ver tells the water which way to go as a mark on the landscape. No need to over-think it. — apokrisis

Conduits do not create or interpret information. They are simply conduits. Nothing more. You have defined neurons perfectly. They are rivers of energy. Exactly what is described in Chinese health theory. It's when you attribute them with human characteristics like marking, learning, inhibiting, exciting, etc. that the hand waving begins.

The discussion had turned towards, for example, the laws of nature understood as habits that formed due to morphic resonance. That was what I was addressing when I said that I could not see how such a notion could be tested.

A river tells the water which way to go as a mark on the landscape — apokrisis

Well, a riverbed doesn't signify a river, unless there's an observer who makes that interpretation ('see that? It's a riverbed. Means that water must flow here sometimes'.)

There are fundamental reasons why physics and biology require different levels of models, the most obvious one is that physical theory is described by rate-dependent dynamical laws that have no memory, while evolution depends, at least to some degree, on control of dynamics by rate-independent memory structures. — Pattee

The Physics of Symbols

I am trying to put my finger on the part that explains how the second level (exemplified in living systems) relates to the first (i.e. physical laws). So I think there is an implicit kind of dualism:

The epistemic cut is the same distinction between hardware and software and, to some extent, as the distinction between mind and body. Its necessity makes itself apparent whenever we have to design a complex artifact, to analyse its functioning, or to explain it to an audience. Doing so without ever mentioning subject/object, controller/controlled/, meter/measure distinctions, though perhaps possible in principle, would be absurdly difficult and would not qualify as proper understanding. The epistemic cut is thus similar to what Daniel Dennett (him again!) calls 'the intentional stance', i.e. the attribution of purposeful intentions to the subjects of an action as a powerful method for compressing our descriptions'

Design and Information in Biology: From Molecules to Systems, J. A. Bryant, page 80. This passage then mentions Pattee's definition of symbols, and says (page 83) 'life is matter with meaning'. That 'meaning' is what I'm having trouble identifying with respect to non-living matter, like rivers and riverbeds.

I provided you with a link which described such a test for morphic resonance fields.

One can embrace morphic resonance fields or not , but if rejected then it hardly helps matters by imbuing human qualities into neurons and labeling the former as hand waving and the latter as "science".

Both theories are quite equivalent - i.e. energy fields are being given the attributes of consciousness. I just happen to feel that morphic resonance explains much more. Neurons are simply a manifestation (subset) of the field.

So, what is the field a "subset or manifestation" of ? And you still haven't explained how the purported field might be tested for. Do you perhaps think 'morphic field' is another term for God?

I provided you with a link of an actual experiment.

No, morphic resonance is Consciousness as are neurons. No matter what sleight of hand or magic is performed by any science, inevitably Consciousness will be imbued into any "explanation" for consciousness. It is unavoidable and irristible because it is consciousness. Neurons are consciousness as is Morphic Resonance fields. It is a simple hierarchy. Sheldrake explains this all though I don't think he actually labels it as consciousness.

I doubt that you are doubting your doubting.

Sheldrake explains this all though I don't think he actually labels it as consciousness. — Rich

I'm sure if he meant to say that, he would have said it.

In this article Shelter juxtaposes the two concepts. It is inevitable. Science ultimately does the same thing (i.e. juxtaposes neurons and human consciousness) but amazingly denies it in the same breath because of the materialistic foundation of their thought. Ultimately every theory has to put Consciousness somewhere - some Bergson are just more forthright about it.

http://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance/part-i-mind-memory-and-archetype-morphic-resonance-and-the-collective-unconscious

As to the OP in question, we cannot doubt our experiences (memory) because we are quite literally memory. It defines everything about us. Doubt is a feeling created by conflicting memories. Different people will doubt differently depending upon the conflicts that memories inspire.

I don't even want to touch the idea that neurons are doubting themselves. That is how mysteries are created.

How can true certainty be produced by doubting? Thinking that one knows is not knowing. If we know anything at all we know it with absolute certainty. If there is to be any such knowledge, real knowledge which is truly distinct from mere belief, then it must be impervious to doubt, by mere definition. How could you ever know when your process of doubting is rightly ended? Certainly not by means of doubt! — John

You seem to be starting from the false assumption that human beings have "true certainty". There is always the possibility that a human being may be mistaken, therefore human beings never obtain absolute certainty. We assign that to God.

Nothing I said is contrary to the idea that lack of knowledge precedes knowledge, or that less knowledge precedes greater knowledge. The point is that knowledge, if it is truly knowledge, cannot be subject to doubt. If it is merely belief, then of course that is a different matter. — John

You have a false impression of what knowledge really is. Since it is always possible that we can be mistaken when we claim to "know" something, then the thing which we refer to as knowledge is fallible. That's simply reality, human knowledge is fallible. You seem to represent human knowledge as some ideal, infallible form of knowledge, but that's not what human knowledge is. We reserve that ideal for God, if there is such a being. If there is no God, then all knowledge will always be fallible.

So, your assertion that not-knowing is prior to knowing is irrelevant because it is not contrary to what I have been saying. I have been saying that once we have knowledge as opposed to mere belief, if we ever do have it, then that knowledge cannot be subject to doubt, and also that that knowledge cannot have originated in doubt, since doubt can only lead to more doubt, Perhaps you could explain how you think it is that the absolute certainty of knowledge could ever proceed from the state of doubt, and how it is that you could ever know from within your state of doubt, that all doubts have now finally been put to rest. — John

You have just refuted your own position here. You say "...once we have knowledge as opposed to mere belief, if we ever do have it...". So you now allow that it is possible that we never really have this "true certainty", which is essential to your position. Now you have cast doubt on all of knowledge, and allow with me, that all so-called knowledge can be doubted. Therefore it is impossible that certainty is prior to doubt, because you have allowed the possibility that no such certainty exists.

Sheldrake says that 'nature forms habits' e.g. when a new crystal is synthesised for the first time, it takes much longer than on subsequent occasions when it is formed again. This is becuase the initial formation has started to form the 'habit'. I can't help but think this is related to Peirce's ideas of how regularities are initially formed out of "tychism" — Wayfarer

If by "synthesized," Sheldrake is referring to a man-made crystal, one hardly need appeal to morphic resonance to explain why it may take longer to synthesize it on the first occasion than on subsequent occasions. In science, as with most other areas of human endeavor, feats generally become easier with practice, and with the collective practice of the scientific community. It's not nature per se (in the sense of the laws or regularities which govern the behavior of naturalistic entities) which is changing, but only the investigators' expertise.

science, as with most other areas of human endeavor, feats generally become easier with practice, and with the collective practice of the scientific community. — Arkady

Sheldrake writes:

If you make a new compound and crystallize it, there won't be a morphic field for it the first time. Therefore, it may be very difficult to crystallize; you have to wait for a morphic field to emerge. The second time, however, even if you do this somewhere else in the world, there will be an influence from the first crystallization, and it should crystallize a bit more easily. The third time there will be an influence from the first and second, and so on. There will be a cumulative influence from previous crystals, so it should get easier and easier to crystallize the more often you crystallize it. And, in fact, this is exactly what does happen. Synthetic chemists find that new compounds are generally very difficult to crystallize. As time goes on, they generally get easier to crystallize all over the world. The conventional explanation is that this occurs because fragments of previous crystals are carried from laboratory to laboratory on beards of migrant chemists. When there have not been any migrant chemists, it is assumed that the fragments wafted through the atmosphere as microscopic dust particles.

Perhaps migrant chemists do carry fragments on their beards and perhaps dust particles do get blown around in the atmosphere. Nevertheless, if one measures the rate of crystallization under rigorously controlled conditions in sealed vessels in different parts of the world, one should still observe an accelerated rate of crystallization. This experiment has not yet been done.

That was written in 1987 - whether there have been developments, I don't know.

Here is Sheldrake's reply to the question 'what is consciousness'?



So - I concede the point!

You are failing to make a proper distinction between knowledge and belief. The certainty of knowledge consists in the absence of genuine doubt. Do you know how to drive a car? Is it possible you could be mistaken and that in fact you do not know how to drive a car? Do you know the street number of your house, your wife's name, that she is female, that she is human, what makes her happy and what annoys her, how many children you have, what kind of dog you have ?

There is no possibility of genuine doubt about any of these. Sure, there is an in extremis, artificial 'it's logically possible that I could be wrong about any of these'. You wife might be a transsexual, or a machine disguised as a human, and so might your kids and your dog. You might be part of a top-secret government project researching into how far people can be deceived in what they believe. Your whole life might have been a dream, and so on with any stupid scenario you can possibly imagine. But all of this sort of imagining would be a bullshit kind of doubt; it has no real force (unless you are psychotic).

If you want to be consistent in saying that everything is subject to doubt, then you should not assert that humans have any knowledge at all, but only beliefs. To know something is to know it beyond doubt. To know something is to experience complete confidence. Anything you cannot have complete confidence in cannot be knowledge; it's that simple.

And you still haven't explained how, magically, the certainty of knowing that you say will be achieved through questioning absolutely everything, will somehow emerge out of your state of universal doubt.

You are failing to make a proper distinction between knowledge and belief. The certainty of knowledge consists in the absence of genuine doubt. Do you know how to drive a car? Is it possible you could be mistaken and that in fact you do not know how to drive a car? Do you know the street number of your house, your wife's name, that she is female, that she is human, what makes her happy and what annoys her, how many children you have, what kind of dog you have ? — John

I know how to drive a car, but I am not so certain of my skill to know that each time I drive I will not have an accident. Therefore despite my knowing there is still doubt. And with all the other instances you mention there is still a degree of uncertainty. The city might change my house number. If I have a wife, see may have just left me, etc..

There is no possibility of genuine doubt about any of these. — John

Speak for yourself. That's the thing about knowledge, what you refuse to doubt, someone else might. But just because you feel a huge degree of certitude about some things doesn't mean there is no possibility of genuine doubt concerning those things. There is no possibility that you would doubt them, but others might. As I said, everything is doubtable. You doubt that, but I'm not surprised, because what I say, like everything else, is doubtable, and you're just demonstrating that fact.

But all of this sort of imagining would be a bullshit kind of doubt; it has no real force (unless you are psychotic). — John

What do you mean by "it has no real force"? What type of force are we talking about here? How would you distinguish between doubt which has force, and doubt which has no force?

If you want to be consistent in saying that everything is subject to doubt, then you should not assert that humans have any knowledge at all, but only beliefs. To know something is to know it beyond doubt. To know something is to experience complete confidence. Anything you cannot have complete confidence in cannot be knowledge; it's that simple. — John

If you are going to insist that "knowledge" implies absolute certainty, such that it is impossible that any particular aspect of knowledge could be wrong, then I agree that humans do not have any knowledge at all. But I think you should accept the reality that sometimes when we claim to know something it turns out to be wrong. This is the way that knowledge exists, in reality, despite the fact that I claim to know X, X might still turn out to be incorrect. The "ideal" knowledge might exclude the possibility of mistake, but the thing which we refer to when we use the words "knowledge", and "knowing", always contains the possibility of mistake.

And you still haven't explained how, magically, the certainty of knowing that you say will be achieved through questioning absolutely everything, will somehow emerge out of your state of universal doubt. — John

Have you never noticed, that when you doubt something, you check it to confirm it? That's how we build certainty through doubt. If someone says to you, it's raining outside, you might just take this for granted, as truth, claiming to know that it's raining out. But certainty is lacking here, because this knowledge is based in hearsay. If, when someone says this to you, you doubt it, and therefore check to confirm, you obtain a much higher degree of certainty. Through doubting knowledge we produce new ways to test and confirm things, thus obtaining higher degrees of certainty. From doubting, we test and confirm, that's the scientific method. Certainty is derived from doubt.

If a malignant demon appears telling us to doubt our perceptions, we cannot really doubt our experience of the malignant demon either.

None of your irrelevant objections carry any force at all for me. If you have a wife now you know you have a wife, and you know she is female ( if she is female of course), you know you can drive a car ( how well you can drive it is irrelevant), you know what your house number is now ( if it hasn't been changed) and so on.

Certainty is not derived form doubting; how could it be? If everything is doubtful then there can never be a situation in which everything will cease to be doubtful. I agree with you that anything we count as a belief may be doubted: and this goes for everything concerning the future, since we don't know at all what will happen. But when it comes to what has happened we can be as certain as we are of our own memories. For example you know you can drive a car, because you remember driving cars in the past, even this morning, say.

So your position is, I remain convinced, based on a conflation of belief with knowledge, and its great weakness is that you have no way of explaining how any certainty of knowing anything could come out of your standpoint of universal doubt. I believe your doubt like Descartes' is artificial; it is not genuine, heartfelt doubt, it is faux-doubt; and that is why I say it carries no force.

None of your irrelevant objections carry any force at all for me. If you have a wife now you know you have a wife, and you know she is female ( if she is female of course), you know you can drive a car ( how well you can drive it is irrelevant), you know what your house number is now ( if it hasn't been changed) and so on. — John

In other words, I know these things, unless I'm wrong, then I don't really know them. OK, how does that make me certain of them?

Certainty is not derived form doubting; how could it be? If everything is doubtful then there can never be a situation in which everything will cease to be doubtful. I agree with you that anything we count as a belief may be doubted: and this goes for everything concerning the future, since we don't know at all what will happen. But when it comes to what has happened we can be as certain as we are of our own memories. For example you know you can drive a car, because you remember driving cars in the past, even this morning, say. — John

You're not making any sense John. First, I explained how certainty is derived from doubting. Doubting leads to checking and confirming, this is the scientific method. All you do here is repeat your assertion, and ask the same question again, "certainty is not derived from doubting, how could it be?". Well, I explained how it is. It's quite obvious to me, doubt leads to questioning, trials, experimentation, and confirmation. But for some reason, you just overlook the whole scientific method and restate your question, "how could it be?".

Then you agree that every belief can be doubted, but you imply that a memory cannot be doubted. How is a memory not a belief? And we all know that memory often fails us, especially as we get older. So it's utter nonsense to claim that we cannot doubt our own memories. I find my memories to be highly dubious, and to be often engaged in discussions as to who is remembering correctly.

So your position is, I remain convinced, based on a conflation of belief with knowledge, and its great weakness is that you have no way of explaining how any certainty of knowing anything could come out of your standpoint of universal doubt. I believe your doubt like Descartes' is artificial; it is not genuine, heartfelt doubt, it is faux-doubt; and that is why I say it carries no force. — John

I wonder what faux-doubt would be. Does that mean that a person believes oneself to be uncertain, but the person is really certain? How would that work? I could deceive myself into thinking that I am uncertain when I am really certain? Or do you think that I am trying to deceive you, saying that I am uncertain, but hiding the certainty behind an image of uncertainty? Do you think I'm omniscient? If not, then why don't you believe me when I say that I am not certain about anything? To be certain about any particular thing, wouldn't it require that you know absolutely everything about that thing? Aren't all things related to one another by some means? So wouldn't it require omniscience to know absolutely everything about anything? How could I be completely certain about anything if I didn't know absolutely everything about that thing? And that would require knowing how that thing related to everything else.

I really admire the confidence in your assertions, your claims of certainty and all that, but I really think that it's you who is putting up the deceptive façade of certitude. Sometimes people like to create that impression of confidence and certitude, to hide the fact that they really don't know what they're talking about.

Your methodology of argumentation consists in distorting what your interlocutor has said, and then writing reams of objections based on this distortion. It's simply not worth the effort of responding to, because whatever I say to correct your copious misreadings will just be distorted again into further misreadings.

Your methodology of argumentation consists in distorting what your interlocutor has said, and then writing reams of objections based on this distortion. — John

That what you say may be distorted, in the way that you claim I distort it, indicates that I cannot even have certainty with respect to the meaning of what has been said. How can I have any certainty with respect to the truth or falsity of what is said, if I cannot even be certain of the meaning of what has been said?

There's no point wasting any further time then.