This will sound evasive — Xtrix
So now we have three ways of talking about existence: this; subject of a predicate; and and something like member of the domain of discourse....constant presence... — Xtrix
An interesting passage:
The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and 'outside' of it a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough. This is why a demonstration that two things which are present-at-hand are necessarily present-at-hand together, can give rise to the illusion that something has been proved, or even can be proved, about Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it.
(p. 205)
I think many on this forum are largely operating within this purview as well -- which is to say, one oriented towards subjects representing objects, and a picture of the human being as an evolved animal with reason, or a mind. Zoon echon logon holds true to this day. — Xtrix
What proof — Banno
But here... — Xtrix
A whole generation read Heidegger... — Srap Tasmaner
if the analytic approach — Frege, Russell, Quine — yields nothing, are we just done? Is there nothing to do unless it’s done this way? — Srap Tasmaner
Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno
Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno
So the being of this armchair extends back to when to was constructed, and forward to when it is destroyed. But also sideways to the bookcase and downwards to the floor. — Banno
One thing I really like is Heidegger's hermeneutic approach: you start from the asking of whatever question, and you don't skip right over how the question is asked, and why, and by whom, and what they think they're up to, but start there, with that vague understanding. And it's fascinating to see how he treats this not just as methodology but as part of the essential structure of the world: we ask vague questions about things we kinda already understand because some of what we understand or could understand is hidden, and that's part of what we investigate too. — Srap Tasmaner
He's aware of Kant's criticism - so go on and explain why he appears to nevertheless use existence as a first order predicate: Beingness. — Banno
...constant presence...
— Xtrix
So now we have three ways of talking about existence: this; subject of a predicate; and something like member of the domain of discourse. — Banno
My previously expressed qualm about "presence" is that it apparently preferences time over space - my prejudices, from my previous life as a student of physics, lead me to think that as far as possible we ought treat them in much the same way. So the being of this armchair extends back to when to was constructed, and forward to when it is destroyed. But also sideways to the bookcase and downwards to the floor. — Banno
Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno
My next criticism would be that presence reduces to being a member of a domain of discourse. That woudl need some filling out, but basically it is saying that the things we talk about ar in a sense given - a familiar notion for you, I suppose. But if I am right, nothing is added to the analysis of being by including presence. — Banno
Kant presupposes both the distinction between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me', and also the connection between these; factically he is correct in doing so, but he is incorrect from the standpoint of the tendency of his proof. It has not been demonstrated that the sort of thing which gets established about the Being-present-at-hand-together of the changing and the permanent when one takes time as one's clue, will also apply to the connection between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me'. But if one were to see the whole distinction between the 'inside' and the 'outside' and the whole connection between them which Kant's proof presupposes, and if one were to have an ontological conception of what has been presupposed in this presupposition, then the possibility of holding that a proof of the 'Dasein of Things outside of me' is a necessary one which has yet to be given would collapse.
Can't see that this helps, if the point is to defend a misuse of language. — Banno
But remember, the question isn't "What kind of word is 'being'"? The question is what is "it"? What is the meaning of being? — Xtrix
Give me a paper to read. — Banno
I haven't read Grice, is his work worth exploring? — Janus
I get that you don't respect Heidegger — Janus
Ideas are not for respecting though. They are for slapping sense into if possible. — I like sushi
When it comes to ideas you wouldn't be thinking about "slapping sense into them" if you respected them. — Janus
Frodo walked into Mordor. "Frodo walked into Mordor" is true. — Banno
...fundamentally temporal nature of a language game — Joshs
we ask vague questions about things we kinda already understand because some of what we understand or could understand is hidden, and that's part of what we investigate too. — Srap Tasmaner
Intentional content can be thought of along the lines of a description or set of information that the subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional objects of her thought. Thus, in thinking that there is a red apple in the kitchen the subject entertains a certain presentation of her kitchen and of the apple that she takes to be in it and it is in virtue of this that she succeeds in directing her thought towards these things rather than something else or nothing at all. It is important to note, however, that for Husserl intentional content is not essentially linguistic. While intentional content always involves presenting an object in one way rather than another, Husserl maintained that the most basic kinds of intentionality, including perceptual intentionality, are not essentially linguistic. Indeed, for Husserl, meaningful use of language is itself to be analyzed in terms of more fundamental underlying intentional states (this can be seen, for example, throughout LI, I). For this reason characterizations of intentional content in terms of “descriptive content” have their limits in the context of Husserl’s thought.
Heidegger isn't treating being as a predicate. — Xtrix
the thesis is that underlying these various Western interpretations is a fundamentally Greek one: constant presence, ousia. — Xtrix
Past the Linguistic Turn? — Srap Tasmaner
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.