Theists ignore the spatial dimension although they seem concerned about time. In other words, God's location doesn't seem to figure in theistic arguments but it's important that God exists i.e. God isn't dead.

P. S. One of God's attributes - omnipresent - doesn't show up much in arguments. It kinda slowly faded out of discourse.

I am a theist and I do not ignore the spatial dimension.

Similarly, what is the semantic difference between "something exists" vs "something is somewhere now"? — Millard J Melnyk

Something exists can mean both inside and outside if spacetime, like God or ideas. Something is somewhere now only applies to locations in spacetime.

There is no difference semantically, or there is some difference. The question is posed as if there were an absolute and irrefutable semantical value to these statements, but there is not. It has been shown pretty definitively that language couldn't have possibly naturally occurred without some inherent ambiguity of meaning. Context is king. Most often I would suggest that "existing" means "not imaginary", which would often but not always coincide with being somewhere at sometime. Saying that poverty exists isn't saying that it's a specific entity that exists in a particular place, it's saying that it isn't a falsehood. Saying that God doesn't exist is saying that God is fictional, mythological or imaginary. The words "real" and "exist" almost always are used in at least implied contrast with the idea of being mistaken or lying. That's why philosophers have such problems with "nothingness", because there isn't anything to contrast it to.

I'm aware of two fundamental domains: actuality (whatever is really going on) and narrative.

The two are distinct because actuality is not referential. It does not refer to something else. It is not about anything at all. Narrative is alway an abstraction, contingent on actuality for meaning and sensibleness. In any narrative chain where imaginaries refer to imaginaries (Harari's "fictional realities"), which refer to yet other imaginaries, etc., if no factual actuality is ever referred to by an imaginary, thus grounding the chain in actuality, then the entire chain is imaginary and meaningless and senseless for purposes in actuality.

The only valid role for an imaginary narrative chain is to influence the consciousness of those who hear/read/watch the narrative. This is why a story of a horse can properly have meaning and sense for purposes in actuality (because there are actualities we class in the category "horses") while (so far as we know) a story of a unicorn holds no meaning or sense for purposes in actuality. "Horse" refers to something in actuality. "Unicorn" refers to nothing in actuality.

We have no evidence whatsoever that "God" and a whole bunch of other "fictional realities"/imaginaries exist anywhere else than in the narratives which present them. Actualities, in contrast, exist utterly in disregard of narrative and make no reference to anything. They are not "about" anything. So the existence of actualities and the "existence" of imaginaries are not at all the same.

Something is somewhere now only applies to locations in spacetime. — Raymond

Once we differentiate between narrative and actuality, it all depends. "God is somewhere now (such as in heaven) by definition (for many believers) transcends space-time. If God and heaven are solely narratives, then God is somewhere now in the heaven in the narrative.

Every "Does God exist?" argument I've seen gets confused because neither atheists nor theists make clear, consistent distinctions between narrative (imaginaries) and actuality (what's really going on). It's a big reason why they invariably end up talking past each other.

The question is posed as if there were an absolute and irrefutable semantical value to these statements, but there is not. — Reformed Nihilist

You can reformulate my statement that way, but then that's not necessarily what I said. It's not necessary to reformulate it. I in fact did not say or imply the question is "absolute" or "irrefutable". So, then, you are responsible to account for your own read-in/inference/inserted implications. I certainly cannot.

I agree, context is king.

Most often I would suggest that "existing" means "not imaginary", which would often but not always coincide with being somewhere at sometime. — Reformed Nihilist

Like I explained above, that is contextual. An imaginary presented in narrative can well "exist" in the narrative. When Oliver held up his bowl and said, "Please sir, I want some more," he and the bowl and the headmaster and the gruel (presumably there was still more in the pot that the headmaster could have said he could have more of) all "existed" in the large stone hall in the school in the story.

Saying that poverty exists isn't saying that it's a specific entity that exists in a particular place, it's saying that it isn't a falsehood. — Reformed Nihilist

It can be stated in that sense, of course, but your unstated, implicit claim seems to be that it can only be stated in that sense. Of course, "poverty" is not an entity, it's much more like a state of affairs involving a large number of entities. The state of affairs is a narrative that refers to the actuality of the context and situation and behavior of all those entities. So the "what's really going on" in that context with those entities in action is the actuality (a system as opposed to a singular entity) which "poverty" refers to.

Referentialy is basic and simple, and I've found very few people who have a good grasp of it.

That's why philosophers have such problems with "nothingness", because there isn't anything to contrast it to — Reformed Nihilist

Yeah, but the problems disappear as soon as they stop confusing an narrative construct that is meaningless unless it's a reference to what is " not" -- which in actuality is a reference to what is "other than" the actual thing/person/object/phenomenon/system/etc. being "notted".

Gotta say, you have very definitive opinions about the responses to a very vague and open ended question. Personally I'd find it more interesting if you put the effort into your original question that you put into your responses.

Where is the domain of natural numbers? Where do physical and scientific principles exist?

The question is legit and non-rhetorical. I do these kinds of posts all the time and I'm so surprised that so few people do it. I'm exposing my "definitive opinions" to scrutiny and criticism in the hopes of learning something I don't already know and having my mistakes pointed out to me. For those purposes, the best way to present the ideas is as clear, unambiguous hyptheses to be tested and/or replicated. It's nothing more than applying the "scientific method" to philosophical thinking. It's what "thought experiments" are all about. I'm testing what to me seems like obvious ideas (i.e., that "exists" is no more than a synonym equivalent to "is somewhere now".

For me, again unlike the vast majority of people I try to have these conversations with, the mere fact that I cannot draw any other conclusion does not, to me, ipso facto imply that no other conclusions could be drawn.

That's where you come in. I want to see if anyone can successfully draw a different conclusion. In the process, I expose the thinking behind my question and the reasons why I can't see any other conclusion.

Apparently that's distasteful to you? You tell me.

I would prefer that you would focus on the content/ideas I present instead of wishing I didn't present them.

Where is the domain of natural numbers? Where do physical and scientific principles exist? — Wayfarer

Where indeed?

In my schema they either belong in the ontological domain of narrative or of actuality.

So you tell me, what actuality (Harari likes to say "objective reality") does 1 + 1 = 2 refer to? And I assume we're not talking applied mathematics but the axiomatic theories we normally refer simply as "mathematics".

All theories are narratives. All principles are narratives. All models are narratives (in their roles as models). They refer to actualities (hopefully). They are about what's really going on. They themselves are not the real goings-on. The represent in abstract, general, symbolic terms what the theory/principle/model asserts really goes on.

Actualities as themselves don't refer to, represent, assert anything at all -- they just are/happen.

This distinction is important if we're to understand human experience -- especially our own -- because in the immanent moment where everything we experience actually occurs, our experience of what's really going on is concrete, not abstract, and a finite amount of time elapses between experiencing what's really going on vs. saying or thinking something about what happened.

Thinking/reflecting/narrative of any sort always post-dates what happened, (unless you believe in prophecy/clairvoyance/prescience, etc., but let's not go there, this chunk is already quite big enough to chew lol.) So -- although I didn't feel like getting into this part here, but I'll mention it -- I'm pretty sure that all narrative/narrative constructs/"fictional realities" refer (are "about) what really happened -- not what is really happening.

Again, that's one of those things that, after decades of thought in and around the topic, I can't see any other conclusion to reasonable draw.

PS. To all: several times I've mentioned Harari. You can read his books, of course (I've perused Sapiens well enough to broad-brush grasp his main ideas) or you can watch this clip in which he explains "objective" and "fictional" realities.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zen-m0rMp4I&ab_channel=RSA

So you tell me, what actuality (Harari likes to say "objective reality") does 1 + 1 = 2 refer to? — Millard J Melnyk

The primitive rules of arithmetic are self-explanatory. It's not 'narrative' although it can serve to underpin any number of narratives. Numbers and the like are not objectively the case. They are referred to to establish what is objectively the case, through quantitative analysis.

Thinking/reflecting/narrative of any sort always post-dates what happened, — Millard J Melnyk

They're also predictive - which is why mathematical analysis is intrinsic to almost all science and engineering. Using mathematical analysis you can make predictions and discover many things which were previously unknown. The last three centuries of science is ample evidence for that. When Paul Dirac posited anti-matter, he did so purely on the basis of a mathematical symettry. It was something for which no evidence as yet existed, but it was validated years after the event.

Again, that's one of those things that, after decades of thought in and around the topic, I can't see any other conclusion to reasonable draw. — Millard J Melnyk

You're not drawing a conclusion. You're simply making an assertion.

The primitive rules of arithmetic are self-explanatory. — Wayfarer

Self-explanatory or not, the fact that math rests on axioms that seem self-evident does not ipso facto signify either that they do or do not refer to anything at all. My question asked what 1 + 1 = 2 refers to. Or I could have just asked what "1" refers to and kept it simpler.

Context. Again, in my schema they are narrative, because we have no way of knowing that they really happen or that they are really there. Aside from the dictum that they "exist" in some quasi-Platonic way, which can be a useful starting point for thinking and discussion, an assertion of the actuality of something that "1" refers to is completely groundless. Ipse dixit does not serve as grounds for anything.

They're also predictive - which is why mathematical analysis is intrinsic to almost all science and engineering. — Wayfarer

They're also predictive — Wayfarer

That's a different sense of "predictive" than what I said. Your sense is based on an assumption that Hume could not justify ("problem of induction") and, to date, I know of no convincing attempt to solve the "problem" he raised almost 350 years ago.

I said something far more fundamental and simple. No matter what physics or math tell us, in point of fact, in actuality, in a real situation where things are really happening, no one knows for sure what is going to happen in the next instant, let alone in the next minutes, hours, or days (unless they're a "psychic".) The reliability of the math or physics principles as applied in actuality depends wholly on the quality and extent of the evidential data which (again, hopefully -- you would not believe how many theorists cherry pick the data to fit their pet theories and how long that BS can persist) the theories draw from. Bad data, bad principles. A "prediction" in the abstract -- in theoretical terms -- is not a prediction in actuality. That's why we need engineers in order to apply math and physics. Physicists handle actualities only insofar as they have a bearing on their (or someone else's) theoretical work. Mathematicians don't typically handle any actualities at all, working completely in a narrative head space. Applied math and applied physics deal with actual predictions -- which is the kind I mentioned.

So that was actually a good example of where failing to keep narrative distinct from actuality creates confusion.

You're not drawing a conclusion. You're simply making an assertion. — Wayfarer

I had no intention of laying out the actual drawing of the conclusion here. And you actually have no knowledge that could possibly serve as a basis for claiming it's an assertion vs. a conclusion. (I'm guessing you mean "assertion" as an ipse dixit there.) You're judging things that are not evident here based solely on what you have seen here.

Like I said, I stated a hypothesis for you to knock down, a straw man that, if there are other conclusions to draw, someone ought to be able to knock down. That's way easier to do than what you seem to want to do. I'm not arguing those hypotheses (for your purposes) as conclusions of a syllogism. I'm soliciting falsification by counter-example. (See Popper's work.) For that purpose, it's irrelevant whether you treat the apparent equivalence between "exists" vs "is somewhere now" as a hypothesis or a conclusion or an assertion.

You have no clue what work I have or have not done that led me to report that I have tried to draw any other conclusion than equivalence but haven't been able to. You seem to think I posted here in order for you to scrutinize and evaluate the work I've done. That's unrealistic. And, again, that's not my purpose here.

As I've already said, my purpose here is to invite counter-examples and comments on the conclusions I've stated as the result of the work I've done, not to invite pretended clairvoyance evaluating things about which I've said nothing and about which you couldn't possibly glean the slightest inkling from from what I have said.

If the assertion/conclusion/hypothesis can be countered/falsified, cool, let me see what counters/falsifies it. If not, that doesn't "prove" it's correct -- it proves that at this point in time neither I nor you nor anyone I know is aware any counter-example or other kind of falsification of it.

Where is the domain of natural numbers? Where do physical and scientific principles exist? — Wayfarer

I could have answered more simply, respectively: in the minds of people who use math and develop the field of mathematics, and in the minds of scientists and people who understand their work.

I could have answered more simply, respectively: in the minds of people who use math — Millard J Melnyk

The reality of numbers can't simply be confined to the minds of those who think. If another planet were to evolve and sentient beings were to evolve, presumably the same fundamental constituents of arithmetic would be discovered by them. Furthermore, having understood some elements of mathematics, further elements can then be discovered, both in terms of pure and applied mathematics, which are then accessible to other persons, and are not in any way the property of those who discover them.

That's a different sense of "predictive" than what I said. Your sense is based on an assumption that Hume could not justify ("problem of induction") — Millard J Melnyk

Mathematical predictions are valid a priori. Hume had no bone to pick with that, his argument was against the idea that the predictable regularities which are understood as causal relationships, really have any grounding in either experience or logic. But I accept that Kant answered that challenge in his reply to Hume.

Like I said, I stated a hypothesis for you to knock down, a straw man that, if there are other conclusions to draw, someone ought to be able to knock down. — Millard J Melnyk

Well, I'll answer it this way. This statement seems to declare that whatever exists must be situated in time and space. You appear to be asking for a challenge to that claim. I have challenged it by raising the issue of the nature of number and scientific principles, and the like. The sense in which they exist is indeed a vexed question in philosophy, but the fact that its a vexed question is sufficient to refute the conjecture that the notion of what exists ought to be confined to what is 'somewhere now', or at least to call it into question. But as I see you've written an accepted your own answer, perhaps I ought not to have bothered responding.

The reality of numbers can't simply be confined to the minds of those who think. — Wayfarer

Why not? Because you ipse dixit so?

If another planet were to evolve and sentient beings were to evolve, presumably the same fundamental constituents of arithmetic would be discovered by them. — Wayfarer

"Presumably" is not terrible basis for making a truth claim like you just did. "Presumably" introduces a hypothetical possibility. For every "presumably" there is a corresponding and equally valid (truth is irrelevant to hypotheticals by definition) "presumably not". Hypothetical possibilities that you like don't carry more epistemic value than their opposites, especially not when it's just because you happen to like them.

Mathematical predictions are valid a priori. — Wayfarer

Dude you're proving my point and don't seem to realize it. A priori means none other than not in actuality. Don't believe me, here's the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the topic.

A Priori and A Posteriori
The terms “a priori” and “a posteriori” are used primarily to denote the foundations upon which a proposition is known. A given proposition is knowable a priori if it can be known independent of any experience other than the experience of learning the language in which the proposition is expressed, whereas a proposition that is knowable a posteriori is known on the basis of experience. For example, the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried is a priori, and the proposition that it is raining outside now is a posteriori.

-- https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/

Independent of any experience other than the experience of learning the language in which the proposition is expressed. How does that not put it squarely within the domain of narrative? Your comments pertain solely to propositions which are none other than narrative constructs. Somehow you aren't getting it.

This statement seems to declare that whatever exists must be situated in time and space. You appear to be asking for a challenge to that claim. — Wayfarer

I didn't write that. I didn't claim that. You inferred that's what I meant, and I corrected you way up at the beginning, but here you are as if I never said anything about it at all.

Sorry man, it's not your fault if you don't get what I'm after. No sweat, it's all good. I'm just telling you that the tracks you keep trying to head down are not anything I'm interested in, not in this post. I think you and I have gone as far as I care to go.

So at what spatiotemporal location can a natural law be found? Or do natural laws not exist?

Edit: I take it that "somewhere" cannot be omnipresent, and that "now" cannot be omni-durational ... this as natural laws are inferred to be.

This statement seems to declare that whatever exists must be situated in time and space. You appear to be asking for a challenge to that claim. — Wayfarer

My bad, I said I corrected you on that way up at the beginning. I did correct the inference, but I misattributed the statement I corrected to you. It was Raymond's statement, not yours, so you might not have reads it -- but you both made the same inference. Even so, I should have checked first. But what I said still stands concerning the inference, even though I got confused about where it came from. See my comment above that begins:

I'm aware of two fundamental domains: actuality (whatever is really going on) and narrative.

Maybe what I said there will help clarify things somewhat.

My apologies.

So at what spatiotemporal location can a natural law be found? Or do natural laws not exist? — javra

So far as we know, nowhere. Narratives about natural laws exist, but the laws themselves "exist" only in narrative, as far as we can tell. "Natural laws" are one explanation for the staggering consistency of the behavior of what's really happening. It's a surmise. We surmise that the reason for the apparently unvarying consistency is that "laws govern" the behavior. We have no more reason to believe that natural laws exist than we have reason to believe gods or faeries exist, and the reasons I've seen people put forward are the same as believers put forward for God and witches put forward for faeries. Except that I spent time with a delightful witch in England in 2012 and she said he could see faeries. I couldn't.

Check out my comment to Raymond, I cover this in what I wrote there, the one beginning with:

I'm aware of two fundamental domains: actuality (whatever is really going on) and narrative.

-- "comment to Raymond"

We have no more reason to believe that natural laws exist than we have reason to believe gods or faeries exist — Millard J Melnyk

I agree. We have a habit of attaching labels to what we can not explain and then proceeding as if the label explains all.

The subconscious of course, transcendence of course, natural law of course. Buzz killers one and all.

Check out my comment to Raymond, I cover this in what I wrote there, the one beginning with:

I'm aware of two fundamental domains: actuality (whatever is really going on) and narrative. — Millard J Melnyk

Yes, I saw that. A natural law, as with a basic law of thought, are taken to be actual if in fact existent. My bad for not clarifying that in my post. As to natural laws being narrative rather than actual, I can see the argument. So to you all natural laws are narrative and, thereby, not "existent". Fair enough.

What about gravity? Like any natural law, it's (taken to be) omnipresent, omni-durational, a governing factor for all mass, and actual rather than narrative. So gravity is not "something that is somewhere now" and yet is something actual, hence existent.

Now, gravity is an inference, true, and as such could be construed as a narrative. But if we go down this line of thought, would not all inferences whatsoever be narratives?

For instance, such that the very inferential notion of "actuality" which we ascribe to some either empirically or introspectively experienced givens would itself become a measly narrative we tell ourselves ... thereby possibly leading to the absurd conclusion that all actualities are nonexistent.

So to you all natural laws are narrative and, thereby, not "existent". — javra

The way I'd say it is that there might or might not be forces that "govern", but we have no way of knowing if there are any or if there aren't. We do know that the notion of "natural laws" was surmised prior to any evidence that: a) Anything "governs" at all; and b) that "natural laws" do the "governing".

So, in their inception, "natural laws" was wholly a narrative matter. If they happened to refer to actual forces that "govern", it would have been a lucky accident at the time.

In addition, we have no knowledge whatsoever that the consistent behavior we observe in actuality will continue at all, or that it will continue the way we see now. If all the planets in the solar system suddenly started revolving and rotating in the opposite direction, what would become of the "natural laws" that "governed" them to revolve and rotate in the original direction? Would the laws say, "Oh no you don't!" and "govern" the behavior back to what it did before it changed? What actually governs what in that case?

And that's not even to touch the fact that the current directions of revolution and rotation are perspectival. We put the direction "north" as going up and "south" as going down. Reverse that orientation and suddenly the revolutions/rotations in fact do reverse, lol.

Gravity is our explanation for what we observe in the attraction of matter to large bodies of matter. The jury is still out after centuries of theorizing about what actuality "gravity" in fact refers to. We don't know if it's a force or not. All we "know" is whether it's a force or not according to a theory like general relativity or quantum mechanics. In other words, we know of nothing in actuality that indicates yea or nay, only what we know if and only if we accept what a specific theory says about gravity.

It turns out that it's really easy to keep actuality and narrative straight and distinct. The indications are in our language. Narrative is always about something. Actuality is not about anything. Amy might be cute or she might be plain. The actual Amy is who and what she is. Statements about Amy are narrative that have meaning solely by virtual of the Amy they refer to. Narratives can refer to other narrative constructs, creating a narrative reference chain. If there is no reference in that chaing that grounds it in actuality, it's an imaginary narrative. It's a cognitive foible that gives us the impression that imaginary narratives involve reality or existence that is a mistake to attribute to them. That's why Harari came up with "fictional realities". They seem real although they're not, but that doesn't stop people from putting them on an ontological par with actualities, which of course is a fundamental mistake.

I demonstrated this in a story about pinkorless balls -- transparent, colorless balls that at the same time are pink. It was inspired by the IPU and thinking through the concept of infinity. It turns out that once you have listened to the story, pinkorless balls seem much more credible than they were before you heard the story.

But if we go down this line of thought, would not all inferences whatsoever be narratives? — javra

Yes.

For instance, such that the very inferential notion of "actuality" which we ascribe to some either empirically or introspectively experienced givens would itself become a measly narrative we tell ourselves ... thereby possibly leading to the absurd conclusion that all actualities are nonexistent. — javra

The term "actuality" is, of course, a narrative construct, but it refers to what's really going on -- something that we all (at a primal level that lies far below thinking) are convinced is actually there to interact with. In other words, the stuff we take for granted that we're interacting with in immanent experience. I think the most fundamental philosophical/scientific statement of all is, "Something is there." If that's not a true statement, then all bets are off and we might as well stop thinking and talking and writing, because then no narrative construct, anywhere of any kind, refers to anything that isn't another narrative construct, the whole thing untethered from any common point of reference outside narrative and, like Wittgenstein showed (as far as I'm concerned), we're just stuck in language games.

If in fact there is nothing non-narrative that "actuality" refers to, then nothing anywhere makes any kind of sense at all, because we're convinced that we're interacting with something that is there, not a solipsistic figment of imagination. And I'm fine with declaring something is there and proceeding as if that's absolutely true, because otherwise we can't proceed anywhere. Everybody assumes actuality when it comes to the things that matter to them in actual experience, no matter what they say in a philo discussion.

Philosophy has failed, in large degree, because philosophers have been bent on reversing the dependency between narrative and actuality. Actuality constrains narrative, not the other way around. Narrative depends on the integrity of its referential dependence on actuality, not the other way around.

The difference is as simple as that "exists" denotes "is" and that somewhere, sometime and somehow are consequent to the "is" and not inherent to the "is".

Now, imagine for a moment that you dropped a single drop of water into the ocean and I asked you: Is it there?
Sure enough, you can affirm it is, but can you pinpoint the "there"?

Salt is salty but you can't point that out before you taste it; hence is versus is experienced or in plus traction equals interaction.

The difference is as simple as that "exists" denotes "is" and that somewhere, sometime and somehow are consequent to the "is" and not inherent to the "is". — Shamshir

Actually, no, they're not consequent because they're not subsequent. There is no "exists" without "exists somewhere" -- which would necessarily be a requirement if "somewhere" were consequent to "is". You're free to give an example that contradicts that assertion.

In your drop of water example, you're confusing the fact that H2O molecules in the drop are there, in the ocean, with the inability to isolate those exact molecules and identify their precise locations. The latter fact does not negate the the former fact.

If you set up is vs. is experienced, explain how one can become aware of is apart from experience. I doubt that you can. Experience puts us in touch with actuality. All our information about actuality is consequent to experience of it -- or else it's imaginary. Everything that we conjure up as a consequence of our experience is narrative. "About" is the tell.

There’s lots of, I'll go ahead and say, inferential content in your latest post to me. Some of which I agree with; some of which I don’t.

Trying to keep this focused on the OP’s intent:

The way I'd say it is that there might or might not be forces that "govern" [...] — Millard J Melnyk

Correct me if you find I’m mistaken, but the semantics to this can fluently translate into: “natural laws might or might not exist”. Natural laws are "forces that 'govern'" and to exist is "to be". If you do correct me, please make the correction semantically coherent, but maybe this goes without saying.

At any rate. Here, there is a possibility that they do exist and a possibility that they don’t. To be nitty-gritty, this then makes the possibility that they might exist semantically cogent to us. Otherwise, the former sentence would be utterly nonsensical.

We’re addressing the semantic differences, or lack thereof, between “exists” and “is somewhere now”.

Conceptually, or else semantically, if a natural law exists, then it – by definition of what a natural law is understood to be - would not be somewhere now, but everywhere at all times.

Therefore, the semantics of “a natural law might exist” is not equivalent to the semantics of "a natural law might be somewhere now”. Hence, here is concluded that the semantics of “exists” is not equivalent to the semantics of “is somewhere now”.

To be clear, here we’re addressing the actuality of semantics; not the actuality of natural laws.