I have a general question about your system. If one can choose between a morally risky option (say, 50% chance of harm) and an even riskier option (say, 70% chance of harm), is one ever justified in picking the latter? Is it wrong to pick the latter?

If we take justice to mean what I said it meant: actions that have the well-being of the subject at heart (this is too simple, but it will suffice for now) then no. If there is no one's well-being to take into account, then there's no moral act to be done. — Tzeentch

Right but the charity example that I gave did have that. Do you believe donating to charity is not moral? I have the receiver’s interests in mind, but I can never be sure my donation actually furthers those interests.

Any “moral act” as you put it is not moral by this definition, since no one is ever certain they have the power to being their intent about

One either knows and has the power, or they do not. The result of their actions will confirm or deny that. — Tzeentch

Clearly they don’t. If I have never touched a computer in my life, but for some reason was convinced I can hack into the pentagon, and by sheer chance pressing random buttons I succeeded, does that mean I “knew and had the power” to bring about my intentions?

The problem is that there are two alternatives, both of which lead to ridiculous outcomes:

1- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means that there is a 100% chance of success, then no one possesses the wisdom or power, and there are no moral acts

2- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means some degree of certainty (X%) that's less than 100%, then one may possess the wisdom and power to accomplish his benevolent intent, but still fail to do so, leading to a negative outcome (with a (100-X)% chance), leading to some acts being both moral and immoral by the current criteria.

But if you're implying there's always an element of risk involved, I would agree with that — Tzeentch

Doesn’t this mean no one has the power you require for an act to be moral?

My advise would be, before donating to charity, figure out where the money goes.

Perhaps more importantly, aim to do good in ways where one actually possesses the wisdom and power to see it through — Tzeentch

But I can never be certain still, can I? After all, maybe all the evidence I found showing this charity is legit, or that I have the power to see this act through, is a hallucination. It’s possible isn’t it? Therefore no act is moral, as no one can be certain they possess the power to do as they intend 100% of the time

One would assume it gives much reason for pause, humility, reflection. — Tzeentch

But it doesn’t though. If I save someone’s life and he goes on to murder others in one instance, and I save another’s life and he becomes a very benevolent philanthropist, what am I to conclude?

I would certainly advise to spend a great deal of time reflecting on one's actions and their consequences, and if one suspects they have committed injustices unknowingly, to acertain these things — Tzeentch

Agreed. But it’s not every waking moment is it?

Similarly, inaction being wrong would mean you must spend every waking moment checking if you’re being immoral.

And in any case, what kind of argument is it to claim that since inaction being wrong would imply more effort, inaction is not wrong?

That depends on the individual. If one sees they have committed an injustice and it does not prompt them to change in some way, — Tzeentch

Let’s say I bought a piece of candy, like I have been doing for years. As a result, the person selling them makes enough money to buy a new tv. As he goes to buy the new tv he gets killed on the way. I know this happened. Now how would you suggest I change my behavior?

If I happened to be so unlucky that this happens every time I buy a piece of candy, how should I change my behavior then?

This is what I mean when I say that the mere fact that an act turned out wrong doesn’t really tell you what to do. Maybe it was just bad luck. Maybe it actually caused the harm.

What you have is correlation. But you shouldn’t change your behavior based on correlation alone should you?

I guess maybe your point is that the consequences one is ignorant of cannot influence their behavior, and that much is true. — Tzeentch

Not even the ones you’re aware of can always influence it. That’s my point. So what exactly is the point of keeping track of these correlations?

How does it not? Shouldn't the thoughtful person deeply consider the consequences before they act? — Tzeentch

Absolutely. But that’s not what your system advocates. Your system doesn’t judge the morality of the act based on a prediction of likely consequences, aka, before the act is committed. It judges the morality of the act based on what actually ends up happening.

You can’t actually state that murder is wrong by a system that judges after the act. Maybe the person was suicidal. Then it’d be good. But if we’re judging by the likelihood of each outcome, before the act is committed, you can unquestionably say the murder is wrong, as it’s very unlikely to result in a good outcome. This is true regardless of whether or not the victim is suicidal.

Judging by outcome doesn’t invalidate any act, as maybe it turns out good. Judging by expected outcome is what I’m advocating. As it will actually allow you to say X is wrong before doing X

Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable. — Tzeentch

Frankly, I chuckled while reading this. I really don’t understand how you can think so.

If I am a fire fighter, and save a 100 people. Then the 101st turns out to be a serial killer and kills a 102 people, have I done something immoral in acting exactly as I’ve acted the 100 times prior all with good results? If so, what should be my takeaway? Am I obligated to retire? How should this new data be interpreted?

Certainly not. It does not influence the casual chain. — Tzeentch

Why not?

it is actually very common that producers are held liable for the harm caused by their products, even if it was never their intention. — Tzeentch

Only when they’re demonstrably negligent. If I put rat poison in candy and sell it, anyone can tell no good will come of that. In other words, only when one can expect that the outcome would be bad.

If I make tables for a living but for some reason, people always kill each other with my tables, I wouldn’t be held liable unless you can demonstrate that I had some reason to expect this outcome, and made the tables anyways.

Standing still is an action. It is something that one is doing, and thus refers to something that is, assuming the individual is actually standing still. — Tzeentch

Again, why is sserping an inaction?

You can detect me standing still (existence/action), and while I am standing still you cannot detect me running (non-existence/inaction). — Tzeentch

Sarah can detect you sserping (existence/action) and while you’re sserping she cannot detect you pressing (non existence/inaction)

What’s wrong with the above?

I have a general question about your system. If one can choose between a morally risky option (say, 50% chance of harm) and an even riskier option (say, 70% chance of harm), is one ever justified in picking the latter? Is it wrong to pick the latter? — khaled

Taking a risk implies one lacks the wisdom and/or power to produce the intended effect and must rely on luck. It cannot be a moral act, thus there's no point in talking about justification.

Right but the charity example that I gave did have that. Do you believe donating to charity is not moral? I have the receiver’s interests in mind, but I can never be sure my donation actually furthers those interests. — khaled

Any “moral act” as you put it is not moral by this definition, since no one is ever certain they have the power to being their intent about — khaled

1- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means that there is a 100% chance of success, then no one possesses the wisdom or power, and there are no moral acts. — khaled

Doesn’t this mean no one has the power you require for an act to be moral? — khaled

But I can never be certain still, can I? After all, maybe all the evidence I found showing this charity is legit, or that I have the power to see this act through, is a hallucination. It’s possible isn’t it? Therefore no act is moral, as no one can be certain they possess the power to do as they intend 100% of the time — khaled

It seems we can go two ways:

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, and the best one can hope for is to refrain from immoral acts. This would be a similar to approaching truth by discarding things one recognizes to be untrue.

Or one can leave the possibility for certainty, thus some form of communion with ultimate reality, open.

I lean towards the latter. Perhaps certain certainties are possible, but definitely not to the extent that we can divine the future life of a person. I believe morality consists of small acts of humility, kindness and compassion, and not of "saving the world".

Perhaps a better word for certainty would be "wisdom".

Clearly they don’t. If I have never touched a computer in my life, but for some reason was convinced I can hack into the pentagon, and by sheer chance pressing random buttons I succeeded, does that mean I “knew and had the power” to bring about my intentions? — khaled

As I said, criteria 3 is a confirmation or criteria 2. If criteria 2 cannot be met, then criteria 3 (ergo the result) is irrelevant.

If I save someone’s life and he goes on to murder others in one instance, and I save another’s life and he becomes a very benevolent philanthropist, what am I to conclude? — khaled

That one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, I suppose.

Similarly, inaction being wrong would mean you must spend every waking moment checking if you’re being immoral.

And in any case, what kind of argument is it to claim that since inaction being wrong would imply more effort, inaction is not wrong? — khaled

I'm arguing inaction isn't wrong, and pointing out the inconsistencies that arise when one tries to argue it is wrong. The most obvious being, if inaction is immoral, and one is unavoidably in inaction towards many perceived problems at any given time, one is always immoral.

These are questions you'll have to answer yourself if you wish to hold the view that inaction is wrong.

Let’s say I bought a piece of candy, like I have been doing for years. As a result, the person selling them makes enough money to buy a new tv. As he goes to buy the new tv he gets killed on the way. I know this happened. Now how would you suggest I change my behavior?

If I happened to be so unlucky that this happens every time I buy a piece of candy, how should I change my behavior then?

This is what I mean when I say that the mere fact that an act turned out wrong doesn’t really tell you what to do. Maybe it was just bad luck. Maybe it actually caused the harm.

What you have is correlation. But you shouldn’t change your behavior based on correlation alone should you? — khaled

If you suspect that the act of buying candy is actively causing people's deaths, it would certainly be a good idea to stop doing it.

In this instance you are already hinting towards the fact that your buying of the candy is not causing people's deaths, just like not pressing the button to save Sarah does not cause her death; whoever put her in the situation causes her death.

Your system doesn’t judge the morality of the act based on a prediction of likely consequences, aka, before the act is committed. It judges the morality of the act based on what actually ends up happening. — khaled

It determines based on both.

You can’t actually state that murder is wrong by a system that judges after the act. Maybe the person was suicidal. Then it’d be good. — khaled

Not if the intent was to murder, obviously. Then the act is wrong from the outset. We have already been over this.

Judging by expected outcome is what I’m advocating. — khaled

That would mean one's ignorance can justify any of one's actions, and that is not a meaningful way of constructing a moral system.


Perhaps this clarifies:

Criteria 1 discerns between benevolence and malevolence.

Criteria 2 discerns between wisdom and ignorance.


One needs to both benevolence and wisdom to do Good.

To do not Good ("Evil") is much easier: one only needs malevolence or ignorance.

If I am a fire fighter, and save a 100 people. Then the 101st turns out to be a serial killer and kills a 102 people, have I done something immoral in acting exactly as I’ve acted the 100 times prior all with good results? If so, what should be my takeaway? Am I obligated to retire? How should this new data be interpreted? — khaled

That depends, if one wishes to live morally (or avoid immoral behavior) one should probably ensure one isn't enabling serial killers, should they not? And if they cannot guarantee one's behavior isn't enabling serial killers, then maybe one should cease that behavior.

Again, why is sserping an inaction? — khaled

Because it refers to something one isn't doing?

Sarah can detect you sserping — khaled

No, she cannot. One cannot detect the non-existence of something - at most one can infer it.

Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable. — Tzeentch

I really don’t understand how you can think so. — khaled

I expected I didn't have to go through this tedium, but alas here we are:


Example A:

I intend to help another person, but instead I end up killing them.

A just intention, but a harmful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral.


Example B:

I intend to kill another person, but instead I end up helping them.

An unjust intention, but a helpful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral either. The unintended outcome is a result of ignorance.


Both intention and outcome have to be regarded to determine the morality of an act.

Taking a risk implies one lacks the wisdom and/or power to produce the intended effect and must rely on luck. It cannot be a moral act, thus there's no point in talking about justification. — Tzeentch

I'm asking if it's immoral to take the higher risk option. You answered that it is not moral. That doesn't answer the question as it could still be neutral.

Perhaps certain certainties are possible, but definitely not to the extent that we can divine the future life of a person. — Tzeentch

That is contradictory for our purposes. If you claim that sometimes we can be certain that our actions will lead to our intentions, then we need to be able to divine the future life of the person who we're acting upon. If we cannot do that this reduces to:

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, — Tzeentch

The certainty you require for moral action is precisely the certainty to divine the future life of a person.

As I said, criteria 3 is a confirmation or criteria 2. If criteria 2 cannot be met, then criteria 3 (ergo the result) is irrelevant. — Tzeentch

It is very relevant. If I lack the wisdom to do something, and attempt it anyways, that's not moral. However, if it doesn't result in a negative consequence that's not immoral leaving us at neutral. Again, there is a world of difference between neutral and immoral acts.

That one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, I suppose. — Tzeentch

That's the problem with your system. Since one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, any action is as justified as another when the only criteria to judge immorality is consequence.

I'm arguing inaction isn't wrong, and pointing out the inconsistencies that arise when one tries to argue it is wrong. — Tzeentch

I know, and I'm saying these "inconsistencies" are just as present in your system of consequentialism. To be moral, one needs to not do immoral things. In your system, what is "immoral" (as opposed to not moral, which is determined by intention) is determined only by consequences. Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? Do you have some flowchart keeping track of all the consequences of every action you've ever taken? No. You don't spend all your energy tracking the morality of every act you take.

Thus for the same reason, if inaction is wrong, that doesn't mean I have to spend all of my energy tracking the morality of every time I choose not to act.

one is unavoidably in inaction towards many perceived problems at any given time — Tzeentch

False. I don't perceive a problem I can help with that I'm not helping with at the moment. If there was such a problem, say, a beggar approached me and I had a million dollars to spare, it would be wrong not to help them

Besides, I could very easily argue that spending every ounce of energy tracking whether there is a problem I could help with I'm not helping with doesn't help anyone, and so the best strategy is to just check every once in a while as most do.

If you suspect that the act of buying candy is actively causing people's deaths, it would certainly be a good idea to stop doing it.

In this instance you are already hinting towards the fact that your buying of the candy is not causing people's deaths, just like not pressing the button to save Sarah does not cause her death — Tzeentch

I'm very interested in knowing why I am causing people's deaths in the first example, but am not causing it in the second. What is your definition of "cause"? In both cases mind you, I'm not the one doing the damage, it's the murderer or the kidnapper that's responsible respectively isn't it? So why am I causing deaths in one case but not causing it in another?

Not if the intent was to murder, obviously. Then the act is wrong from the outset. We have already been over this. — Tzeentch

Right, but the intent could always be benevolent. The murderer could bet on the 0.001% chance that the victim is actually suicidal and wants to be killed. You can't say the act is wrong until after it is done, and inevitably the 99.999% is what happens. THEN it becomes wrong.

Let's say there is an extremely lucky serial killer. The killer always has the benevolent intent of helping out suicidal people, or sending as many people to heaven as possible. The killer picks targets randomly, but by some statistical miracle they all turn out to have been suicidal and wanting to die. Assume the killer wants to live morally. Should the killer continue to pick randomly?

That depends, if one wishes to live morally (or avoid immoral behavior) one should probably ensure one isn't enabling serial killers, should they not? And if they cannot guarantee one's behavior isn't enabling serial killers, then maybe one should cease that behavior. — Tzeentch

Can you guarantee that you waking up in the morning isn't enabling serial killers? Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society.

See the problem?

Assuming one wants to live morally it's either:

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite the fact that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative.

Because it refers to something one isn't doing? — Tzeentch

Let's say there is an alternate world history, where "sserping" was defined first. And "pressing" was defined as "Not sserping". Does sserping now become an action?

Pressing refers to not sserping. So are pressing and sserping both inactions?

No, she cannot. One cannot detect the non-existence of something — Tzeentch

Let's say I'm pressing a button. What's the "something" whose existence is detected?

I'm trying to understand what is the "something" that is missing and so can't be detected in sserping, but is present and can be detected in pressing. Or simply, the difference between action and inaction.

I intend to help another person, but instead I end up killing them.

A just intention, but a harmful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral. — Tzeentch

Disagreed. That's precisely the point of disagreement. But I'm far more interested in the internal workings of your ethical system right now, than a highlight of its differences from mine.

I intend to kill another person, but instead I end up helping them.

An unjust intention, but a helpful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral either. — Tzeentch

Agreed. Because the intent was to do an act that has a very low chance of helping.

Both intention and outcome have to be regarded to determine the morality of an act. — Tzeentch

You do understand this isn't a majority view or anything right? There is a whole separate form of ethics called deontology which doesn't take into account consequence at all. The idea that both matter is far from a settled conclusion. And I don't intend to debate it right now, I'm interested in your consequentialism specifically.

I'm asking if it's immoral to take the higher risk option. You answered that it is not moral. That doesn't answer the question as it could still be neutral. — khaled

That depends on the outcome. It could be neutral, I suppose.

If you claim that sometimes we can be certain that our actions will lead to our intentions, then we need to be able to divine the future life of the person who we're acting upon. If we cannot do that this reduces to: — khaled

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, — Tzeentch

The certainty you require for moral action is precisely the certainty to divine the future life of a person. — khaled

By performing an action that involves another person, we must be able to foresee the consequences as far as our actions cause them. Of course that can be a complicated matter, depending on the ambition (or hubris) of one's action.

When one saves another person's life, the rest of their life will be a consequence of this act. In that case, I would agree certainty is impossible thus it is not a moral act. That doesn't automatically mean it is immoral though, or incapable of having desirable effects.

If I lack the wisdom to do something, and attempt it anyways, that's not moral. However, if it doesn't result in a negative consequence that's not immoral leaving us at neutral. Again, there is a world of difference between neutral and immoral acts. — khaled

Certainly. I never intended to imply otherwise.

Since one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, any action is as justified as another when the only criteria to judge immorality is consequence. — khaled

Or the intentions. And whether consequences can be known is up for debate. In a lot of cases I would argue they cannot, but perhaps in some cases they can.

In your system, what is "immoral" (as opposed to not moral, which is determined by intention) is determined only by consequences. — khaled

It seems we are talking past each other.

If one's intentions are malevolent the act is unquestionably immoral.

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? — khaled

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. But also, I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it.

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? Do you have some flowchart keeping track of all the consequences of every action you've ever taken? No. You don't spend all your energy tracking the morality of every act you take. — khaled

Ideally one makes such a "flow chart" before one acts, to the best of their ability. Think before one acts. If one cannot act with wisdom, do not act. It is why I advocate to seek to do Good in small ways, that are overseeable.

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. The deed has already been done. What would the point be of tracking the consequences? Lessons?

That would imply ridding oneself of ignorance is a moral duty. While I think it is certainly advisable to do so, I doubt it would make much sense to turn it into a moral duty.

Thus for the same reason, if inaction is wrong, that doesn't mean I have to spend all of my energy tracking the morality of every time I choose not to act. — khaled

If inaction is wrong, then every moment spent in inaction towards the problems one perceives is wrong. I think there's no way around that.

If there was such a problem, say, a beggar approached me and I had a million dollars to spare, it would be wrong not to help them — khaled

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify your inaction towards all the thousands of beggars and poor people you know exist?

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify ever sitting on the couch watching tv when you know there are people out there that need your help?

Besides, I could very easily argue that spending every ounce of energy tracking whether there is a problem I could help with I'm not helping with doesn't help anyone, and so the best strategy is to just check every once in a while as most do. — khaled

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? :chin:

I'm very interested in knowing why I am causing people's deaths in the first example, but am not causing it in the second. — khaled

If you save someone's life, you cause the rest of their life, no? Thus you are responsible for it.

In your example of the person dying in traffic you don't cause anything. This is either a result of the person's bad driving or another person's bad driving.

Right, but the intent could always be benevolent. The murderer could bet on the 0.001% chance that the victim is actually suicidal and wants to be killed. You can't say the act is wrong until after it is done, and inevitably the 99.999% is what happens. THEN it becomes wrong.

Let's say there is an extremely lucky serial killer. The killer always has the benevolent intent of helping out suicidal people, or sending as many people to heaven as possible. The killer picks targets randomly, but by some statistical miracle they all turn out to have been suicidal and wanting to die. Assume the killer wants to live morally. Should the killer continue to pick randomly — khaled

So criteria 1 is met, and criteria 3, but not criteria 2. A moral act is an impossibility and whether it is immoral comes down to whether people got hurt by the killer's ignorance.

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. (Same question was raised about having children)

How would he know? Well, that's the problem with ignorance: one often doesn't realise it.

Perhaps due to his astronomical luck he continues to be neutral, ending up in some limbo of ignorance. Or his luck runs out, which I guess is more likely.

Can you guarantee that you waking up in the morning isn't enabling serial killers? — khaled

Of course. Don't be ridiculous.

One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong. — khaled

Of course not. If one can discern their actions will have a positive effect, surely one can choose to act. The question is whether one can discern it.

I think in the instance of Jeff we agreed that if Jeff agrees to be pinched to save Sarah, it is not wrong by virtue of imposing on Jeff, because no imposition took place. It can still be wrong for a myriad of other reasons.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite the fact that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative — khaled

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. No one is obligated by anyone to live a moral life. If individuals want to go out and take incredible risk because of contrived reasons presented for the sake of winning an argument, who will stop them?

The likely result will be they live an immoral life, and if we agree that living a moral life (or at least approaching it as we can) is something we are interested in, that prospect of failure should serve as a deterrent in itself.

Let's say there is an alternate world history, where "sserping" was defined first. And "pressing" was defined as "Not sserping". Does sserping now become an action? — khaled

No. It refers to something that isn't.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light".

Let's say I'm pressing a button. What's the "something" whose existence is detected? — khaled

Your action is detected.

I have a general question. How do you determine what a benevolent intent is?

When one saves another person's life, the rest of their life will be a consequence of this act. In that case, I would agree certainty is impossible thus it is not a moral act. — Tzeentch

If one does anything to another person the rest of their life will be a consequence of that act. You can't be certain of how much of a butterfly effect any act had. This means there are no moral acts in general. That's unavoidable I think.

Or the intentions. And whether consequences can be known is up for debate. In a lot of cases I would argue they cannot, but perhaps in some cases they can. — Tzeentch

I understand. I thought I corrected my comment and added "acts with benevolent intent" everywhere but I seem to have missed one. Or two.

But what is to be done when the consequences cannot be known? What's the takeaway? Say someone drops a bomb from an airplane, with the benevolent intent of reducing the crime rate by eliminating criminals, and there is no news coverage of the event. Now they don't know the consequence of their action. What's their takeaway?

If inaction is wrong, then every moment spent in inaction towards the problems one perceives is wrong. I think there's no way around that. — Tzeentch

I didn't disagree. I explained why I don't act to solve every problem I see. I said it's the same reason you don't track all your consequences. Which is:

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. But also, I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it. — Tzeentch

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify your inaction towards all the thousands of beggars and poor people you know exist?

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify ever sitting on the couch watching tv when you know there are people out there that need your help? — Tzeentch

Ideally I would, yes. But I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it.

I see a contradiction here:

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so?
— khaled

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. — Tzeentch

But you also say:

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. — Tzeentch

So is one obligated to track or not?

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? — Tzeentch

Correct. Why is this strange? You have it so that action is wrong only every once in a while. I'm saying both are sometimes right and sometimes wrong.

Of course. Don't be ridiculous. — Tzeentch

I'll be as ridiculous as I need to be. I outlined exactly how it could here:

Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society. — khaled

If certainty that the act you're about to do is harmless is what you require, then you will never be justified in acting. Where have I made a mistake here?

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. — Tzeentch

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it?

Of course not. If one can discern their actions will have a positive effect, surely one can choose to act. The question is whether one can discern it. — Tzeentch

Let me change it then:

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action since everyone can discern that inaction is safer since it has a 0% chance of failure in your system. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite despite thinking that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative. (may change depending on your resolution of the above)

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. — Tzeentch

Moral obligation.

The likely result will be they live an immoral life, and if we agree that living a moral life (or at least approaching it as we can) is something we are interested in, that prospect of failure should serve as a deterrent in itself. — Tzeentch

We're discussing what's right or wrong by your system not what practical actions a person abiding by your principles would be motivated towards or deterred from.

If individuals want to go out and take incredible risk because of contrived reasons presented for the sake of winning an argument, who will stop them? — Tzeentch

We're discussing what's right and wrong not how enforceable right behavior is.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light". — Tzeentch

One could also define light as "not darkness" could they not? There is no third alternative, it's either light or dark. So what meaning is lost by defining light as "not darkness"? Which of these two "exists" and which is the "non existence of the other" and why can't these criteria be flipped?

Your action is detected. — Tzeentch

I ask you what makes an action. You say something is detected for action that's not detected for inaction. I ask you what that something is. You say action. See the problem?

Let me try something else since this is going nowhere:

Say A operates a gate by pressing a button. When he presses it the gate opens for a few seconds then closes. B is walking and wants to pass through the gate. B cannot operate the gate (can't get to the booth as it's on the other side of the gate). A refuses to let B through. A is denying B space. Is A imposing on B?

I think "yes" is the unavoidable conclusion, since this is the exact same scenario with the walker and stander, except I just changed the mechanism by which the stander is impeding the walker. If so you have an example where sserping a button is an action (since inactions can't be impositions since they can't be wrong). Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. So, what makes it an inaction in Sarah and Jeff's case?

I have a general question. How do you determine what a benevolent intent is? — khaled

That is an expansive topic, and I don't think it is constructive to branch out our discussion even further. Lets keep this subject for when we have reached an understanding on the other topics.

If one does anything to another person the rest of their life will be a consequence of that act. You can't be certain of how much of a butterfly effect any act had. This means there are no moral acts in general. That's unavoidable I think. — khaled

It seems this idea equates every type of interaction to a cause or consequence of every thing that follows. I don't necessarily agree with that. In terms of the butterfly effect; does a butterfly cause a hurricane on the other side of the world, or is the flap of its wings a tiny influence in an ocean of influences that cause that hurricane, not all of which are meaningful in the context of our discussion.

But on the other hand, it is a possible conclusion that morality functions like truth. We cannot know truth, but we can aspire to live in accordance with it as much as possible by discarding those things we can discern as not true. Thus living morally would translate into avoiding immorality. It seems consistent.

But what is to be done when the consequences cannot be known? What's the takeaway? Say someone drops a bomb from an airplane, with the benevolent intent of reducing the crime rate by eliminating criminals, and there is no news coverage of the event. Now they don't know the consequence of their action. What's their takeaway? — khaled

No idea. Should there be one?

Assuming the goal of this hypothetical person is to live a moral life, then one would assume they will at some point be moved to reflect upon their actions. Hopefully they realize that their aspirations of doing Good far exceed their limited wisdom.

How to make one see their own ignorance? Some seem to lack that ability entirely, thus a moral life is probably out of reach for them. They're doomed to do harm, and learn very little. A tragic reality, I guess.

I explained why I don't act to solve every problem I see. — khaled

So why is inaction wrong in some circumstances, but not in others? And why is it wrong in the case of Sarah and Jeff?

One instance in which I can agree that inaction is wrong, is when one has taken voluntary responsibility over the well-being over another individual, which is the case for having children.

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. — Tzeentch

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. — Tzeentch

So is one obligated to track or not? — khaled

Track, no.

To make a serious consideration of the consequences before one acts, yes. If one is interested in living morally/avoiding immorality, it would certainly be advisable to say the least.

But this inevitably raises questions of what constitutes enough consideration, whether one can ever be certain, whether every consequence is meaningful, one's ideas on cause and effect, etc.

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? — Tzeentch

Correct. Why is this strange? — khaled

Since not much of a case has been made as to why this distinction should be made.

You have it so that action is wrong only every once in a while. — khaled

I don't think that follows from my argument. The main issue seems to be with whether one can know and/or be certain.

Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society. — khaled

If certainty that the act you're about to do is harmless is what you require, then you will never be justified in acting. Where have I made a mistake here? — khaled

The fact that this "risk" one would be taking is likely to end up with a neutral result, because the possibility of something like this happening is astronomically low.

I'll be as ridiculous as I need to be. — khaled

Ok, but do you think the fact that you need to be ridiculous speaks in your argument's favor or mine?

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. — Tzeentch

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it? — khaled

It's unresolved. We have already established that.

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action since everyone can discern that inaction is safer since it has a 0% chance of failure in your system. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite despite thinking that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative. (may change depending on your resolution of the above) — khaled

I don't think this problem can be understood through something like chance, which in itself is a faulty representation.

I get your point though: if certainty is impossible, and one is obligated to choose the option with the least risk of harm, then it would follow inaction is always the correct option.

To an extent I agree. When in doubt, inaction is the safe option.

However, I don't think the impossibility of certainty, at least certainty to a degree that is meaningful in the context of our discussion, is a given. Nor do I think chance and risk are constructive ways of looking at this problem, because they inherently contain ignorance to causes.

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. — Tzeentch

Moral obligation. — khaled

I don't believe such a thing exists.

We're discussing what's right or wrong by your system not what practical actions a person abiding by your principles would be motivated towards or deterred from. — khaled

In that case I think I've answered your question:

Doing things that are incredibly irresponsible and risky with good intentions:

Very likely to be immoral, with a lot of luck neutral.

Or perhaps categorically immoral if we were to conclude there is some level of risk-taking that is immoral in and of itself. That has remained unresolved.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light". — Tzeentch

One could also define light as "not darkness" could they not? — khaled

We could call darkness purple and it would still refer to the absence of light.

Which of these two "exists" and which is the "non existence of the other" and why can't these criteria be flipped? — khaled

Photons exist, and the absence of them is what we refer to as darkness. Strictly speaking darkness does not exist. it is what we call the absence of photons and it is by their absence that we infer what we know as darkness.

I don't think going further down this sidetrack is constructive.

I ask you what makes an action. You say something is detected for action that's not detected for inaction. I ask you what that something is. You say action. See the problem? — khaled

No, I don't. Action is like light, and inaction is like darkness.

Say A operates a gate by pressing a button. When he presses it the gate opens for a few seconds then closes. B is walking and wants to pass through the gate. B cannot operate the gate (can't get to the booth as it's on the other side of the gate). A refuses to let B through. A is denying B space. Is A imposing on B? — khaled

Assuming it fits our earlier definition of what an imposition is, ergo this is a conscious effort of A to deny B entry, then yes.

I think "yes" is the unavoidable conclusion, since this is the exact same scenario with the walker and stander, except I just changed the mechanism by which the stander is impeding the walker. If so you have an example where sserping a button is an action (since inactions can't be impositions since they can't be wrong). Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. So, what makes it an inaction in Sarah and Jeff's case? — khaled

What this determines, and I thought we had already agreed upon this several posts ago, is that inaction can be an imposition.

What makes an imposition is the use of force (including various non-physical categories of force) to make someone act in accordance to one's desires.

In the case of Sarah and Jeff, one chooses not to get involved at all.

Similarly, if A does not operate the button so as to not involve himself (with the caveat that inaction can be immoral, in the circumstances we have discussed), then it is not an imposition.

Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. — khaled

As I said, the linguistic trick is one I think you're playing on yourself here. I understand the confusion, but I don't see the point and it's honestly getting a little tedious.

This isn't fruitful. It takes too long to type these and it takes longer to get a straight answer:

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it? — khaled

It's unresolved. We have already established that. — Tzeentch

I can't tell if your sense of morality is warped, or if you're just insistent on not "losing an argument". I'll just answer your questions and leave.

So why is inaction wrong in some circumstances, but not in others? And why is it wrong in the case of Sarah and Jeff? — Tzeentch

Inaction is not wrong when action is risky, for one. For Sarah and Jeff, pinching Jeff despite his protests is not nearly as risky as walking away and killing two people for sure.

Moral obligation.
— khaled

I don't believe such a thing exists. — Tzeentch

Lead with that. Save everyone some time.

Speech is Silver, Silence is Golden.. Arabs!

English versions, according to the above link:

Still waters run deep.

Empty vessels make the most sound.

The Chinese had something to say about it too:

He who speaks does not know. He who knows does not speak. — Laozi

Furthermore:

Silencium universi (Fermi Paradox).

Radio Silence (EMCON).

Aphasia (an illness!!)

Compulsive talking (also an illness!!)

This is the perfect moment for The Golden Mean aka Madhyamaka.

Unfortunate that such an interesting discussion had to end with accusations.