But it is a continuity based on the continuity of magnitiude. — Joshs

What does magnitude have to do with "now"? The point was that Heidegger wrongly portrayed Aristotle's conception of the continuity of time as a continuity of nows. "The 'now' is no part of time...any more than points are parts of a line..." Physics 220a, 18.

"Continuity without any nows" is what, exactly? Perhaps citing Aristotle to support whatever claim you're making would be helpful. — Xtrix

Read Physics 220a, 13-23. Here's a sample: "In so far as the 'now' is a boundary it is not time, but an attribute of it..." 220a 20.

The conclusion here is that time is "a number" with respect to before and after, ('before and after' having been distinguished by the application of a 'now'). It is continuous, because it has been designated to be an attribute of motion and magnitude, which are continuous. And it is in theory, divisible by the application of a now which separates before from after.

The issue I had was with Heidegger's portrayal of a succession of nows as being proposed as an objective present. I do not think that Aristotle proposes any objective present because "present" is defined as the time "not far from now". But the objectivity of "time" is based in "before and after", not on the application of a 'now'. The 'now' is simply used for marking before and after, and in counting time.

He does bring in the term "care," which I'd like to say is similar to "willing," but I don't find much textual support for this move. — Xtrix

That’s an interesting topic. Here’s what Heidegger says about willing in B&T:

“ "The phenomenon of care in its totality is essentially something that cannot be split up; thus any attempts to derive it from special acts or drives such as willing and wishing or urge and predilection, or of constructing it out of them, will be unsuccessful. Willing and wishing are necessarily rooted ontologically in Da-sein as care, and are not simply ontologically undifferentiated experiences which occur in a "stream" that is completely indeterminate as to the meaning of its being. This is no less true for predilection and urge.”

“If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following factors are constitutive for it: the previous disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which in general{being ahead-of-oneself), the disclosedness of what can be taken care of (world as the wherein of already-being), and the understanding self-projection of Da-sein upon a potentiality-for-being toward a possibility of the being "willed." The underlying totality of care shows through in the phenomenon of willing.”

So what on earth does this mean? I don’t think it denies a place for will and desire. But I think he’s trying to do two things. First, like Nietzsche, he wants to get away from the old philosophical idea of will as the choice of an autonomous metaphysical subject. Instead, he sees will as just as much determined by the matter as by he who who wills. Second, he wants to avoid the impression that will is a ‘free’ choice , unattached to ongoing relevant concerns and goals. Instead, before we choose to will anything , we are already thrown ahead of ourselves into a totality of relevance. So , really, we find ourselves willing just as we find ourselves in the world, pulled by the matter and projected by pre-existing concerns and engagements.

Do you mean we'd lose touch with the history of the idea? — frank

I was thinking of it more as a proposition. So. not very historical as something that has to be weighed against other statements. It declares something to be the case and challenges those who think otherwise.

What does magnitude have to do with "now"? The point was that Heidegger wrongly portrayed Aristotle's conception of the continuity of time as a continuity of nows. "The 'now' is no part of time...any more than points are parts of a line..." Physics 220a, 18. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is continuous, because it has been designated to be an attribute of motion and magnitude, which are continuous, and it is in theory, divisible by the application of a now which separates before from after.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Heidegger’s critique of Aristotle’s concept of time goes well beyond whether Aristotle marks off ‘now’ points. You’ll notice that for Aristotle , before and after occupy separate positions. The after succeeds the before. This creates a continuity akin to motion and magnitude , as you point out. Motion and magnitude cannot be thought without presupposing an objectively present basis for motion and magnitude. motion and magnitude are changes in something that remains self-identically present through its changes. What difference does it make whether I mark off ‘now’ points on a line. It’s the supposition of the line ( the geometrical
realization of magnitude) thats the issue for Heidegger. Each before and after is identical in its difference from the previous, creating an endless continuous string of before and afters.

I was thinking of it more as a proposition. So. not very historical as something that has to be weighed against other statements. It declares something to be the case and challenges those who think otherwise. — Valentinus

We use it to specify a state of the world, like "He is guilty."

Do you think this aspect of human life, this specification of states, is covered by the idea of language games? Or not?

We use it to specify a state of the world, like "He is guilty." — frank

At this point, it seems you are mostly interested in promoting a particular political point of view.
Whatever.

My own answer would be that we assume there is an aboutness to language.

Being is about what's real, what's authentic, what's here vs what's absent, etc.

I like the idea that we lose touch with the rich history of the idea if we deflate it too much. The demand for deflation isn't too strong anyway.

The 'now' is simply used for marking before and after, and in counting time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Used for counting time, exactly. I don't see the problem.



That's interesting, thanks.

I think it's useful to bring the conversation to our modern understanding of being.

When we talk about the "real world," or "reality," or the world in general, or the universe, we have a certain conception in mind. What's going on in people's heads comes mostly from two sources, at least in the West: Christianity and science, and to be honest it seems as if the Christians use the story of science a lot themselves (excluding creationists, of course).

I'd like to quote from an post a while back which is relevant here.

Most of today's scientists will claim to assume "naturalism" in their endeavors. Someone famous once said that "I believe in God, I just spell it n-a-t-u-r-e." I've heard this a lot from the likes of Sagan, Dennett, Dawkins, Gould, and many others -- especially when contrasting their views with religious views or in reaction to claims that science is "just another religion."

It's worth remembering that science was simply "natural philosophy" in Descartes' day, Newton's day and Kant's day. This framework and its interpretation of the empirical world dominates every other understanding, in today's world, including the Christian account (or any other religious perspective, really). Therefore it's important to ask: what was (and is) this philosophy of nature? What is the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know through our senses and our reason?

A clue is given from the word itself: "natural." And so "nature." This word comes from the Latin natura and was a translation of the Greek phusis.

It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively.

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

From Phusis: The Basis of Modern Science?

So we can see some connection here with the question of being. If "phusis" is the Greek term for being, and which is later the basis for both physics and nature, which comes to dominate our modern understanding -- is this not ultimately one part of the "metaphysics of presence" described in the OP?

Thus the "metaphysics of presence" is our philosophical ancestry, with several major variations: phusis, eidos, ousia, substance, God, nature, matter, energy.

We may ask: so what? So we see the world in terms of nature, or matter, or energy, or in the language of science. Science is the best we currently have, so what's wrong with that?

I think we simply have to look around and see how things are turning out to really understand where this tradition has come to. In Heidegger it's come to the "dead end." To Nietzsche, it's come to nihilism. I think both are correct. I would add: capitalism, as an offshoot of this way of thinking about nature and human beings (namely, materialism), is the most destructive force in the world today. It's not government, it's not socialism or communism, it's not what's traditionally thought of as religion (although capitalism is a kind of religion) -- it's the creation of a system of social organization that puts a small number of owners and shareholders on top and everywhere else puts as the servants and wage slaves of these owners.

Perhaps another way to say it: at the core of the issue today is, ultimately, a degeneration of a long philosophical tradition into a world where the central goal is to accumulate wealth and resources. And now we face almost certain destruction at the hands of climate change, thanks in part to the greed and shortsightedness of the fossil fuel capitalists. Yet we go on as the world crumbles around us.

Maybe only a god can save us in the end after all.

Husserl makes a distinction between bound and free idealities. Spoken and written language, and all other sorts of gestures and markings which intend meaning, exemplify bound idealities.Even as it is designed to be immortal, repeatable as the same apart from any actual occurrence made at some point, — Joshs

This is an interesting distinction. Bound idealities are context differentiated meanings and which persists as long as the context persists?

Last few pages of the section 16 of the 1925/26 lectures contain interesting thoughts about "p u r e presencing". (Rational, axiomatic, mathematical, theoretical) logic is based on the care about pure presencing? It is based on a (non psychological) act of temporizing. It tries to preserve or maintain ( = is cared about) a certain ("rational") order in which the temporizing act of presencing (making present, Gegenwärtigen) dominates.

Presencing is necessary in order to have something as encountered or discovered but logical activity transforms this presencing into a pure presencing. It locates itself into a pure present where "units" are fully present as themselves. Other temporal ecstasies, hasbeen and futurity, are completely subordinated to the present.

“If willing is to be possible ontologically.....”

So what on earth does this mean? — Joshs

Nothing, if willing isn’t possible ontologically. What does it even mean for the ontological possibility for willing anyway?

Where’s the profit in classifying that which is merely a metaphysically determinable doing, under the auspices of a discipline concerning itself with that which is a being? If it is true humans will, the necessity of its means are given immediately, the matter of it being quite irrelevant.

Or.....how to make a mess of it, by overburdening what we do, which is determinable, with that which we do it with, which isn’t.

The after succeeds the before. This creates a continuity akin to motion and magnitude , as you point out. — Joshs

This is highly doubtful. Before and after require the application of a 'now', and the 'now' divides the time so that it is not a continuity. Therefore the assumption of before and after actually negates the possibility of continuity. This is described at 219a, 26. The before is segment A, and the after is segment B. That A is different from B implies that there is a third thing intermediate between them. That third thing necessarily breaks the continuity between A and B. The conclusion then is that time is bounded by the 'now'.

And since there appears to be no such thing as time without before and after, the whole idea that time is continuous is cast into doubt. Then 'now' appears to be ambiguous, having two meanings, one accounting for time as continuous, without before and after if there is such a thing, and the other accounting for time as divided, (therefore not continuous), in relation to before and after.

Motion and magnitude cannot be thought without presupposing an objectively present basis for motion and magnitude. motion and magnitude are changes in something that remains self-identically present through its changes. What difference does it make whether I mark off ‘now’ points on a line. It’s the supposition of the line ( the geometrical — Joshs

The thing which moves is said to be real, the motion is not 219b, 30. So Aristotle assumes a separation here between magnitude and motion, and that is why motion is a property of magnitude. So what is presupposed as "objectively present" is the magnitude, not any sense of "time" itself. But the magnitude itself is a contingent thing with generation, corruption, and changes, it cannot be represented as a continuous line.

Used for counting time, exactly. I don't see the problem. — Xtrix

The issue is that there are two senses of "time", one as a tool for counting, and the other as the thing counted. The 'now', in proper use, is a part of the former, but not a part of the latter. When we try to make the 'now' into a part of the thing which is counted, (as in 'the now is a continuous present moment'), then we have the problem of incompatibility.

Methfhisical undercover what you referat as "now" can be split into smaller now ? Or is one whole thing impossible of division ?

What does it even mean for the ontological possibility for willing anyway? — Mww

It means the condition of possibility of willing.

Where’s the profit in classifying that which is merely a metaphysically determinable doing, under the auspices of a discipline concerning itself with that which is a being? If it is true humans will, the necessity of its means are given immediately, the matter of it being quite irrelevant. — Mww

Or.....how to make a mess of it, by overburdening what we do, which is determinable, with that which we do it with, which isn’t — Mww

The ontological structure Heidegger offers can also be thought of as a psychological structure. Think of him as critiquing older models of will.

Heidegger speaks of the intentional structure of motivated attending to as a letting oneself be affected, being-ahead-of-oneself (the moment of awareness as foreign and familiar at the same time). “One cannot construct being-in-the-world from willing, wishing, urge, and propensity as psychical acts.”(Zollikon).The desire for this conversation is determined by the task I have before me. This is the motive, the "for the sake of which" [ Weswegen]. The determining factor is not an urge or a drive, driving and urging me from behind, but something standing before me, a task I am involved in, something I am charged with. This, in turn—this relation to something I am charged with—is possible only if I am "ahead" [vorweg] of myself.” (Zollikon)

Peter was his all life same guy, is "now" in same principle always same guy ?

Aristotle assumes a separation here between magnitude and motion, and that is why motion is a property of magnitude. So what is presupposed as "objectively present" is the magnitude, not any sense of "time" itself. But the magnitude itself is a contingent thing with generation, corruption, and changes, it cannot be represented as a continuous line. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn’t have to be a continuous line. It can be a series of lines. Magnitude , as the basis of continuity, is a more complex notion than a simple plurality or multiplicity. To construe a multiplicity as a magnitude requires that we assume numeric iteration, the ‘how much’, quantity. Numeric iteration implies identical repetition, the identical ‘again and again’ of number. Magnitude also implies the earlier and later, the less and the more.

Before and after require the application of a 'now', and the 'now' divides the time so that it is not a continuity. Therefore the assumption of before and after actually negates the possibility of continuity — Metaphysician Undercover

The quantitative ‘same again and again’, that the continuity of magnitude assumes implies discrete units. Otherwise , we couldnt equate magnitude with quantity.
In this way the two notions of time both depend on countable presences positioning themselves ‘in’ time as appearing and passing away, earlier and later.

intentional structure of motivated attending to as a letting oneself be affected, being-ahead-of-oneself — Joshs

Yes, I get that. “Intentional structure of motivated attending to” represents “to will”; “letting oneself be affected” presupposes an autonomous causality contained in that self that wills.

The desire for this conversation..... — Joshs

Conversation? Where or what are the conversants? Is letting oneself be affected a conversation?

This is the motive, the "for the sake of which" — Joshs

Yes, it’s been called a moral constitution.

The determining factor is not an urge or a drive, driving and urging me from behind, but something standing before me, a task I am involved in, something I am charged with. — Joshs

Yes, it’s been called a moral obligation.

this relation to something I am charged with—is possible only if I am "ahead" [vorweg] of myself.” — Joshs

Ehhhh....I cannot be ahead of myself if I and my self are identical. Nevertheless, any relation to something I am charged with, some moral obligation, is possible only if I am imbued with something that is not an obligation, otherwise there isn’t a relation. It would seem the relation, having already incorporated something I am charged with, needs to incorporate that by which I am charged, “for the sake of which” the relation itself is possible.

Your guy is alright; he’s just plowing up a field that already has a good crop on it. Progress, I suppose, but not necessarily an improvement.

“letting oneself be affected” presupposes an autonomous causality contained in that self that wills. — Mww

Not for Heidegger, who follows Nietzsche here. The self is not autonomous for either of them.

“Philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most familiar thing in the world. In fact, Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice. Willing strikes me as, above all, something complicated, something unified only in a word – and this single word contains the popular prejudice that has overruled whatever minimal precautions philosophers might take. “

“As far as the superstitions of the logicians are concerned: I will not stop emphasizing a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath to admit: that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want. It is, therefore, a falsification of the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old “I” – well that is just an assumption or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate certainty.” In fact, there is already too much packed into the “it thinks”: even the “it” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself.”( Nietzsche)

I cannot be ahead of myself if I and my self are identical. — Mww

They are not identical. The self is an action, a relation , a transition.

Your guy is alright; he’s just plowing up a field that already has a good crop on it. Progress, I suppose, but not necessarily an improvement. — Mww

It depends on whether one thinks getting rid of the word ‘moral’ when talking about the psychological or philosophical structures of motivation, willand desire is an improvement. I agree with Nietzsche and Heidegger that it is. Why do you think the word ‘moral’ is necessary here?

The self is not autonomous for either of them. — Joshs

No, the self is not autonomous; it being susceptible to a plethora of inclinations. Still, “an autonomous causality contained by the self” does not make the self autonomous.
—————

I cannot be ahead of myself if I and my self are identical.
— Mww

They are not identical. The self is an action, a relation , a transition. — Joshs

That is only from a second-party speculation. The first-person subject acts without thinking himself an actor, relates without being the relation. Even if qualitatively or quantitatively transitioned to a modified self over time, the self as a whole retains its own identity.
————-

....getting rid of the word ‘moral’ when talking about the psychological or philosophical structures of motivation, willand desire is an improvement. I agree with Nietzsche and Heidegger that it is. Why do you think it’s necessary? — Joshs

The word “moral”, or some representation synonymous with it, is necessary in order to talk about the intrinsic duality of human nature. It cannot be an improvement, to negate that which represents an absolute necessity. To do so would require logical conclusions given by a theory in which humans are not intrinsically moral agents. And if that were the case, the fact that humans both think and feel would be refuted, or, be shown to be the same thing. The former being impossible, the latter being absurd, I should say.

The self is an action, a relation , a transition.
— Joshs

That is only from a second-party speculation. The first-person subject acts without thinking himself an actor, relates without being the relation. Even if qualitatively or quantitatively transitioned to a modified self over time, the self as a whole retains its own identity. — Mww

The question is, is the self changed each moment of
time by its exposure to a world , or even to its own reflections? Is it always a slightly different self that comes back to itself moment to moment? ( See Galen Strawson on this) .If so, then we could say that the self retains its identity in a relative way over time, continuing to be itself differently, like an ongoing theme or style that never reproduces itself identically.

if that were the case, the fact that humans both think and feel would be refuted, or, be shown to be the same thing. The former being impossible, the latter being absurd, I should say. — Mww

It is a hallmark of radically temporal models like that of Heidegger that thinking and feelings are shown to be inseparable aspects of the same process. This is the case with enactive and embodied cognitive approaches also. For them the idea of thinking divorced from feeling is incoherent. Feeling is the cradle within which cognition rests, and is what allows thought to ‘make sense’.

“ “...affect binds us to things, making them relevant and ‘lighting up' aspects of the world in such a way as to call forth actions and thoughts. Without the world-structuring orientation that they provide, we are disoriented, cut off from the world, which no longer solicits thoughts and actions and is consequently devoid of value. In effect, [William] James is saying that our very sense of reality is constituted by world-orienting feelings that bind us to things .” (Ratcliffe 2005)

This inseparability of feeling and thought reflects the overall fuctional unity of a self-organizing system, which lends it a valuative normativity in which it relates to and interprets it’s world via an anticipatory posture based on the relevance to its goals and aims. If you want to call this a ‘moral stance , it is a morality of pragmatic goal oriented sense making.

Methfhisical undercover what you referat as "now" can be split into smaller now ? Or is one whole thing impossible of division ? — Nothing

I don't know how one might split a now into a smaller now. Can you think of a way to split a point into a smaller point?

It doesn’t have to be a continuous line. It can be a series of lines. Magnitude , as the basis of continuity, is a more complex notion than a simple plurality or multiplicity. To construe a multiplicity as a magnitude requires that we assume numeric iteration, the ‘how much’, quantity. Numeric iteration implies identical repetition, the identical ‘again and again’ of number. Magnitude also implies the earlier and later, the less and the more. — Joshs

I really don't understand what you're saying Joshs. If it's a series of lines rather than a continuous line then we are not talking about a continuity anymore. That's the point which Aristotle made. If before is distinct from after, as A is distinct from B, then there is necessarily a third thing which separates the two. That there is something else distinct from A and B which is intermediary between A and B, negates the possibility that A and B are a continuity.

The quantitative ‘same again and again’, that the continuity of magnitude assumes implies discrete units. — Joshs

But that is not a continuity. In the case of a series of lines, each segment is different and distinct. So you cannot describe it as "same" again and again, each is different. A continuity composed of discrete units is incoherent as self-contradictory.

Otherwise , we couldnt equate magnitude with quantity. — Joshs

We cannot equate magnitude with quantity, this should be obvious to you. Magnitude is what is measured, quantity is the measurement.

i agree, i cannot split now further is one whole thing
if you are one guy whole life, is now always the same ? you grow, go slimmer, fatter, change some personalities,.. you changed but still the same guy, is now always the same ? what do you think.

thinking and feelings are shown to be inseparable aspects of the same process. — Joshs

Aspects of the same process, perhaps, dunno. Depends on what the process is. I doubt the process is reason, however. But nonetheless, they are separable, insofar as one cannot cognize a feeling, and one cannot feel pain or pleasure over a mere thought. A feeling is a condition of the self, a thought is a condition of the content of the self. Feelings may or may not have objects that define the condition of the self, thinking always has objects given to it, or constructed by it, that define the content of self.

And the kicker....feelings do not permit, allow, facilitate, or make account of, knowledge. Thinking alone is responsible for all our knowledge.
————

Is it always a slightly different self that comes back to itself moment to moment? — Joshs

How does a self come back to itself? Where did it go, how did it separate, such that coming back is intelligible?

That I realize I have different content in consciousness now than before doesn’t mean I am not myself because of it. The self necessarily changes pursuant to experience, but all experiences belong to a single self. It is never a consideration which “I” thinks or feels this and which other “I” thinks or feels that. And by the same token, it is never a consideration that one “I” thinks this yet another “I” feels this.
————

“ “...affect binds us to things, making them relevant and ‘lighting up' aspects of the world.... — Joshs

What affect is implied here? I grant an affect that binds us to things, but I suspect of a different nature.

We cannot equate magnitude with quantity, this should be obvious to you. Magnitude is what is measured, quantity is the measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Tell me how you would define or explain what a magnitude is to somebody who was unfamiliar with the concept. How does one make it comprehensible without invoking a multiplicity of a certain type , a continuous succession that differs from a randomly changing flow in a specific way.

I really don't understand what you're saying Joshs. If it's a series of lines rather than a continuous line then we are not talking about a continuity anymore. That's the point which Aristotle made. If before is distinct from after, as A is distinct from B, then there is necessarily a third thing which separates the two. That there is something else distinct from A and B which is intermediary between A and B, negates the possibility that A and B are a continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I am trying to get at here is that whether we are talking about a continuity or your example of a non-continuous succession in the form of something that separates the before from the after, in each case we have examples of a unified totality. A continuity is a unified totality, a succession of change that, like in the example of physical movement of an object, is a variation of a particular sort. If I move a marble from here to there and describe the path in terms of a continuous linear trajectory , notice how this flow of change is different from my me telling you to now imagine a rock, then a movie you saw, then tell you to look at your finger. There is constant change here but no continuity , no enduring identity like in the example of continuous motion. Also notice that even through the continuity is. it itself divided up , it is in the nature of this continuity that it less itself to measurement.

Now let’s look at before, after and the third thing that separates them. Can we talk about this structure in terms of an enduring pattern that stretches indefinitely , or infinitely long? However long we define the duration of this pattern of repeated before, during and after, notice that the pattern as a whole is a unity, a self-identical object, even though it is composed of a non-continuous sequence of events. Furthermore , the events which make up this non-continuous series are countable, allowing us to say that such and such a process took a certain number of minutes. So in both examples , the behavior is explained in terms of an identical totality , an objectively present whole.
For Heidegger, time cannot be counted or measured because it is not an objectively present series of before after and during. And it is not a continuity akin to the behavior of a moving object.

i agree, i cannot split now further is one whole thing
if you are one guy whole life, is now always the same ? you grow, go slimmer, fatter, change some personalities,.. you changed but still the same guy, is now always the same ? what do you think. — Nothing

I can't grasp the comparison because a now is like a point, while a person is a thing. There;s a categorical difference here.

Tell me how you would define or explain what a magnitude is to somebody who was unfamiliar with the concept. How does one make it comprehensible without invoking a multiplicity of a certain type , a continuous succession that differs from a randomly changing flow in a specific way. — Joshs

A magnitude is anything measurable, it is size. As such, a magnitude is one single thing to be measured. But the measurement of the thing is expressed as a quantity of units of measure, and this invokes a multiplicity. So a magnitude is one, but a measurement of that magnitude is a multiplicity. If we say that a unit of measure is itself a magnitude, this is one unit of measure, not a multiplicity.

What I am trying to get at here is that whether we are talking about a continuity or your example of a non-continuous succession in the form of something that separates the before from the after, in each case we have examples of a unified totality. — Joshs

The point I was making is that there is no "unified totality" in this portrayal. If before is separated from after, in the way described, then it is impossible that these two are unified. That which is divided is not unified. Note that the portrayal is not of the potential for division, or divisibility, it is of an actual division between before and after. So if it is a succession, it is a succession of distinct things, and nothing to make them unified except that they are understood under the precepts of "one order". The order, being potentially infinite, is not necessarily a totality.

If I move a marble from here to there and describe the path in terms of a continuous linear trajectory , notice how this flow of change is different from my me telling you to now imagine a rock, then a movie you saw, then tell you to look at your finger. There is constant change here but no continuity , no enduring identity like in the example of continuous motion. Also notice that even through the continuity is. it itself divided up , it is in the nature of this continuity that it less itself to measurement. — Joshs

The two examples are clearly distinct, but this is the incompatibility I referred to. If you represent the "continuous linear trajectory" of the marble, as being at point A at time 1, and point B at time 2, and so on, then you have the same problem of change without continuity. What happens to the marble between A and B? We say it "moves". But to have the continuity, we need to account for the movement. If we posit a point halfway between A and B, and half the time, we still don't account for the movement, because we might still ask how the marble gets from A to this point, and the answer is that it moves. So we might divide infinitely, and we still would have the movement actually occurring between the points, and the actual movement would never be accounted for, despite invoking an infinity of points to plot the trajectory.

This is the same issue as the incompatibility between the point and the line. Any line segment might be represented as an infinity of points. But an infinity of points does not produce a continuous line. The line is always what occurs between the points. So despite the assumption of an infinite number of points in a finite line segment, the line itself, which is what lies between the points, is never accounted for..

Now let’s look at before, after and the third thing that separates them. Can we talk about this structure in terms of an enduring pattern that stretches indefinitely , or infinitely long? However long we define the duration of this pattern of repeated before, during and after, notice that the pattern as a whole is a unity, a self-identical object, even though it is composed of a non-continuous sequence of events. — Joshs

Like I explained above, the only thing which allows us to say that these separate entities are unified, or are a unity, is that they are of one order. But then the unity is in the order, and if the order is allowed to be infinite, or "stretches indefinitely", there is no whole. So there is no self-identical object, just an order. If it were "an object", the order would be constrained within the defined boundaries of that object.

For Heidegger, time cannot be counted or measured because it is not an objectively present series of before after and during. And it is not a continuity akin to the behavior of a moving object. — Joshs

In other words, Heidegger describes time as absolutely unintelligible, i.e., outside the limits of intelligibility. What point is there to that?

feelings do not permit, allow, facilitate, or make account of, knowledge. Thinking alone is responsible for all our knowledge. — Mww

Have you read any Damasio? He has had a major impact on models of affectivity and their relation to thinking and reasoning.

“Damasio claims that science, like philosophy, has historically paid too little attention to emotion, regarding it as something distinct from and additional to the structures and processes that comprise human cognition.In contrast to this picture, Damasio argues that the machinery of intelligence and reasoning is not only built upon the machinery of emotion but also from within it. The psychological correlate of this neurological organisation is that emotions constitute a kind of cradle within which cognition rests. Any neurological damage to the working of emotions therefore has a profound effect on human reasoning, which essentially takes place relative to a background of moods and emotions.”

“… there are cases where emotional impairment is reliably coupled with a catastrophic failure of practical reasoning. Neurological studies of the damage suggest that this coupling is no coincidence. A complex of intimately connected structures are involved, as opposed to distinct brain systems involved in distinct tasks that are coincidentally damaged together. On the basis of such studies, Damasio proposes that emotions play a central role in the cognitive processes that guide choices and ensure that we choose effectively.”

one cannot cognize a feeling, and one cannot feel pain or pleasure over a mere thought. A feeling is a condition of the self, a thought is a condition of the content of the self. Feelings may or may not have objects that define the condition of the self, thinking always has objects given to it, or constructed by it, that define the content of self. — Mww

Every word you wrote above was chosen for a purpose , for its relevance in the context of the argument you are trying to advance. So each word is two things at once. It conveys a conceptual content , a ‘what’, and it conveys a relevance, a significance , the ‘how’ of the way it matters to you in the context of the larger argument. This mattering and relevance is the affective or ‘feeling’ aspect of thought. Things are meaningful to us because of how we care about them. We always have some attitude toward the objects of our experience. Things are important, boring , engaging, frightening, enraging. So we do ‘cognize’ feeling, in that built into a cognition is why it matters to us just now. If I say
I see a train’ there is always some affective subtext to the sentence. The meaning of the sentence could
include excitement over who is on the train, or disappointment , or trepidation. It is never devoid of some affective attitude or comportment. And this comportment isn’t peripheral to or separable from the supposedly pure definition of the words in the sentence. It belongs intrinsically to what they are trying to say.

A magnitude is anything measurable, it is size. As such, a magnitude is one single thing to be measured. But the measurement of the thing is expressed as a quantity of units of measure, and this invokes a multiplicity. So a magnitude is one, but a measurement of that magnitude is a multiplicity. If we say that a unit of measure is itself a magnitude, this is one unit of measure, not a multiplicity — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m talking about what is included in our concept when we use a word like magnitude. It may refer to one unit of measure, but when it does, built into its meaning is a multiplicity. If it didnt imply a relation to multiplicity , then there would be no point in saying ‘this is a magnitude’, rather than ‘this is a something’. Even saying ‘this is one unit’ implies multiplicity , because the concept of unit is incoherent without implicit reference to measure. It is one unit OF measure.

I understand the distinction you’re making between a quantity of units and magnitude as one unit , but both of those concepts fuse multiplicity and singularity ( in different ways) when we invoke either of them. The first concept involves a multiplicity OF singularities , the second a unit abstracted off from a multiplicity. But if we think ONLY the single something we are not thinking the concept of magnitude.

And of course I didn’t mention that it is not just multiplicity that belongs to the concept of magnitude whenever we think it , it is NUMERIC multiplicity. If numeric multiplicity isnt part of the concept of magnitude as we invoke it , then we are not thinking of a magnitude but a part.

if it is a succession, it is a succession of distinct things, and nothing to make them unified except that they are understood under the precepts of "one order". The order, being potentially infinite, is not necessarily a totality. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is this order I’m referring to with the name totality. What I mean here is that an order is a category of meaning. Motion, for example , is a category of sense. The behavior of motion can be potentially infinite , but the concept of motion , as a category , is bounded by its definition. It is a totality , or better yet, the category is a finite entity, as are all categories of meaning.

If we substitute the order of time for the order of motion, we have the same situation. Within the category of time, we can talk about an infinity, but the category of time itself is finite , it is a single concept.

This might all seem obvious as well as irrelevant to the issue we began with concerning Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, but if time for Aristotle is built on the model of either motion or magnitude , then numeric multiplicity is intrinsic to the invocation of the concept of time , just as we saw with the concept of magnitude.

Imagine an infinitely long freight train passing by your window. Each car is loaded with something different. From your window you can only see a single
car. So from your window of ‘now’ it appears as
though there is only ever the same car but with always changing contents. If you choose to you can count these changing items, and you can count changes in the rate of change if you like.

So if I understand correctly, Aristotle has two concepts of time , time as continuity and time as discrete measurable changes. Each concept of time by itself is necessary but not sufficient. Both are needed.

If I have this right , then what Heidegger is objecting to is time as measurable succession. His notion of authentic temporality is not an order that allows for potential measurement of a ‘how much’ or ‘how long’ or ‘how fast’.
That doesn’t mean he denies we makes these measurements , only that such ways of treating time are modifications of a more fundamental experience of it.

Do you think of Kant and Heidegger as psychologists?

I think any major philosophical model implies a psychology. As regards Heidegger, you may be aware that Medard Boss and Ludwig Binswanger created a psychotherapy called Daseinanalysis based on his work.

I’m talking about what is included in our concept when we use a word like magnitude. It may refer to one unit of measure, but when it does, built into its meaning is a multiplicity. If it didnt imply a relation to multiplicity , then there would be no point in saying ‘this is a magnitude’, rather than ‘this is a something’. Even saying ‘this is one unit’ implies multiplicity , because the concept of unit is incoherent without implicit reference to measure. It is one unit OF measure.

I understand the distinction you’re making between a quantity of units and magnitude as one unit , but both of those concepts fuse multiplicity and singularity ( in different ways) when we invoke either of them. The first concept involves a multiplicity OF singularities , the second a unit abstracted off from a multiplicity. But if we think ONLY the single something we are not thinking the concept of magnitude.

And of course I didn’t mention that it is not just multiplicity that belongs to the concept of magnitude whenever we think it , it is NUMERIC multiplicity. If numeric multiplicity isnt part of the concept of magnitude as we invoke it , then we are not thinking of a magnitude but a part. — Joshs

What I tried to explain, is that I really don't agree with your way of conflating singularity and multiplicty within both, the thing measured, and the measurement. There is no multiplicity implied by, or "built into" the meaning of "magnitude'. The magnitude is always one, as the thing which is measured, and the multiplicity is of the units of measure. So the thing measured might be measured by a countless number of different types of units of measurement, such that the measurement of the thing might be numerous different multiplicities, but that is strictly a property of the measurement. The magnitude itself cannot be more than one, or else the thing being measured would be distinct magnitudes, and this is contradictory.

It is clear to me that when you refer to "NUMERIC multiplicity", you are referring to the measurement of the magnitude, not the magnitude itself. Magnitude is a property of a thing, which a thing has regardless of whether or not it has been measured, while the numeric multiplicity is a property of the measurement. Since the magnitude is a property of the thing, it is one, as the thing is one., despite the fact that the magnitude might be measured in many different ways. The "many different ways" is proper to the measuring, not to the magnitude.

It is this order I’m referring to with the name totality. What I mean here is that an order is a category of meaning. Motion, for example , is a category of sense. The behavior of motion can be potentially infinite , but the concept of motion , as a category , is bounded by its definition. It is a totality , or better yet, the category is a finite entity, as are all categories of meaning. — Joshs

This looks mistaken to me as well. We can define something as unbounded, "infinite", like the natural numbers. So defining does not necessitate "bounded". Likewise, a defined thing is not necessarily "a totality", because a thing might be defined as incomplete. What this indicates is that your definition of "definition" is somewhat faulty. A definition does not necessarily create something bounded, nor does it necessarily produce a totality. This is important because it is the only way that we can have concepts of things like "infinite", and "incomplete". In order to have real concepts of these, we need to allow that the definitions actually produce something (a concept) unbounded, or incomplete. so for example, if we are to conceive of motion as "potentially infinite", we must provide something within the definition of "motion", which will allow that motion has some freedom from being bounded, and this is a feature of the definition. So as much as boundaries may be created by definitions, a lack of boundaries is also created by definitions. A deprivation in terms of boundary is often seen as an imperfection, or incompleteness in a concept. But it is sometimes intentional to a concept, depending on what is seen as useful for the intended application.

If we substitute the order of time for the order of motion, we have the same situation. Within the category of time, we can talk about an infinity, but the category of time itself is finite , it is a single concept. — Joshs

So I don't see how this could be the case. If the category of "time" is defined as an infinite category, then the category of time is not finite. Whether the category is finite or infinite depends on the definition.

This might all seem obvious as well as irrelevant to the issue we began with concerning Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, but if time for Aristotle is built on the model of either motion or magnitude , then numeric multiplicity is intrinsic to the invocation of the concept of time , just as we saw with the concept of magnitude. — Joshs

I completely disagree. I think it is wrong to think that multiplicity is intrinsic to magnitude. I think it is very clear that "one" is intrinsic to magnitude. A magnitude is necessarily one, otherwise we'd have to say that there is a multiplicity of "magnitudes". And it would be contradictory to say that both one and many are intrinsic to a magnitude. The numeric multiplicity you refer to is produced by the act of measuring, and is a property of the measurement not of the magnitude.

And this is exactly what Aristotle explains concerning our conception of time. We need to distinguish "time" as a tool of measurement, in which case it is a multiplicity of units of measure, from "time" as the thing (analogous to magnitude) which is measured, in which case it is one undivided continuum, therefore not a multiplicity.

Imagine an infinitely long freight train passing by your window. Each car is loaded with something different. From your window you can only see a single
car. So from your window of ‘now’ it appears as
though there is only ever the same car but with always changing contents. If you choose to you can count these changing items, and you can count changes in the rate of change if you like. — Joshs

This analogy doesn't work. Either you see separate cars going by, with the boundaries between them, or if the train were fast enough, you would see a blur, not seeing any cars. Never would it appear like the train is just one car. And if you could see the contents of the cars, the same thing would be the case, either separate cars with distinct content, or a blur.

To count "changing items" is no different from counting distinct cars. You need to be able to distinguish between them. And if it's a blur, you cannot do that. You'd be just throwing numbers at the train with no justification for your supposed "count".

So if I understand correctly, Aristotle has two concepts of time , time as continuity and time as discrete measurable changes. Each concept of time by itself is necessary but not sufficient. Both are needed. — Joshs

You do not seem, yet, to be distinguishing between the count, and the thing counted. This distinction is the one Aristotle based his two senses of "time" on. Each is a very distinct conception of "time" Here's an example which might clarify. Suppose that from the point in time that the sun rises, until that point again, constitutes "one day". We can employ "one day" as a unit of measurement, and compare how many days it takes for an occurring event. Notice that "time" in this sense, as a tool of measurement, must consist of points of reference (sunrise in this example), or else it cannot be employed for measurement. So whenever we use time to measure with, hours, days, seconds, or whatever, we employ points of reference, that's what a clock does, counts cycles or whatever. Now consider that the passing of time is an actual thing which we want to measure. Time seems to go by continuously without any inherent points of reference by which we might measure it. All those points of reference which we employ when using time to measure. are really derived from the motions of things, not from the passing of time itself. So "time" in the sense of something that is measured has no real points of reference, and the points which we use to measure time are referenced from recurring motions.