I am locked inside a windowless room, can say "iff it is raining then John is right and Jane is wrong and iff it is not raining then Jane is right and John is wrong." — Michael

You can say that, yes. It would mean "iff I come to believe it is raining (after meeting my threshold of satisfactory justification) then John is right and Jane is wrong and iff it is not raining then Jane is right and John is wrong." It would mean that because that is the only context in which you could possibly use the term.

And sometimes we do have access to the facts; sometimes it rains and sometimes we experience that rain. What is that if not access to the facts? — Michael

So we can't be wrong? If I say "it's raining", after having experienced the rain, I'm not referring to my belief, but rather really am referring to the direct fact that it's raining. If so then what happens when I find out I was just hallucinating? Does what really happened change post hoc?

John isn't made wet by you believing that he is; he's made wet by being actually covered in water. — Michael

2. is a statement, not the wetness of John.

It can be the case that one person believes that John is wet and one person believes that John is not wet, but the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction entail that only one of them is right. — Michael

Yes, I agree.

Either the person who believes that John is wet is right (and has knowledge)... — Michael

This just begs the question. The matter of discussion is whether this is the case, just restating that you believe that to be the case doesn't progress the discussion at all.

So we can't be wrong? If I say "it's raining", after having experienced the rain, I'm not referring to my belief, but rather really am referring to the direct fact that it's raining. If so then what happens when I find out I was just hallucinating? Does what really happened change post hoc? — Isaac

If the experience is an hallucination then we do not have access to the facts, and what we say about the weather is false (even if we believe that it is true and never learn that it was an hallucination), but if the experience is veridical then we do have access to the facts, and what we say about the weather is true.

What you seem to be saying is that either 1) we never have veridical experiences, or 2) if hallucinations are possible then a veridical experience isn't access to the facts.

Whether or not the first is true seems a topic for another discussion, but the second is an invalid inference.

You can say that, yes. It would mean "iff I come to believe it is raining (after meeting my threshold of satisfactory justification) then John is right and Jane is wrong and iff it is not raining then Jane is right and John is wrong." It would mean that because that is the only context in which you could possibly use the term.

It doesn't mean that at all. I am quite capable of understanding that a) there are facts, and that b) it is possible that my beliefs are wrong (as they do not correspond to the facts). Given this understanding I understand the difference between "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining," and so what I mean by "John is right iff it is raining" isn't what I mean by "John is right iff I believe that it is raining."

2. is a statement, not the wetness of John.

The statement "John is wet if I believe that he is covered in water" is false because John isn't made wet by you believing that he is; he's made wet by being actually covered in water, and so the statement "John is wet if he is covered in water" is true.

This just begs the question. The matter of discussion is whether this is the case, just restating that you believe that to be the case doesn't progress the discussion at all.

I have already said that some form of realism is taken for granted in this discussion (and you have agreed to argue your position from this understanding). There are facts, independent of what we believe.

If the independent fact is that John is wet then the person who believes (and claims) that John is wet is right, and the person who believes (and claims) that John is not wet is wrong. If the independent fact is that John is not wet then the person who believes (and claims) that John is not wet is right, and the person who believes (and claims) that John is wet is wrong.

What the JTB definition attempts to explain is the conditions that must be satisfied for us to know what these independent facts are.

This is my takeaway from the above paragraph:
Reveal — InPitzotl

Yeah, the 'it's just obvious to any right thinking person' argument.

I disagree with the postulate that to talk about x, I must have "direct access" to x, whatever "direct access" means. — InPitzotl

Well then how do you talk about X? If I show you a box and tell you there's a flower in it, you say "the flower is green", but there's no flower in the box. How can you have been talking about the actual green flower? There is no actual green flower. There's no referent for your sentence. You were talking about your 'mental image' of a flower which I had tricked you into thinking existed.

If I say "I'll put my hat on the subject of your next sentence" and you say "the flower in your box is green" where do I put my hat? Your claim is that your sentence is about an actual flower, so I should be able to put my hat on something, so following your claim, where do I put my hat?

It's of no consequence in normal conversation, but it's clearly what we actually do when we say "it's raining". — Isaac

I have no idea what the antecedent to the underlined "it" is supposed to be. — InPitzotl

The behaviour, the act of speaking.

In this case the end is obviously being able to eat my lunch. The attempt to induce false belief was a means. — InPitzotl

No, the end is to become satiated, the means is by eating your lunch. Or the ends is to remain alive

How do you even put one foot in front of another without a belief that doing so is an appropriate next step for you? — Isaac

Wrong question... the accusation here was that you were tunnel visioned, not blind. — InPitzotl

, the means is by satiating your hunger... we could go on all day.

You said

Most of the time, it's used to get the listener to believe it's raining (by which I mean have a tendency to act as if it's raining - put a coat on, carry an umbrella, write a poem about it...). — InPitzotl

...in response to my claim that we communicated a belief, ie arguing that we didn't communicate a belief (otherwise the appropriate response would heave been something like "yes, I see what you're saying...")
You gave this father saying "it's raining" by way of example, so I'm expecting an example proving that we're not communicating beliefs. This doesn't now seem to be such an example.

Well then how do you talk about X? If I show you a box and tell you there's a flower in it, you say "the flower is green", but there's no flower in the box. How can you have been talking about the actual green flower? There is no actual green flower. There's no referent for your sentence. You were talking about your 'mental image' of a flower which I had tricked you into thinking existed. — Isaac

Apologies for butting in, but I'd like to comment on this.

That we can point at nothing isn't that we can't point at something. If there is a flower then I can point to it. If there isn't a flower then there's nothing to point to, other than the floor or empty air or whatever.

And it's certainly not the case that if there isn't a flower then I'm actually pointing to my finger or to my mental image of a flower.

There's nothing in principle different between pointing to a green flower with my finger and using the phrase "that green flower."

If in your scenario there is a green flower in the box then that is what @InPitzotl is referring to.

Apologies for butting in, but I'd like to comment on this.

That we can point at nothing isn't that we can't point at something. If there is a flower then I can point to it. If there isn't a flower then there's nothing to point to (other than the floor or empty air or whatever).

There's nothing in principle different between pointing to a green flower with my finger and using the phrase "the green flower." — Michael

Don't mind the interjection at all, fill your boots. I don't understand it though.

At T1 you point (by reference in a statement) to a flower - you want to say it's the actual flower you're pointing to

At T2 you find out there's no flower, so now it's not the actual flower you're pointing to, it's nothing

You can't then go back in time and change what the event at T1 was. It was (apparently) pointing at a flower, so where's the flower you were pointing at at T1?

To translate back into knowledge claims...

At T1 you say "it's raining" referring (apparently) to the actual rain

At T2 you find out you were deceived and there was no rain

Where's the actual rain you were referring to at T1, can we water the garden with it?

You can't then go back in time and change what the event at T1 was. — Isaac

I’m not changing what it was. As I keep explaining there are facts, independent of belief. You accept this yourself in your scenario where you say that there isn’t actually a flower in the box (apparently contradicting your own arguments).

If the independent fact is that there isn’t actually a flower, as in your scenario, then InPitzotl isn’t pointing at/referring to anything, even though he believes and says he is.

If the independent fact is that there is actually a flower then InPitzotl is pointing at/referring to that flower.

You accept this yourself in your scenario where you say that there isn’t actually a flower in the box (apparently contradicting your own arguments). — Michael

I've always argued that (when said by me) that "there's no flower in the box" means 'I believe there's no flower in the box'. Likewise, "it's raining" (when said by me) means 'I believe it's raining' - No contradiction.

If the independent fact is that there isn’t actually a flower, as in your scenario, then InPitzotl isn’t pointing at/referring to anything, even though he believes and says he is. — Michael

Right. So he isn't pointing/referring to the actual rain in the sentence "it's raining" at T1 contrary to his claims.

If you say he is actually pointing to the actual rain at T1 you're required to change the past when you realise, at T2 that there's no rain.

Alternatively, if he's pointing/referring to his belief that it's raining at T1 we have no temporal problems on realising at T2 that there is no rain, the belief was still there, we can picture it (with super advanced fMRI, perhaps), record it on a USB stick - it's still actually real no matter what happens at T2.

With your system we have to retrospectively change what was the case in the past. We say at T1 that he's pointing/referring to the actual rain, but when, at T2, we discover there was no rain, we somehow go back into the past and change what he was actually pointing at

I've always argued that (when said by me) that "there's no flower in the box" means 'I believe there's no flower in the box'. — Isaac

Then let’s phrase your scenario appropriately:

Well then how do you talk about X? If I show you a box and tell you there's a flower in it, you say "the flower is green", but I believe that there's no flower in the box. How can you have been talking about the actual green flower? I believe that there is no actual green flower.

What do your beliefs have to do with what InPitzotl talks about and what his words refer to? Your beliefs are irrelevant; they have nothing to do with what he says. He will say that his words refer to the actual green flower.

If you say he is actually pointing to the actual rain at T1 you're required to change the past when you realise, at T2 that there's no rain. — Isaac

I said that if it’s raining then he’s referring to the actual rain. Your response is to say that if it’s not raining then he’s not referring to actual rain. Your response is a non sequitur.

In the scenario where he refers to actual rain there is no T2 where he “realised” that there wasn't rain. There actually was rain and there’s never any reason to believe otherwise. For the rest of his life he (and everyone else) (correctly) believes that it was raining at T1.

Neither are what you claimed. You gave us a list of behaviours which would lead to being a bachelor, that's not that same thing a a definition of what the word means. A series of biophysical changes are necessary for a seed to be a tree, they're not what the word 'tree' means. — Isaac

It's exactly what I claimed; a man who has not been wed is a man who has not participated in the series of events involved in being wed, just as I said earlier.

Yeah, the 'it's just obvious to any right thinking person' argument. — Isaac

There was no argument in that cartoon... just as there was no argument in the thing it responded to. The cartoon was just a way to respond to the smoke you were blowing (you certainly weren't commenting on the actual contents of what you quoted).

Your claim is that your sentence is about an actual flower, — Isaac

Nope; not if there is no actual flower. But it is about the contents of that box. In this case, the truth value of "the flower is green" is undefined, as that statement has no referent, but the reason it has no referent is because that box doesn't have a flower in it.

No, the end is to become satiated, the means is by eating your lunch. Or the ends is to remain alive ..., the means is by satiating your hunger... we could go on all day. — Isaac

I don't disagree that you can go on all day, but none of your suggestions are related to how normal people use the terms "means" and "ends". None of this is relevant anyway, as having hunger and remaining alive aren't beliefs.

You said
"Most of the time, it's used to getinform the listener to believethat it's raining (by which I mean have a tendency to act as if it's rainingto convey information necessary for the listener to adapt to the rain - put a coat on to avoid getting wet, carry an umbrella to avoid getting wet, write a historically accurate poem about it...)." — InPitzotl
...in response — Isaac

FTFY.

You gave this father saying "it's raining" by way of example, so I'm expecting an example proving that we're not communicating beliefs. — Isaac

If you say so, but I'm not beholden to what you expect of me.

Then let’s phrase your scenario appropriately:

Well then how do you talk about X? If I show you a box and tell you there's a flower in it, you say "the flower is green", but I believe that there's no flower in the box. How can you have been talking about the actual green flower? I believe that there is no actual green flower.


What do your beliefs have to do with what InPitzotl talks about and what his words refer to? — Michael

That's not the correct phrasing. In the scenario (at T2), I've shown InPitzotl the empty box. We believe there's no flower in it.

If you say he is actually pointing to the actual rain at T1 you're required to change the past when you realise, at T2 that there's no rain. — Isaac


I said that if it’s raining then he’s referring to the actual rain. — Michael

So what a person is actually referring to can never be established (since we can never know for sure if it's actually raining)? This is still the same problem, at T1 (before we know if it's actually raining), we can't say what the statement refers to, because it only refers to the actual rain if it's actually raining and we don't know that at T1. Are you in the habit of making statements and not knowing what they're referring to?

a man who has not been wed is a man who has not participated in the series of events involved in being wed — Janus

Yep. a description of the steps necessary to achieve a state is not the same as an investigation into the meaning of the word. If it were philology and science would be the same topic.

There was no argument in that cartoon — InPitzotl

the smoke you were blowing — InPitzotl

...is an argument. Or did you think it was one of your famous 'independent facts' that my position is just blowing smoke?

Nope; not if there is no actual flower. But it is about the contents of that box. In this case, the truth value of "the flower is green" is undefined, as that statement has no referent, but the reason it has no referent is because that box doesn't have a flower in it. — InPitzotl

The point is that you only know that at T2 when you see the empty box. so at T1 you are making a statement whose proper referent you don't know. But your claim is that you do know the referent of "it's raining" - the rain, even at T1.

You said
"Most of the time, it's used to getinform the listener to believethat it's raining (by which I mean have a tendency to act as if it's rainingto convey information necessary for the listener to adapt to the rain - put a coat on to avoid getting wet, carry an umbrella to avoid getting wet, write a historically accurate poem about it...)." — InPitzotl
...in response — Isaac

FTFY. — InPitzotl

We're going round in circles. To inform someone is to get them to believe something, it's just a subset of getting someone to believe something where you also believe that thing.

Yep. a description of the steps necessary to achieve a state is not the same as an investigation into the meaning of the word. If it were philology and science would be the same topic. — Isaac

You're still off the point; which was simply that there are actual events that distinguish a bachelor from a non-bachelor; meaning it's not merely that a bachelor is someone who the linguistic community refers to as such.

there are actual events that distinguish a bachelor from a non-bachelor; meaning it's not merely that a bachelor is someone who the linguistic community refers to as such. — Janus

Yep. I agree with all that. Only I'm not arguing about what a bachelor is. I'm arguing about what "John is a bachelor" means.

Doesn't 'John is a bachelor' mean, by implication 'John is a man who has not participated in the kind of series of events that are generically referred to as "getting wed"'?

Doesn't 'John is a bachelor' mean, by implication 'John is a man who has not participated in the kind of series of events that are generically referred to as "getting wed"'? — Janus

That's the matter under discussion. My contention is that it means ' John is a man who I believe has not participated in the kind of series of events that are generically referred to as "getting wed"'

My argument is given above so I won't repeat it here.

What I've yet to hear is (what I consider to be) any counter argument beyond just "it isn't".

I don't see it that way. I think "John is a bachelor" means that John is a bachelor. Of course it could be wrong, or it could be right, that is true or false. That is true of any proposition. If 'John is a bachelor" meant "John is a man who I believe is a bachelor" then the sentence could not be false, unless you were a liar, or didn't actually know what you believed, but that would make it too much about you and not enough about John; the actual subject of the sentence. It would, in effect, by implication, make you the subject of the sentence, and not John.

OK. So how do you personally resolve the issue I've outlined in my argument above.

At T1 you say "John is a bachelor" - you want to say that this statement is not about your beliefs but rather that it's about John, the man.

At T2 you disover that there's no such person, you were deceived (a hallucination, or a trick).

There's no problem with my system because at T2, your belief is still a real thing (albeit historical).

There's a problem (I see) with your system because at T2 you have the change what your statement at T1 was about. It can't have been referring to John, the actual man, because there was no John.

So do you retrospectively change what your statement was about, go back and change what was the case in the past? If so, are there other situations where we can change what was actually the case in the past?

Note we're not revising our belief about what was the case. Your claim is that your statement "John is a bachelor" actually is about John, not just that you believe it to be but might revise that belief later if contrary evidence arises.

If a person is hallucinating a cat and points to where they see a cat then they’re not pointing to a real cat, but will (wrongly) claim that they are. If they later come to realize that they were hallucinating then they will (rightly) claim that they weren't pointing to a real cat.

If a person is having a veridical experience of a cat and points to where they see a cat then they’re pointing to a real cat, and will (rightly) claim that they are. If they are later tricked into believing that they were hallucinating then they will (wrongly) claim that they weren't pointing to a real cat.

The fact that the first scenario can happen doesn’t entail that the second scenario can’t happen. In the second scenario the person is pointing to a real cat (even if they later come to believe otherwise).

And I’m not pushing you to answer but in case it was missed it there’s still this post where I address the issue of hallucinations and veridical experiences and access to the facts.

If a person is hallucinating a cat and points to where they see a cat then they’re not pointing to a real cat; they’re pointing to empty air or to the ground or to nothing or whatever. — Michael

Right. So in the first scenario "the cat is black" is not about the cat (there isn't one).

So it's incorrect to say that the statement "the cat is black" is about the cat. At best, it might be about the cat, or it might not be. We won't know until we determine whether the cat was a hallucination or not.

My issue with this way of looking at things is that it sets up a situation where we don't know what we're talking about at the time of saying it. Which seems silly.

Also, in the second scenario, what was "the cat is black" about? It sounds like in the second scenario we find out that "the cat is black" turns out after all to have been about our belief, not an actual cat. So why didn't we know that at the time. We can't be wrong about our beliefs so I'd know at the time if I was referring to a belief.

there’s still this post where I address the issue of hallucinations and veridical experiences. — Michael

The discussion about the temporal mess of deciding post hoc what a statement was about was supposed to be an answer to that. Sorry.

Also, in the second scenario, what was "the cat is black" about? It sounds like in the second scenario we find out that "the cat is black" turns out after all to have been about our belief, not an actual cat. — Isaac

No, it was about an actual cat.

But what do you mean by "an actual cat" when you say "'the cat is black' isn't about an actual cat"?

The discussion about the temporal mess of deciding post hoc what a statement was about was supposed to be an answer to that. Sorry.

The post I linked to was a response to your post about "deciding post hoc"?

Right. So in the first scenario "the cat is black" is not about the cat (there isn't one).

So it's incorrect to say that the statement "the cat is black" is about the cat. At best, it might be about the cat, or it might not be. We won't know until we determine whether the cat was a hallucination or not.

My issue with this way of looking at things is that it sets up a situation where we don't know what we're talking about at the time of saying it. Which seems silly.

Also, in the second scenario, what was "the cat is black" about? It sounds like in the second scenario we find out that "the cat is black" turns out after all to have been about our belief, not an actual cat. So why didn't we know that at the time. We can't be wrong about our beliefs so I'd know at the time if I was referring to a belief. — Isaac

Also, I wasn't (yet) talking about the phrase "the cat is black." I was just talking about pointing to a cat (with one's finger).

Are you saying that in the second scenario the person isn't pointing to a real cat with their finger?

No, it was about an actual cat. — Michael

So in the scenario where it turns out there's no cat, the statement was about a cat? What cat? Who is it's owner? Did it have any kittens?

But what do you mean by "an actual cat" when you say "'the cat is black' isn't about an actual cat"? — Michael

In that context I simply mean a cat which everyone in the language game agrees is there.

For clarity, in the wider sense (as in "there's no such thing as the actual cat"), I mean an object in a model of the world where the objects we see are determinable by some means to exist outside of our Markov blanket as they appear to us from inside it. I think such a model is problematic in certain circumstances so I don't use it in things like philosophical discussions, or in my research work. I do, however, use it to make a cup of tea or get on the train, it's pragmatically very good.

As usual, different meanings in different contexts.

The post I linked to was a response to your post about "deciding post hoc"? — Michael

Oops! Looking again then...

What you seem to be saying is that either 1) we never have veridical experiences, or 2) if hallucinations are possible then a veridical experience isn't access to the facts.

Whether or not the first is true seems a topic for another discussion, but the second is an invalid inference. — Michael

I agree. I'm not saying that it's not possible to have veridical experiences. I'm saying that because we don't know at the time whether an experience is veridical or not, it doesn't make sense to say that our expressions refer to the external objects of that experience. Those object might not even exist, we can't possibly be referring to them, we must, rather, be referring to our beliefs, our mental images of them. It's those that actually exist at the time.

Are you saying that in the second scenario the person isn't pointing to a real cat with their finger? — Michael

I'm saying they might not be. Although you've introduced 'real' now, a whole different kettle of fish. I think Frodo is 'real' in some senses of the word, we'd need to be clearer about what you mean by 'real' before I can properly answer that.

So in the scenario where it turns out there's no cat, the statement was about a cat? — Isaac

No, that's the first scenario. When there isn't a cat he isn't talking about an actual cat.
But in the second scenario where there is a cat he is talking about an actual cat.

In that context I simply mean a cat which everyone in the language game agrees is there. — Isaac

The person is alone. Nobody else is around to either see or not see a cat. The person can see a cat, and talks about the cat he sees.

I'm saying that if his experience is veridical then he is talking about an actual cat, and if his experience is an hallucination then he is talking about an imaginary cat. What can you say about this situation?

Also mass hallucinations are a thing, and it's possible that the entire language community hallucinates a cat.

I'm saying that because we don't know at the time whether an experience is veridical or not, it doesn't make sense to say that our expressions refer to the external objects of that experience.

We were talking about access to facts. If my experience is veridical then ipso fact I have access to a fact.

Imagine I were to have a bag of money. It may or may not be real money. Are you saying that because I don't know if the money is real then I don't have access to real money? That doesn't follow. If the money is real then I have access to real money, even if I cannot distinguish real money from fake money.

I'm saying they might not be. Although you've introduced 'real' now, a whole different kettle of fish. I think Frodo is 'real' in some senses of the word, we'd need to be clearer about what you mean by 'real' before I can properly answer that. — Isaac

Real in the ordinary sense of the word, as a realist would understand it. If my experience is veridical then the cat I see is a real cat.

If my experience is veridical then my finger is pointing to a cat. If my experience is an hallucination then my finger isn't pointing to a cat.

I'm saying that because we don't know at the time whether an experience is veridical or not, it doesn't make sense to say that our expressions refer to the external objects of that experience. — Isaac

What do you mean by not knowing at the time whether an experience is veridical or not? Your entire argument is that to know is to believe. Iff I believe that my experience at the time is veridical then I know that my experience at the time is veridical.

Do you now accept that knowledges requires more than just belief? That knowledge requires that what we believe is (independently) true (and perhaps some other stuff as well)?

...is an argument. — Isaac

I think you have the wrong room. This is philosophy. The argument clinic is down the hall.

Here in the philosophy forum, you made an argument tracing back to this:

It coveys (1)a belief about a weather condition, not (2)the actual weather condition (3)(which is composed of atmospheric molecules). — Isaac

...to which I replied that (1) goes on in my skull, (2) and "it's raining" four feet in front, and (3) is just a model we use to explain (2).

I've seen two replies to this, but no responses. I don't know why you keep quoting me; you don't seem very interested in actually talking about this.

The point is that you only know that at T2 when you see the empty box. so at T1 you are making a statement whose proper referent you don't know. But your claim is that you do know the referent of "it's raining" - the rain, even at T1. — Isaac

You're very confused and I have no idea how to fix it. There's no green flower in my right shoe either, but a discovery of that fact at T2 wouldn't mean anything relevant. By contrast, the discovery that the box is empty does have relevance, as you implicitly acknowledge. The reason the latter is relevant whereas the former is irrelevant is because "The flower is green" is about the contents of the box, as opposed to having nothing to do with the contents of my right shoe. This isn't a new point; it's exactly the same point I was making with "it's raining" being about weather. But it has nothing to do with this confusion of what you imagined my claim was in your quote here.

No, that's the first scenario. When there isn't a cat he isn't talking about an actual cat.
But in the second scenario where there is a cat he is talking about an actual cat. — Michael

Sorry. The second, there's an actual cat (where by 'actual' I mean here that the whole language community playing that particular language game agree there's cat).

The person is alone. Nobody else is around to either see or not see a cat. The person can see a cat, and talks about the cat he sees. — Michael

Then there's no meaning to anything they say. No-one to speak to, no meaning to the expressions. Language is a social enterprise.

We were talking about access to facts. If my experience is veridical then ipso fact I have access to a fact. — Michael

I agree.

Are you saying that because I don't know if the money is real then I don't have access to real money? That doesn't follow. If the money is real then I have access to real money, even if I cannot distinguish real money from fake money. — Michael

I agree here too. I don't see how it follows from this that you can say our expressions must be about these facts which is turns out we have veridical access to. That it turns out we sometimes have access to veridical facts is one thing, that our expressions are about them is another.

If my experience is veridical then my finger is pointing to a cat. If my experience is an hallucination then my finger isn't pointing to a cat. — Michael

Yep, since you can't verify which at the time of speaking you're left with either retrospectively changing the subject of expressions, not knowing the subject of expressions at the time or that the subject of expressions in belief not cats. I think the first two are nonsensical.

What do you mean by not knowing at the time whether an experience is veridical or not? Your entire argument is that to know is to believe. Iff I believe that my experience at the time is veridical then I know that my experience at the time is veridical. — Michael

No. I'm saying that knowing is a type of belief, a type with a particularly compelling set of justifications (usually they are 'my epistemic peers would mostly agree' and 'when I act as if it were the case I get the expected results') these two types of justification for believing something are very persuasive but they're still just justifications for believing something.

Here in the philosophy forum, you made an argument tracing back to this:

It coveys (1)a belief about a weather condition, not (2)the actual weather condition (3)(which is composed of atmospheric molecules). — Isaac

...to which I replied that (1) goes on in my skull, (2) and "it's raining" four feet in front, and (3) is just a model we use to explain (2).

I've seen two replies to this, but no responses. I don't know why you keep quoting me; you don't seem very interested in actually talking about this. — InPitzotl

I don't know what a response to this would look like that's not what I've been providing. You've just said that you believe the actual weather you're referring to goes on outside of your skull. I don't. I've gibven the argument that if it were the actual weather we were referring to we'd have to retrospectively change what we referred to if we found out we were being deceived so it makes more sense to say it's our belief about the weather that we refer to. I don't know what's 'not a response' about that.

"The flower is green" is about the contents of the box, as opposed to having nothing to do with the contents of my right shoe. — InPitzotl

So you're claiming that the expression "the flower is green" is not about the flower?

You've just said that you believe the actual weather you're referring to goes on outside of your skull. I don't. — Isaac

That doesn't explain this:

It coveys (1) a belief about a weather condition, not (2) the actual weather condition (3) (which is composed of atmospheric molecules). — Isaac

If "it's raining" describes what's inside my skull, and (2) is inside my skull, and atmospheric molecules are inside my skull, then (1), (2), (3), and "it's raining" are all inside my skull. But what does "my skull" refer to? Per the logic, it only refers to my belief in my skull, which is in my skull. So if (1), (2), (3), and "it's raining" are in my skull, and my skull is in my skull, we must have an infinitely regressing series of skulls, and the actual weather can't be outside any of them.

None of this supports your idea that "it's raining" cannot convey "the actual weather condition"... both of those things are in the innermost core of this infinitely recursive solipsistic russian doll.

This explanation I'm afraid implodes upon itself. Maybe you want to think this through and try again. Why can "it's raining" not refer to the "actual weather condition" again?

At an absolute minimum, I expect some sort of explanation from you that achieves the goal of building a fence such that "it's raining" and "a belief about a weather condition" are on one side of the fence, and "the actual weather condition" is on the other (possibly because "atmospheric molecules" make "the actual weather condition"), such that you can say "it's raining" is on the side of the former and not the side of the latter. Because something like that is what you actually claimed.

I've gibven the argument that if it were the actual weather we were referring to we'd have to retrospectively change what we referred to if we found out we were being deceived so it makes more sense to say it's our belief about the weather that we refer to. — Isaac

It doesn't make any sense at all to me.

So you're claiming that the expression "the flower is green" is not about the flower? — Isaac

What flower?

OK. So how do you personally resolve the issue I've outlined in my argument above.

At T1 you say "John is a bachelor" - you want to say that this statement is not about your beliefs but rather that it's about John, the man.

At T2 you disover that there's no such person, you were deceived (a hallucination, or a trick). — Isaac

I don't see the problem. If there is no actual John, but only an imagined John, then I believed the statement was a about an actual John, but subsequently discovered I was mistaken, and that it was about an imagined or fictive John.

If "it's raining" describes what's inside my skull, and (2) is inside my skull — InPitzotl

Who said (2) is inside your skull?

At an absolute minimum, I expect some sort of explanation from you that achieves the goal of building a fence such that "it's raining" and "a belief about a weather condition" are on one side of the fence, and "the actual weather condition" is on the other (possibly because "atmospheric molecules" make "the actual weather condition"), such that you can say "it's raining" is on the side of the former and not the side of the latter. Because something like that is what you actually claimed. — InPitzotl

We can just take that as a given. If you believe in such a model and I do too, there seems no need to go through the work of demonstrating it's construction.

So you're claiming that the expression "the flower is green" is not about the flower? — Isaac

What flower? — InPitzotl

The flower you originally claimed you were talking about. I've just exchanged for the sake of the thought experiment. "it's raining">"the weather is raining">"the flower is green" - all expressions of the the same form "the x(object) is y(property)". You want to claim that "the weather is raining" is about the actual weather outside your skull (object), so "the flower is green" is about the actual flower outside your skull.

So when you find out you were deceived and there was no flower, what do you do about your expression at T1? You claim it was about a flower outside your skull, but there was no flower. Do you go back in time and change what it was about? Do you not know what your expressions are about (only guess)? Do the outside-skull objects of your expressions blink in and out of existence depending on what's later believed about them?