Did you already say the idea came from Heidegger via Husserl? If so, my apologies I missed it. I'm not aware of that idea deriving from Husserl, but in any case it is abundantly clear in Heidegger.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Always_already — Janus
The difference I see with Heidegger is that Heidegger takes pragmatic awareness as a totality of relevance that unifies our total past as background ‘framing’ of every disclosure of a ready to hand thing. Husserl begins instead with the perceptual object that only indirectly links back to a larger totality of our past experience. — Joshs
Where does Heidegger say being is a “happening”? Or that being is anything at all? — Xtrix
Occurrence, so far as I’ve read, is another term for the present at hand. That’d be like saying Heidegger agrees with the western tradition. — Xtrix
notice that the account of being given in the tradition of Frege, Russell, Quine and so on does not depend on time.
— Banno
This is like saying it doesn’t depend on human being. But Frege and Russell were indeed human beings. — Xtrix
This is like saying it doesn't depend on German, but both Husserl and Heidegger arranged their arguments in German. — Banno
I also find it tiresome when I’m told he makes more sense when you’ve read his earlier work. If so why can’t anyone explain what he meant? — I like sushi
With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'. If we may allude to some earlier researchers on the analysis of Being, incomparable on their own level, we may compare the ontological sections of Plato's Parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's Metaphysics with a narrative section from Thucydides; we can then see the altogether unprecedented character of those formulations which were imposed upon the Greeks by their philosophers. And where our powers are essentially weaker, and where moreover the area of Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which was presented to the Greeks, the harshness of our expression will be enhanced, and so will the minuteness of detail with which our concepts are formed.
Where does Heidegger say being is a “happening”? Or that being is anything at all? — Xtrix
The ontological difference is the distinction between being and beings— it is not a description or claim about being itself. — Xtrix
With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'. — Xtrix
You’ve tried to define dasein before and failed. Not surprising as Heidegger failed too. That is my point. — I like sushi
Personally , I don’t need to know the meaning of being in general, although I believe that it is closely linked with temporality, as his 1962 book, On Time and Being suggests. I am satisfied with knowing Dasein’s kind of being ( the ontological difference , the in-between , happening , occurrence , the ‘as’ structure , projection). — Joshs
We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this inter connection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light-and genuinely conceived-as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for anyway of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.
You’ve tried to define dasein before and failed. Not surprising as Heidegger failed too. That is my point. — I like sushi
Dasein is temporality. Being "here" (da-sein) is being the present moment, but only if we don't define the present exclusively as a present-at-hand now-point (that is, thought abstractly) -- but instead as the experience from which all time tenses arise. That's my understanding. — Xtrix
Being "here" (da-sein) is being the present moment, but only if we don't define the present exclusively as a present-at-hand now-point (that is, thought abstractly) -- but instead as the experience from which all time tenses arise. — Xtrix
Why not just say Time isn’t something we can readily atomise? The ‘Now’ is merely a way of framing time appreciation just like a second is a measure of physical time a ‘moment’ is merely a human reference to unregulated and vague demarcation of felt time. — I like sushi
Now that’s what I call garbled. It’s garbled but I can still recognize the traditional notion of time dating back to Aristotle in it. This is what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time and Husserl calls constituted or objective time.
Heidegger, in a move similar to Husserl, traces the origin of the mathematical and of empirical science to the concept of enduring objective presence undergirding constituted time (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time). — Joshs
To know what "being" is is to know what is referred to with "being". But when the uses of "being" are distinctly divergent, then no amount of endless analysis of use will determine what "being" is. The word refers to distinct things (or conceptions). Then we must turn to something other than use (which only leads us into confusion), to determine what being is. And in this sense Banno is clearly incorrectAsking "what is being?" is asking "How do we use the word 'being'?" — Banno
I am suggesting that an examination of the language of being looks more productive than musings about time. — Banno
Then dasein is defined by dasein. That is okay because he already made ‘clear’ :D how what he says isn’t ‘circular’ though right. — I like sushi
1. What is the difference between a sweet, juicy, red apple and a sweet, juicy red apple that exists? The difference between a red apple and a green apple, or a sweet apple and a sour apple, is pretty clear. But explaining clearly what is added to an apple by existing...? — Banno
Why not just say Time isn’t something we can readily atomise? The ‘Now’ is merely a way of framing time appreciation just like a second is a measure of physical time a ‘moment’ is merely a human reference to unregulated and vague demarcation of felt time. — I like sushi
I believe the separation between what you call "the vulgar conception of time", and the modern conception of time, is initiated by Hegel. He's the one who firmly rejected Aristotelian principles, offering an alternative starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover
modern mathematics allows an infinity of points within a continuity. This also provides the foundation for Heidegger and phenomenologists to portray 'being', and consequently 'beings', as forms of becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover
the real apple is an apple that reveals itself as an apple — Heiko
You can instead, in a vaguely Wittgensteinian way, see that juggling apples and pretending to juggle apples are different language-games. It's not a difference that can be summed up by saying that the apples being juggled are in the 'exists' box or not. — Srap Tasmaner
I'm good with that, but I'm not sure it provides a 'way in' for someone starting from a 'categorical' understanding. If you think categorically, then you can still say, a real apple is an apple and an imaginary apple isn't; a real apple can be sweet or tart, crisp or mushy, but an imaginary apple can't be. And then you're just puzzled, because imagination is puzzling, and now you're thinking about that instead of being. The whole approach of taking a 'complete' description of an object, as a collection of properties, and just adding or subtracting instantiation, checking the 'exists' box or not -- it's not that that doesn't lead anywhere, but it leads you in the wrong direction. — Srap Tasmaner
Here’s a phenomenological way of putting it:
“ “Equipment is “in order to.” This proposition has an ontological and not merely an ontical meaning; a being is not what and how it is, for example, a hammer, and then in addition something “with which to hammer.” Rather, what and how it is as this entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its functionality. A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality, functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity upon functionality relation.”(Basic Problems of phenomenology 1927) — Joshs
take this to mean that the hammer was manufactured with a certain, known intention and therefor it's being is in-itself when we understand that intention. But note that this happened in an act of human work and is different to a mere relevation of being in that the hammer was invented by reflecting over use, need and purpose. — Heiko
Emphasis mine - sorry for bad copy&paste.The Greeks had an appropriate term for 'Things': 1rpayp.a-ra-that is
to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings
But ontologically, the specifically 'pragmatic' character of the 1rpayJLa-ra is just what the Greeks left in obscurity ; they thought of these 'proximally' as 'mere Things'. We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern "equipment". In our dealings we come across
equipment fo r writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement.
The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The
clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of equipment - namely, its equipmentality.
Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being
of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which
it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something
in-order-to . . . A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or referernce of something to something.
Equipment, taken strictly, never "is".Ein Zeug »ist« strenggenommen nie.
I take this passage to mean that Heidegger really does make such a distinction. A speculative reason is given above. — Heiko
To know what "being" is is to know what is referred to with "being". But when the uses of "being" are distinctly divergent, then no amount of endless analysis of use will determine what "being" is. The word refers to distinct things (or conceptions). Then we must turn to something other than use (which only leads us into confusion), to determine what being is. And in this sense Banno is clearly incorrect — Metaphysician Undercover
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.