It occurs to me that there are fictional creations in which such inferences do not hold. Hence, Nonsense as a genre. — Banno
"Just the place for a Snark!" the Bellman cried,
As he landed his crew with care;
Supporting each man on the top of the tide
By a finger entwined in his hair.
"Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true. — Lewis Carroll
The method employed I would gladly explain,
While I have it so clear in my head,
If I had but the time and you had but the brain—
But much yet remains to be said.
What I tell you three times is true. — Lewis Carroll
Does the thrice-telling make it true, or does the Bellman tell it three times because it is true? — Janus
we can only infer about them what follows from what is told — Janus
Do we move to a paraconsistent logic, in which statements made within the text or inferred therefrom are true, and all other statements neither true nor false? — Banno
Which raises the intriguing notion of a free, paraconsistent logic. — Banno
Free logic would, in my humble opinion, open up the world of fiction - Tolkein's works, Doyle's works, etc. - to logical analysis.
— TheMadFool
You seem to think this would be problematic. Why shouldn't fiction be logical?
Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street. Why shouldn't we consider this to be true, within the context of the writings of Doyle and their derivatives? Is there an argument against this? — Banno
But then what of spoilers - story facts kept till last? Are they neither true nor false until presented in the narrative? — Banno
sentences found in fiction are literally false — Srap Tasmaner
That fictional sentences may be true within the fiction? — Banno
you can define it in a regular old first-order predicate logic, which is pretty much what you did above.
So we say, as a postulate governing its interpretation, that E!x iff ∃y[y=x]. — Snakes Alive
Quantifiers are (nothing but) predicates of formulae. — Snakes Alive
the domain of non-existents. — Snakes Alive
Broadly, I'm not opposed to some kind of analysis that distinguishes internal and external frames of reference, however you do that, but it's not perfectly obvious how to do that formally. — Srap Tasmaner
My apologies, I'm not sure what to make of this.
So Epistemic Logic is the various logics that include predicates for belief and knowledge - yes? Where's that fit here?
But it's not true, nor even helpful, to think of fictional worlds as only existing in the mind of the author. Were this true, both Holmes and Frodo would have ceased to exist along with the minds of their respective authors. — Banno
Paris doesn't exist in {eggs, Bacon}. Hence we might introduce the predicate "...is meat", the member of which is bacon; and conclude that Paris is not a meat; and "..."is breakfast", the members of which are both eggs and bacon, and conclude that Paris is not a breakfast. — Banno
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