If the world were unpredictable, this would undermines not just science, but the capacity to describe the world in a consistent fashion. — Banno
And it is very difficult, or even impossible, to provide a physicalist account of intentionality, because there is no obvious analogy in physical theory for 'aboutness' or 'intentionality'. ' — Wayfarer
You know what the physical world is. — Banno
Banno's method is to drag all of these debates into the realm of the banal by repeated use of innappopriate metaphors, cliches and over-simplifications repeated ad nauseum until all interest is drained out of the discussion and everyone looses interest — Wayfarer
One of the most important things to do when dealing with abused children is to provide a world which is predictable. Perhaps the ability to see the world in an orderly fashion relies on a nice middle-class upbringing. — Banno
Your question is like asking what the mass is of democracy, and using the lack of an answer to argue that since democracy does not have a mass, it doesn't exist. — Banno
What does the theory of evolution visually look like?
How can one quantify its mass in principle? — javra
If we are nothing more than the perpetually rotting physical I can't be sure it has any meaning. — TiredThinker
Yes!We do good, we experience good, we learn, we try to evolve. — TiredThinker
Whether you like it or not you will have lived. That can never be changed; that you exist is in a sense eternal, unchangeable. What you do with life is up to you, as is what value your life has.All is worthless if it all ceases when our bodies end. — TiredThinker
...there are two ways to describe raising your arm. One involves forming the intention and acting on it. The other involves the firing of neurones and the contraction of muscle tissue.
I say these are two differing descriptions of the very same thing. — Banno
You've claimed thoughts have physical mass. — javra
Those who suppose otherwise - the ball is in your court. It is over to you to explain how mind can have an impact on the physical world if it is an utterly different sort of thing. — Banno
But Banno, you are advocating dualism! Not property dualism, of the sort the article espoused, but some sort of dualism with regard to discourse, were intentional states are irreducible to physical states...!
There is one interesting and scientifically-validated piece of evidence for the immaterial nature of mind. This comes from a discussion of the 'neural binding problem' in neuroscience. 'Binding' is the cognitive process which brings together all of the various elements of perception - movement, shape, colour, position, the nature of the object, and so on - into the unified whole that comprises subjective experience (called the 'stable world illusion'). In brief, the neural binding problem is that neuroscience can find no functional area of the brain which can account for this unified sense of self. — Wayfarer
1.9.1 Misconceptions concerning the existence of a binding problem
The sense in which separate neural pathways carry information about colour, shape, movement, etc. is not semantic, but, at best, information-theoretic. In neither sense of 'information' can information be 'organized' into 'cohesive perceptions'. In the semantic sense, information is a set of true propositions, and true propositions cannot be organized into perception (i.e. into a person's perceiving something). In the engineering sense, 'information' is a measure of the freedom of choice in the transmission of a signal, and the amount of information is measured by the logarithm to the base 2 of the number of available choices - and this too is not something that can be 'organized' into perceptions. One cannot combine colour, form and dimensions into perceptions, just as one cannot put events into holes - this form of words makes no sense. And, correspondingly, when we see a square purple box, we do not 'combine' purple, squareness and boxhood - for this too is a nonsensical form of words. It is true that in order to see a coloured moving object with a given shape, separate groups of neurons must be active simultaneously. But it does not follow that, in the semantic sense of information, the brain must 'associate' various bits of information; nor could it follow, since brains cannot act on the basis of information or associate pieces of information. Whether the brain, in some sense that needs to be clarified, 'associates' information in the information-theoretic sense is a further question. But if it does, that is not because the features of the object perceived have to be 'combined in the brain', for that is a nonsense.
Above all, to see an object is neither to see nor to construct an image of an object. The reason why the several neuronal groups must fire simultaneously when a person sees a coloured three-dimensional object is not because the brain has to build up a visual image or create an internal picture of objects in the visual field. When we see a tree, the brain does not have to (and could not) bind together the trunk, boughs and leaves, or the colour and the shape, or the shape and the movement of the tree. One may see the tree clearly and distinctly or unclearly and indistinctly, and one may be sensitive to its colour and movement, or one may suffer from one or another form of colour-blindness or visual agnosia for movement. Which neuronal groups must simultaneously be active in order to achieve optimal vision, what form that activity may take, and how it is connected with other parts of the brain that are causally implicated in cognition, recognition and action, as well as in co-ordination of sight and movement, are what needs to be investigated by neuroscientists. Since seeing a tree is not seeing an internal picture of a tree, the brain does not have to construct any such picture. It merely has to be functioning normally so that we are able to see clearly and distinctly. It does not have to take a picture apart, since neither the visual scene nor the light array falling upon the retinae are pictures. It does not have to put a picture back together again, since what it enables us to do is to see a tree (not a picture of a tree) in the garden (not in the brain).
...
For the neural correlates, the various cells firing in the various locations of the 'visual' striate cortex, cannot be 'recombined', and do not need to be. The thought that the features a perceiver perceives must be correctly synthesized 'to form a separate object', the so-called 'binding problem', is confused. (For critical discussion see pp. 32-8.) To perceive is not to form an image of what is perceived, either in one's brain or in one's mind. What is perceived is the tree in the quad, not a representation of a tree in the quad. The brain does not have to synthesize a representation of the tree out of representations of its size, shape, colour and orientation - it has to enable the perceiver to see the tree and its features clearly. — History of Cognitive Neuroscience, pp37-38,55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S.
Which neuronal groups must simultaneously be active in order to achieve optimal vision, what form that activity may take, and how it is connected with other parts of the brain that are causally implicated in cognition, recognition and action, as well as in co-ordination of sight and movement, are what needs to be investigated by neuroscientists. — History of Cognitive Neuroscience, pp37-38,55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S.
It's not the creation of an image per se but the ability to recognise the concrete whole and to recognise it and interpret it. — Wayfarer
Which neuronal groups must simultaneously be active in order to achieve optimal vision, what form that activity may take, and how it is connected with other parts of the brain that are causally implicated in cognition, recognition and action, as well as in co-ordination of sight and movement, are what needs to be investigated by neuroscientists.
— History of Cognitive Neuroscience, pp37-38,55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S.
That doesn't really contradict the passage I quoted, as far as I can see. — Wayfarer
That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. — The neural binding problem(s) - Jerome Feldman
why would a "neural representation" be assumed in the first place? — Andrew M
Because "subjective experience" (...) is a Cartesian conception of experience (the Cartesian theater, as it were). — Andrew M
But why would a "neural representation" be assumed in the first place? Because "subjective experience" (defined in the paper as "qualia") is a Cartesian conception of experience (the Cartesian theater, as it were). — Andrew M
when we see a square purple box, we do not 'combine' purple, squareness and boxhood - for this too is a nonsensical form of words. It is true that in order to see a coloured moving object with a given shape, separate groups of neurons must be active simultaneously. But it does not follow that, in the semantic sense of information, the brain must 'associate' various bits of information; nor could it follow, since brains cannot act on the basis of information or associate pieces of information. Whether the brain, in some sense that needs to be clarified, 'associates' information in the information-theoretic sense is a further question. — History of Cognitive Neuroscience, pp37-38,55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S.
Substance dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two distinct substances. — RussellA
then the mind must be of a different substance to the physical brain from which it emerges. — RussellA
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