that only what fills space and time can exist.” (Gendlin)

If we are parts of the world (universe) along with everything else, including (as I believe) our thoughts, values, feelings, culture, conduct, societies, institutions, biases, prejudices...all being human is...what would that mean regarding "Being" and ontology? Are they, along with other non-ethical philosophical questions, dependent on a belief that we, and what we think, do, feel, etc. aren't parts of the world? A question. — Ciceronianus

Yeah, smoke 'em out of that platonic cave, counselor. :fire:

If we are parts of the world (universe) along with everything else, including (as I believe) our thoughts, values, feelings, culture, conduct, societies, institutions, biases, prejudices...all being human is...what would that mean regarding "Being" and ontology? Are they, along with other non-ethical philosophical questions, dependent on a belief that we, and what we think, do, feel, etc. aren't parts of the world? — Ciceronianus

There is a more fundamental thinking that penetrates beneath the idea of a world as a container with ‘parts’(existing beings) of which we are just one more. Rather than the world being just object beings that are presented before a subject being ( who is also an object within that world), the world ( including the subject) is enacted , produced , synthesized rather than just mirrored and represented. From this vantage , ‘being’ isn’t the existing parts, it’s the synthesizing, enacting , producing activity that creates and recreates the subject and object poles. The being of this world is in its becoming, and our own indissociable becoming. ( Is that obscure enough for ya?)

There is a more fundamental thinking that penetrates beneath the idea of a world as a container with ‘parts’(existing beings) of which we are just one more. Rather than the world being just object beings that are presented before a subject being ( who is also an object within that world), the world ( including the subject) is enacted , produced , synthesized rather than just mirrored and represented. From this vantage , ‘being’ isn’t the existing parts, it’s the synthesizing, enacting , producing activity that creates and recreates the subject and object poles. The being of this world is in its becoming, and our own indissociable becoming. ( Is that obscure enough for ya?) — Joshs

As parts of the world, though, we're active participants in it. We aren't mere observers. As products of evolution, we're even in a sense are created by the world, which is to say we developed--we became human, and took on the characteristics of humans--by our interaction with the rest of the world over time. No world, no humans. The conditions of the rest of the world shape us, and we shape certain parts of the rest of the world. Speaking of Being, how do we explain why and how human beings exist if we doubt the existence of the rest of the world or doubt we can know or understand it? Do we resort to God or magic of some kind?

The word "being" is used in ever so many ways.
I guess it's up to linguists and philosophers to clarify them.
One way is to differentiate fictional/imaginary and real, where "exists" sometimes is used instead of "real", though fictions exist too, they're just not real.
We might speak of ontological categories, like substance, event, property, relation, ...

In a general sense, being can have no complement.
Which is also why you can't really miss it.

There is a more fundamental thinking that penetrates beneath the idea of a world as a container with ‘parts’(existing beings) of which we are just one more. Rather than the world being just object beings that are presented before a subject being ( who is also an object within that world), the world ( including the subject) is enacted , produced , synthesized rather than just mirrored and represented. From this vantage , ‘being’ isn’t the existing parts, it’s the synthesizing, enacting , producing activity that creates and recreates the subject and object poles. The being of this world is in its becoming, and our own indissociable becoming. ( Is that obscure enough for ya?) — Joshs

The interesting question: If the world, the things, just everything is the real production of "being", why should we not concern ourselves with them? The mysticism is of a kind that says "Okay, these things _are_ but beyond those, if you try hard, there is the world of being." But being "mediates" itself towards itself by those things. When shifting view away from the things as they _are_ towards "being", you are hunting a mere abstraction. The absolute nothingness.

The interesting question: If the world, the things, just everything is the real production of "being", why should we not concern ourselves with them? The mysticism is of a kind that says "Okay, these things _are_ but beyond those, if you try hard, there is the world of being." But being "mediates" itself towards itself by those things. When shifting view away from the things as they _are_ towards "being", you are hunting a mere abstraction. The absolute nothingness. — Heiko

One of my favorite psychologists says that every experience we have of the world is a construct. To experience anything is to construe it. And he defines a construct as a referential differential. Specifically, a construct is a dimension along which to perceive an event along dimensions of likeness and difference with respect with a prior meaning in our construct system. Furthermore, every new moment in time must be construed, so our construct system is changing from
moment to moment.
Let me ask you , is a construct an ‘object’? Is it something that just ‘is’? Or it it a way that we are changing? Does it make sense to point to a content of the construct , what it ‘is’ , apart from the way it makes a
change over what went before? If we try to point to what it supposedly ‘is’ in itself , it vanishes, because it isn’t anything ‘in itself’. It is only what it is as a comparison, and we need both sides of the comparison in order to have the event, the construct. The event is this thing that is what it is by differing in a very specific way from what it changed from. So it is not a thing, it is a difference , a xomparison, an edge , a hinge, a ‘from there to here.
So what we have here with a construct is a change, a transition, a movement , a difference, a becoming, that doesn’t consist of something that simply ‘is’ what it is in itself as a static state or inherence or substance or res extentia before being changed or moved. The change (consisting inseparably of a ‘what was’ paired with a ‘what is’) prior to the supposed stasis, the ‘pure content’ of an in itself.

I would argue it isn’t ‘being’ that is the abstraction , it is the idea of a thing in itself as static state,

I've met a few so-called "pygmies"* is Congo, more correctly called the Twa people. Their environment is quite diverse, with plenty of open spaces such as rivers, clearings, hiltops, etc. Rest assured they can see things from afar and understand what they are seeing. — Olivier5

I am sure they are diverse. It wasn't intended to stereotype pygmies. It was an anecdotea about a particular individual from a particular environment.

If we are parts of the world (universe) along with everything else, including (as I believe) our thoughts, values, feelings, culture, conduct, societies, institutions, biases, prejudices...all being human is...what would that mean regarding "Being" and ontology? — Ciceronianus

That would mean recalling that science deals principally with what can be measured. And that, as Max Planck said, 'science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are a part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.'

If we try to point to what it supposedly ‘is’ in itself , it vanishes, because it isn’t anything ‘in itself’. — Joshs

You are missing the point. The "in-itself" is a speculation. The "thing" will negate any phantasm you might have about it by itself. This is what is called reality. For example, if you mistake a table decoration for a real apple you will recognize it when it really matters.

It is only what it is as a comparison, and we need both sides of the comparison in order to have the event, the construct. — Joshs

There is no construct, that is the real thing. If there is no reality preventing you from upholding a belief about it then the description, in fact, matches the subject. Propagating a general doubt "just because" is not backed by any reality, irrational, destructive and dishonest.

I would argue it isn’t ‘being’ that is the abstraction , it is the idea of a thing in itself as static state, — Joshs

Yes, "in itself" - you got it.

The "in-itself" is a speculation. The "thing" will negate any phantasm you might have about it by itself. This is what is called reality. — Heiko

Built into your model of reality is an ‘in-itself. You wouldn’t call it reality otherwise. How else does what happens negate or correct if not by the effect of something that persists or endures as what it ‘is’, independent of the context of your expectations and background of undersranding , and independent of social context of use?

What makes an apple real? How would you define it ? Does it endure over time as what it is, does it have properties and attributes? Is it the same apple regardless of who is interacting with it or how they are using it?

Built into your model of reality is an ‘in-itself. You wouldn’t call it reality otherwise. How else does what happens negate or correct if not by the effect of something that persists or endures as what it ‘is’, independent of the context of your expectations and background of undersranding , and independent of social context of use? — Joshs

No, that is a supposed identity of the object. If the object crumbles into pieces the identity is lost. The identity certainly does not lie in the thing.

No, that is a supposed identity of the object. If the object crumbles into pieces the identity is lost. The identity certainly does not lie in the thing. — Heiko

What if the object doesn’t crumble into pieces? Does it have an identity up till the time it crumbles? If the identity doesn’t lie in the thing , where does it lie?

What if the object doesn’t crumble into pieces? Does it have an identity up till the time it crumbles? If the identity doesn’t lie in the thing , where does it lie? — Joshs

In "being" itself. The point is that a vase is just a vase. It doesn't matter the slightest that it could turn into a pile of broken glass any moment - until it really becomes one. It is a "real vase". You could not convince yourself the vase was a pile of broken glass. It could even become a pile of sand if we started grinding it. Doesn't matter at all. It _is_ a vase. That is what "being" itself wants it to be.
To show the stupidity I'll borrow your own vocabulary: Say the vase is a construct. That is deemed of missing something therefor you should reflect on the construct "construct"? Doesn't that miss something? More than that: I could not convince myself the vase was a pile of glass. So, taking the vase as a vase means there was no contradiction. But now there is a construct "construct" because constructs were deemed to not tell "the truth"? Please....

What if the object doesn’t crumble into pieces? Does it have an identity up till the time it crumbles? If the identity doesn’t lie in the thing , where does it lie? — Joshs

It is identifiable up until the time it crumbles. The idea that it "has" a fixed identity is an abstraction from its identifiability.

The idea that it "has" a fixed identity is an abstraction from its identifiability. — Janus

What would it mean for it to have a fixed identity? If we say
that it is composed of subatomic particles , do these particles have a fixed identity? Let’s say a quark exists for a millisecond. Does it have an identity that endures for this span of time?

Say the vase is a construct. That is deemed of missing something therefor you should reflect on the construct "construct"? Doesn't that miss something? More than that: I could not convince myself the vase was a pile of glass. So, taking the vase as a vase means there was no contradiction. But now there is a construct "construct" because constructs were deemed to not tell "the truth"? Please.... — Heiko

I’m nit sure I understand why a construct is ‘missing something’ or doesn’t ‘tell the truth’. Missing what? What truth?

I’m nit sure I understand why a construct is ‘missing something’ or doesn’t ‘tell the truth’. Missing what? What truth? — Joshs

I just cite your argument:

To experience anything is to construe it. And he defines a construct as a referential differential. Specifically, a construct is a dimension along which to perceive an event along dimensions of likeness and difference with respect with a prior meaning in our construct system. Furthermore, every new moment in time must be construed, so our construct system is changing from
moment to moment. — Joshs

It is not me who doubts the vase is a vase until it isn't anymore.

What Kant fails to do is to take away his notion of space
as and idealized abstract geometry in order to reveal how it is produced by primordial acts of synthesis. — Joshs

Yeah, the common counterargument. Acts of synthesis are phenomena given by imagination, as far as the notion of space is concerned. Failing to show how space is produced by imagination prevents it from having to be phenomena, hence alleviates the possibility of space being represented in us as an object of perception, and from that, experience. Pretty hard to justify space as an phenomenal experience, methinks.

Besides, to say “primordial” acts of synthesis requires faculties correspondingly primordial, more so than those to which such acts are already accountable. That, or, the present faculties would be required to accomplish acts of synthesis, the primodality of which is beyond their respective capacity. Can’t synthesis something not given, or something not within the capacity of that to which it is given. Both of which may be speculated, but iff authorized by a theory with sufficiently different initial conditions.

Idealized abstract geometry is the science of quantifiable spaces on a priori grounds, which allows there to be a notion of space in general, as idealized intuition, that isn’t itself a science.

I was just showing one analogy pre-dated by one just like it, that’s all.

It is not me who doubts the vase is a vase until it isn't anymore. — Heiko

Who said anything about doubting it is a vase? I can construe something as a vase but there are many, many different ways of doing this. Remember, to construe something is to compare and contrast it along dimensions of similarity and difference with respect to something else. The purpose of a construct is to anticipate patterns within changing events. So the aim of my construal of something as a vase is to anticipate a regularity in an ongoing flow of experiences. The criterion of success for a construct is its usefulness in guiding my interaction with the world such that I am. it being surprised at every turn by changes in my world.

I could construe a vase as having fixed properties and attributes that is nonetheless breakable. This construct is quite useful up to a point, but there are always alternative ways I could construe the events that I am calling a ‘vase’.

I can construe something as a vase but there are many, many different ways of doing this. — Joshs

There it is again. "You can construe". This is not the relation between you and a vase.

There it is again. "You can construe". This is not the relation between you and a vase. — Heiko

What about the relationship between me as a scientist and an empirical realm? A construct is like a scientific paradigm. Do you think Kuhn’s paradigms describe the relation between the scientist and the vase? If not, tell me how you critique Kuhn’s approach.

What about the relationship between me as a scientist and an empirical realm? — Joshs

Reality becomes visible when theories do _not_ hold. I doubt you can "construe" a vase out of thin air.

Reality becomes visible when theories do _not_ hold. I doubt you can "construe" a vase out of thin air. — Heiko

not according to KUHN. He says that reality appears differently under different scientific accounts. It is up to the scientist to choose which account appears more useful. There is no account of reality which is truer than any other. Sounds like you prefer Popper.

not according to KUHN. — Joshs

I am really not concerned with Kuhn. I am more or less talking to you. But if you take his words to mean that assuming a flat earth is scientifically justified, you must have read him wrong or he is an idiot.

You have a lot of opinions, which is good. But it doesn’t sound like you’ve read a lot of philosophy.

Or just different ones. What was the point of "falsification" again?