I would say so. Regulations, when broken, are met with punishments. In the case of state law, when one resists these punishments because, for example, one disagrees with being punished, the punishment will become more and more severe with incarceration as the end station.

As such, law is based on coercion and, in my view, clearly imposition. — Tzeentch

Without laws, anarchy. With laws, oppression. How do we tackle this dilemma?

Without laws, anarchy. With laws, oppression. How do we tackle this dilemma? — TheMadFool

Emit conservative values and infuse yourself with anarchic values.

Emit conservative values and infuse yourself with anarchic values. — I like sushi

:chin: Life is, after all, a masquerade ball.

Without laws, anarchy. With laws, oppression. How do we tackle this dilemma? — TheMadFool

That dilemma is not all that relevant to me.

Whether it's anarchy or oppression, it's the result of the collective behavior of individuals. I can't and don't want to decide for others what they must do.

I can however look at these systems and ponder their nature, and whether I want to live my life in accordance to their principles.

That dilemma is not all that relevant to me.

Whether it's anarchy or oppression, it's the result of the collective behavior of individuals. I can't and don't want to decide for others what they must do.

I can however look at these systems and ponder their nature, and whether I want to live my life in accordance to their principles. — Tzeentch

Yep. Your position on the issue is not as radical as some have made it out to be. What happens when we grow up? Regulations/rules ease from being 5 years old and being 18+ years old. It's just that people are irresponsible with their freedom and hence laws.

Hence why I am an anarchist internally (at odds with any authority even my own) and generally conservative outwardly, because I've lived enough to realise things are more complex and silly than I did when I was younger so it is sometimes best not to shake things up 'out there' and rather do it 'in here' (my head/myself) and it will bleed through anyhow.

Of course I fail all the time and stubbornly refuse to adhere to what other people do as what I should do because that is how things are done :D

But you believe that any idea is as good as another. What does “testing” mean then? All the ideas are just as good what is there to test? — khaled

Ideas can approximate reality to varying degrees, and the closer they approximate reality, the "better" (for the lack of a better term) they are. Obviously I believe some of my ideas approximate reality more closely than others, otherwise I would not have those ideas. I realize however, that I am fallible and have no way to confirm, therefore I shall not impose those ideas on anyone.

There is no such thing as non interference sometimes. But let’s test this theory. You see a train barreling at someone who’s tied to the tracks. By this principle of non interference, it would be wrong to attempt to remove them. Do you agree with that? — khaled

I haven't proposed a principle of non-interference. I have however stated that I do not think non-interference is an imposition.

In your example I would say it is not wrong to remove someone from a train track who is clearly being held there against their will. I also don't believe choosing non-interference (leaving the person on the track) is wrong; perhaps it is nothing. Perhaps it is simply neutral. And perhaps freeing the person from the train track is good.

It's what your arguments seem to boil down to every time you try to explain what constitutes a "better guess" — Tzeentch

Where did you get that? What argument is the one that boiled down to that? — khaled

Correct me if I am wrong, but you have stated that when one gets the sense one's ideas are closer to truth, one gets a right to impose them.

Example:

At a moment in time, a person conducted an experiment to determine the effects of alchohol on driving skills. Lets say they found that 10% of subjects could still drive at an acceptable level under the effects of alchohol, whereas 90% of subjects could not.

You may state that because 90% of subjects could not drive at an acceptable level, the other 10% may rightfully be imposed upon. I would disagree. Since the study found no proof that they could not drive at an acceptable level after alcohol consumption, their existence in fact undermines the study's claim to truth.

The line of reasoning continues: but it is not practical to determine on a case by case basis who should drive after alcohol consumption and who shouldn't. So because it is not practical for the majority, the minority may rightfully be imposed upon: might ("we are with more") makes right.

But what constitutes a better guess, then? — Tzeentch

How do we tell when that’s the case? Very difficult. But better than not trying. — khaled

Debatable. I'm sure you're aware of what happens when collectives disagree on what is the better guess.

Try to escape? — Tzeentch

This would get everyone killed. — khaled

How?

Don't impose. — Tzeentch

The problem is that you don’t follow this. Admittedly, you would impose sometimes. — khaled

I do follow that, since I've never been in the highly unlikely situation that my life is directly threatened and the only means of survival is to defend myself.

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. As I've stated earlier:

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc.

In the case of directly protecting one's own life, is one really imposing desires on someone else? Is it even volutary? Or is it a biological reflex? One may argue that the will to live would be a desire one is imposing, but is it really that simple? Then there's the fact one is responding to an imposition on something that belongs unequivocally to them; the individual and their body are inseperable, they live as one and die as one. I think the instance of direct protection of oneself is more complicated than that, but these are all fair questions.

Then again, maybe the right thing to do is to sit there and accept one's fate - to turn the other cheek. Perhaps that is what Buddha would do. And didn't Jesus carry his own cross to Golgotha to die on it? I'm willing to consider that option.

What shortcuts am I taking? — khaled

We've spoken about this. You realize that knowledge of ultimate reality is outside of the human grasp, yet for practical considerations you make do with "a sense of the better guess" and consider it just grounds for impositions on others.

What do you do when some fool comes around with "a sense of the better guess" and starts imposing on you? These ideas are all fine and good, until someone comes around to uses them against you, and that is essentially the root of all human conflict.

There are situations where inaction is an imposition. Or do you not think so? — khaled

I do not think so.

"Non-interference is not an imposition." - Tzeentch

The example of someone standing in the way and not moving is good. He’s not doing anything to you, is he? How is he interfering? You’re the one that wants him to move. So he’s not imposing correct? — khaled

Correct, assuming the standing person is not consciously attempting to deny the other person of this space. If it is a conscious attempt to deny, it is an imposition.

Hence why I am an anarchist internally (at odds with any authority even my own) and generally conservative outwardly, because I've lived enough to realise things are more complex and silly than I did when I was younger so it is sometimes best not to shake things up 'out there' and rather do it 'in here' (my head/myself) and it will bleed through anyhow.

Of course I fail all the time and stubbornly refuse to adhere to what other people do as what I should do because that is how things are done :D — I like sushi

Inner chaos, outer order. :up:

Ideas can approximate reality to varying degrees, and the closer they approximate reality, the "better" (for the lack of a better term) they are. — Tzeentch

Ok. So at least we're past "all opinions are equally silly" yes? I can agree with the above.

But I'm not sure you answered the question anywhere. Can I assume you mean to say that your goal here is to arrive at ideas that approximate reality even better?

I realize however, that I am fallible and have no way to confirm, therefore I shall not impose those ideas on anyone. — Tzeentch

An important thing to point out: The idea that we should not impose because we're fallible is just as susceptible to being wrong as any other idea. Agreed?

I haven't proposed a principle of non-interference. I have however stated that I do not think non-interference is an imposition. — Tzeentch

My misunderstanding.

In your example I would say it is not wrong to remove someone from a train track who is clearly being held there against their will. — Tzeentch

But it's not clear if they're being held against their will or if they're there by choice. Maybe it's actually a very expensive movie shot, and the tied person is an actor and by attempting to remove them you would ruin the shot. What to do then?

In other words, what do we do when we're not sure if we're imposing or not?

And I would like some further clarification on what makes an imposition: If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? If, for instance, I wake someone up not knowing whether or not they wanted to be woken up, and it turns out that they actually did want to wake up at that time because they have an appointment, have I imposed?

Correct me if I am wrong, but you have stated that when one gets the sense one's ideas are closer to truth, one gets a right to impose them. — Tzeentch

Yes. Though one also has a duty to do as much research as they can to make sure their idea is actually closer to truth.

I also don't believe choosing non-interference (leaving the person on the track) is wrong — Tzeentch

Does this apply regardless of the potential damage and ease of the act? If, for instance you had a button that could cure all strains of COVID, is it morally permissible not to press it and just walk away?

You may state that because 90% of subjects could not drive at an acceptable level, the other 10% may rightfully be imposed upon. — Tzeentch

That's not quite it. The problem is that it's a choice of either imposing slightly on 10% of drivers or imposing on everyone a much higher risk of accidents (including said drivers in the first place). This gets difficult to discuss without a clear definition of what an imposition is. Is refusing to instantiate a law that you know will benefit the community an imposition? Or is instantiating it the imposition?

But better than not trying. — khaled

Debatable. I'm sure you're aware of what happens when collectives disagree on what is the better guess. — Tzeentch

Isn't attempting at getting a better answer better in your eyes too? If it wasn't, why would you comment here?

If we didn't try to get at better guesses, any guess would be just as good. Wars happen when large amounts of people disagree on something. Imagine what would happen if everyone disagreed on everything. That would be worse wouldn't it?

It seems to me you believe that if we recognized our fallibility, and thus gave up on trying to approach objectivity, people wouldn't be trying to impose as much. I think the opposite will happen, people will try to impose more.

How? — Tzeentch

Because that's the described situation. Either you press a button that kills Jeff. You press a button that kills Sarah. Or you press neither (escaping would involve this) and both die. (I'm not sure if I kept the same names)

I could make it a bit more obvious. Let's say one button would impose on Jeff by pinching him. The other button would impose on Sarah by burning her alive. Walking away leads to both being burned alive. Now in all situations, you're imposing correct? Or do you think that walking away here is not an imposition? Incidentally, do you think non interference is right here too?

I do follow that, since I've never been in the highly unlikely situation that my life is directly threatened — Tzeentch

I said you would impose sometimes, so you don't follow that maxim. Point is that you would be willing to break it at a specific degree of inconvenience. Just that yours is supposedly much higher than most. You claimed that you apply the principle consistently but to say that you must seriously believe self defense is morally wrong.

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

That's what I would argue, but I've been using your definition of imposing this whole time, and it seemed to me that you counted even self defense as imposition, so I didn't question it.

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc. — Tzeentch

This seems to fit the bill here too though. One of your desires is for the psychotic killer not to kill you. And you impose that one desire on the killer through the use of force do you not? I don't think your definition leaves much wiggle room.

Then again, maybe the right thing to do is to sit there and accept one's fate - to turn the other cheek. Perhaps that is what Buddha would do. And didn't Jesus carry his own cross to Golgotha to die on it? I'm willing to consider that option. — Tzeentch

In ethics it all depends on your starting premises. Do you truly believe that turning the other cheek is always the correct thing to do? Some people do. Some people would just sit there and die. But neither of us would, so we seem to agree that turning the other cheek is not always the correct thing to do. Pointing out that others disagree is not helpful for this conversation because we both disagree with said others.

What do you do when some fool comes around with "a sense of the better guess" and starts imposing on you? — Tzeentch

Impose on him by stopping him because I have the better guess.

These ideas are all fine and good, until someone comes around to uses them against you, and that is essentially the root of all human conflict. — Tzeentch

Oh I don't doubt that they're the root of human conflict. But I maintain that your ideas would lead to much more conflict. If the fool believes in my ideas as I do, he would cease his imposition the moment he realizes his guess is bad. He would even apologize and thank me for showing him a better guess.

In your case, there is nothing that can be used to stop the psychotic killer or the fool. I would try to imagine a world where everyone think all impositions are wrong but I can't really do so without knowing what you mean by imposition, which brings me to the next point:

Correct, assuming the standing person is not consciously attempting to deny the other person of this space. If it is a conscious attempt to deny, it is an imposition. — Tzeentch

This doesn't help much. I noticed you also ignored my question on what constitutes an imposition.

I'm sat in this chair right now. Right now I am denying you the space I am sitting in. Is that an imposition? I doubt it. What if the stander doesn't see it as denying? After all, what of the person trying to pass? Isn't he consciously trying to deny the stander that space as well? Isn't he the one asking the stander to move?

The stander would tell you the walker is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. The walker would tell you the stander is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. Who's right here? Both only see the other as imposing because they feel entitled to that passage. Who's entitled to the passage? This is why I asked for a clarification on what imposition is.

Incidentally, this is why I believe your system would lead to more conflict. People believe they're being imposed on all the time. People believe they're entitled to all sorts of different things. If we didn't try to systematize these beliefs, and lay out clear boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable activity, there would be way more conflict, not less. Even if this systematization sometimes inevitably makes some feel like they're being imposed upon, a lack of it would mean virtually everyone feeling they're being imposed upon.

all opinions are equally silly — khaled

:lol:

fool — khaled

Yes? Someone called mu name? Hello!?

@Tzeentch said both of those. Go ask him.

What do you do when some fool comes around with "a sense of the better guess" — Tzeentch

Opinions are all equally silly — Tzeentch

:ok:

Can I assume you mean to say that your goal here is to arrive at ideas that approximate reality even better? — khaled

In practice, it more often translates into discarding ideas that when scrutinized appear unfeasible.

The idea that we should not impose because we're fallible is just as susceptible to being wrong as any other idea. Agreed? — khaled

Indeed.

However, because one will not impose their ideas in the first place, it does not matter if they are wrong.

In other words, what do we do when we're not sure if we're imposing or not? — khaled

Inaction is always an option.

Or act according to your best judgement, and risk being wrong. Humans are fallible after all.

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? If, for instance, I wake someone up not knowing whether or not they wanted to be woken up, and it turns out that they actually did want to wake up at that time because they have an appointment, have I imposed? — khaled

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm.

Yes. Though one also has a duty to do as much research as they can to make sure their idea is actually closer to truth. — khaled

Ok, so I do my duty, I do all I can to come to a "sense of the better guess", and then start imposing my ideas on you. They just happen to be wildly different from yours, but that doesn't matter, because I did my duty and because I feel I'm right, I get the right to impose. All that stops me is whether I have the power to force you to do those things I would like you to do.

Is this how it should work? Might makes...

Isn't attempting at getting a better answer better in your eyes too? If it wasn't, why would you comment here? — khaled

Yes, as long as one doesn't impose of course one can try to find better answers to their heart's desire. I would even encourage it.

Once one starts imposing based on their conviction on having the better guess, that's when things get muddy quickly. That's what I meant with saying it is debatable.

Does this apply regardless of the potential damage and ease of the act? If, for instance you had a button that could cure all strains of COVID, is it morally permissible not to press it and just walk away? — khaled

Yes.

The problem is that it's a choice of either imposing slightly on 10% of drivers or imposing on everyone a much higher risk of accidents (including said drivers in the first place). — khaled

It is not a slight imposition. A law is an imposition made under threat of violence.

This gets difficult to discuss without a clear definition of what an imposition is. — khaled

What wasn't clear in my definition?

Is refusing to instantiate a law that you know will benefit the community an imposition? Or is instantiating it the imposition? — khaled

Inaction is not an imposition.

Creating a law is an imposition almost by definition, because laws are only created for things that people need to be forced to do or not do.

If we didn't try to get at better guesses, any guess would be just as good. Wars happen when large amounts of people disagree on something. Imagine what would happen if everyone disagreed on everything. That would be worse wouldn't it? — khaled

It would be perfectly fine if people didn't impose their conflicting ideas on each other.

It seems to me you believe that if we recognized our fallibility, and thus gave up on trying to approach objectivity, ... — khaled

I never said one should give up on trying to approach objectivity.

Try to escape? — Tzeentch

This would get everyone killed. — khaled

How? — Tzeentch

Because that's the described situation. Either you press a button that kills Jeff. You press a button that kills Sarah. Or you press neither (escaping would involve this) and both die. (I'm not sure if I kept the same names) — khaled

I thought you were talking about the example where I am being held against my will.

In the case of the button, if there are no good choices to be made, then inaction is fine. Both would die, but it is not my responsibility to save them - I didn't put them there nor did I voluntarily accept any task to care for their safety.

Perhaps one could try to talk to them, to see if either is willing to make the sacrifice.

Let's say one button would impose on Jeff by pinching him. The other button would impose on Sarah by burning her alive. Walking away leads to both being burned alive. Now in all situations, you're imposing correct? Or do you think that walking away here is not an imposition? Incidentally, do you think non interference is right here too? — khaled

Inaction would not be wrong. It is also not right. It is neutral.

In this instance one could use their best judgement to conclude that pinching Jeff is a meaningless imposition that does not compare in any way to being burned alive, and thus choose to impose on Jeff and save Sarah. Jeff will probably agree and thank you for it. If he doesn't, you have made a terrible mistake, but alas people aren't perfect.

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc. — Tzeentch

This seems to fit the bill here too though. One of your desires is for the psychotic killer not to kill you. And you impose that one desire on the killer through the use of force do you not? I don't think your definition leaves much wiggle room. — khaled

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

Then again, maybe the right thing to do is to sit there and accept one's fate - to turn the other cheek. Perhaps that is what Buddha would do. And didn't Jesus carry his own cross to Golgotha to die on it? I'm willing to consider that option. — Tzeentch

In ethics it all depends on your starting premises. Do you truly believe that turning the other cheek is always the correct thing to do? Some people do. Some people would just sit there and die. But neither of us would, so we seem to agree that turning the other cheek is not always the correct thing to do. Pointing out that others disagree is not helpful for this conversation because we both disagree with said others. — khaled

I don't disagree with them at all. In fact, I am willing to consider that they are right. It would be consistent with the rest of my ideas.

I'm also willing to consider that the direct protection of one's physical body deserves a clause.

Then again, scenarios involving psychotic killers are so unlikely that they're hardly worth the time and effort. I'll deal with the matter when one comes on my path.

Impose on him by stopping him because I have the better guess. — khaled

And thus begins the viscious cycle of human conflict.

But I maintain that your ideas would lead to much more conflict. — khaled

Doubtful. I'll maintain that the more conflict-prone individuals there are, the more conflicts there are. And the more conflict-avoidant individuals there are, the fewer conflicts there are.

If the fool believes in my ideas as I do, he would cease his imposition the moment he realizes his guess is bad. He would even apologize and thank me for showing him a better guess. — khaled

That undoubtedly happens sometimes, yet human conflict is as rife as ever. Perhaps convincing fools that imposing is right is the work of fools?

In your case, there is nothing that can be used to stop the psychotic killer or the fool. — khaled

Reason? Kindness? Compassion? If all else fails, simple avoidance?

I'm entertaining this line of the discussion because I'm curious just how water-tight I can make my argument, but if we're willing to open the Pandora's box of a right to impose based on the supposed existence of unavoidable psychotic killers, we are past a certain point, aren't we?

It's a bit ironic actually, that our system to "stop unavoidable psychotic killers" involves individuals sitting behind a screen dropping bombs on people like it's a computer game. It's almost like we have become the unavoidable psychotic killers.

Ends don't justify means.

I noticed you also ignored my question on what constitutes an imposition. — khaled

I've provided a straight-forward definition in the very post you replied to. Please, lets keep our discussion honest.

I'm sat in this chair right now. Right now I am denying you the space I am sitting in. Is that an imposition? I doubt it. What if the stander doesn't see it as denying? — khaled

I would put it this way:

If you are sitting in your chair, consciously trying to deny someone else from sitting in it, you are imposing. The fact that there's no one to notice it only stops you from doing harm, so the imposition is meaningless, but it is still an imposition.

Intention matters.

If I try to kill someone, but I fail and the victim never notices I tried to kill them, was I not wrong for trying to kill them?

The stander would tell you the walker is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. The walker would tell you the stander is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. Who's right here? — khaled

Neither. They're both imposing on each other and thus both are wrong. It only takes one of them to wisen up and step aside, but they both choose not to. It's a conflict of egos.

Even if this systematization sometimes inevitably makes some feel like they're being imposed upon, a lack of it would mean virtually everyone feeling they're being imposed upon. — khaled

A solution which seeks to mend feelings of being imposed upon with actual impositions seems self-defeating.

When someone feels I have imposed on them in some meaningful way, they will probably tell me, and we can work things out. Seems like constructive human interaction to me.

I'll try to keep it shorter this time. If I miss anything important, quote it and I'll address it.

Inaction would not be wrong. It is also not right. It is neutral.

In this instance one could use their best judgement to conclude that pinching Jeff is a meaningless imposition that does not compare in any way to being burned alive, and thus choose to impose on Jeff and save Sarah. Jeff will probably agree and thank you for it. If he doesn't, you have made a terrible mistake, but alas people aren't perfect. — Tzeentch

Would you say it is wrong to press either button here? Let's for a moment agree that inaction here (leaving them both to die) is neutral, though I find that ridiculous. Thus we have 3 alternatives:

1- Pinch Jeff
2- Kill Sarah
3- Allow both to die

The first 2 are undoubtedly impositions. The last is supposedly not. Since impositions are wrong that leaves us with the conclusion that it's wrong to pinch Jeff and so save both of their lives, and that the morally correct option (relatively, it's a neutral option with 2 bad alternatives) is to allow both to die. Do you agree with this?

In this instance one could use their best judgement to conclude that pinching Jeff is a meaningless imposition that does not compare in any way to being burned alive, and thus choose to impose on Jeff and save Sarah. Jeff will probably agree and thank you for it. If he doesn't, you have made a terrible mistake, but alas people aren't perfect. — Tzeentch

Is it right to refer to better judgement, even if it involves imposing? (different way of asking the same question as above)

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — Tzeentch

Ok. Next question: Is such an imposition wrong regardless of how certain we are that the victim will not mind it?

Once one starts imposing based on their conviction on having the better guess, that's when things get muddy quickly. That's what I meant with saying it is debatable. — Tzeentch

I think the alternative, where one doesn't impose whatsoever, is much muddier.

Ok, so I do my duty, I do all I can to come to a "sense of the better guess", and then start imposing my ideas on you. They just happen to be wildly different from yours, but that doesn't matter — Tzeentch

Why would it not matter? My having wildly different ideas should be reason to reevaluate the quality of your research. Clearly someone should be careful before imposing, I don't disagree with that. I disagree with the idea that it's always wrong to impose.

If I thought that stabbing a power outlet with a fork would produce candy, please, kindly impose on me and stop me. By your system, such an imposition would be wrong. That's what I'm against.

It is not a slight imposition. A law is an imposition made under threat of violence. — Tzeentch

Banning people from drinking while they're driving is very slight. They can drink afterwards. Or get a taxi or a friend to drive them. That's what I meant by "slight", not how strongly it's enforced.

I don't disagree with them at all. In fact, I am willing to consider that they are right. It would be consistent with the rest of my ideas.

I'm also willing to consider that the direct protection of one's physical body deserves a clause. — Tzeentch

No offense, but I don't much care for what you're "willing to consider" and I mean this in the nicest way possible. I'm interested in what you're arguing. If you argue that imposition is always wrong, that means there are no such clauses.

If you change your argument by adding said clause, I would ask why you added this specific clause, and which other clauses may be added.

Doubtful. I'll maintain that the more conflict-prone individuals there are, the more conflicts there are. And the more conflict-avoidant individuals there are, the fewer conflicts there are. — Tzeentch

If so, then why did you claim that my ideas were "the source of all human conflict" if it's only about "conflict proneness"?

I've provided a straight-forward definition in the very post you replied to. Please, lets keep our discussion honest. — Tzeentch

I apologize. I didn't mean to be dishonest. It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, when it very clearly is by that initial definition. That's why I asked for clarification.

The fact that there's no one to notice it only stops you from doing harm, so the imposition is meaningless, but it is still an imposition.

Intention matters. — Tzeentch

So are you saying that, by denying you this space (where I'm sitting) I am imposing on you? You also maintain that all impositions are wrong correct? Wouldn't that mean that I'm doing something wrong by being sat here? I suspect I misunderstood you, I can't quite tell what you mean here.

Since someone will always occupy some space, and if doing so is an imposition, how would one go about not imposing in your system? Does your system not permit someone to not be wrong?

If I try to kill someone, but I fail and the victim never notices I tried to kill them, was I not wrong for trying to kill them? — Tzeentch

Agreed. Is this intended as an analogy for sitting in chairs?

Neither. They're both imposing on each other and thus both are wrong. It only takes one of them to wisen up and step aside, but they both choose not to. It's a conflict of egos. — Tzeentch

Ok, how about we generalize a bit. Say A tries to impose X on B, and B tries to impose Y on A. In this scenario, it seems your system would produce that both A and B are wrong, regardless of X and Y correct? And if A wants to not be wrong, he should cease trying to impose X and if B wants to not be wrong he should cease trying to impose Y. Do you agree with this?

Would you say it is wrong to press the button here? That was the real question. — khaled

And the real answer is, I don't know.

However, one could use their judgement to assume that Jeff would want one to press the button to pinch him and save Sarah, in which case there is no conflict of desires and no meaningful imposition was made.

That judgement could be completely wrong though, and if it is, one has made a mistake.

Obviously in a more realistic situation one goes into dialogue to determine these things before one makes a decision.

Since impositions are wrong that leaves us with the conclusion that it's wrong to pinch Jeff and so save both of their lives, and that the morally correct option (relatively, it's a neutral option with 2 bad alternatives) is to allow both to die. Do you agree with this? — khaled

The crucial factor here, as mentioned in the previous line, is that one doesn't know if one is making an imposition. One can reasonably assume that Jeff agrees pinching him is much better than Sarah dying, but again, one could be wrong in which case one has certainly made an imposition, which is wrong.

Inaction is not a "morally correct" option; it is neutral. One doesn't get involved, one refuses to be part of the moral dilemma.

Now very importantly: Is it right to refer to better judgement, even if it involves imposing? — khaled

Certainly not categorically.

One could imagine a situation where the other may be grateful for the imposition afterwards - lets say I push someone out of the way of a moving car. But in this example am I imposing my desires on someone, or simply acting on behalf of theirs? Either way, it is a risk.

Is such an imposition wrong regardless of how certain we are that the victim will not mind it? — khaled

If one consciously attempts to use force to make someone act in accordance to one's desires, it is wrong regardless of the outcome. If one knows it will not affect the other, then one requires no force.

Ok, so I do my duty, I do all I can to come to a "sense of the better guess", and then start imposing my ideas on you. They just happen to be wildly different from yours, but that doesn't matter — Tzeentch

Why would it not matter? My having wildly different ideas should be reason to reevaluate the quality of your research. — khaled

I reevaluated my research and came to the conclusion that I am still right, and you are still wrong. Let the impositions begin!

f I thought that stabbing a power outlet with a fork would produce candy, please, kindly impose on me and stop me. By your system, such an imposition would be wrong. — khaled

As stated a few lines above, it is not clear to me whether we are in this instance imposing our desires on someone, or attempting to act on behalf of theirs. While we cannot be sure, circumstances may prompt us to take a risk, and if the subject thanks us afterwards perhaps we have made the right choice. If we are scolded and cursed afterwards, we must have imposed and then we have done something wrong.

No offense, but I don't much care for what you're "willing to consider" and I mean this in the nicest way possible. I'm interested in what you're arguing. If you argue that imposition is always wrong, that means there are no such clauses. — khaled

Then I'll change my argument to "Imposition is wrong, except in the case of direct protection of one's own physical body where I am not sure."

If you change your argument by adding said clause, I would ask why you added this specific clause, and which other clauses may be added. — khaled

We can come back to this, if we can get on the same page with everything else. I think you'll agree that the discussion is getting a bit unwieldy already.

I'll maintain that the more conflict-prone individuals there are, the more conflicts there are. And the more conflict-avoidant individuals there are, the fewer conflicts there are. — Tzeentch

If so, then why did you claim that my ideas were "the source of all human conflict" if it's only about "conflict proneness"? — khaled

A desire to impose and being conflict-prone are almost synonymous, but I'll restate it:

"The more imposers there are, the more conflicts there are. The more non-imposers there are, the fewer conflicts there are."

It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, ... — khaled

I haven't argued that, because it clearly would be an imposition. The question that remains is whether it is also immoral to impose in such a situation.

So are you saying that, by denying you this space (where I'm sitting) I am imposing on you? — khaled

If you're doing it with the express intention of denying me, then yes.

Wouldn't that mean that I'm doing something wrong by being sat here? — khaled

Again, intentions matter. You just sitting in your chair is not an imposition. You sitting in your chair with the intention of denying someone else a place to sit is an imposition (even if the other person isn't aware or even affected).

If I try to kill someone, but I fail and the victim never notices I tried to kill them, was I not wrong for trying to kill them? — Tzeentch

Agreed. Is this intended as an analogy for sitting in chairs? — khaled

Sure. If I try to deny a person from sitting in a chair by sitting there myself, and the person just walks by and never noticed I attempted to impose on them, was I not wrong for trying to impose on them in the first place?

Say A tries to impose X on B, and B tries to impose Y on A. In this scenario, it seems your system would produce that both A and B are wrong, regardless of X and Y correct? — khaled

Correct.

And if A wants to not be wrong, he should cease trying to impose X and if B wants to not be wrong he should cease trying to impose Y. Do you agree with this? — khaled

Sure.

In case it wasn't clear, the fact that one has to use force to make someone act in accordance with one's desires generally implies conflicting desires, and conflicting desires (or the impression thereof, in case of intentions) are key to determining whether something is an imposition.

And the real answer is, I don't know. — Tzeentch

But pinching Jeff is undoubtedly an imposition, yes? Does this mean that you're not sure if all impositions are wrong anymore?

That judgement could be completely wrong though, and if it is, one has made a mistake. — Tzeentch

Is this a form of consequentialism? It sounds to me like you're implying that an imposition is wrong only if it ends up conflicting with the victim's interests. Am I correct?

The crucial factor here, as mentioned in the previous line, is that one doesn't know if one is making an imposition. One can reasonably assume that Jeff agrees pinching him is much better than Sarah dying, but again, one could be wrong in which case one has certainly made an imposition, which is wrong. — Tzeentch

I believe there is a contradiction here. Remember I asked you already:

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? — khaled

And you answered:

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — Tzeentch

But here you say that one "doesn't know if they're making an imposition", implying that if Jeff had been fine with getting pinched to save him and Sarah, then pinching him is not an imposition.

Additionally, by your original definition, pinching is certainly an imposition. So which is it? Is doing something to someone without consent, and it happening to coincide with their intentions, an imposition or not?

Perhaps now you understand why I often ask for clarification.

If one consciously attempts to use force to make someone act in accordance to one's desires, it is wrong regardless of the outcome. — Tzeentch

This seems to be your original definition of imposition, which is always wrong. We can agree that pinching Jeff falls here yes? (Desire: save Jeff and Sarah, Force: Pinch) If so that would make it wrong. But you said at the start that you're not sure.

One could imagine a situation where the other may be grateful for the imposition afterwards - lets say I push someone out of the way of a moving car. But in this example am I imposing my desires on someone, or simply acting on behalf of theirs? — Tzeentch

Again, intentions matter. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure why that would matter, could you elaborate? So far, your ethical system ruled out all impositions as wrong. So I'm not sure how intention factors into it. And intentions aren't mentioned in your definition of imposition as far as I can see.

It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, ...
— khaled

I haven't argued that — Tzeentch

I thought you did here:

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

The question that remains is whether it is also immoral to impose in such a situation. — Tzeentch

If you claim that all impositions are wrong, and that this (self defense) is an imposition, what question remains? Isn't the answer clearly that it's wrong? Which statement would you change (either not all impositions are wrong, or self defense is not an imposition)

Sure. If I try to deny a person from sitting in a chair by sitting there myself, and the person just walks by and never noticed I attempted to impose on them, was I not wrong for trying to impose on them in the first place? — Tzeentch

I certainly don't think you're always wrong. If you owned the chair, I would say you are definitely not wrong for instance. Do you believe that you would be wrong even then?

In case it wasn't clear, the fact that one has to use force to make someone act in accordance with one's desires generally implies conflicting desires, and conflicting desires (or the impression thereof, in case of intentions) are key to determining whether something is an imposition. — Tzeentch

Again, I see contradiction between that and this:

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed?
— khaled

And you answered:

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — khaled

In one you claim that an imposition is an imposition regardless of the intent of the victim. In the other, you claim that the victim's intent is "key to determining whether something is an imposition". Which definition shall we proceed with?

But pinching Jeff is undoubtedly an imposition, yes? — khaled

No, not undoubtedly. As I tried to make clear, there must be a conflict of desires or the impression thereof to make it an imposition.

In this example one can reasonably assume Jeff would want to be pinched if it meant saving Sarah, and thus one may choose to take that risk. But it is still a risk.

If it turns out Jeff disagrees, one has made an imposition.

Inaction is the only safe option here.

It sounds to me like you're implying that an imposition is wrong only if it ends up conflicting with the victim's interests. Am I correct? — khaled

No. As I said, intentions matter. Just like when one intends to kill someone but fails, that is still an immoral act.

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? — khaled

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — Tzeentch

But here you say that one "doesn't know if they're making an imposition", implying that if Jeff had been fine with getting pinched to save him and Sarah, then pinching him is not an imposition. — khaled

The key here is in the first instance one is acting regardless of the subject's desires and end up, by accident, not doing harm.

In the second instance one is making an estimation of the subject's desires and acting in accordance with them.

Again; intention.

Additionally, by your original definition, pinching is certainly an imposition. — khaled

Not by definition. If one attempts to act in accordance to the subject's desires rather than impose their own, it is not an imposition assuming they are successful.

If one consciously attempts to use force to make someone act in accordance to one's desires, it is wrong regardless of the outcome. — Tzeentch

This seems to be your original definition of imposition, which is always wrong. We can agree that pinching Jeff falls here yes? (Desire: save Jeff and Sarah, Force: Pinch) — khaled

If one's intention is, to the best of their judgement, make a decision that is in line with Jeff's desires it is not an imposition.

The issue here is that Jeff's desires are unknown and therefore this decision does entail a risk. If it turns out we were wrong about Jeff's desires, we have imposed.

As I tried to make clear, the use of force implies a conflict of desires. If there is no conflict of desires or impression thereof, there is no imposition. One would still be able to make bad decisions that affect others, but those would be of a different nature that have to do with ignorance and not imposition.

It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, ... — khaled

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

I left that open-ended on purpose. We discuss the details after we have agreed on everything else.

If you claim that all impositions are wrong, and that this (self defense) is an imposition, what question remains? — khaled

I ammended my claim, leaving the question of self-defense unresolved for now. Why skip over that?

I certainly don't think you're always wrong. If you owned the chair, I would say you are definitely not wrong for instance. Do you believe that you would be wrong even then? — khaled

Yes.

There are few things as subjective as ideas of what belongs to whom, and those ideas certainly don't bestow a right to impose on the holder.

In one you claim that an imposition is an imposition regardless of the intent of the victim. In the other, you claim that the victim's intent is "key to determining whether something is an imposition". Which definition shall we proceed with? — khaled

There is no contradiction.

If it is one's desire to impose, it is an imposition regardless of the subject's desires.

If it is not one's desire to impose, but one for whatever reason feels forced to make a judgement call, the desires of the victim and one's ability to accurately determine them become key.

I find very little I disagree with in this comment.

No, not undoubtedly. As I tried to make clear, there must be a conflict of desires or the impression thereof to make it an imposition. — Tzeentch

Ok let's go with that. I'm assuming we're still using "all impositions are wrong"

In this example one can reasonably assume Jeff would want to be pinched if it meant saving Sarah, and thus one may choose to take that risk. But it is still a risk.

If it turns out Jeff disagrees, one has made an imposition. — Tzeentch

But the question is whether or not taking the risk is permissible. Is it permissible to risk imposing when our best judgement shows that it's the best option?

I ammended my claim, leaving the question of self-defense unresolved for now. Why skip over that? — Tzeentch

I didn't intend to. I misinterpreted it. I thought you meant to say that the morality of self defense is unknowable, not unknown, so I tried to show how it's clear from your definitions that it would be wrong.

Now let me change the situation a bit, because I'm not convinced that this:

If it is not one's desire to impose, but one is instead for whatever reason to make a judgement call, the desires of the victim and one's ability to accurately determine them become key. — Tzeentch

Is the end all be all. I'm not sure it's purely the imposition victim who has to be taken into account but rather also the victims of not imposing

Suppose Sarah is Jeff's ex-wife and he hates her with a burning passion. So much so, that he doesn't mind dying with her, and so verbally and loudly opposes your decision to pinch him to save both. Now does it become immoral to pinch Jeff? By the current formulation, you know you'd be opposing Jeff's intent, and so it would be an imposition, and so wrong. Do you agree with that?

Or another situation, imagine the Jeff is stoned out of his mind and mumbles something about how he hates blue so much so don't you dare press the blue button. Incidentally, that's the button to pinch Jeff. Would it be wrong to press it then?

Because. When an absolute fact is legislated and condemned to be relative opinion, truth dies and its only mourners are curiosity and wonder.

But the question is whether or not taking the risk is permissible. — khaled

The question of whether it was permissable lies solely with whether one was able to accurately determine the desires of the subject.

If one did, it was permissable. If one didn't, it wasn't. There's no way to determine the morality of such an act beforehand, hence the risk.

Suppose Sarah is Jeff's ex-wife and he hates her with a burning passion. So much so, that he doesn't mind dying with her, and so verbally and loudly opposes your decision to pinch him to save both. Now does it become immoral to pinch Jeff? — khaled

Yes.

Inaction is the safe option.

Or another situation, imagine the Jeff is stoned out of his mind and mumbles something about how he hates blue so much so don't you dare press the blue button. Incidentally, that's the button to pinch Jeff. Would it be wrong to press it then? — khaled

This is a situation where one could reasonably assume that the desires expressed by Jeff are not his true desires but a result of a deteriorated mental state. One could take the risk.

Whether that decision is right or wrong can only be accertained after Jeff sobers up.

I'm not sure it's purely the imposition victim who has to be taken into account but rather also the victims of not imposing — khaled

The issue with this is that it implies that inaction is immoral, which in turn implies that one has to spend their every waking moment and ounce of energy solving what one perceives to be the world's problems (despite the fact that one may be completely wrong in their judgement of what constitutes problems and solutions). Every moment spent in rest or thought would be akin to inaction, and thus immoral.

This makes no sense to me.

Incidentally, before I begin, you’re an antinatalist correct? Or am I misremembering?

If one did, it was permissable. If one didn't, it wasn't. There's no way to determine the morality of such an act beforehand, hence the risk. — Tzeentch

A consequentialist answer then? One cannot tell beforehand if what he’s about to do is permissible or not.

I don’t see how you square it with this however:

Just like when one intends to kill someone but fails, that is still an immoral act. — Tzeentch

The first quote implies that an attempt at murder is never wrong (“there is no way to determine the morality of the act beforehand”). Successful murder is itself only conditionally wrong (wrong only if the victim wants to live)

The second implies that the attempt itself is wrong.

Yes — Tzeentch

This is a situation where one could reasonably assume that the desires expressed by Jeff are not his true desires but a result of a deteriorated mental state. One could take the risk.

Whether that decision is right or wrong can only be accertained after Jeff sobers up. — Tzeentch

I find it curious that if Jeff is drunk then we shouldn’t respect his intentions, but when he’s malicious we should.

If it was 20 people in that room, and Jeff was purely evil, would it still be wrong? If there were 100 would it still be wrong? What about if it was between Jeff’s wish to cause death and the entirety of the human race on the other end? Would it still be immoral to pinch Jeff?

The issue with this is that it implies that inaction is immoral, which in turn implies that one has to spend their every waking moment and ounce of energy solving what one perceives to be the world's problems — Tzeentch

Yes I do believe inaction is sometimes immoral, but I don’t see how that means that we must spend every waking moment trying to fix things. As to why I believe inaction is sometimes immoral (one of the reasons):

There is no fundamental difference between action and inaction.

Let’s return to Jeff and Sarah. We say that the action is pressing a button correct? Let me coin a new verb: “sserp” and it means “to not press”. So now, Sarah can accuse you of imposing on her by sserping the button.

The split between action and inaction is a trick of the language.

This idea hasn’t gone under much scrutiny I’ll admit, so I’m curious what you’ll say. What is it about sserping that makes it an inaction as opposed to an action? What separates them in general?

Is standing still an action or inaction?

Incidentally, before I begin, you’re an antinatalist correct? — khaled

Depends on what you mean with anti-natalist.

I'm not campaigning for people not to have children. I am however seriously considering the possibility that the act of having children is immoral.

A consequentialist answer then? One cannot tell beforehand if what he’s about to do is permissible or not. — khaled

Yes, in the context of what we've specified that is true.

I don’t see how you square it with this however: — khaled

Just like when one intends to kill someone but fails, that is still an immoral act. — Tzeentch

The first quote implies that an attempt at murder is never wrong (“there is no way to determine the morality of the act beforehand”). Successful murder is itself only conditionally wrong (wrong only if the victim wants to live)

The second implies that the attempt itself is wrong. — khaled

An intent to harm can by itself be immoral.

However, when the intent is benevolent, but the outcome is wrong, it can also be immoral.

So it stands to reason that actions cannot be judged solely on either intent or outcome, but by a bit of both.

I find it curious that if Jeff is drunk then we shouldn’t respect his intentions, but when he’s malicious we should. — khaled

This is how I would personally judge this hypothetical situation and I could of course be wrong. Maybe Jeff's anger is entirely out-of-character in which case one could take a risk, just like when he was intoxicated.

If it was 20 people in that room, and Jeff was purely evil, would it still be wrong? If there were 100 would it still be wrong? What about if it was between Jeff’s wish to cause death and the entirety of the human race on the other end? Would it still be immoral to pinch Jeff? — khaled

Yes. In essence you are imposing on Jeff to sacrifice himself on behalf of others. I don't think sacrifice can be morally imposed on anyone (no matter how alien their dispositions seem to be).

If we make the judgement that somehow, because we perceive the pinch to be only a minor sacrifice, we are justified in imposing on Jeff we open a box of Pandora.

Yes I do believe inaction is sometimes immoral, but I don’t see how that means that we must spend every waking moment trying to fix things. — khaled

Because if inaction towards a perceived problem is immoral, then every moment not spent solving the problems one perceives is immoral.

Personally, I think inaction is only immoral towards those situations one has voluntarily taken responsibility for.

For example, if one chooses to have a child, one must care for its well-being and inaction is not morally permissible.

There is no fundamental difference between action and inaction. — khaled

I think there is, and I also think it is fundamental.

Let’s return to Jeff and Sarah. We say that the action is pressing a button correct? Let me coin a new verb: “sserp” and it means “to not press”. So now, Sarah can accuse you of imposing on her by sserping the button. — khaled

Sarah has no grounds to demand (impose) one's involvement in their predicament.

When I have a problem, I cannot simply make people part of that problem and then accuse them of imposing on me for not solving my problems.

The split between action and inaction is a trick of the language.

This idea hasn’t gone under much scrutiny I’ll admit, so I’m curious what you’ll say. What is it about sserping that makes it an inaction as opposed to an action? What separates them in general?

Is standing still an action or inaction? — khaled

Standing still is an act(ion). But while one is standing still, one may also be in inaction. For example, one is not running.

It is as fundamental as the distinction between that which is and that which isn't.

I think the trick of language is one you're playing on yourself here.

I am however seriously considering the possibility that the act of having children is immoral. — Tzeentch

This is what I mean. But by the current standard, you cannot tell the morality of an act beforehand. So having children would only be wrong if the child grows up hating their life wouldn't it? Assuming of course that the parents don't have malicious intent with their children. What further consideration is needed?

An intent to harm can by itself be immoral. — Tzeentch

Well then it looks like further amendment is needed. It's not just about the consequence anymore, the morality of an act also depends on the intent before it takes place. What to do when those contradict?

If one has a benevolent intent but the outcome is bad, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

On the other hand, if the intent is malicious, but the outcome is good, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

What's the "timeline of morality" here? Is the morality of the act initially determined by intent but then we "add" the consequence after the act is done and recalculate the morality of the act? If so, what's the point of this extra addition and recalculation? That's the best I can make of this so far.

I've never come across a system that determines the morality of the act both before (intent) and after (consequence) the act, so I'm confused on what to make of this.

If we make the judgement that somehow, because we perceive the pinch to be only a minor sacrifice, we are justified in imposing on Jeff we open a box of Pandora. — Tzeentch

I think the idea that no matter how minor the sacrifice, it cannot be imposed, is a much bigger Pandora's box. I understand one should be very careful if they intend to impose a sacrifice, but not so careful that it's always wrong.

Besides, doesn't saving Sarah fall under "benevolent intent"? So the outcome could be wrong (benevolent intent, but the act ends up contradicting Jeff's wishes). What makes you so sure it is wrong? What variables determine when benevolent intent overrides the consequences of an act and when it doesn't?

This is how I would personally judge this hypothetical situation and I could of course be wrong. Maybe Jeff's anger is entirely out-of-character in which case one could take a risk, just like when he was intoxicated. — Tzeentch

Couldn't you say this regardless of how out of character the anger is? There is always a chance that Jeff doesn't mean what he says, or a chance that it's actually not Jeff speaking but you hallucinating. What if one bets on those chances? Can your system definitively state that imposing a sacrifice on Jeff is wrong? I don't see how it could given that morality is determined after the act is done, and given that the intent in this case is benevolent (save Sarah).

But you also seem sure that it is wrong. Why is that?

Because if inaction towards a perceived problem is immoral, then every moment not spent solving the problems one perceives is immoral. — Tzeentch

Correct. Now how would this imply that one has to spend all their time fixing things?

In your system, action can be immoral if it's against the victim's interest. That doesn't mean that one has to spend every waking moment checking if their actions have imposed or not does it? You typed many responses to me, did you once ask me if you were imposing?

One doesn't need to spend every waking moment checking if their inaction is immoral for the same reason you don't spend every waking moment checking if your action is immoral.

Personally, I think inaction is only immoral towards those situations one has voluntarily taken responsibility for. — Tzeentch

And how does responsibility work? Many would argue that you have a responsibility to save Sarah in that scenario.

Can one ethically have a child and choose not to take on the responsibility associated? If not, then it is not clear that responsibility is entirely voluntary.

I think there is, and I also think it is fundamental. — Tzeentch

What is it then?

Sarah has no grounds to demand (impose) one's involvement in their predicament. — Tzeentch

But they are involved aren't they? They're sserping the button! They're causing her death!

Standing still is an act(ion). But while one is standing still, one may also be in inaction. For example, one is not running. — Tzeentch

Well this doesn't help much. If the same act can be an action and an inaction, what tells you that sserping is an inaction, instead of an action?

I'm not sure what the example implies. Do you mean for example, that if I have an intended act X, then doing X is an action and not doing X is an inaction? What's the principle at work in the example?

This is what I mean. But by the current standard, you cannot tell the morality of an act beforehand. So having children would only be wrong if the child grows up hating their life wouldn't it? Assuming of course that the parents don't have malicious intent with their children. What further consideration is needed?

Well then it looks like further amendment is needed. It's not just about the consequence anymore, the morality of an act also depends on the intent before it takes place. What to do when those contradict?

If one has a benevolent intent but the outcome is bad, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

On the other hand, if the intent is malicious, but the outcome is good, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

What's the "timeline of morality" here? Is the morality of the act initially determined by intent but then we "add" the consequence after the act is done and recalculate the morality of the act? If so, what's the point of this extra addition and recalculation? That's the best I can make of this so far. — khaled

The question has now become, what constitutes a moral act.

This is my idea about that:
1. The intention of the act must be just.

What constitutes justice is a seperate discussion, but for now it will suffice to say just intentions have the well-being of their subject at heart.

2. One must possess the power and wisdom to make their intentions reality.

Without these things, the person would be incapable of the intended act to begin with, and thus one would be acting ignorantly.

3. The intended outcome.

This is essentially a confirmation of 2.

Assuming the parent is well-intentioned and wishes the happiness of their child, there is a myriad of matters one is fundamentally ignorant of and powerless over.

A few examples:
- The parent does not know what constitutes the happiness of their child.
- The parent does not know the countless factors that will affect the happiness of their child, and is powerless to influence many of them.
- The parent does not know the effects of their upbringing on the child.
- The parent does not know the effects of their child on the world.

The course of a human life is simply too complicated to oversee, and the factors too diverse to control. The degree to which intentions of the parents coincides with the outcome relies mostly on luck.

Even if criteria 1 can be fulfilled and the parents accurately estimate the desires of the child, criteria 2 cannot be fulfilled, for no other reason that the actor of has very limited control and little to no knowledge over the outcome.

That is to say, having children cannot be a moral act. The question is then, is it always immoral? To me this is unresolved. Perhaps making such a decision on the basis of so much ignorance and so little power is irresponsible and immoral to begin with.

The next question is, what constitutes an immoral act.

An act that has a malicious intention, is immoral, regardless of the outcome.

An act that has a harmful outcome, is immoral, regardless of the intent. One could say that even if the intentions were good, the immorality of one's deed stems from their ignorance, or hubris.

But what of the act that is well-intentioned, and has a good outcome, but not by power or wisdom of one's own but by mere coincidence.

This would be the case for the well-intentioned parent that happens to raise a happy child. (Note: since the child is a creation of the parent, their actions will be their full responsibility, so the actions of the child will be another factor in determining the (im)morality of having the child).

It cannot be a moral act, because as we have determined: a parent fundamentally lacks the power and wisdom to have created a happy child. It is simply largely outside of their control.

But is it immoral? The same ignorance and hubris are present, with all the risks they bring, yet the intentions were good and no harm has come of it. Maybe it is not immoral. Or maybe it is. Unresolved.

I've never come across a system that determines the morality of the act both before (intent) and after (consequence) the act, so I'm confused on what to make of this. — khaled

I don't think a system could make any sense without taking both into account.

Besides, doesn't saving Sarah fall under "benevolent intent"? So the outcome could be wrong (benevolent intent, but the act ends up contradicting Jeff's wishes). What makes you so sure it is wrong? What variables determine when benevolent intent overrides the consequences of an act and when it doesn't? — khaled

The fact that one intends not only to save Sarah but also impose (sacrifice) on Jeff is what makes it wrong. The intention must be good, not half-good, half-bad.

Couldn't you say this regardless of how out of character the anger is? There is always a chance that Jeff doesn't mean what he says, or a chance that it's actually not Jeff speaking but you hallucinating. What if one bets on those chances? — khaled

Of course, and one could always bet on those chances if one felt they had ample reason to do so.

One risks making a misjudgement, though, and thus a major mistake.

Can your system definitively state that imposing a sacrifice on Jeff is wrong? — khaled

In the situation we have specified, yes.

I don't see how it could given that morality is determined after the act is done, and given that the intent in this case is benevolent (save Sarah).

But you also seem sure that it is wrong. Why is that? — khaled

See my earlier explanation of what constitutes a moral act.

Correct. Now how would this imply that one has to spend all their time fixing things? — khaled

It rests on the assumption that one is interested in living a moral life. If one isn't interested in that, this entire discussion isn't relevant to them.

In your system, action can be immoral if it's against the victim's interest. That doesn't mean that one has to spend every waking moment checking if their actions have imposed or not does it? You typed many responses to me, did you once ask me if you were imposing? — khaled

If impositions are in any way meaningful, one may expect some kind of signal from the person who one supposedly imposed on. If the imposition is not important enough to let one know, then one can assume no meaningful imposition was made.

But if you take this discussion as an imposition on my part, and you find it impossible for yourself to stop partaking in this conversation for whatever reason, let me know and I'll stop.

And how does responsibility work? — khaled

Like I said, responsibility can only be an effect of situations one has caused voluntarily.

Can one ethically have a child and choose not to take on the responsibility associated? — khaled

It should be obvious that if the choice to have a child is voluntary, one cannot choose not to take responsibility for its well-being.

Many would argue that you have a responsibility to save Sarah in that scenario. — khaled

And I disagree. After all, I haven't put Jeff and Sarah in this predicament. Whoever did that, is responsible.

But they are involved aren't they? They're sserping the button! They're causing her death! — khaled

Whoever put them in their predicament is causing their death.

There is no fundamental difference between action and inaction. — khaled

I think there is, and I also think it is fundamental. — Tzeentch

What is it then? — khaled

I explained; the difference between action and inaction is similar to that which is and that which isn't.

... , what tells you that sserping is an inaction, instead of an action? — khaled

It refers to something that isn't.

1. The intention of the act must be just. — Tzeentch

2. One must possess the power and wisdom to make their intentions reality. — Tzeentch

criteria 2 cannot be fulfilled, for no other reason that the actor of has very limited control and little to no knowledge over the outcome.

That is to say, having children cannot be a moral act. — Tzeentch

Couldn't this be applied to all acts? After all, if by criteria 2, you mean the power and wisdom to make intentions a reality with 100% chance, then no act at all fulfills that criteria. People aren't omnipotent or omniscient. Let's take giving to charity. There is always a chance that the money I send gets stolen and used to fund the Russian mafia. I do not have the wisdom or power to ensure that that will not happen with 100% certainty. Therefore donating to charity is not moral by this formulation.

It seems clear to me that 100% certainty is not maintainable, or else all acts are not moral. So how certain should we be before an act with benevolent intentions becomes justified?

Also, what is the difference between "not moral" and "immoral"? Is it ok to do "not moral" acts?

An act that has a malicious intention, is immoral, regardless of the outcome.

An act that has a harmful outcome, is immoral, regardless of the intent. — Tzeentch

I have two important questions:

First, what happens when these criteria contradict? So what happens when one has benevolent intent, and has enough certainty that they'll succeed (so the act is moral) but the act has a negative consequence (so the act is immoral)? Or conversely, when one has benevolent intent, but not much certainty (so the act is not moral) but the act turns out ok (so the act is not immoral)? Until this is answered there are many things I cannot address.

And second, what counts as the "outcome" exactly? If, say, I help an old lady cross the road (out of benevolent intent), but then 3 years later she ends up murdering 5 people, have I done something wrong or right? How far into the future do we need to look?

But is it immoral? The same ignorance and hubris are present, with all the risks they bring, yet the intentions were good and no harm has come of it. Maybe it is not immoral. Or maybe it is. Unresolved. — Tzeentch

So? By the current formulation, this hubris and ignorance have no bearing on whether or not an act is immoral. Why do they factor in?

If the presence of this "hubris" makes the morality of an act undecided, then the morality of all well intentioned unharmful acts is undecided, since you consider anything less than 100% "hubris"

I don't think a system could make any sense without taking both into account. — Tzeentch

Of course, and one could always bet on those chances if one felt they had ample reason to do so. — Tzeentch

And this is the issue. Your system cannot say "this is wrong". Only "this was wrong". Who cares about the latter? It's already done. What does knowing that an act happened to be wrong accomplish? It doesn't guide you towards living morally.

It rests on the assumption that one is interested in living a moral life. If one isn't interested in that, this entire discussion isn't relevant to them. — Tzeentch

But as I explained, since your system also has the morality of acts depend on their consequences, you never know the morality of an act before it is done. So by the same logic shouldn't you spend every waking moment tracking the consequences of every act you have ever committed to ensure that they didn't have bad consequences that would make them immoral? Do you do that?

And let's say you do manage to track act X to have resulted in a negative consequence (putting aside the "how far into the future should we look" question), it doesn't seem like that fact alone (that an act happened to turn out wrong) would have any bearing on future behavior. If it doesn't impact your behavior surely it doesn't lead you to live a more or less moral life? So then, how does your system lead to a more moral life if doesn't impact behavior?

If impositions are in any way meaningful, one may expect some kind of signal from the person who one supposedly imposed on. — Tzeentch

Even then, one can bet on the chance that they're hallucinating that particular signal, once again making their intention benevolent. And since the morality of an act is only determined by its consequence at that point, they are free to do anything. The "intention" requirement is trivial to fill. And the consequence requirement doesn't deter an act. Resulting in an ethics that cannot say anything is immoral until after it's committed.

But if you take this discussion as an imposition on my part, and you find it impossible for yourself to stop partaking in this conversation for whatever reason, let me know and I'll stop. — Tzeentch

Hypothetically, if someone found your holding this belief that impositions are wrong, itself an imposition on them, and asked you to stop, would you? If not, why not? What justifies that imposition?

Whoever put them in their predicament is causing their death. — Tzeentch

Multiple things can cause the same event correct? It's not just the person that put them in their predicament, but also the person that supplied him with the tools, and the person that supplied him with funds, and so on. You sserping the button is also part of the causal chain. Any change in these variables could have prevented the event. However some people are responsible and some aren't.

Let's take the person who built the pods to trap Sarah and Jeff. If said person knew what their use would be, and built them anyways, is he wrong? Now, importantly, if he didn't know, and they happened to be used for evil, is he wrong?

By your system the answer would be yes to both correct? Because if the consequence is bad, then the act is wrong regardless of intention. How might one ever act morally then? Or conversely, if every single act can be immoral or moral assuming benevolent intention, isn't every act done with benevolent intention justified?

I explained; the difference between action and inaction is similar to that which is and that which isn't. — Tzeentch

That doesn't help very much. I can cite one of many differences between existence and non existence. For one: Existing things can be detected, non existing things cannot. Can you similarly cite a difference between action and inaction?

.. , what tells you that sserping is an inaction, instead of an action?
— khaled

It refers to something that isn't. — Tzeentch

How so? What is the "something" in this case?

I don't quite understand this critique as you've already claimed that the same act can be an action or an inaction based on.... I don't know:

Standing still is an act(ion). But while one is standing still, one may also be in inaction. — Tzeentch

But now you claim that there is a category for action/inaction that depends on "whether they refer to something that is/isn't". So is standing still an action or inaction now? Does it refer to something that isn't or something that is? Maybe if you answer these questions I could better understand what you mean by "refers to something that is/isn't"

Couldn't this be applied to all acts? — khaled

If we take justice to mean what I said it meant: actions that have the well-being of the subject at heart (this is too simple, but it will suffice for now) then no. If there is no one's well-being to take into account, then there's no moral act to be done.

After all, if by criteria 2, you mean the power and wisdom to make intentions a reality with 100% chance, then no act at all fulfills that criteria. — khaled

Chance is simply a guise for fudging what we don't know, so that first part is meaningless to me. One either knows and has the power, or they do not. The result of their actions will confirm or deny that.

But if you're implying there's always an element of risk involved, I would agree with that. That's something I have tried to highlight throughout our discussion, and why I have advised caution when making decisions on behalf of others.

Let's take giving to charity. There is always a chance that the money I send gets stolen and used to fund the Russian mafia. I do not have the wisdom or power to ensure that that will not happen with 100% certainty. Therefore donating to charity is not moral by this formulation. — khaled

Donating to the mafia, even if it is due to ignorance, is not moral, clearly. My advise would be, before donating to charity, figure out where the money goes.

Perhaps more importantly, aim to do good in ways where one actually possesses the wisdom and power to see it through. Do good in small things - that also is a sign of humility.

So how certain should we be before an act with benevolent intentions becomes justified? — khaled

It only becomes justified if the act leads to the desired outcome. It cannot be justified beforehand. It entails a risk.

How certain should you be? That's up to the individual and how much risk they're willing to take. That question deserves much consideration every time one acts.

Also, what is the difference between "not moral" and "immoral"? Is it ok to do "not moral" acts? — khaled

In the context of our discussion, there are three kinds of acts:
- Moral
- Neutral
- Immoral

So "not moral" means either neutral or immoral.

It's not good to commit immoral acts, obviously. Neutral acts, in the context of our discussion, are inconsequential. I hope that answers your question.

First, what happens when these criteria contradict? So what happens when one has benevolent intent, and has enough certainty that they'll succeed (so the act is moral) but the act has a negative consequence (so the act is immoral)? — khaled

Then they weren't as certain as they thought they were and they committed injustice. It's an immoral act. It is overconfidence; one tried to meddle in things that they had not the wisdom to comprehend or the power to influence positively, and one made someone else pay the price for their ignorance.

All criteria must be met for an act to be considered moral.

And second, what counts as the "outcome" exactly? If, say, I help an old lady cross the road (out of benevolent intent), but then 3 years later she ends up murdering 5 people, have I done something wrong or right? How far into the future do we need to look? — khaled

In the example of the old lady, one has not caused the old lady to murder those people. One has only helped her cross the road.

However, if one saves the life of a murderer, and that murderer goes on to murder many people during the rest of their life, that is a consequence of one's actions. One shares responsibility for that suffering, and one has committed injustice.

Your system cannot say "this is wrong". Only "this was wrong". Who cares about the latter? — khaled

Essentially what you are asking here is who cares about the consequences, which can only be acertained after the act, of their actions.

I do. And I assume you do as well. Like I said, I cannot think of a moral system that makes sense, that doesn't take consequences into account.

What does knowing that an act happened to be wrong accomplish? — khaled

One would assume it gives much reason for pause, humility, reflection.

It doesn't guide you towards living morally. — khaled

Nothing I have shared in our discussion so far has been aimed at moral guidance, but only analyzing ideas. (What is an imposition, what is a moral act, etc.)

Moral guidance is an entirely seperate matter. Interesting to be sure, and perhaps something to be kept for later. I doubt my ideas of moral guidance will be of much use if we do not agree on/understand each other's premises.

But as I explained, since your system also has the morality of acts depend on their consequences, you never know the morality of an act before it is done. So by the same logic shouldn't you spend every waking moment tracking the consequences of every act you have ever committed to ensure that they didn't have bad consequences that would make them immoral? — khaled

I would certainly advise to spend a great deal of time reflecting on one's actions and their consequences, and if one suspects they have committed injustices unknowingly, to acertain these things.

However, whether one knows the consequences of their actions or not does not change the nature of the injustice, for it already has been committed.

So no. I don't believe such a moral duty exists, for it would imply one has a moral duty to rid oneself of all ignorance, which is clearly impossible. Ignorance however, is its own punishment, so I would consider it to be in the individual's best interest to rid oneself of as much of it as possible.

And let's say you do manage to track act X to have resulted in a negative consequence (putting aside the "how far into the future should we look" question), it doesn't seem like that fact alone (that an act happened to turn out wrong) would have any bearing on future behavior. — khaled

That depends on the individual. If one sees they have committed an injustice and it does not prompt them to change in some way, that says a lot about the individual, and very little about that which I have proposed.

If it doesn't impact your behavior surely it doesn't lead you to live a more or less moral life? — khaled

I guess so. But the choice whether we let our actions and their consequences (the ones we are aware of) impact our future behavior is a choice one makes.

I guess maybe your point is that the consequences one is ignorant of cannot influence their behavior, and that much is true.

So then, how does your system lead to a more moral life if doesn't impact behavior? — khaled

We are discussing the basic premises of the system, and haven't yet touched upon the question of how it can contribute to living a more moral life. Lets agree on/understand things first before we move on.

Even then, one can bet on the chance that they're hallucinating that particular signal, once again making their intention benevolent. — khaled

It has to be genuine, of course. If one is simply putting up an act, one may fool others as to what their intentions are, but they cannot fool reality, so to speak.

If hallucinations are being used as a pretense, then obviously the intent is not benevolent at all.

And since the morality of an act is only determined by its consequence at that point, they are free to do anything. — khaled

If one isn't interested in living morally, then yes. In that case, one should do whatever one wishes.

Obviously someone interested in living morally would never come to the conclusion that they should use their ignorance to justify their every act. The consequence would be an immoral life.

"intention" requirement is trivial to fill. — khaled

It is certainly not trivial. An unjust intention categorically excludes an act from being moral.

And the consequence requirement doesn't deter an act. — khaled

How does it not? Shouldn't the thoughtful person deeply consider the consequences before they act? Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable.

If anything this emphasis on consequences should prompt the individual to carefully consider before acting.

Hypothetically, if someone found your holding this belief that impositions are wrong, itself an imposition on them, and asked you to stop, would you? If not, why not? What justifies that imposition? — khaled

That would not match my definition of an imposition, namely the use of force to make the subject act in accordance with one's desires.

Multiple things can cause the same event correct? It's not just the person that put them in their predicament, but also the person that supplied him with the tools, and the person that supplied him with funds, and so on. — khaled

Certainly, and they all share some moral responsibility.

... sserping the button is also part of the causal chain. — khaled

Certainly not. It does not influence the casual chain.

Let's take the person who built the pods to trap Sarah and Jeff. If said person knew what their use would be, and built them anyways, is he wrong? Now, importantly, if he didn't know, and they happened to be used for evil, is he wrong? — khaled

Yes. And while you make it sound like this is some alien concept, it is actually very common that producers are held liable for the harm caused by their products, even if it was never their intention. This is not the same, but similar.

Because if the consequence is bad, then the act is wrong regardless of intention. How might one ever act morally then — khaled

By ensuring the consequence matches the intention, and yes, that requires much care and deliberation before one attempts a moral act, that is to say, before one attempts to influence another's well-being. Maybe technically one could say one is never completely certain, so it entails a risk.

No one said living a moral life was easy.

Or conversely, if every single act can be immoral or moral assuming benevolent intention, isn't every act done with benevolent intention justified? — khaled

If the consequences do not match the intention, there is no moral act or justification. If the consequences actually cause harm instead of the intended benefit, it was in fact immoral despite the intention.

To be clear, an intention can never justify an act. It would be crazy to say one's actions with harmful consequences were somehow justified because of one's ignorance.

That doesn't help very much. I can cite one of many differences between existence and non existence. For one: Existing things can be detected, non existing things cannot. Can you similarly cite a difference between action and inaction? — khaled

You can detect me standing still (existence/action), and while I am standing still you cannot detect me running (non-existence/inaction).

I don't quite understand this critique as you've already claimed that the same act can be an action or an inaction... — khaled

You haven't read carefully.

One can be in action and in inaction at the same time. I haven't argued that the standing still and not running are the same act.

So is standing still an action or inaction now? Does it refer to something that isn't or something that is? — khaled

Standing still is an action. It is something that one is doing, and thus refers to something that is, assuming the individual is actually standing still.

Expression is to memes as Expectoration is to Covid-19. Spread the word, will ya! I will (cough, sniff).