But who can judge what is or isn't a Fact? — I like sushi

Nobody needs to judge it. The poison will kill me even if nobody believes it will. The facts do not depend on any person’s judgements.

'Bachelor' is a term given to people who the user believes are unmarried and the who the user believes is a man. That is how 'bachelor's used. It is not reserved for use only when we have managed to obtain some sort of objective fact about a person's sex or marital status. — Isaac

It may be appropriate to use the term “bachelor” if you believe that the person is an unmarried man, but that doesn’t mean that “bachelor” means “a person I believe to be an unmarried man.” In fact, “bachelor” means “unmarried man.”

You’re equivocating.

There's no debate about what it means to be dead (or not much anyway). There's debate about what it means to know.

No-one is arguing that your position is incoherent (at least I'm not). It's a perfectly coherent possibility, it's just not the possibility which actually pertains.

'To know' could mean what you say it does. It just doesn't happen to.

You’re equivocating. — Michael

Well then, as I've asked before, if circumstances of felicitous use don't give us the meaning of terms, what does?

If I say that "to know" 'really' means 'to have a hat on', what criteria are you going to draw on to tell me I'm wrong?

You're labelling it as a wrong use of the word, but I'm calling it a correct use of the word, just a wrong belief. It's correct to use the word 'bachelor' of someone you believe to be unmarried and believe to be a man, it's how everyone uses the word and it would be perverse to suggest it wasn't correct (ie everyone is wrong).

You might later come to believe that he is married, or a woman (or both), so now, believing this, it would no longer be correct to use the word 'bachelor'. — Isaac

This is further equivocation. The use is appropriate if you believe that John is an unmarried man, but if John isn’t an unmarried man (i.e your belief is wrong) then your assertion that John is a bachelor is false, because he isn’t a bachelor.

Well then, as I've asked before, if circumstances of felicitous use don't give us the meaning of terms, what does? — Isaac

See above. You’re equivocating. That it’s appropriate to say what you say isn’t that what you say is true. Your assertion that John is a bachelor can be appropriate, given what you believe, but false given the actual facts. And your assertion that you have knowledge can be appropriate, given what you believe, but false given the actual facts.

There's no debate about what it means to be dead (or not much anyway). There's debate about what it means to know.

No-one is arguing that your position is incoherent (at least I'm not). It's a perfectly coherent possibility, it's just not the possibility which actually pertains.

'To know' could mean what you say it does. It just doesn't happen to. — Isaac

If you ask people which of these is true, I believe most would say the first (not the second and not both):

John knows what the weather is like if the weather is as he justifiably believes it to be.

John knows what the weather is like if the weather isn’t as he justifiably believes it to be.

John only has knowledge in the first scenario.

We say "I know if what I believe is true" and "you know if what you believe is true" but we don't say "I know if I have a belief" or "you know if I agree with what you believe." We say "I thought I knew, but I was wrong" but we don't say "I thought I believed, but I was wrong."

I say "John is a bachelor" if I believe that John is a bachelor but I don't say "John is a bachelor if I believe that John is a bachelor," and I say "I know his name" if I believe that I know his name but I don't say "I know his name if I believe that I know his name."

But that is not a ‘real’ situation.

Let is say there is a poison and doctors and toxicologists have done thousands of experiments testing the fatality of this poison.

100mg will kill the average person. You take 300mg. I think we can be fairly sure you’ll die (basically enough is known that this amount will kill you for sure). The question is at what point (at what quantity) of said poison do we draw the line that it is True (a fact) that it will kill you? At what point are we dealing with a Fact and at what point does this Fact because merely a 99% certainty?

If your argument is simply that after the fact if the matter of you drinking the poison we’ll know what the fact of the situation is then we can only have the kind of knowledge you’re talking about after the event has happened.

To state that drinking something that will kill you will kill you is not exactly saying anything. Nor is it anything to state that believing that someone is dead doesn’t make them dead. This has nothing to do with what I’ve been trying to say.

The point being is that the True in the JTB is not applicable in reality as an abstract truth because we’re talking about reality.

I am saying there are ‘abstract truth’ that are proven and that there are ‘semantic truths’ that are necessarily open to being wrong. To frame a real life situation based on a presumption of Truth about the reality is overstepping the mark. In a great number of circumstances we can be statistically sure of something being ‘impossible’ (which doesn’t mean that something cannot happen simply due to the universe not existing forever the chance is as good as zero - entropy).

Still not getting what you're saying here, so I'll punt and try my best. There are three parts to this I'll highlight with underlines:

It coveys a belief about a weather condition, — Isaac

...that is part 1.

not the actual weather condition — Isaac

...that's part 2.

(which is composed of atmospheric molecules). — Isaac

...and that is part 3.

So whatever you're saying, you're trying to contrast whatever part 1 refers to with whatever part 2 refers to. And for some reason the fact that part 3 describes part 2 has to do with what you're contrasting. You're doing all of this to try to say that "it's raining" refers to something like what you're referring to by part 1, and not something like what you're referring to by part 2, presumably because part 2 is described by part 3.

If that's what you're trying to say, then it's hardly convincing. Part 1 is a belief; I believe with my mind, which is a product of my brain, which is in my skull; so part 1 is something going on in my skull. Part 2 is something that happens outside my window, which is about four feet in front of my skull. It doesn't rain in my skull; it rains outside my window. So "it's raining" does indeed talk about what's "outside my window", like that thing part 2 referred to, and not what's "inside my skull", like that thing part 1 referred to.

Part 3 is just a theoretical model we humans came up with to explain that stuff outside the window. The model exists in my skull; what it's about exists four feet in front.

You seem to have just repeated what I said. Does a listener, sucessfully informed that it's raining, not now believe that it's raining? — Isaac

The focus is different, and what I said was distinct. A major difference is that what you said is consistent with manipulative behavior; I don't want you to eat my lunch so I say "that is a poisonous lab experiment". In this case, I'm not informing the listener; I'm attempting to manipulate the listener. Another difference is that I might inform the listener even if I have no reason to think the listener would believe me as a result (IOW, the answer to your question is "not really"). The point isn't so much that we don't tell people things to get them to believe it; but rather, that telling people things to get them to believe it isn't the point; beliefs aren't the ends you're making them out to be.

A mother asks a father before going outside what the weather's like. The father says "it's raining". The mother then gets her rain coat and umbrella, and puts a poncho and rain boots on her kids, then walks out the door. The father said something to the mother; but the mother didn't say anything to the kids, but these two acts are nevertheless quite similar. The father's information helps the mother prevent herself from actual wetness caused by the actual rain. The mother's dressing up the kids prevents the kids from actual wetness caused by the actual rain. We're not just speakers and believers; we're agents navigating a world. This is an extension of my complaint that you're tunnel visioned and too focused on belief; you're not seeing the bigger picture that beliefs are not the ends; they are just means.

This post is long enough; I'll end it here. Let me know if you want a response to the rest.

You will get wet if it is raining and you stand outside uncovered.

The above is true even if nobody judges it to be raining.

You don't respond to the above by asking "if it's raining according to who?" That's ridiculous. It's not the case that "if, according to me, it is raining, then you will get wet if you stand outside uncovered." It's not according to anyone, it's just if it is raining.

If it is actually raining, irrespective of what anyone believes, then you will get wet if you stand outside uncovered. It is the actual rain that makes you wet, not my judgement that it is raining that makes you wet.

The meaning of "if it is raining" in the context of "you will get wet if it is raining and ..." is the meaning of "if it is raining" in the context of "John knows that it is raining if it is raining and ..." It's about the actual state of affairs obtaining.

So this is what a popular phase feels like...

where I still take issue is that the 'standard' can be no more than a set of justifications — Isaac

Yeah, I agree with this. I guess one could posit an ideal set of justifications, wrt which other justifications are inferior. The whole thing is pretty ill-defined.

A 'bachelor' is not a thing outside of language community declaring it to be a thing - felicitous use of the term 'bachelor', that's all I'm saying there. — Isaac

That's not true; being a bachelor means that you have not gone through various processes, at the very least, being wed, whether in a church or a civil ceremony or a registry office.

if John isn’t an unmarried man (i.e your belief is wrong) then your assertion that John is a bachelor is false. — Michael

Indeed, on discovery of such a set of circumstances it would also be inappropriate to use the term 'bachelor', so there's no separation between appropriate and 'true'.

Up until this new belief (that John isn't an unmarried man), it's appropriate to use the term 'bachelor', on updating to this new belief it's no longer appropriate.

That it’s appropriate to say what you say isn’t that what you say is true. Your assertion that John is a bachelor can be appropriate, given what you believe, but false given the actual facts. And your assertion that you have knowledge can be appropriate, given what you believe, but false given the actual facts. — Michael

Indeed, very possibly. We're talking about what 'bachelor' means, what 'knowledge' means. What's 'true' is another matter. Although you probably won't like my preferred ideas about what's 'true' either...

I can use the word 'bachelor' to describe John and later come to believe I was wrong, I can use the word 'bachelor' to describe John and you, at the time, believe I'm wrong.

What makes no sense is to talk about me using the term 'bachelor' to describe John and just being wrong, absent of anyone believing I'm wrong. It's not a state we can access, we can't act on it, it can never form part of our lives, none of our language or concepts can be based on it...

The state you describe as me just being wrong is just you believing I'm wrong but wanting to reach for a bigger stick than that with which to beat your detractors. "Ahh, no it's not just my opinion...you actually are wrong"

Part 1 is a belief; I believe with my mind, which is a product of my brain, which is in my skull; so part 1 is something going on in my skull. — InPitzotl

Already you're mixing up the mode of identity being used. "part 1 is something going on in my skull". No it isn't. part 1 is a statement, what's going on in your skull is firing neurons and neurotransmitters. What you mean to say is that part 1 is about what's going on in your skull.

So

"it's raining" does indeed talk about what's "outside my window", — InPitzotl

It cannot. It attempts to talk about what's happening outside of your window, it intends to talk about what's happening outside of your window. It cannot actually do so directly because you do not have direct access to what's going on outside your window. It's of no consequence in normal conversation, but it's clearly what we actually do when we say "it's raining".

I just don't see how you or @Michael could possibly deny that, in using the expression "it's raining", we take our belief that it's raining, our desire to communicate that belief (for whatever reason) and formulate the behavioural strategy {say "it's raining"}. The actual weather plays only a supporting role in that something of the actual weather probably triggered our belief that it's raining.

The point isn't so much that we don't tell people things to get them to believe it; but rather, that telling people things to get them to believe it isn't the point; beliefs aren't the ends you're making them out to be. — InPitzotl

Not getting that from what you've said. Beliefs still seem to be the end point, just sometimes we don't care if the belief matches ours (we don't believe the sandwich is poisonous but we want them to)

The father's information helps the mother prevent herself from actual wetness caused by the actual rain. — InPitzotl

...by getting her to believe it's raining.

we're agents navigating a world. — InPitzotl

How do we navigate the world? How do you even put one foot in front of another without a belief that doing so is an appropriate next step for you?

Let me know if you want a response to the rest. — InPitzotl

It's what I'm here for, though I've hardly any time in the week at the moment, so responses may be few and far between. Always interested in what you have to say.

being a bachelor means that you have not gone through various processes, at the very least, being wed, whether in a church or a civil ceremony or a registry office. — Janus

Well yes. even 'means' means different things in different contexts. Here you're using it to describe the behaviours one would have to have done to be likely to be referred to as a 'bachelor'. That's not the same use of 'means' as in "bachelor means and unmarried man" where 'means' is telling us how to use the word.

@Isaac

Which of these is true?

1. John is wet if he is standing in the rain
2. John is wet if I believe that he is standing in the rain

Which of these is true?

1. John is a bachelor iff he is an unmarried man
2. John is a bachelor iff I believe that he is an unmarried man

Which of these is true?

1. John has knowledge iff the facts are as he believes them to be
2. John has knowledge iff I believe that the facts are as he believes them to be

You are arguing that because we say “John is wet” if we believe that John is standing in the rain and that because we say “John is a bachelor” if we believe that John is an unmarried man and that because we say “John has knowledge” if we believe that the facts are as John believes them to be then in each case 2) is true.

This is a misunderstanding of meaning-as-use. In each case 1) is true. At the very least this should be obvious in the case of John being wet: he’s not wet because of my beliefs; he’s wet because of the actual weather. The same principle applies in the cases of being a bachelor and having knowledge.

According to JTB theory, the truth of a proposition is independent of its justification (hence both J and T are conditions). That only happens in induction (the conclusion is only probable given the premises) but then we already knew that. Much ado about nothing!

Which of these is true?

1. John is wet if he is standing in the rain
2. John is wet if I believe that he is standing in the rain

...
— Michael

The first is not equivalent to the latter two.

We can define 'wet' without using 'standing in the rain' (or any synonyms for it). Easily done.

We can't define 'bachelor' without using 'unmarried man' (or any synonym for it). Nor can we define 'knowledge' without using 'the facts are as he believes them to be' (or any synonym for it).

The first is causal, the others definitional.

We don't use the word 'wet' to describe people who've been standing in the rain (not definitionally). We use the word wet to describe people we believe are covered in water.

The definitional equivalent would be...

1. John is wet if he is covered in water
2. John is wet if I believe that he is covered in water

In which case, yes, the two are equivalent (as spoken or written by you).

You seem to be arguing that because we have a model of 'A causes B' we must for some reason conclude that such a model must apply to the way we determine what words mean, something like a B which somehow causes the expression under consideration. But determining the meaning of a word is not an exercise in causality. It's the result of empirical investigation, trial and error practical experience.

What makes no sense is to talk about me using the term 'bachelor' to describe John and just being wrong, absent of anyone believing I'm wrong. It's not a state we can access, we can't act on it, it can never form part of our lives, none of our language or concepts can be based on it... — Isaac

I don't need to have access to the facts. I just need to accept that there are facts. If John believes that it is raining and Jane believes that it is not raining then I, the impartial third party with no opinion on the matter because I am locked inside a windowless room, can say "iff it is raining then John is right and Jane is wrong and iff it is not raining then Jane is right and John is wrong."

What I wouldn't say is "neither John nor Jane are right because I have no reason to believe either of them over the other," and nor would I say "both John and Jane are right because they are both convinced in their beliefs."

And sometimes we do have access to the facts; sometimes it rains and sometimes we experience that rain. What is that if not access to the facts?

The definitional equivalent would be...

1. John is wet if he is covered in water
2. John is wet if I believe that he is covered in water

Fine, but it’s still the same: 1) is true, 2) is not. John isn't made wet by you believing that he is; he's made wet by being actually covered in water.

It can be the case that one person believes that John is wet and one person believes that John is not wet, but the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction entail that only one of them is right. Either John is wet or he isn't. Either the person who believes that John is wet is right (and has knowledge), because John really is wet, or the person who believes that John is not wet is right (and has knowledge), because John really isn't wet. And I can say this despite not having my own opinion on whether or not John is wet.

That's not the same use of 'means' as in "bachelor means and unmarried man" where 'means' is telling us how to use the word. — Isaac

It's the same. "Bachelor' means an unmarried man' is the same as "Bachelor' means a man who has not been wed' since 'unmarried man' means 'a man who has not been wed'. Divorcees are not usually referred to as bachelors. Of course no definition is ironclad, there is nothing to prevent a male divorcee from being referred to as a bachelor, but that doesn't matter because it is not the common usage.

Already you're mixing up the mode of identity being used. "part 1 is something going on in my skull". No it isn't. part 1 is a statement, what's going on in your skull is firing neurons and neurotransmitters. What you mean to say is that part 1 is about what's going on in your skull. — Isaac

This is my takeaway from the above paragraph:

It cannot. It attempts to talk about what's happening outside of your window, it intends to talk about what's happening outside of your window. It cannot actually do so directly because you do not have direct access to what's going on outside your window. — Isaac

Your argument does nothing for me, because I disagree with the postulate that to talk about x, I must have "direct access" to x, whatever "direct access" means.

It's of no consequence in normal conversation, but it's clearly what we actually do when we say "it's raining". — Isaac

I have no idea what the antecedent to the underlined "it" is supposed to be.

Beliefs still seem to be the end point, — Isaac

What's an "end point"? The terms "means" and "ends" are used as pairs to refer to a main goal you're trying to achieve (the end) and a thing you're just using to get there (the means). In this case the end is obviously being able to eat my lunch. The attempt to induce false belief was a means.

...by getting her to believe it's raining. — Isaac

...which would make "getting her to believe it's raining" a means to the end of helping her prevent herself from getting wet by actual rain.

How do we navigate the world? — Isaac

By beliefs (see below), but also by attending, observing, modeling, reasoning, testing, reacting, and so on.

How do you even put one foot in front of another without a belief that doing so is an appropriate next step for you? — Isaac

Wrong question... the accusation here was that you were tunnel visioned, not blind.

"Let me know if you want a response to the rest. — InPitzotl"
It's what I'm here for, though I've hardly any time in the week at the moment, so responses may be few and far between. — Isaac

Ooookay. As for the delays, I'm a very patient little piggy. I'd prefer you take time to read what I write... it's not a speed contest for me.

But this is another long post, and I'm going to go into a bit of detail, so I'll just squirrel this away under another hide:

Gödel & Gettier

According to the JTB theory of knowledge,

1. If p is true then, there is proof of p (justification is necessary for truth)

2. If there is no proof of p then, p is false (contraposition 1)

According to Gödel there are true but unprovable propositions (in math), given an axiom set.

If so the following is true.

3. p is true & there is no proof of p

But 3 means

4. False that if p is true then, there is proof of p

1 & 4 is a contradiction!

WTF?

According to the JTB theory of knowledge,

1. If p is true then, there is proof of p (justification is necessary for truth) — Agent Smith

The JTB theory doesn’t say this.

The JTB theory doesn’t say this. — Michael

You're joking, right? What does it say then?

If I believe p (B) and p is true (T) but have no justification (no J), do I have knowledge?

You're joking, right? What does it say then?

If I believe p (B) and p is true (T) but have no justification (no J), do I have knowledge? — Agent Smith

It says that justification (and truth) are necessary for knowledge.

It doesn't say that justification is necessary for truth.

It says that justification (and truth) are necessary for knowledge.

It doesn't say that justification is necessary for truth — Michael

:ok: On point (not a 100% sure though). That implies whatever statement Gödel is talking about, it isn't knowledge. What's going on?

That implies whatever statement Gödel is talking about isn't knowledge. What's happening? — Agent Smith

I don't understand your question. What does Gödel's first incompleteness theorem have to do with it?

Never mind. :up: Merci beaucoup!

It's the same. "Bachelor' means an unmarried man' is the same as "Bachelor' means a man who has not been wed' since — Janus

Neither are what you claimed. You gave us a list of behaviours which would lead to being a bachelor, that's not that same thing a a definition of what the word means. A series of biophysical changes are necessary for a seed to be a tree, they're not what the word 'tree' means.