We cannot begin with complete doubt. — Ciceronianus

Peirce said that by the way, not me.

Ciceronianus

Peirce said that by the way, not me. — Ciceronianus

I know, sorry about the misquote. It's just not a criticism of Descartes.

These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up.(Peirce). — Ciceronianus

The self-deception that Peirce had in mind is akin to, and indebted to, the self-deception that Kant revealed the Cartesian certainty to rest on. Every new philosophical system that comes down the pike defines itself via its critical relation to a philosophy that came before it. Put differently, the new philosophy exposes as self-deception what had been take to be indubitable within the older view. This is not unlike the way newer scientific theories falsify older ones. Which doesn’t mean the older theories were pretending.

I think you'd like Descartes. He's saying we don't need the Church as a foundation for knowledge. It was a step on the right direction.

I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things" I guess he was pretending, then — Ciceronianus

No more than philosophers of mind are pretending when they invoke derangements of cognitions such as schizophrenia and then ask if there is anything left of the sense of self that the deranged mind can rely on. Schizophrenics offers lose their sense of boo derives between their body and the world outside of it. They literally lose their hands, eyes, flesh, etc and believe themselves inanimate or indefinable, and may imagine this to be the result of an evil power.

It is conceded that no one delays their day to day interactions in order to reconfirm their corporeal existence, but that again is a reference to pragmatism. — Hanover

It's a reference to what we do, and are, and think, and believe, and confirm every day of our lives. I don't know what you mean by "pragmatism", but for me, if we in doing philosophy claim to doubt what we do, and are, and think, and believe, and confirm every day of our lives, we're pretending to do so, as as our own conduct, our own lives, establish that we don't doubt that at all.

No more than philosophers of mind are pretending when they invoke derangements of cognitions such as schizophrenia and then ask if there is anything left of the sense of self that the deranged mind can rely on. — Joshs

Well, we shouldn't entirely disregard the fact that in that case, they're considering the effects of a disease or condition they don't doubt exists on an actual person they don't doubt exists.

think you'd like Descartes. He's saying we don't need the Church as a foundation for knowledge. It was a step on the right direction. — frank

It's certainly true I'd agree with him about that.

if we in doing philosophy claim to doubt what we do, and are, and think, and believe, and confirm every day of our lives, we're pretending to do so, as as our own conduct, our own lives, establish that we don't doubt that at all. — Ciceronianus

If we are good philosophers, we should doubt those things, because there are many brain conditions that show us what we at one time thought to be indubitable are merely relative , contingent constructions of mind. Phenomenologist talk about the naive attitude we normally use to encounter the world, in which it’s assumed certainly is not doubted. There point is that if anything is ‘pretend’ it is the assumption of the certainty of the world, not the doubting of it. If you don’t doubt it , then you are deceiving yourself. Or more precisely, you are confusing a relative and contingent construction of mind with a certainty.

If we are good philosophers, we should doubt those things, because there are many brain conditions that show us what we at one time thought to be indubitable are merely relative , contingent constructions of mind n — Joshs

It may be useful in some sense to pretend to doubt for a particular purpose, just as it may be useful in some sense to pretend to be or do something we aren't or don't do for a particular purpose. But we should know we're pretending in that case, and I think the purposes for which we pretend would be fairly limited.

Well, we shouldn't entirely disregard the fact that in that case, they're considering the effects of a disease or condition they don't doubt exists on an actual person they don't doubt exists. — Ciceronianus

As a good phenomenologist I begin by doubting the unquestioned existence of the world , including other persons.

“The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the- man among other men. “(Husserl, Crisis, p.184)

It may be useful in some sense to pretend to doubt for a particular purpose, just as it may be useful in some sense to pretend to be or do something we aren't or don't do for a particular purpose. But we should know we're pretending in that case, and I think the purposes for which we pretend would be fairly limited. — Ciceronianus

Which is why Descartes wasn’t pretending, any more than researchers are pretending when they use what they learn from pathological conditions to shed legitimate doubt on capacities they previously thought to be unquestionable.

I'm with Peirce when it comes to Descartes — Ciceronianus

I don't know what you mean by "pragmatism", — Ciceronianus

From Wiki:

"Charles Sanders Peirce (/pɜːrs/[8][9] PURSS; September 10, 1839 – April 19, 1914) was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician and scientist who is sometimes known as "the father of pragmatism"."

You're quoting the father of pragmatism yet aren't sure why I'd be interpreting your position as pragmatism?

if we in doing philosophy claim to doubt what we do, and are, and think, and believe, and confirm every day of our lives, we're pretending to do so, as as our own conduct, our own lives, establish that we don't doubt that at all. — Ciceronianus

Is the point of using this strained meaning of "pretending" to disparage the position to imply an intentional dishonesty? I get up every day expecting the sun to rise so that I can go about my day. I act just like it rises and greet the rising sun as if it had risen, totally pretending as if it rose.

It turns out the earth is spinning and the sun is sitting still. Sometimes things aren't as they appear. Who'd have thunk? Maybe I should question other things, or would I be accused of pretending?

:up:

Every new philosophical system that comes down the pike defines itself via its critical relation to a philosophy that came before it. Put differently, the new philosophy exposes as self-deception what had been take to be indubitable within the older view. — Joshs

A bit too Oedipal (or p0m0) for my tastes ... but true often enough.

It strikes me as odd that a lawyer would even attempt to say that philosophy as a field is all make pretend. I mean, at least the philosopher is sincere about his intentions about the issue of foundationalism or Descartes' skepticism or theories of truth, no?

With what limited understanding I have of pragmatism from Rorty, I think, what you allude to @Ciceronianus is an attempt to elucidate something greater than a dead or defunct methodology in attempting to understand the same issues that bother the mind's of many philosophers.

My understanding of the issue is that you're perverting what Dewey might have stated in that we only think when confronted with a problem. Is that accurate in your view?

Hume wrote something along the lines of thinking about scepticism all day and then going out to play billiards without the least doubt about the existence of the external world. I can't find the quote but it's in the spirit of the thread I think.

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. — Hume

(THN 1.4.7.9 ; SBN 269)

Perhaps it's unfair to characterize the discussion of some traditional philosophical discussions as mere "play." Perhaps it's kinder and more accurate to consider it to be a mental exercise. — Ciceronianus

Philosophy is very broad. Laws and constitutions are built on philosophical foundations. Philosophy includes questions of moral responsibility, human rights, the scope of state powers. The answers to the questions can affect lives and deaths. So this is not just play. Whether philosophy helps or not is another question. I suspect that when tyranny is being planned then philosophy is ineffective. But that's different from being unserious.

It strikes me as odd that a lawyer would even attempt to say that philosophy as a field is all make pretend. I mean, at least the philosopher is sincere about his intentions about the issue of foundationalism or Descartes' skepticism or theories of truth, no? — Shawn

Sorry to take so long to respond. I was (ever so sincerely) doubting my hands exist, and questioning whether, if they did, they could use this (apparent) keyboard on which I may or may not be typing, for some time now. I've decided, after serious thought, that it doesn't matter in the least.

Don't you think that lawyers pretend as well? This very moment, I'm pretending I care what you think about lawyers. What wonders will I learn from this pursuit?

I'm sure that Descartes was very sincere in his insincerity. I'm also confident that he, like Hume as Cuthbert noted, understood his faux doubt to be ridiculous when he stopped philosophizing. When philosophizing, he seriously pretended he had no hands, eyes, etc. He did that for a purpose. That's what I mean when I say pretended.

I think he was misguided in doing so. You may, if you wish, think he really believed he had no hands, etc., and only very slowly and laboriously convinced himself that he did indeed have them, but I don't.

With what limited understanding I have of pragmatism from Rorty, — Shawn

I think you have very limited understanding of Classical Pragmatism if what you understand is derived from Rorty.

My understanding of the issue is that you're perverting what Dewey might have stated in that we only think when confronted with a problem. Is that accurate in your view? — Shawn

I positively seethe with perversity. But I don't pervert what someone "might have" said. That would be silly and pointless--to pervert what might or might not have been said. If it had not been said, there would be nothing to pervert.

It happens Dewey indeed said that (although I paraphrase). You may find that out for yourself if you manage to convince yourself there is an Internet and you can access it. I happen to agree with him. And with Peirce that what he calls "self-deception" on the part of Descartes shouldn't be indulged in.

You're quoting the father of pragmatism yet aren't sure why I'd be interpreting your position as pragmatism? — Hanover

Yes.

Is the point of using this strained meaning of "pretending" to disparage the position to imply an intentional dishonesty? I get up every day expecting the sun to rise so that I can go about my day. I act just like it rises and greet the rising sun as if it had risen, totally pretending as if it rose. — Hanover

I quoted a definition of "pretend" in the OP. I think it applies. I think it's possible to pretend without being intentionally "dishonest." When I say Descartes was pretending when he assumed there was an Evil Demon, and all that entailed as he described it, I'm saying he didn't believe there was an Evil Demon, nor did he believe had no hands, eyes, etc. Do you think he believed in the Demon, and that he had no hands, or eyes and all else he said was entailed by the Demon's illusion? If you don't, I agree with you. If you do, I think there's a problem.

“The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the- man among other men. “(Husserl, Crisis, p.184) — Joshs

For me, this merely shows how clumsy, how awkward, how incoherent we become when we try to make explain the ineffable in words, as philosophy.

Philosophy includes questions of moral responsibility, human rights, the scope of state powers. The answers to the questions can affect lives and deaths. — Cuthbert

It doesn't do anything so useful and worthy when it entails questioning the existence of the "external world" or asking why there's something whether than nothing and such inconclusive, unresolvable chestnuts (meaning, "something repeated to the point of staleness").

Do you think he believed in the Demon, and that he had no hands, or eyes and all else he said was entailed by the Demon's illusion? — Ciceronianus

I think he believed it possible he were so deceived.

. I happen to agree with him. And with Peirce that what he calls "self-deception" on the part of Descartes shouldn't be indulged in. — Ciceronianus

I dont think so. I think you’re directly contradicting Peirce. From the quote you citied, Peirce is suggesting Descartes sincerely believed in his method of radical doubt, and that his was an unintentional self-deception This is the opposite of what you’re claiming, which is that it was a deliberate self-deception, in the same way that Kant’s categorical imperative may be a self-deception. . Never does Pierce suggest that deliberate “pretending” is involved in the hypothetical of the Evil demon , which is the core of the OP.

For me, this merely shows how clumsy, how awkward, how incoherent we become when we try to make explain the ineffable in words, as philosophy. — Ciceronianus

To me this shows what happens when we go on first impressions rather than bothering to read the background material.

I'm saying he didn't believe there was an Evil Demon, nor did he believe had no hands, eyes, etc. Do you think he believed in the Demon, and that he had no hands, or eyes and all else he said was entailed by the Demon's illusion? — Ciceronianus

Descartes believed in God , and what’s more, he believed in a god that placed the faculty of perfect reason in our heads, via the pineal gland. Now, if one can believe in a god with such powers, one must also entertain the possibility ( which is quite different than pretending, since we’re not talking about a fantasy, but about a scenario that in Descartes’ mind could not be ruled out) that such an all powerful Being could manipulate those faculties to deceive us. In fact, isnt the god’s very placement of faculties of perfect reason already a manipulation? Is what you’re
really trying to argue here that the belief in a god who tells us how to think must be considered ‘pretend’?

Is what you’re
really trying to argue here that the belief in a god who tells us how to think must be considered ‘pretend’? — Joshs

Alright, I confess. All this time I've been seeking to undermine belief in God.

To me this shows what happens when we go on first impressions rather than bothering to read the background material. — Joshs

Does it also show that you shouldn't quote someone without quoting the "background material" as well, and then complain that the person you provided the quote to hasn't bothered to read the "background material"? By all means, quote all of Husserl and the work of all phenomenologists. I'll let you know when I'm done reading, but you can check on my progress now and then if you like.

Alright, I confess. All this time I've been seeking to undermine belief in God. — Ciceronianus

Sounds like a reasonable project to me.

I dont think so. — Joshs

Ok.