The more common version of this is "The truth is somewhere in the middle", which is also problematic.

"The true is somewhere in the middle" is an example of waffling. The speaker doesn't know what the truth is and doesn't want to admit it.

Sometimes the truth is somewhere in the middle of two extreme opinions, such as "Capitalism is the perfect economic system" vs "Socialism is the perfect economic system". The adjective "perfect" rarely applies to human affairs, so we have a clue that the truth is not in either extreme position, but somewhere in between. On the other hand, the truth of string theory in physics is not somewhere in the middle. The theory either works or it doesn't. In the Soviet Union's debate between Lysenko's theories about evolution and Darwin's theories, the truth was way over on Darwin's side, not 'somewhere in the middle".

Responsible news editors often want to present "both sides of the issue". Sometimes this makes sense (ObamaCare should be repealed) and sometimes it is absurd -- giving both sides of the the serial murderer's crimes (in a news show, not a trial court). There are no "two sides" to a murder spree.

On the other hand, the truth of string theory in physics is not somewhere in the middle. The theory either works or it doesn't. — Bitter Crank

What about Newtonian mechanics? It works fairly well with billiard balls and planets, not so much with heat, light and electrons. It has a restricted scope of application, works pretty well within that scope and fails outside. For all we know, could this not also turn out to be the case for string theory? I would surmise that, upon Kantian reflections on the concept of law of nature, this must be the case for any scientific theory whatsoever.

There are no "two sides" to a murder spree. — Bitter Crank

Might it not sometimes be a moral decision? What if the killings occur in the context of war? The assassination of Nazi officers in occupied France by the French resistance, say? Vichy loyalists may even dispute that there is a state of war between France and Germany. I am not arguing that the question of the criminality (or justifiability) of the act can't be decided. I think moral question can be objectively decided. But there certainly seems to be two sides there to be discussed and arbitrated. Murder isn't a "natural kind" as electric charge or biological species are.

The truth is somewhere in the middle can also mean truth in that situation is not a binary proposition.

My observation - based on no formal statistical analysis whatsoever - is that in most cases where this phrase is used it relates to a value judgement, which even the most ardent of anti-post-modernists might agree does not necessarily have anything to with truth. BC's example of capitalism vs communism exemplifies this: what one considers to be a 'good' economic system depends on one's values, especially in relation to (but not limited to) the relative importance of freedom and equality.

Also, the implicit assumption that the available options are restricted to the line segment connecting the two points is rarely valid. In cases where there is arguably a truth against which two competing points of view may be judged, and it is not simply equal to one or the other of them, it usually lies off the line segment that connects them. Life is not one-dimensional!

An interesting application of this principle is found in Buddhist philosophy. As is well-known, Buddhism is said to be a 'middle way' - between the 'extremes' of ascetic self-denial, on the one side, and hedonistic self-indulgence, on the other.

But the same principle is applied more broadly through the 'philosophy of the middle way', called Madhyamaka. This holds that phenomena are empty of real existence (svabhava), that is, their existence is dependent on causes and conditions. So phenomena (dharma) are not absolutely existent, but neither are they non-existent; they are said to be 'empty of own-being' (śūnyatā).

Those who advocate the 'extreme of non-existence' (i.e. deny the reality of self and world) are characterised as nihilists; those who advocate the extreme of 'independent existence' (i.e. that there is an unchanging essence or substance) are said to be 'eternalists'. (This division reflects the philosophical concerns of the culture in which it was situated.)

Buddhists rejects both extremes and are therefore said to be 'philosophers of the middle way' (Madhyamika).

(Philosopher Graham Priest has an interesting essay on Buddhist logic on Aeon.)

To say that the truth is always in the middle seems to be contradictory, doesnt it? — rickyk95

This is a tricky issue because it depends whether you are reasoning about the particular, or about the general.

When you are making claims about the particular, you can expect it to be the case that either something is true, or it is not. The thing in question is either present, or absent. Possible or impossible. It is a black and white bivalent choice with no grey.

But when you are making claims about the metaphysically general, you wind up with a dialectical argument or, formally, a dichotomy. You get two opposed extremes - both of which are "true" in being the limits of the conceivable. A dichotomy is that which is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. So it is a system of thought for reducing vague possibility to two complementary alternatives - with the result that all actual possibilities will be found in the gray area in-between the book-ending extremes.

So we have all the classic categorical dichotomies that drive metaphysical level thinking. Is X discrete or continuous, substance or form, accident or necessity, plastic or static, determined or random, atom or void, etc.

We find that if anything is definitely the case, then it must fall within two bounding and apparently contradictory extremes of being. It might of course approach either bound with arbitrary closeness. Yet it still needs the "other" to secure its identity. You can only know you are close to one of the bounds because you know you are far from the other bound. So that leaves actual being always somewhere in "the middle" - the middle being the spectrum of all the states intermediate between to anchoring boundaries.

And this is why arguments play out the way they do. At first people are uncertain about the right answer, but they have some intuitions. They push the argument strongly in some direction, and that naturally exposes the dichotomous "other" that they are hoping to move away from and indeed leave completely behind. But then other folk can seize on the alternative and start to see its essential rightness.

The space of the possible get sharply dichotomised by a dialectical debate - and eventually it becomes obvious the sensible answer is "somewhere in the middle", the middle now being itself sharply defined in some measurable fashion as a result of the argument. An argument for black vs white results in 50 (or an unlimited number) of shades of grey.

You can actually make a still stronger argument than this.

Saying the truth is in the middle feels a little limp and compromisy. As if we are just happy with a gray muddle. But take an argument like whether intelligence is the product of nature or nurture. Or whether individuals should be free or constrained.

In the end, it feels dumb to say IQ is something like 60% genes and 40% upbringing, or whatever. You want to assign 100% value to them both. And this is because the sum of the two is more than the parts. It is like yes, both are completely true. Both of them contribute fully - and can do so because they are coming from complementary directions and are not treading on each other's toes. Their mixing "in the middle" is not subtractive - a dimming of each other's light. Instead it is multiplicative. By being sharply divided, they make any mixing a much more definite kind of mix.

It is like cooking. The best food combines strong and antagonistic flavours - salty and sweet, crunchy and smooth. You don't want to cook with bland muddled ingredients. It is contrast which produces rich complexity.

So the middle itself now needs to be understood as not just some bland state of greyness but itself a potential dichotomy. It's own "truth" could indeed be bland grey - a simplest possible outcome. Or it could be a zingy, zesty, complex mix of extreme contrasts.

But now we are clearly into territory that ordinary models of logic don't venture. As I say, most people's idea of logic goes no further that reasoning about particulars - the bivalent approach which wants to reduce a claim about a thing to the counterfactually definite options of true or false, yes or no. It is quite exotic even to suggest some kind of trivalent logic which uses the options of yes, no and maybe. Or 1, 0 and -1.

Then metaphysics is built on dialectical or dichotomistic reasoning. Yet for some reason, even this is not a widely understood fact.

Beyond that, I guess it is only over the past 40 years that people have really started to develop a mathematical-level appreciation of complexity - the rich mixture that characterises highly dichotomised middles. And here you would have to turn to hierarchy theory, and fractal or scalefree models of reality, if you want to see a proper "logic of middles".

Hierarchy theory is all about the middles that emerge between complementary bounds. It is a formal way of making the argument I outlined. It is the meta way of escaping the apparent circularity you identified in the OP.

I do not have a position on Newtonian Mechanics vs. Quantum Mechanics. Sorry.

A murder spree is a murder spree and war is war. If the French Resistance shot 10 Nazi officials one day in occupied Paris, neither the Nazis nor the Resistance should call it murder (though the Germans might want to tell the story that way). Similarly, serial murders are not confused with war, and their perpetrators are not confused with soldiers. The Butcher of Brooklyn who extended his trade to his fellow man could be said to have "waged war on Brooklyn" but that was only a figure of speech. The couple of dozen victims who ended up on his cutting board were murdered in cold blood.

Was the German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) an act of war or a psychopathic killing spree? Some psychopaths may have participated, but from both sides' point of view, the extreme savagery of the fighting (and the behind-the-lines liquidation of millions of people) was war. War is very bad, and very bad things happen in war. Operation Barbarossa was planned, prepared for, and executed as state policy by the Third Reich. So was the retribution that the Soviet Union visited on the Germans, starting a couple of years later.

There is no middle here.

I do not have a position on Newtonian Mechanics vs. Quantum Mechanics. Sorry. — Bitter Crank

But you do have a position on string theory??

A murder spree is a murder spree and war is war. — Bitter Crank

In order to defend this claim you provided paradigmatic examples of clear cut cases, or examples where our suspension of judgment is naturally lifted after we are appraised of more facts about the case and of relevant features of its context. But is it always like that? Are there not cases where the very existence of a state of war between two nations can be disputed? (e.g. the "invaders" conceive of themselves as "liberators"?) Or where the motives of the criminal come very close to constituting extenuating circumstances. A jury may be deadlocked not on account of lack of information but rather because the applicability of agreed upon criteria to the specific case are in dispute. In such "soft" cases, the claim that truth lies in the middle might be a way of pointing out that both the case for the defense and the case for the prosecution necessarily leave out troublesome features of the case.

If the French Resistance shot 10 Nazi officials one day in occupied Paris, neither the Nazis nor the Resistance should call it murder (though the Germans might want to tell the story that way). — Bitter Crank

Sure, but you can also fill up the details of the case such that it isn't so clear cut. Imagine this to occur on the brink of liberation, or with low level officers, or soldiers, who may want to claim prisoner status, etc. etc. Whatever question is raised that problematizes the verdict, you can for sure imagine filling up the details of the case in such a way as to resolve it unambiguously (though still conditionally to the endorsement of a specific value system, as others have pointed out), or, in such a way as to problamatize the case even more. The real world often is like that. The more you learn about some (though not all) specific criminal cases, the more curveballs are thrown at you.

So, what I know about string theory could be written on the back of a postage stamp in none-too-small lettering. Any thoughts I have about string theory are fourth hand and not worth your time.

Take Hilary Clinton's e-mail server and as Sanders put it, "her damned e-mails". Gallons of ink have been spilled on this case, from 100% pro to 100% against, and every minute interval in between. Why was Hilary using a private e-mail server for official business? I don't know. Is the truth somewhere in the middle? My guess is that the truth is closer to one end than the other, maybe quite close--but I don't know which end that would be. I'm not entirely sure that Hilary Clinton herself knows the answer to the question.

A lot of questions are like the server problem: They seem to begin in dark, murky water and go down hill from there. It may be that very bad motives are driving an act, or it may be that the really good motives and acts just don't look great in bright daylight. It may be that critical pieces of information about [the issue] are missing. Or, it may be that many people (for and against) are lying. It may be that the whole shebang is just a token for something else that has stuck in somebody's craw.

The indeterminate nature of so many questions is real enough, but it doesn't mean the answer is "somewhere in the middle" (though, of course, that's where it might be).

But is it always like that? — Pierre-Normand

No.

The Nazis launched Kristallnacht on November 09, 1938. This was allegedly in response to the murder of a low-level German diplomat in Paris by a 17-year-old Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, who allegedly wanted revenge for his parents’ sudden deportation from Germany to Poland.

I don't know for sure what Herschel Grynszpan's motives were for shooting Ernst vom Rath. Perhaps it was because his parents were being deported, perhaps it was because of the severe antisemitism being promoted in Germany. Whatever the motive, it was officially murder in 1938, and not an act of war. "The war" was underway but it hadn't been clearly declared. In any event, Herschel Grynszpan can not be listed as a cause of Kristallnacht. Killing Rath wouldn't help his parents deportation; he was, most likely, just the first German to walk into the crosshairs of Grynszpan's gun (unless Grynszpan was singling out Rath for some other, unknown, reason). Further, vom Rath's death wasn't worth anything even remotely close to a reprisal like Kristallnacht.

Kristallnacht was, most likely, planned in advance and vom Rath's death was simply a convenient excuse.

Many people in France (and elsewhere) were dreading the outbreak of war. Some were fairly sure that war between Germany and France was unlikely. Some thought that war would break out and that the French armed forces would successfully defend France. Some were oblivious to the possibilities. Some people favored German antisemitic policies. So, we can not be sure what strain of thinking might have been influenced Herschel Grynszpan's actions the most.

So, what I know about string theory could be written on the back of a postage stamp in none-too-small lettering. Any thoughts I have about string theory are fourth hand and not worth your time. — Bitter Crank

OK, so you are walking back your claim that the truth of string theory can't be in the middle, and that either the theory works or it doesn't. It could turn out that, just as is the case for Newtonian mechanics (or any other well surveyed, well established scientific theory, in my view) string theory could turn out to have a restricted scope of applicability such that the question of its categorical truth (i.e. non-scope relative) is ill defined.

No. — Bitter Crank

In that case we are in agreement. (And I agree with all the rest of your post too.) But then your earlier claim that "a murder spree is a murder spree and war is war", which seemed to preclude the possibility of undecidable cases, or of middle ground judgments, in specific cases where a verdict seems to be called for in point of legality or of moral legitimacy, was misleading.

The indeterminate nature of so many questions is real enough, but it doesn't mean the answer is "somewhere in the middle" (though, of course, that's where it might be). — Bitter Crank

I am unsure how to interpret this other than meaning that for some questions truth can lay in the middle (i.e. be ill defined, or nuanced) but for some other questions (also asked in specific contexts regarding well defined particulars) truth is categorical. Am I reading you correctly or is there some point I am missing?

Madhyamaka has a mathematical counterpart, to wit ZERO sitting exactly in the middle between positive and negative numbers. And doesn't that resonate with sunyata?

For a long time now humans have been trying to categorize experience into neat little boxes, crisply delineated domains. However, nature hasn't been very cooperative - throwing at us intractable vagueness and complexity.

The middle path is a result of our efforts to carve nature into high-resolution images and the inherent vagueness of nature.

Madhyamaka has a mathematical counterpart, to wit ZERO sitting exactly in the middle between positive and negative numbers. And doesn't that resonate with sunyata? — TheMadFool

Well, it is believed that Buddhist (or possibly Hindu) mathematicians first came up with the idea of zero, without which, of course, decimal notation was not possible, and this was at least partially because they were comfortable with the idea of denoting the idea of 'nothing' (which ancient mathematicians in the West were not.) But śūnyatā doesn't actually mean 'nothing', it is a more subtle idea than that. It refers to the 'emptiness of phenomena', their lack of substance or essence.

But śūnyatā doesn't actually mean 'nothing', it is a more subtle idea than that. — Wayfarer

How would you explain the concept of sunyata to a child?

To me sunyata (name itself derived from sunya which means zero?) means nothing - nothing lasts forever, there's neither good or bad, there's no nirvana nor samsara, etc. I think this is a nihilistic interpretation of the concept but I like it because from then on being good is a personal choice - it is complete freedom to choose one's path in life - and one assumes total responsibility for one's actions.

How would you explain the concept of sunyata to a child? — TheMadFool

I don't think you would.

Buddhists certainly recognize freedom of choice but they also undertake to observe the dharma.

I don't think you would.

Buddhists certainly recognize freedom of choice but they also undertake to observe the dharma. — Wayfarer

I think something unique to Buddhism is at the level of sunyata philosophy everything is acceptable - a no-holds-barred game. Enlightened people/bodhisattva's are known to dwell through the entire spectrum from extreme goodness to depraved cruelty.

It is when you realize that there's nothing you become truly free. What follows then is a choice you make on your own terms, devoid of external influences - to be good for no reason whatever. This is beautiful.

sunyata philosophy everything is acceptable - a no-holds-barred game — TheMadFool

Actually, Buddhists have a name for that view. It's called 'total bullshit'. It's a very common affliction amongst decadent Westerners. You're just totally, like, you know, wallowing in your own ego.

Actually, Buddhists have a name for that view. It's called 'total bullshit'. It's a very common affliction amongst decadent Westerners. You're just totally, like, you know, wallowing in your own ego. — Wayfarer

Then what is the right view?

It is when you realize that there's nothing you become truly free. What follows then is a choice you make on your own terms, devoid of external influences - to be good for no reason whatever. This is beautiful. — TheMadFool

It seems self-contradictory, though. You can't divorce reason from moral goodness. Non-rational animals can't behave well or badly in a moral sense since they lack moral understanding. If someone choses to act well (in a moral sense) for no reason at all, then what would be the measure of her action according to which it isn't seen to be deviating from goodness into some gratuitous cruel or unjust behavior? If you chose to act well -- or to be good -- "on your own terms", as you say, then your own understanding of goodness, as distinguished from evil, provides your reason for acting. This rational understanding becomes the law, or the measure, of your own behavior, as it were, even if this law is autonomously endorsed by you (rather in the way a mathematician acquires intellectual autonomy when she comes to rationally endorse the principles of valid logical inference that she first was trained to follow unreflectively by her community, because those principles later withstood her own attempts at criticizing them.)

If someone choses to act well (in a moral sense) for no reason at all, then what would be the measure of her action according to which it isn't seen to be deviating from goodness into some gratuitous cruel or unjust behavior? If you chose to act well -- or to be good -- "on your own terms", as you say, then your own understanding of goodness, as distinguished from evil, provides your reason for acting. — Pierre-Normand

Perhaps I chose the wrong words. What I mean is that we can, from sunyata, realize that to do good we shouldn't have an ulterior motive e.g. attaining nirvana or salvation etc. Simply be good.

Perhaps I chose the wrong words. What I mean is that we can, from sunyata, realize that to do good we shouldn't have an ulterior motive e.g. attaining nirvana or salvation etc. Simply be good. — TheMadFool

Yes, that makes sense. Sorry for misconstruing what you had said. One can indeed act for a reason and one's acting for this reason not constituting one's having an ulterior motive, right?

What I mean is that we can, from sunyata, realize that to do good we shouldn't have an ulterior motive e.g. attaining nirvana or salvation etc. Simply be good. — TheMadFool

That is less egregious then your earlier 'everything is acceptable'. That attitude is just the kind of relativism or nihilism that is warned against by the Śūnyavada (exponents of Śūnyatā). There is a sense in which the spiritually emancipated are free from social rules and restrictions, on account of having gone beyond them, but that has to be interpreted carefully. I think it would be generally understood that such persons have no need of rules, because they have 'internalised' virtue to the point where it has become their nature. Perhaps it is reminiscent of Augustine's 'Love, and do what you will'.

Simply be good. — TheMadFool

I think it was Aristotle who said 'virtue is its own reward', and there is considerable truth in that.