Well, words are important. For example, speaking of "sense data" or "qualia" or feelings or thoughts as if they're things, somewhere, in the mind, distinct from the world we interact with at every moment. If that's what "subjective data" are, I don't accept that view. — Ciceronianus

So your view is a metaphysical one. Do you see why it's a form of rationalism? IOW, you're more like Descartes than Wittgenstein.

This is just elementary stuff that I'm sure you fully accept, so I'm wondering why it need be explained and that there's this dropping back to some sort of holism that demands that every part of me is sentient and every part of me cognitive, from the hair on top of my head to the my toenails.

It is the only answer to the question “what perceives?”

And such an answer doesn’t demand that all parts of the organism are cognitive or sentient. That would be a fallacy of division. An eye removed from the organism does not see. A brain removed from an organism does not perceive. Parts do not perceive.

In short, we need not reduce the concept of “perception” to any other object in the world, whether faculty or organ. So why would we we?

In short, we need not reduce the concept of “perception” to any other object in the world, whether faculty or organ. So why would we we? — NOS4A2

Because when one has a perceptual problem only that portion of the body that perceives need be addressed, much like when you are having a digestive disorder, treatment is focused upon the digestive system and not upon eardrum.

That’s true. But when we address a portion of the body we are nonetheless addressing the body. So we need only reduce our focus and area of concern, not the object that perceives.

I'm sorry you spent so much time on that post.

The point made is that the blip can be used to refer to the plane in much the same way that word "plane" can be used to refer to the plane.

Nothing more.

Because in both cases, there is a plane.

QED.

If you don't have the concept beforehand then you can't know. To have that concept you must have already learned the abstract dictionary idea of rose with its associated word rose correctly, then you can make an educated guess that your object is a rose flower. — magritte

That has to be wrong. Children acquire new concepts.

So do some adults.

Some folk even invent new concepts.

We learn new stuff.

If perception involves prediction, then are we seeing the object, or what our brains expect to be the object of perception? — Marchesk

Dunno.

The point I am making is simply that there are objects.

QED, except that no one is arguing there is no plane.
The point is that blips, "plane"s, and planes are three distinct things. Therefore, when you see a blip and "plane", you are not seeing a plane.

Then you are adamantly and emphatically agreeing with realism.

Good.

But not the naive variety.

The point made is that the blip can be used to refer to the plane in much the same way that word "plane" can be used to refer to the plane. — Banno

There is the plane and then there is the word "plane," so I'm counting 2 things here.
There is the plane and then there is the perception I have of the plane, so, again, I'm counting 2 things here.

Why must I use the word "plane" to refer to the plane, but I must consider my perception of the plane to be the actual plane?

More consistent would be that the word "plane" is the plane, but it's just another way of dealing with planes. That seems the @Ciceronianus approach (I think, and I'm truly not trying to misstate or put words in anyone's mouth.). This approach eliminates duality on all levels. There are just planes and they are however we experience them.

I'll entertain the idea of non-representationalism, but I think we need to do it consistently. That is, we have objects of unknown quality such that it's incoherent to speak of the thing in itself, so we therefore limit our "knowledge" of the objects in our world to how we interact with them. So, when we say "the plane is in the sky," the word "plane" is a direct experience of the plane equal to seeing it, touching it, licking it, and sensing it in every humanely possible way, just so long as it offers an understanding of the plane. The understanding of the plane is the plane.

I'm not sure this is realism, but I've at least formulated something consistent from all I've taken in here.

You seem to be fascinated by your perception of me as a lawyer, or perhaps of lawyers in general. I suggest this unhealthy, as you say you believe it isn't real. — Ciceronianus

Lawyers are real, perceptions of lawyers are also real. While causally connected, they are not the same thing.

Not least because, the perception is not a thing at all. It is an event.

Why not? What specificaly do you think naive realism is?

Why must I use the word "plane" to refer to the plane, but I must consider my perception of the plane to be the actual plane? — Hanover

Your perception of the plane is not the actual plane.

Your perception is of the plane.

The fact that "none of this matters" would seem, to me, to establish something regarding its acceptability as an assessment of the world and out place in it. That it's incredible. — Ciceronianus

But lack of credibility and lack of relevance are different objections.

The question we're addressing is the probative value of evidence, which presupposes representations of "truth" whatever that may be, and which is the subject matter of this thread. That is, when I see something, of what probative value is my having seen the thing in terms of proving the thing exits? That is, does the evidence I possess prove the thing I assert, namely that the thing is as I say it is? It seems we need to know what the thing is if we seek to establish whether my claims about it are true.

Your perception of the plane is not the actual plane. — Banno

What is the distinction between the two? Just location?

No. One is a plane. the other is something like an interaction between you and the plane.

One is a plane. the other is something like an interaction between you and the plane. — Banno

Alright, we have 2 things: (1) the plane, and (2) (a) an interaction between me and (b) the plane.

What does #1 look like?
What does #2(a) look like?

My guess is that the only thing we know anything about is 2(a). I've said 100 times 2(b) is causative of 2(a), but I've also said the only thing we can know is 2(a).

#1 is a noumenal causative agent of #2, which is the phenomenal.

Hanover's view is in line with science. You have to go out on a limb to disagree with him, and like Ciceroninus, you're in danger of turning rationalist (relying on your own reason to say what is, rather than science).

Perhaps. Or perhaps you havn't followed the argument.

Look, to avoid going over this yet again, here are the things that I am objecting to.

1. The notion of a thing-in-itself. This is a nonsense.
2. The notion that when we talk about the things in the world around us, we are not actually talking about them, but about our perceptions of them. I say we do talk about cups and planes and trees.
3. The notion that we cannot make true statements about the stuff that makes up our world. I say we can truthfully say things like "the cup has a handle".

Let me know which you are addressing, if any.


Which of these do you say is not in line with science? "cause I'm not seeing it. Quiet the reverse.

Well you hope you see one anyway.

I'm just kidding.

say we do talk about cups and planes and trees. — Banno

Of course we do. Science says we model the world. We talk about our models.

Yep. The models of the things in the world. Realism. DO you have an objection? An argument? Something relevant to say?

Or perhaps you havn't followed the argument. — Banno

Tbh, I was mainly interested in what Hanover said. I like his turn of phrase.

Fair enough. He is erudite, despite being wrong. :wink:

Yep. The models of the things in the world. Realism. DO you have an objection? An argument? Something relevant to say? — Banno

I think you should help your buddy Ciceroninus avoid digging in with a metaphysical take on the issue. That's a very weak position.

You have to go out on a limb to disagree with him, and like Ciceroninus, you're in danger of turning rationalist (relying on your own reason to say what is, rather than science). — frank

You believe that science is in support of the view that we can't know the rest of the world?

Fair enough. He is erudite, despite being wrong. :wink: — Banno

He may be wrong, yet state of the art science supports his view. You're out on a limb.

@Ciceronianus is eruditer than Hanover, in my humble opinion. The OP is a case in point.