Is essentialism a mistake, due to our wishful thinking? (Argument + criticism)

Amalac

First, I’ll state the argument that defends the affirmative answer. It comes from someone who I consider to be one the greatest philosophers of my small country, though this particular argument of his is one that I don’t find very convincing.

I shall now attempt to give a translation of his argument, which was originally stated in spanish, and then give my criticism:

The argument: all talk about essence is a mistake, due to our wishful thinking

Philosophers have given various distinct definitions to the words essence (quidditas) and substance (oὐσία).

However, when speaking about essence, they usually mean something among the lines of: a general attribute or quality. The quidditas or essence, as opposed to the existence, of a thing. The real individual peculiarity or haecceity of something, which goes beyond general concepts. Being in itself, as opposed to mere being and appearance. The core, as opposed to the shell. The internal, as opposed to the external. The necessarily defining, as opposed to the accidental and random. Sometimes, it is true, they mean merely the general, as opposed to the particular.

Further, Rudolf Carnap pointed out that the answer to a question of the form “What is X?” or “what is characteristic of X?” (“What is woman?” “What is democracy?” “What’s the corona virus?”) is often one to which the expected answer is an essentialist one, or one which employs the notion of essence.

Such an approach very often carries with it the ontological assumption that in regards to the question “What is X?”, there is always a “something” (whether material or immaterial, ideal or real) which is what is characteristic, defining or essential of X. The rest of X is, according to this assumption, merely incidental, contingent and apparent. The doctrine presupposed by this way of asking questions is thus essentialism.

Essentialism essentially maintains that in individual entities such as chairs, tables or bottles there are certain essential, universal qualities which give them their particularity or haecceity. For example: all swans are white, but only in so far as they all partake of a common whiteness, which constitutes the essence of white swans.

It should be kept in mind, however, that essentialism is a false doctrine. The reason for this is quite simple: there are no essences, there is no oὐσία. Although we humans wish that there be characteristic, permanent and unique things behind such terms as “law”, “justice”, “freedom”, “equality”, “state”, “humanity”, “society”, “rationality”, etc., in truth behind such words there’s only... words, which are no more than the common agreement between us humans, a social convention. Nominalism, rather than essentialism, is therefore to be preferred.

There is no essence, no substance, no core. Everything is appearance.

Criticism of the argument

In short, his argument seems to be that there are no essences because we human beings want there to be essences, and this wish makes us blind, through self-deception, to the fact that they are merely the product of our wishful thinking and imagination.

But it seems to me that this is a non-sequitur: it does not follow from the fact that we wish something to be the case, that it is not the case. For example: a man may ardently wish that his wife be pregnant with a boy rather than a girl, and that certainly would not imply that his wife is pregnant with a girl.

One could perhaps interpret the argument more charitably as stating rather that if we wish for something to be true, that means it’s not likely to be true. This is true in many cases, like winning the lottery, but its being unlikely is due to the laws of chance, not due to our wishing that it happened. In my previous example clearly such an inference from what someone wants (consciously or not) to be the case to how likely it is to be the case would not be valid, since each scenario is almost just as likely as its opposite.

So I don't think that there is a satisfactory way to know how likely or plausible it is that there are essences, given the difficulty of the subject and the various disagreements among philosophers on this topic to this day.

The polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski had already noticed that arguments with such a logical structure are not valid, when he criticized Nietzsche for using an argument similar to the one above:

(...) And from the fact that we need an order, it does not follow that there is none, even if Nietzsche is right in pointing out that arguments for the beliefs which conform to our wishes ought to be prima facie treated with suspicion. We may need an order and wish it to be real but it still may be real, not just a concoction of our wishful thinking. — Leszek Kolakowski, Horror Metaphysicus

ChatteringMonkey

↪Amalac

I don't think he is making an argument there at all, he seem to be just stating what he thinks is the case, and why we tend to believe in essences... i.e. because we wish it.

But it seems to me that this is a non-sequitur: it does not follow from the fact that we wish something to be the case, that it is not the case — Amalac

Yes, and it cuts both ways, wishing doesn't have a necessary relation with truth either way... there are just putting the emphasis on the other way (because that is where the tradition they are criticizing was coming from I guess).

Amalac

I don't think he is making an argument there at all, he seem to be just stating what he thinks is the case, and why we tend to believe in essences... i.e. because we wish it. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, it's either just an assertion with no argument to support it, or a poor argument.

Yes, and it cuts both ways, wishing doesn't have a necessary relation with truth either way... there are just putting the emphasis on the other way (because that is where the tradition they are criticizing was coming from I guess). — ChatteringMonkey

One does see this sort of argument often in philosophy of religion as well for example, some philosophers seem to claim that there is no afterlife, or that religious text are just fairy tales, and then go on to say that we only believe in those things because we don't want to die (among other things), but that does not prove (as they sometimes seem to imply) that there is no afterlife or that religious texts are just fairy tales.

There are also cases like that of Harari, who seems to just take it to be self-evident that religion is nothing more than a cohesive myth.

Of course the burden of proof is on the claimant, but the claim that religious texts are no more than fantasy has a burden of proof as well. The right attitude, it seems to me, is to not make claims either way.

This reminded me of another quote of Kolakowski's:

Various definitions (of religion) are therefore acceptable; However, those that imply that religion "is nothing more than" an instrument of secular, social or psychological needs are not acceptable(for example, that its meaning is reducible to its function in social integration); they are empirical statements (false, I believe) and can be rejected beforehand as parts of a definition.

ChatteringMonkey

↪Amalac

One does see this sort of argument often in philosophy of religion as well for example, some philosophers seem to claim that there is no afterlife, or that religious text are just fairy tales, and then go on to say that we only believe in those things because we don't want to die (among other things), but that does not prove (as they sometimes seem to imply) that there is no afterlife or that religious texts are just fairy tales. — Amalac

It's no proof, right... but it is a sort of explanation for why people are holding those beliefs if you already assume they don't hold those beliefs because they are true.

Agent Smith

It's possible that Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that words lack an essence is a sign of sorts that the OP is on the right track.

180 Proof

Is belief in essences merely the product of our wishful thinking? — Amalac

No. The affirmative assumes 'logical psychologism' which is unwarranted, even incoherent (Frege, Husserl); and nearly an attribution error.

Amalac

The affirmative assumes logic psychologism — 180 Proof

I'm not sure about that, in the OP he says that rejecting essences only commits one to nominalism, not to psychologism.

It's true, however, that universals and essences are not quite the same thing, as he seems to suggest. I think it's possible to reject essences while at the same time believing in universals. Russell, among others, took this view, more or less, since he considered essence to be a “hopelessly muddle-headed notion” (a claim with which I agree), but also thought that universals must, in some sense, exist.

I'm interested to know why you think logic psychologism is incoherent/an attribution error, if you could elaborate on that.

Cuthbert

If there are no essences, then it's not essential for a chair to be made of a physical substance or to have more than two dimensions. This is one of the criteria of essence. It's the properties without which a thing could not be the thing that it is. If a thing is not physical (like triangles and constitutions) or it has at most two dimensions (like a circle or a geometrical point), then we can't say much specific about it but we can say at least and for sure that it is not a chair. That's not a huge philosophical triumph but it's a start.

Amalac

It's possible that Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that words lack an essence is a sign of sorts that the OP is on the right track. — AgentSmith

If what he means is that we have no sufficient grounds for maintaining that there are “true” or essential definitions, because it seems more plausible that we understand the meaning of a word by seeing how it is used in a language game, then I do agree.

The essence of a triangle, one could say, consists of all the properties required for us to call something a triangle, such as having three sides, that its interior angles add up to 180° and so on. It could be that things have an essence in some other sense, but we have no way of knowing if that's the case.

For example, if we are mathematically rigorous, we can't say that Cusa's infinite "triangle" is actually a triangle, since it only has one infinitely long side, and it's part of the essence of a triangle, as it is rigurously defined, that it must have 3 sides. Yet one could device a different language game, some different kind of geometry, in which we are allowed to call such a thing a triangle, if we believe (as I do) that something useful could be achieved by doing that, so that the essence depends upon the particular language game/form of life.

Agent Smith

:cool:

Agent Smith

The Voynich manuscript: is it that we can't understand it or is it gibberish?

Ghosts: Is it that we can't see them or is it that they don't exist?

Amalac

This is one of the criteria of essence. It's the properties without which a thing could not be the thing that it is. — Cuthbert

This is possible, no doubt, but it's also possible that those properties merely reflect what our minds impose upon what we apprehend:

The "essence" of a thing appears to have meant "those of its properties which it cannot change without losing its identity." Socrates may be sometimes happy, sometimes sad; sometimes well, sometimes ill. Since he can change these properties without ceasing to be Socrates, they are no part of his essence.

But it is supposed to be of the essence of Socrates that he is a man, though a Pythagorean, who believes in transmigration, will not admit this. In fact, the question of "essence" is one as to the use of words. We apply the same name, on different occasions, to somewhat different occurrences, which we regard as manifestations of a single "thing" or "person." In fact, however, this is only a verbal convenience.

The "essence" of Socrates thus consists of those properties in the absence of which we should not use the name "Socrates." The question is purely linguistic: a word may have an essence, but a thing cannot. — Russell

It's curious that although what Russell says about the use of words seems quite in line with Wittgenstein, he concludes that words do have an essence, unlike Wittgenstein. I suspect there's a linguistic confusion there somewhere.

Amalac

↪AgentSmith

Is there a triangle? — AgentSmith

No (if we use the usual definition of triangle), your point being?

Agent Smith

your point being? — Amalac

Nothing that constitutes an essence of a triangle is present in a Kanizsa "triangle".

Amalac

Nothing that constitutes an essence of a triangle is present in a Kanizsa "triangle". — AgentSmith

Your link didn't show any picture, which is why I answered that there wasn't a triangle.

I looked up the Kanizsa "triangle", and my answer as to whether or not it's a triangle depends upon how we define the word “triangle”.

It's a purely semantic matter.

Cuthbert

The "essence" of Socrates thus consists of those properties in the absence of which we should not use the name "Socrates." The question is purely linguistic: a word may have an essence, but a thing cannot. — Russell

It's curious that although what Russell says about the use of words seems quite in line with Wittgenstein, and yet he concludes that words do have an essence, unlike Wittgenstein. — Alamac

I have to admit I do not really know what it means for words to have an essence and yet things not to have an essence. If the essence of "Socrates" is every property in the absence of which something encountered in the universe is not Socrates, then the same criterion can be used to determine correct and incorrect use of the name "Socrates" - and vice-versa - perhaps?

An interesting note on this argument Kripke on Naming and Necessity. Socrates might have died aged 2 and it would still have been Socrates the very same person, as Kripke said. He was challenging Russell's view of names as 'disguised descriptions' and pointed out that almost all the descriptions we might use to pin down a reference to Socrates could have been false and yet we would still successfully refer to Socrates. I think Kripke came close to essentialism in that argument.

Agent Smith

↪Amalac

Hypothetical essence.

World with only 4 properties: redness (R) or blueness (B) & circular (C) or triangular (T).

Possibilities:

1. RC
2. CR
3. RT
4. TR
5. BC
6. CB
7. BT
8. TB

Categories:

(i) Red & Circular (Eenie)

1. RC (John)
2. CR (Henry)

(ii) Red & Triangular (Meenie)

1. RT (Mary)
2. TR (Sue)

(iii) Blue & Circular (Miny)

1. BC ( Dick)
2. CB (Tom)

(iv) Blue & Triangular (Moe)

1. BT (Sara)
2. TB (Fiona)

Each of the 4 categories (Eenie, Meenie, Miny, Moe) has an essence and all individuals in each category (John, Henry, Mary, Sue, Dick, Tom, Sara, Fiona) have unique essences.

Amalac

↪Cuthbert

If the essence of "Socrates" is every property in the absence of which something encountered in the universe is not Socrates, then the same criterion can be used to determine correct and incorrect use of the name "Socrates" - and vice-versa - perhaps? — Cuthbert

Whether the use is “correct” or “incorrect” depends upon how the word “Socrates” is defined or used.

Let's use as an illustration the question whether a fetus is a person o not: under some definitions it is a person, and under some other definitions it is not. I don't think we can know if there's such a thing as the “true” definition of a word, so which definition we prefer depends upon what we want to achieve with it, on the consequences of adopting one definition rather than another.

So for instance if we thought abortion is bad, then we would prefer the definition that allows for legally punishing those who abort. But if we thought abortion is not bad, then we would use a different definition.

Socrates might have died aged 2 and it would still have been Socrates the very same person, as Kripke said. — Cuthbert

I still think that's merely a semantic matter, we can define the word “Socrates” so as to make it so Kripke is right, or not. Depends on what we want to achieve.

Cuthbert

Depends on what we want to achieve. — Amalac

One thing we want to achieve is preservation of the phenomena. Is the sentence "Socrates wrote The Republic" using the name "Socrates" correctly to refer to Socrates and saying something false about him; or using the name incorrectly by introducing a false description and therefore referring to Plato? Kripke (in those lectures) would say we would tend to say the former.

Amalac

↪Cuthbert

One thing we want to achieve is preservation of the phenomena. Is the sentence "Socrates wrote The Republic" using the name "Socrates" correctly to refer to Socrates and saying something false about him; or using the name incorrectly by introducing a false description and therefore referring to Plato? Kripke (in those lectures) would say we would tend to say the former. — Cuthbert

Of course, it seems like nothing useful could be gained by defining "Socrates" in that way, but there are other cases where different definitions could have important consecuences, for example the pragmatists' new proposed definition of “truth”, or considering Cusa's shape as a triangle. But these also depend upon what we want to achieve by defining the terms in that way rather than in any other way.

Amalac

Here's an interesting video about essentialism, which clarifies some of the topics discussed here further, for those who are interested in this subject:

Cuthbert

Amalac

Very interesting lecture. "There are no essences: things are just what they are." The knock-down slogan against essentialism.

An essentialist might reply: "There are essences: because things are just what they are."

Just as you noted, Russell and Wittgenstein seem to come to opposite conclusions about the essences of words from much the same premisses.

Agent Smith

Is there no essence to Wittgenstein or nonessentialism? That gums up the works, doesn't it?

Is essentialism a mistake, due to our wishful thinking? (Argument + criticism)

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