The seeming things do... — Srap Tasmaner
...which is...That looks like just a denial of Heidegger’s first sense of ‘phenomenon’... — Srap Tasmaner
something that is shown, or brought to light, or shows itself in itself, — Srap Tasmaner
So, when talking about being, we would predicate being. — Heiko
Does the pencil as writing instrument have at least one existential attribute in common with the pencil as rocket?
— ucarr
Do you mean, do they both exist?
I don’t think ‘as’ confers or conjures existence. You can use a rock as a hammer, but you don’t thereby bring into existence the-rock-as-hammer alongside the rock itself, do you?
Or going the other way, in abstracting, you can look at a basketball as a toy, as a shape, as a souvenir, as a commercial product, and so on. Those are ways in which the basketball can be seen, but it’s the basketball being seen in this specific light, the basketball that is the thing here, and how it is viewed is not another and separate thing.
Or is none of this what you meant by ‘existential attribute’? — Srap Tasmaner
"Harry Potter is a fictional character" on the other hand explicitely expresses the mode of his existence and makes perfect sense. — Heiko
...existence is in the relation between subject and predicate — Joshs
What we do in pretending does not seem to be grounded in how things can seem to be something they’re not; nor does it bring about any such seeming. Maybe I’m missing something, but I can’t find much of a connection. — Srap Tasmaner
Just as putting the pieces on the board sets us up to play, but is not part of the game. — Banno
Davidson phrased the same point in a less misleading way when he pointed out that the world is always, already, interpreted. — Banno
Who, as I said, got it from Husserl.
I'm not much interested in who said it first, so much as who said it best - the point is to be clear about what is being claimed. — Banno
A theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true.
setting the game up is not playing the game; we need to keep track of which activity we are involved in.
Or if you prefer, setting the game up is usually a different language game to playing, although of course one can imagine a game in which setting up the game is aprt of the game. — Banno
Is ∃(x)f(x) to be understood as a relation between things that f and existence? — Banno
I'm not aware of that idea deriving from Husserl, but in any case it is abundantly clear in Heidegger. — Janus
The first sentence took me some time. I don't think that "alteration" is the right word there - "defines" would be more appropiate, I think. When using the existential quantor the "x" typically appears in the predicate as well. It does not seem to make sense to say "There is an x, so that 3=3" (atough the grammar indeed seems to allow this - but I would have to look that up).Existence would be the way that the particulars ( a thing that is f) alters the sense of the subject that they are particulars of. Formal logic supposes that the subject and predicate sit still as self-identical contents , while we cobble them together in an external relation. — Joshs
When Tolkien pretends that what he offers to the public is a translation of The Red Book of Westmarch, he pretends both that there is such a thing and that his work is a translation. If you want to say that ‘in some sense’ the Red Book exists, then is Tolkien’s work ‘in some sense’ a translation? In what sense could that possibly be true? — Srap Tasmaner
Being isn't any-thing, including a "happening," including "becoming," including "change." It is very much like nothing. We interpret this "nothing," but that's all we can say about it. — Xtrix
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