Kind of like having a map of the territory without including the map's location on the map. The map is as much a part of the territory (the world) as the rest of the world. Why exclude the map when making a map of the territory - if you want an accurate representation of the territory? — Harry Hindu

I should add that when you attempt to include the map as part of the territory when making a map of the territory, it involves jumping down a never-ending rabbit hole where your map includes itself and the territory in an infinite regress - kind of like looking down an never-ending corridor when two mirrors are placed opposite of each other - and kind of like what it is like when contemplating the self - and turning thinking upon itself in thinking about thinking.

The distinction between subjective and objective is simply where unrelated reasons and assumptions are used in the process of interpreting sensory data compared to not using unrelated reasons and assumptions to interpret sensory data. — Harry Hindu

I'm talking about how people usually talk: they usually present their own opinion of a matter of objective fact, even when it is an opinion. They externalize.

Some real examples:

Neighbor: Try these cherry tomatoes.
I: (tasting them) Hm ... I don't particularly like them.
Neighbor: You don't know what's good!

I: James' The Portrait of a Lady is one of my favorite books.
"Friend": You're wrong. This is actually a very boring book.

Both the neighbor and the friend considered themselves to be the arbiters of reality, the judges of what is objectively a good tomato or a good book.
I made a point of speaking assertively, to use assertive formulations, I-statements. They, on the other hand, used the objective form.

I'm talking about how people usually talk: they usually present their own opinion of a matter of objective fact, even when it is an opinion. They externalize. — baker

Sure, it could simply be a matter of communicating more efficiently. When someone says that the cherry tomatoes are good, it is short for "I feel that the cherry tomatoes are good". For some, using the short-hand version could make a listener think that they are projecting when they actually aren't. I expect you to know I'm talking more about my feeling when eating the cherry tomatoes, and less about the cherry tomatoes. Ripeness would be an attribute of the cherry tomatoes that I wouldn't be projecting as ripeness is a property of cherry tomatoes, not feelings.

When someone says that the cherry tomatoes are good, it is short for "I feel that the cherry tomatoes are good". — Harry Hindu

Given that my neighbor replied "You don't know what's good!", it's clear that he didn't operate on the above principle.

For some, using the short-hand version could make a listener think that they are projecting when they actually aren't.

We can usually see from the other things the person says whether this is the case or not. In the examples I gave, it's not.

I expect you to know I'm talking more about my feeling when eating the cherry tomatoes, and less about the cherry tomatoes.

As a rule, it seems that people typically conflate the two, their feelings about something and the thing itself. (Gourmet culture is a vivid example of such conflation.)


And this isn't a benign matter. If people wouldn't conflate like that, they couldn't come to statements like "Jews are inferior".

My disagreement with you was specifically over your claim that Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. There was really no need for you to comment at all, just to say that you are going to abstain from participation. Anyway if all you want to do is go over that argument again. which I think has already been well settled, then it is probably best that you are going to dip out.

For there is a clear sense in which what we experience and try to analyze is subjective, it is "object knowledge", available to subjects. — Manuel

Sure, but there is also a clear sense in which there is a difference between introspected "contents" and publicly available objects. In any case the point of this thread is to determine whether Dennett is correct in his characterization of phenomenology as consisting in mere introspection.

Yeah, formal descriptions of percepts. But to what end? Apparently not Dennett's, so what's Zahavi's (or your) point, Janus? — 180 Proof

Zahavi's point is to refute Dennett's characterization of phenomenology as consisting in mere introspection..As already pointed out, according to Zahavi he refers to phenomenology as practiced by Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau Ponty and others as "autophenomenology", a merely introspective "first person" practice which can yield no substantive knowledge, and proposes that it should become a
"third person practice" (Cognitive Science). Is it true according to you that "traditional" phenomenology as practiced is a practice that yields no substantive knowledge or not?

Dennets position is still philosophy. One can only reject philosophy with philosophy as long as one is speculating about the core of life

Does phenomenology necessarily lead to existentialist?

These sure sound like they are talking about introspection, maybe self-awareness. But when you start digging, you find the whole thing is just another western philosophical mountain of words. They seem to want to discuss human experiences without talking about the experiences themselves.

My personal way of seeing things focusses on self-awareness and the experience of the world. This is why I find eastern philosophies so attractive. Seems like I should be attracted to phenomenology too, but it leaves a bad taste in my mouth. — T Clark

Right, it does seem that way. But if you read the paper you will see that Zahavi argues that phenomenology is much more than that. He presents it as being concerned with reaching inter-subjective agreement as to how human experience seems to be structured.

Now Dennett might reject such results as being "mere folk understanding" and claim that we need to subject the reports of subjects to scientific testing and analysis in order to discover whether they are valid.

I think Zahavi is arguing that this alternative approach of Dennett's predicated as a substitute for traditional phenomenology, a substitute justified due to the latter's purported inadequacy, vacuity or whatever, is based on a misunderstanding of traditional phenomenology, a misunderstanding due to Dennett's lack of familiarity with the tradition.

Does phenomenology necessarily lead to existentialist? — Gregory

Sartre considered himself a phenomenologist but was callled an existentialist by many. There are no clear-cut boundaries between the two since there is no single agreed upon definition of either. I tend to think of existentialism as a precursor to phenomenology, not just historically but also in terms of content.

I think Zahavi is arguing that this alternative approach of Dennett's predicated as a substitute for traditional phenomenology, a substitute justified due to the latter's purported inadequacy, vacuity or whatever, is based on a misunderstanding of traditional phenomenology, a misunderstanding due to Dennett's lack of familiarity with the tradition. — Janus

It's also because Dennett has to deny that the first-person perspective contains any elements that are not in principle reproducible from a third-person point of view. Dennett's philosophy is bounded entirely by what can be regarded as objective knowledge according to scientific method. He's the poster-boy of scientism.

It's also because Dennett has to deny that the first-person perspective contains any elements that are not in principle reproducible from a third-person point of view. — Wayfarer

Dennett's "heterophenomenology" uses for its data, first person reports of experience, and then attempts to match, or discover mismatches, of what is revealed about neural activity by brain imaging with what is reported to be going on by subjects. As he admits this is just Cognitive Science as already practiced. It is an entirely different approach than traditional phenomenology. Zahavi argues that Dennett has misunderstood traditional phenomenology.

I was hoping that participants in this thread would read the paper and respond to the arguments therein. I;m not interested in your opinions about whether Dennett is a "poster boy" for scientism. I also don't want to get into arguments about which is the better approach. That said, it seems obvious Dennett thinks his is the better approach, even the only cogent approach. If that is so, is his attitude based on a misunderstanding of traditional phenomenology as Zahavi argues?

I think you and I agree, but this is a subject I'm still working on. Have you read "More is Different" by Anderson. — T Clark

I haven't, unfortunately.

When I talk about mind or consciousness I use words like "feeling," "thought," "memory," or "imagination." When I talk about biology and neurology, I use words like "neuron," "neurotransmitter," or "synapse." To say this use of different language shows that the two phenomena are not the same thing is not to deny that they are intimately related. — T Clark

Yes, that's what I was getting at.

Could you elaborate a bit? I do t see phenomenology as restricting itself to some special category of experience( subjective vs objective). On the contrary, it claims to
ground all forms of experiencing. — Joshs

I think you and I agree, but this is a subject I'm still working on. Have you read "More is Different" by Anderson.
— T Clark

I haven't, unfortunately.

When I talk about mind or consciousness I use words like "feeling," "thought," "memory," or "imagination." When I talk about biology and neurology, I use words like "neuron," "neurotransmitter," or "synapse." To say this use of different language shows that the two phenomena are not the same thing is not to deny that they are intimately related.
— T Clark

Yes, that's what I was getting at. — Agent Smith

Of course, there is something "non phenomenological" about phenomenology — Astrophel

I don't think I said that. Was it implied?

I read the article and it seems to me Dennett gets close to Wittgenstein's philosophy. Like I said, he can't get away from philosophy of all kinds

Dennets position is still philosophy. One can only reject philosophy with philosophy as long as one is speculating about the core of life — Gregory

I agree. I think there are various possible philosophical approaches, and it is not my intention to denigrate Dennett's heterophenomenology.To repeat, the question is as to whether Dennett's denigration of traditional phenomenology is misplaced.

I read the article and it seems to me Dennett gets close to Wittgenstein's philosophy. Like I said, he can't get away from philosophy of all kinds — Gregory

I don't think Dennett is trying to "get away from philosophy of all kinds"; I mean he self-identifies as a philosopher after all.

When I talk about mind or consciousness I use words like "feeling," "thought," "memory," or "imagination." When I talk about biology and neurology, I use words like "neuron," "neurotransmitter," or "synapse." To say this use of different language shows that the two phenomena are not the same thing is not to deny that they are intimately related. — Agent Smith

Yes, but the question that phenomenology asks is whether we need to recognize that talking about biology or neurology is not departing from the grounding phenomenological structures that makes taking about mind or consciousness possible.

Yes, but the question that phenomenology asks is whether we need to recognize that talking about biology or neurology is not departing from the grounding phenomenological structures that makes taking about mind or consciousness possible. — Joshs

I think this is an important point. Dennett's approach and cognitive science generally seem to be predicated on the idea that we cannot elucidate the "grounding phenomenological structures" by practicing phenomenology, but that "third person" scientific investigations are necessary lest we fall into mere "folk" science or philosophy.

I understand the thinking that is taken to justify this stance in general, but I wonder whether Dennett would change his mind if his stance is based on this (purported) misunderstanding, and the misunderstanding were to be cleared up for him, I doubt it: I think his stance comes first and his misunderstanding of phenomenology is driven by the presuppositions involved in that standpoint. But I'm interested to hear what others have to say about it.

To put it another way, should phenomenology be considered to be a failure, a waste of time, vacuous and so on just because it is not a science in the usual understanding of what it is to be a science? I think it is more of an art than a science in that narrow sense of "science', and that it has much value on that account. I mean the rest of philosophy doesn't count as science in that narrow sense, either; so could there be a reason to dismiss phenomenology that doesn't apply to all the other domains of philosophy?

I also want to point out that no one has yet addressed the headline question: 'does phenomenology consist merely in introspection'? If it does then Dennett does not misunderstand it, if it doesn't then he does misunderstand it.

For my part I agree with the passage quoted from Zahavi; phenomenology does not merely consist in introspection, but of course introspection is involved just as it is with heterophenomenology. So, I see the two approaches as two possible ways to investigate the data supplied by subjective reports concerning experience; accounts of what is experienced and how that experience feels and how it is understood.

Sure, but there is also a clear sense in which there is a difference between introspected "contents" and publicly available objects. In any case the point of this thread is to determine whether Dennett is correct in his characterization of phenomenology as consisting in mere introspection. — Janus

Ah, then I misread the OP, I thought you were asking if we thought that phenomenology was merely introspecting into one's mind, not to evaluate Dennett's critique.

I don't profit from him nor can I talk much about him without getting very annoyed, so, I'll take my bow.

Apologies for my clumsy reading.

Husserls observation that to experience someone else's qualia would be to become that person is pure philosophy and not psychology. Dennett is a philosopher but he seems to me to want to control others philosophical musings and iron them out so that little if any philosophy of being remains. Heidelberg too speaks of man as time. Surely that is something psychology and brain science can't get it's hands on, right?

I'm afraid I can contribute nothing more to the discussion. Adios!

I don't think I said that. Was it implied? — Agent Smith

You said:The takeaway: There's something nonchemical about biology and there's something nophysics about chemistry, so on and so forth.
Phenomenology is indeterminate on the issue of foundational knowledge claims, and for most, the only foundation one can defend is hermeneutics, and this applies across the board, even to the itself, which is hard for many to grasp. There really is no way out: Language itself is inherently indeterminate.

Dennett levels this criticism at phenomenology in Consciousness Explained and proposes that, because of this subjective nature of phenomenology, which doesn't give us any reliable data to work with, it should be thought of as "autophenomenology", and as a supposed corrective he proposes a discipline he names "heterophenomenology", which is the "third person" recording, analysis and critique of the reports of others about what they take to be the nature of their consciousness. He says that this is not a new discipline but is in fact just Cognitive Science. The other dimension of this investigation is brain imaging to look for neural correlates with what people report is going on in their minds. — Janus

Keep in mind that Dennett does not believe that his assumptions about science's knowledge claims are absolutes, but that, following Russell, he thinks science is simply the only wheel that rolls. And it does roll so well! Thus you get outrageous utterances like "which doesn't give us any reliable data to work with." he really isn't even trying to understand phenomenology, and I doubt he has read much, or any. He reads scientific journals, I imagine exclusively. Heidegger? I think not.
People like this are simply out of their depths. They don't see that phenomenology is not at all in conflict with scientific perspectives; it's just that science is altogether something OTHER than philosophy. Dennett doesn''t seem to want to look closely at this because he's too busy reading other things, and also, I think, because it does take a certain capacity to freely pull away from the paradigms of science and move to a higher order of thinking, which he doesn't have. Training forbids.
So this philosophically myopic thinker really doesn't understand anything about phenomenology. He thinks it's like studying qualia, and if you ever take a little time to read Being and Time, you would see this is Heidegger (as well as the post modern thinking that followed him) says nothing at all like this. Husserl was a bit like this (Heidegger said he was "walking on water).

Anyway, never listen to a scientist turned philosopher. All they produce is dogmatic reassurances that everything is okay and we really DO understand the world. They are a silly bunch.

Language itself is inherently indeterminate. — Astrophel

Whaddaya mean?

Whaddaya mean? — Agent Smith

I mean when we make statements about the world, the first place basic inquiry begins is the beginning: the language event that produces meaning that is presupposed in the utterance. THE phenomenological insight is that what is there sitting before waiting for analysis already possesses the terms for analytic work, and these terms are not magically hooked up with their referents: they are pre-understood in the language of an evolved knowledge base. So, the geologist isn't looking at "properties" exhibited by the object that are stand alone; their "standing" is a composite of what the understanding brings to the occasion.
This is the kind of thing Dennett and his ilk do not want to talk about. But there is a whole history of philosophy that does talk about this, right up to the present time.

Given that my neighbor replied "You don't know what's good!", it's clear that he didn't operate on the above principle. — baker

They could have meant, "You don't know how I feel!".

The point is that we already have a way of using words that can refer to our feelings in an objective way. The problem is confusing one for the other - our feelings and the object our feelings are associated with, not a problem of language. Our minds and our feelings are just as real as everything else and can be talked about objectively, just like everything else.

As a rule, it seems that people typically conflate the two, their feelings about something and the thing itself. (Gourmet culture is a vivid example of such conflation.)

And this isn't a benign matter. If people wouldn't conflate like that, they couldn't come to statements like "Jews are inferior" — baker

Is this a result of how they see the world independent of language, or how language has made them see the world?

We agree that people conflate the two, but my point was that some people don't, and that there is no limitations in our language that prevent us from talking about the world and the mind objectively.

A more interesting example of the subjective nature we view the world is how we view it as a species vs. other species. Being able to determine what you perceive is real or an illusion is by using your observations of how others behave in a similar instance, is fine for limiting personal subjective errors, but what if we all have the same kind of illusion because of how our particular brains and senses function compared to other species? Using the behavior of others that share the same illusion isn't going to be very helpful. The use of animals, like dogs with heightened senses of hearing and smell are often used in addition to our own senses to determine if the noise you heard isn't just a figment of your imagination.

Now consider how any brain processes information compared to the other processes of the world. The brain takes time to process information, and the time it takes to process that info is relative to the process of change everywhere else. So how the brain perceives the world can be relative to how fast or slow everything else changes. Stable, slow changing processes would appear as fixed, unchanging objects, while faster processes would appear as processes of the objects themselves.

Think of how we perceive the three states of matter. Solid objects are composed of slow-moving, stable molecular interactions. Liquids are composed of faster and less stable molecular interactions, and gases even more so. Could it be that the quantified three states of matter are really more to do with how we perceive other processes relative to the frequency of how our brains process the information? This isn't to say that the interaction between molecules doesn't change, only that our compartmentalized view of these changes is a projection, kind of like digitizing an analog signal.

This would mean that the objects that we perceive are the result of our own subjective frequency of processing information relative to these frequency of change in the other processes that we are perceiving. This would mean that brains as objects don't really exist. Everything is process. This would explain why what we perceive appears differently to how we perceive (objects vs process).

I heard two sayings recently:

"Everything is so relative that it becomes absolute"

"If the world is God, then the laws of science of science are his mind"

Dennett doesn't like God and he is putting the horse behind the cart when he says (or seems to say) that philosophy is physiology

I mean when we make statements about the world, the first place basic inquiry begins is the beginning: the language event that produces meaning that is presupposed in the utterance. THE phenomenological insight is that what is there sitting before waiting for analysis already possesses the terms for analytic work, and these terms are not magically hooked up with their referents: they are pre-understood in the language of an evolved knowledge base. So, the geologist isn't looking at "properties" exhibited by the object that are stand alone; their "standing" is a composite of what the understanding brings to the occasion.
This is the kind of thing Dennett and his ilk do not want to talk about. But there is a whole history of philosophy that does talk about this, right up to the present time. — Astrophel

What's pre-understood? If I catch your drift, you seem to be saying something to the effect that we already comprehend/know the world; all that's needed is to become conscious/aware of it. If it's remembering then we're in rationalist territory (innate ideas). :chin: Fascinating!