Laugh and ironise all you want; it is your own refusal to engage in arguments that may lead one to conclude that you don't care about them. — Pierre-Normand

I did. It's just that you find them in an inconvenient form. How does one reject reductionism without making naturalism as vulnerable.

If you say a similar argument can be made against naturalism, I am happy to concede. — Frederick KOH

I have been explicitly arguing that naturalism and reductionism are not aligned positions. I've criticized Weinberg's tacit assimilation of them. I endorse a form of the former and reject most forms of the latter. (I endorse only Ernst Mayr's scientific "analysis", a rather weak form of methodological/heuristic "reductionism"). Naturalism and irreducible-pluralism live happily together. Almost all of the emergentist/anti-reductionist scientists and philosophers who I learn from are naturalists. (They may be called 'relaxed' naturalists: a position that harmonises with Putnam's 'realism with a human face'). For a depiction of this sort of naturalism, see the various essays in Mario De Caro, David Macarthur eds, Naturalism in Question, HUP 2008. (I recommend especially the essays by Davidson, Dupré, Hornsby, McDowell and Putnam.)

I have been explicitly arguing that naturalism and reductionism are not aligned positions. — Pierre-Normand

They don't have to be aligned and I am not saying they are. I am saying analogous arguments can be made against naturalism.

They don't have to be aligned and I am not saying they are. I am saying analogous arguments can be made against naturalism. — Frederick KOH

It is not a sound criticism of a sound argument that merely "similar" arguments can be made to support a false position. If this is the case, then you had better attend to the difference, rather than the similarity, in order to properly diagnose the subtle flaw in the second argument.

It is not a sound criticism of a sound argument that merely "similar" arguments can be made to support a false position. — Pierre-Normand

All non-trivial philosophical positions have respectable arguments against them. What does "false" mean?

If this is the case, then you had better attend to the difference, rather than the similarity, in order to properly diagnose the subtle flaw in the second argument. — Pierre-Normand

As I keep saying, they have the same flaws, subtle or not.

Supernatural phenomena are really only natural phenomena we don't expect. In any case, the reason for rejecting a (super) natural phenomena is because of a lack of evidence/falsification.

When we ask: "how does the chicken soup do that?", a testable hypothesis needs to be defined before we can approach the question. To just speculate "magic" fails to do this. We can't even progress to whether or not a (super) natural cause is in effect because no (super) natural cause has been proposed. Someone has just seen chicken soup and said "magic".

They are, in fact, saying there is nothing further to investigate about how the chicken soup worked. Magic has not been defined as a testable actor. As presented, it is not suggesting any sort of answer to how the chicken soup works, so it's rightly dismissed for failing to even define a hypothesis.

As I keep saying, they have the same flaws, subtle or not. — Frederick KOH

You haven't stated what the flaws in my arguments were. You haven't offered any specific counter-argument. You merely complained that if they weren't assumed to be flawed in some way or other then some dogmatic "naturalists" might sh*t their pants.

You haven't stated what the flaws in my argument were. — Pierre-Normand

"They" referred to naturalism and reductionism. How did my "they" turn into your "my"?

You haven't offered any specific counter-argument. You merely complained that if they weren't assumed to be flawed in some way or other then some dogmatic "naturalists" might sh*t their pants. — Pierre-Normand

In a way, you argued with yourself. You were challenged on your naturalism and your position shifted noticeably. I even juxtaposed/quoted the change in some of my comments.

"They" referred to naturalism and reductionism. How did my "they" turn into your "my"? — Frederick KOH

Sorry, I misunderstood. But your argumentative strategy is so bizarre and out of this world that you are easily misunderstood. You are now arguing, again, that it matters not at all if Weinberg's arguments in favor of reductionism are afflicted by little or large flaws. (And this after straddling me with the burden of criticizing his allegedly very strong arguments). You are now arguing that the flaws in his pro-reductionism arguments must be ignored since, if they were acknowleged, then similar (albeit unspecified) flaws in pro-naturalism arguments could make some naturalists worried. Meanwhile, you are declining to indicate how the sort of pluralism that I (together with several distinguished scientists and philosophers of science) recommend might constitute any threat at all to a defensible naturalism that wouldn't share the flaws that afflict reductionism.

You are now arguing, again, that it matters not at all if Weinberg's arguments in favor of reductionism are afflicted by little or large flaws. (And this after straddling me with the burden of criticizing his allegedly very strong arguments). — Pierre-Normand

The arguments against naturalism are respectable philosophical arguments. If we accept naturalism anyway, does it mean that it matters not at all that arguments against it are afflicted by little or large flaws?

In a way, you argued with yourself. You were challenged on you naturalism and you position shifted noticeably. I even juxtaposed/quoted the change some of my comments. — Frederick KOH

Since you assumed naturalism to be roughly equivalent to reductionism, you misconstrued what my acknowledgement of naturalism (which I defined as the mere denial of super-naturalism, or of mysterious emergent laws that defy all explanation) entailed. You position shifted rather more dramatically from an acknowledgement of the burden to defend Weinberg's pro-reductionism arguments against my criticism to a claim of indifference towards the flaws, small or large, that they may present.

You are now arguing that the flaws in his pro-reductionism arguments must be ignored since, if they were acknowleged, then similar (albeit unspecified) flaws in pro-naturalism arguments could make some naturalists worried. — Pierre-Normand

No. Please give me exact quote.

a defensible naturalism that wouldn't share the flaws that afflict reductionism. — Pierre-Normand

There isn't one.

Since you assumed naturalism to be roughly equivalent to reductionism, you misconstrued what my acknowledgement of naturalism (which I defined as the mere denial of super-naturalism, or of mysterious emergent laws that defy all explanation) entailed. — Pierre-Normand

When you deny the "super" of something, how do you avoid talking about the something first?

The arguments against naturalism are respectable philosophical arguments. If we accept naturalism anyway, does it mean that it matters not at all that arguments against it are afflicted by little or large flaws? — Frederick KOH

No. Quite the contrary. If we endorse naturalism then we thereby straddle ourselves with the burden of showing that anti-naturalism arguments are flawed. Either that, or we must show that the specific form of naturalism that we endorse doesn't share in the flaws of the different sort of naturalism that the anti-naturalism arguments target. The essays in the Naturalism in Question book that I references earlier make clear that there are various doctrines that fall under the name "naturalism", some of which are viewed as reasonable (e.g. McDowell's "relaxed" naturalism) and some of which are viewed as questionable (e.g. various forms of reductionism or scientism), by the very same philosophers.

You position shifted rather more dramatically from an acknowledgement of the burden to defend Weinberg's pro-reductionism arguments against my criticism to a claim of indifference towards the flaws, small or large, that they may present. — Pierre-Normand

Accepting a position does not mean you are indifferent to its flaws. Similar flaws exist in other positions.

The tactic Weinberg used is particularly suitable for this situation where all alternatives are problematic. Soup or touch. We know what choice we would make first and think of the reasons later.

If we endorse naturalism then we thereby straddle ourselves with the burden of showing that anti-naturalism arguments are flawed. — Pierre-Normand

This does not erase the flaws of naturalism.

When you deny the "super" of something, how do you avoid talking about the something first? — Frederick KOH

If this were a thread about naturalism, then I might take that burden. But I need no produce a detailed account of the naturalism that I would feel comfortable arguing for in order to point out that Weinberg's assimilation of anti-reductionism to a belief in magic, or in supernatural phenomena, is unwarranted. It suffices for me to sketch an account of the forms of non-reductive scientific explanations -- explanations that are commonly generated in ordinary scientific practice, including in physics -- the structure of which Weinberg completely overlooks, in order to show that his fear is unwarranted.

If this were a thread about naturalism, then I might take that burden. But I need no produce a detailed account of the naturalism that I would feel comfortable arguing for in order to point out that Weinberg's assimilation of anti-reductionism to a belief in magic, or in supernatural phenomena, is unwarranted. It suffices for me to sketch an account of the forms of non-reductive scientific explanations -- explanations that are commonly generated in ordinary scientific practice, including in physics -- the structure of which Weinberg completely overlooks, in order to show that his fear is unwarranted. — Pierre-Normand

Then how can any denial of super-naturalism be "mere"?

This does not erase the flaws of naturalism. — Frederick KOH

Well, how else do you "erase" the alleged flaws of a position that you endorse other than through showing that the arguments mustered by your critics against it are themselves flawed or point missing?

No. Please give me exact quote. — Frederick KOH

You asked rhetorically: "How does one reject reductionism without making naturalism as vulnerable." and you seem to value highly the defense of naturalism. Since you mostly argue through asking non-committal rhetorical questions, it's very hard to reconstruct what it is that you might believe of be arguing for, positively. If you feel that your views are being misconstrued, it would be better for you to be more explicit rather than challenge *me* to justify my paraphrases of them, and invite even more misunderstanding without committing to anything.

There isn't one. — Frederick KOH

This is a mere dogmatic denial. There are many such forms of naturalism on offer (both in the philosophical literature and within ordinary scientific practice). It is your burden to show that they entail some sort of unacknowledged belief in magic, or to show that all forms of genuine scientific explanation that don't involve magic (and that aren't either reliant on mysterious emergent laws that defy all explanation) must be reductionistic in Weinberg's sense. I have showed you why Weinberg's demonstration that all "Why?" explanations must either be reductive or magical is flawed, since he overlooks many forms of successful explanation of scientific laws or principles (or natural regularities, biological norms, etc.) that are commonly made use of in ordinary scientific practice and that are neither reductionistic nor magical. They just don't happen to all point neatly in the direction of the unique point of convergence where Weinberg locates his dreamed of "final theory".

Accepting a position does not mean you are indifferent to its flaws. Similar flaws exist in other positions. — Frederick KOH

I am not faulting you for failing to abandon the position that you had taken the burden to defend (and that you had straddled me with the burden of criticizing the specific arguments Weinberg muster in favor of it). I am rather faulting you with failing to even acknowledge (let alone seriously address) my criticisms of Weinberg's positive arguments on the ridiculous ground that any flaws a philosophical position might present aren't necessary fatal to it and hence dont really undermine it.

Well, how else do you "erase" the alleged flaws of a position that you endorse other than through showing that the arguments mustered by your critics against it are themselves flawed or point missing? — Pierre-Normand

In the case of Weinberg, he faces what I consider an insurmountable disadvantage. Even when he engages philosophers, he engages as a scientist. He makes claims that have no hope of being philosophically defended because they are empirical claims but of a different order. They are not properly scientific either because these are claims at a higher level of generality than a scientific theory.

It's quite a jump to get from me saying

"How does one reject reductionism without making naturalism as vulnerable."

to

You are now arguing that the flaws in his pro-reductionism arguments must be ignored since, if they were acknowleged, then similar (albeit unspecified) flaws in pro-naturalism arguments could make some naturalists worried. — Pierre-Normand

This is a mere dogmatic denial. There are many such forms of naturalism on offer (both in the philosophical literature and within ordinary scientific practice). It is your burden to show that they entail some sort of unacknowledged belief in magic, or to show that all forms of genuine scientific explanation that don't involve magic (and that aren't either reliant on mysterious emergent laws that defy all explanation) must be reductionistic in Weinberg's sense. — Pierre-Normand

No I don't. Either there is such a naturalism and people opposed to naturalism in general are all incapable of reasoning or there is none. I am inclined to conclude the latter.

I am rather faulting you with failing to even acknowledge (let alone seriously address) my criticisms of Weinberg's positive arguments on the ridiculous ground that any flaws a philosophical position might present aren't necessary fatal to it and hence dont really undermine it. — Pierre-Normand

Because he isn't doing philosophy. I repeat here what I said in another comment:

In the case of Weinberg, he faces what I consider an insurmountable disadvantage. Even when he engages philosophers, he engages as a scientist. He makes claims that have no hope of being philosophically defended because they are empirical claims but of a different order. They are not properly scientific either because these are claims at a higher level of generality than a scientific theory.

In the case of Weinberg, he faces what I consider an insurmountable disadvantage. Even when he engages philosophers, he engages as a scientist. He makes claims that have no hope of being philosophically defended because they are empirical claims but of a different order. They are not properly scientific either because these are claims at a higher level of generality than a scientific theory. — Frederick KOH

I guess I can agree with you that Weinberg's arguments aren't any better when construed as scientific arguments than they are when construed as philosophical arguments. His lack of so much as a cursory acquaintance with the relevant literature on reduction and emergence, either in physics, specifically, or in science, generally (e.g. in chemistry, biology, social sciences and cognitive sciences) also puts him at a severe disadvantage compared with his numerous colleagues who both are well acquainted with this literature, and who also (some of them) actively contribute to it.

Weinberg's denial of the autonomy of emergent domains of scientific explanation seems to rest on the belief that the affirmation of such an autonomy amounts to a denial that the laws and principles formulated at this higher-level can have any explanation. — Pierre-Normand

Notice that Weinberg again assumes that either the emergent laws must have reductive explanations in terms of deeper scientific principles that govern (in this case) the individual constituents of the high-level entities (i.e. the composite individuals picked up by the high-level "terms") or they must be believed by the strong emergentist to be governed by principles that are "fundamental" in the sense that they don't have any explanaton at all — Pierre-Normand

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory to determine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction?