A single Monism

khaled

There are multiple "kinds" of monists from idealists, to physicalists to materialists, to God knows what else. I think they're all the same, despite sparking such heated discussion (the first 2 especially).

I've always struggled to see the difference between the "kinds" of monism when I dig deeper into them. They always just seemed to be saying the same thing eventually because X keeps getting less descriptive until it just reduces to "a thing". It's because, if you say "everything is X" then X is meaningless.

Any property we think of is only a property if there is something that doesn't have it. "Orange" makes sense because you can take something orange, and something that is not orange, and point to the difference. If you couldn't, no one would be able to learn what "orange" means. Same with all the other properties. We understand them because there is something that doesn't have them, and something that does.

A corollary to this would be that there can be no property that applies to everything while being meaningful. If I said that everything is "hakuna matata" I couldn't pass on my great insight to anyone else. Because if someone asked "what does hakuna matata mean?" I wouldn't be able to tell them, as I cannot bring something that isn't hakuna matata to show the difference (since everything is hakuna matata). So whatever it is that everything is made of, cannot have any specificity or else it would exclude something that exists, making it so that it is not what everything is made of. I conclude that all the monisms: "Everything is X" are the same, just using different words to describe the same X.

If the world was made of chocolate, then "chocolate" would be a meaningless word. Its only use would be to say that something exists similar to "thing".

Thoughts?

Olivier5

So monism is ultimately meaningless because uniformizing?

baker

↪khaled

Hence the doctrine of inconceivable one-ness and difference.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Achintya_Bheda_Abheda

T Clark

Any property we think of is only a property if there is something that doesn't have it. "Orange" makes sense because you can take something orange, and something that is not orange, and point to the difference. If you couldn't, no one would be able to learn what "orange" means. Same with all the other properties. We understand them because there is something that doesn't have them, and something that does. — khaled

There is nothing wrong, or contradictory, or even difficult about the idea that something can be two things at the same time - diversity and unity. It's a matter of perspective and the situation at hand.

tim wood

They always just seemed to be saying the same thing eventually because X keeps getting less descriptive until it just reduces to "a thing". It's because, if you say "everything is X" then X is meaningless. — khaled

E.g., being. Which is why Kant said that being is not a predicate.

khaled

↪Olivier5

So monism is ultimately meaningless because uniformizing? — Olivier5

Not meaningless. But the debate between the different monisms is. Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. "Mental thing" adds nothing to "thing" when "mental" is a property of everything. Same with "physical".

↪T Clark

There is nothing wrong, or contradictory, or even difficult about the idea that something can be two things at the same time - diversity and unity. It's a matter of perspective and the situation at hand. — T Clark

It becomes a problem when the categories you define (as a substance dualist, or someone who thinks there is more than two categories) are defined as contradictory, or incapable of interacting. Something cannot be mental and physical at the same time to a substance dualist. That's really what separates him from a monist.

Olivier5

Not meaningless. But the debate between the different monisms is. Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. — khaled

Okay, materialism is logically equivalent to idealism. I can agree with that. For instance, wasn't materialist Marx the epitome of political idealism?

SophistiCat

Not meaningless. But the debate between the different monisms is. Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. "Mental thing" adds nothing to "thing" when "mental" is a property of everything. Same with "physical". — khaled

So what does "any one kind of thing" add to just "thing"? What is monism's substantial claim in your view? Is it about the existence of some fundamental "stuff" from which everything is formed?

Olivier5

What is monism's substantial claim in your view? Is it about the existence of some fundamental "stuff" from which everything is formed? — SophistiCat

Monism says there can be only one kind of fundamental stuff. Not two or three or an infinity of different kinds of stuff but just one. Khaled's point is that it doesn't matter how you call that fundamental stuff; that behind the conflicting labels (materialism, idealism), there is in fact only one kind of monism.

It's just that one stuff, however you want to call it.

Personally, I never really understood monism. How could all this diversity stem from just one stuff? Monism can only be static, dead, boring; it's simplistic at the extreme. In reality it's always two to tango; one needs two different things to make a ying-yang. There's not enough tension and dynamism in monism to explain the world as we know it.

TheMadFool

I dunno if this makes sense but the following statements are all different:

1. $A \subseteq B$

2. $A \subset B$

3. $A = B$

khaled

↪SophistiCat

What is monism's substantial claim in your view? Is it about the existence of some fundamental "stuff" from which everything is formed? — SophistiCat

Yes. That it's ONE fundamental stuff not many.

khaled

↪Olivier5

How could all this diversity stem from just one stuff? — Olivier5

How many shapes can you make out of lines?

In reality it's always two to tango; one needs two different things to make a ying-yang. There's not enough tension and dynamism in monism to explain the world as we know it. — Olivier5

But that doesn't contradict monism. You can have a circle and a square (and infinitely more shapes) all made out of lines. Different combinations of the same thing.

But when you claim there is multiple fundamental kinds of stuff, this fundamental kind of stuff cannot interact with that fundamental kind of stuff. If they could, in what sense are they fundamental kinds of stuff?

Olivier5

You can have a circle and a square (and infinitely more shapes) all made out of lines. Different combinations of the same thing. — khaled

Technically, you cannot get a circle or a square just with lines. You also need a 2D space as the context for those lines, i.e. a plane in which to inscribe your circles and squares.

Our world is spatial too, just like the world of lines. Do you think that space and time are made of the same one stuff as apples and rocks? That's what it would take to be a true monist. If you think that space, time or spacetime is NOT made of the same stuff as apples and rocks, then you have at least two kinds of stuff in your worldview: spacetime, and "apples and rocks", so you are still a dualist...

I take your point that stuff interacts with stuff, which may constrain the degree to which there can be essentially different stuff in the universe.

It's just that to me, one unique stuff cannot possibly self-differentiate. Some external force would have to be applied to that unique stuff in order to differentiate it into particulars, like in the book of Genesis when the god(s) create an original chaos and then separate light and obscurity and divide the earth from the skies. The chaos could not separate all by itself; the Elohim had to do it. So here we have the Elohim and their creation, i.e. two kinds of stuff.

If we conceive of a world made of only one kind of stuff, whence the dynamism and creativity in it? Whereas if reality is premised on tension or equilibrium between several stuff, then it can be essentially dynamical.

180 Proof

It's just that to me, one unique stuff cannot possibly self-differentiate ... If we conceive of a world made of only one kind of stuff, whence the dynamism and creativity in it? — Olivier5

"Our Nada, who art in Nada, hallowed be thy Nada ..."

How could all this diversity stem from just one stuff? Monism can only be static, dead, boring; it's simplistic at the extreme. In reality it's always two to tango; one needs two different things to make a ying-yang. — Olivier5

I think you're quite mistaken, Oliver. Daoism, for instance, is fundamentally monistic. To wit:

The Dao 道 (the “way”) gives birth to one.
One gives birth to Two,
Two gives birth to Three.
Three gives birth to thousands of things or all things in the universe.
All things carry yin and embrace yang.
When yang and yin combine, all things achieve harmony. — Daodejing, Chap. 42

So are Democritean atomism¿, Spinozist dual-aspect holism (i.e. "property dualism"), Advaita Vendata's māyā (re: acosmism), Heraclitean fire (i.e. flux¿), ... Meillassoux's hyperchaos¿, etc, more or less, instances of dialectical monism.

Re: Observational complexity from fundamental simplicity (à la Conway's "Game of Life") e.g. vacuum fluctuations¿ (i.e. virtual particles, radiation) aka "spontaneous symmetry-breaking" —> from planck radius accelerating expansion (inflation) to Hubble volume ...

Okay, materialism is logically equivalent to idealism. — Olivier5

Yeah, "logically equivalent" as members of the same set of "monism"; however, they are not conceptually equivalent: "idealism" – protestations notwithstanding – presupposes (or supervenes on) "materialism" – mind is nonmind-dependent (i.e. idea-tion is embodied) – and not the other way around; otherwise one gets the kind of 'Parmenidean idealism' which you aptly describe as

... can only be static, dead, boring; it's simplistic at the extreme.

i.e. an unpredicated, useless concept.

For instance, wasn't materialist Marx the epitome of political idealism?

Yes, but because of his teleology (i.e. a variation on Hegel's dialectic), IME, not materialism per se.

↪khaled

:up:

Olivier5

Yeah, "logically equivalent" as members of the same set of "monism"; however, they are not conceptually equivalent... — 180 Proof

I fail to see that big conceptual difference between materialism and idealism. It's all just one type of chocolate, to paraphrase @Khaled.

The Dao 道 (the “way”) gives birth to one.
One gives birth to Two,
Two gives birth to Three... — Daodejing, Chap. 42

This is precisely the point I am arguing against. One cannot really "give birth to two". One can only give birth to yet another one. For some change to happen, one needs a sort of engine for difference, a reason for change, a maker of novelty. And to me that could be either an external force ("gods") or some instability internal to the universe, some tension, a fundamental yin-yang in the fabric of the world.

For instance, wasn't materialist Marx the epitome of political idealism?
Yes, but because of his teleology (i.e. a variation on Hegel's dialectic), IME, not materialism per se. — 180 Proof

In my mind, a materialist should try and be logically consistent and not adopt anything like a teleology. But Khaled's point is precisely that such an idea is naïve, because if one thinks that there is only one kind of stuff out there, then that one kind of stuff is everything and does everything. So in the case of Marx, matter provided him with an ideal, illogical as that may sound on first examination.

Pinprick

Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. — khaled

Because they disagree on what that “thing” is (mental/physical).

"Mental thing" adds nothing to "thing" when "mental" is a property of everything. Same with "physical". — khaled

That’s true, but only if there is complete agreement. As of now there are competing concepts about the fundamental “thing,” so different words are needed to differentiate between these concepts. The properties of a physical thing are different from those of a mental thing. So the debate is about what properties (I.e. mental=A, B, C; physical=X, Y, Z) every “thing” has.

180 Proof

This is precisely the point I am arguing against. One cannot really "give birth to two". — Olivier5

Failure of (your) imagination isn't an argument, O.

Consider: suppose the "One" thing is dynamic, unstable, chaotic, unbounded ... suppose flowing, fluidity, fluctuation is all there "really" is ... suppose the "One" thing which constitutes everything is fundamental (like the ocean) and the "Many" are only surface effects (like ocean waves caused by – symptomatic of – ocean currents, etc) ...

... suppose :fire:

As pointed out already, two or more whatevers (substances?) would not be fundamental, and so the question would be begged. Even "there is no fundamental whatever" is, in fact, fundamental no-thing-ness (i.e. atomism's void, Buddhist sunyata, etc).

SophistiCat

Yes. That it's ONE fundamental stuff not many. — khaled

I still don't see what substantive claim is being made. Sometimes we make distinctions, sometimes we lump things together. When we lump everything together, we end up with one undifferentiated referrent. Wouldn't that be the same as this fundamental stuff of monism? If so, it doesn't seem to commit us to anything.

Olivier5

Failure of (your) imagination isn't an argument, O.

Consider: suppose the "One" thing is dynamic, unstable, chaotic, unbounded ... — 180 Proof

Fair enough: this one and unique substance of the monists could well harbor in itself, as part of its very own necessary (intrinsic) qualities, the capacity to change in a radical manner, to transform creatively over time. To become different from its earlier... form?

As pointed out already, two or more whatevers (substances?) would not be fundamental, and so the question would be begged. Even "there is no fundamental whatever" is, in fact, fundamental no-thing-ness (i.e. atomism's void, Buddhist sunyata, etc). — 180 Proof

I suppose it all boils down to what is meant by fundamental, then. In my mind, a kind of stuff can be said to be fundamentally different from another IFF it is impossible to produce one from the other and/or vice versa (not even in theory) by re-arraging its components for instance. E.g. since it is theoretically possible to change lead into gold, or clay into pot, or energy into matter, these two kinds of stuff are not fundamentally different.

Is that different or similar to your concept of it?

khaled

↪Olivier5

Do you think that space and time are made of the same one stuff as apples and rocks? — Olivier5

Yes.

I take your point that stuff interacts with stuff, which may constrain the degree to which there can be essentially different stuff in the universe. — Olivier5

Yes.

It's just that to me, one unique stuff cannot possibly self-differentiate. — Olivier5

I don't see why it couldn't.

Some external force would have to be applied to that unique stuff in order to differentiate it into particulars — Olivier5

What applied that force?

If it's a different kind of stuff, then how could it apply said force? That's the dualist problem.

khaled

↪Pinprick

So the debate is about what properties (I.e. mental=A, B, C; physical=X, Y, Z) every “thing” has. — Pinprick

Let's say you find out, after long exhaustive search, that the fundamental thing making up the world is Matata. How would you go about explaining what Matata is?

My point is that you literally cannot articulate what the property that everything shares is, if everything truly shares it. If you want to explain what Matata is, you need to bring something that is not Matata to compare it to. But if there is something that is not Matata, then not everything is Matata.

Olivier5

If it's a different kind of stuff, then how could it apply said force? — khaled

Not sure why not. Difference is not indifference.

khaled

↪Olivier5

If you think different kinds of stuff can apply forces on each other, then do you think the mind-body problem is not real?

What does the word "fundamentally" add to "fundamentally different"?

Anyways it's 3 am and I'm going to bed, don't expect a reply :yawn:

khaled

↪SophistiCat

Sometimes we make distinctions, sometimes we lump things together. — SophistiCat

Except it matters how we make these distinctions. To me, positing that there are two fundamentally different kinds of stuff would also mean they cannot interact. Like in the mind body problem.

Monism isn't against making distinctions, it's against making distinctions that make it so that the categories cannot interact.

Olivier5

What does the word "fundamentally" add to "fundamentally different"? — khaled

In my mind, a kind of stuff can be said to be fundamentally different from another IFF it is impossible to produce one from the other and/or vice versa (not even in theory) by re-arraging its components for instance. E.g. since it is theoretically possible to change lead into gold, or clay into pot, or energy into matter, these two kinds of stuff are not fundamentally different.

180 Proof

↪Olivier5

Similiar. :point:

Monism isn't against making distinctions, it's against making distinctions that make it so that the categories cannot interact. — khaled

:100:

Pinprick

Let's say you find out, after long exhaustive search, that the fundamental thing making up the world is Matata. How would you go about explaining what Matata is? — khaled

“Hey guys, remember how we thought everything was ‘Hakuna Matata?’ Well, it turns out it’s just Matata.”

We are capable of imagining things that aren’t real, so we can always compare our actual findings with whatever we previously imagined them to be.

SophistiCat

Except it matters how we make these distinctions. To me, positing that there are two fundamentally different kinds of stuff would also mean they cannot interact. Like in the mind body problem.

Monism isn't against making distinctions, it's against making distinctions that make it so that the categories cannot interact. — khaled

But who believes that these categories cannot interact? The mind-body problem is precisely a problem, it is posed as a challenge for dualism, not something that dualism embraces.

I think you are right in framing monism as an opposition to dualism though - that is how it appears historically. Dualism, in its most general outlines, carves out a special and exceptional place for the mental in its ontology and metaphysics. This is sometimes referred to as mentalism. So the best case for monism that I can see is a straightforward rejection of mentalism and nothing more.

TheMadFool

The format for monisms:

Everything is x

You see some apples, apples! You see some apples & bananas, fruits! You see some apples, bananas and meat, food! You see some apples, bananas, meat and bulldozers, things!

"What's that thing you have in your hands?" An unknown, Apollonius of Perga's legacy.

A distinct feeling of ignorance, being in the dark.

Say everything is physical. Light! A transition from ignorance to knowledge. Illusory/ real?

"Bring me that thing over there," said she to Tom.
Tom: :confused: :chin: ???

She clarifies, "if it's physical, bring it."
Tom: :confused: :chin: ???

TheMadFool

Failure of (your) imagination isn't an argument, O. — 180 Proof

Argument from (personal) incredulity.. It's a short read.

TheMadFool

The word "thing" is,

1. A universal referent i.e. if the universe, universe in the broadest sense, is a set, the word "thing" refers to any and all members of that set, the universal set.

2. a variable, like x or y or z in mathematics it simply designates an unknown.

Do you see what's going on here?

In sense 1, a thing is the value of a variable (x = thing) and in the sense 2, a thing is a variable (x).

If Ax = x is an apple and Px = x is physical,

3. Apples are physical: If something is an apple then it is physical. $(\forall x)(Ax \rightarrow Px)$

4. Things are physical: $(\forall x)Px$ [A variable can't be a value]

What gives?

A single Monism

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