I'm not sure about that. It's a topic in religious studies, called the Katz-Forman Debate (2), or the context-decontextualisation debate. Robert Katz is the proponent for 'contextualism', i.e. mystical experiences are culturally mediated, there is no 'pure experience'. His opponents, such as Robert Forman, say that a certain class of mystical experience and process are represented in diverse traditions, so is universal or perennial.

I see the 'contextualist' claim as basically reductionist, because it's trying to say that all experience is conditioned, the product of education, history, culture, and so on, which undercuts the idea of a 'realisation of the absolute'. Because of my background which was influenced by theosophy and perennialism, I tend to favour the 'de-contextualists'. But it's another of those arguments that can never be decisively concluded. — Wayfarer

That's interesting, I haven't heard of that debate before; but I guess it would be an inevitable topic in religious studies. There seems to be really two questions here: firstly, is the experience, as such, culturally mediated, and secondly, regardless of what the answer to the first question might be, is the interpretation of the experience culturally mediated.

In relation to the first I suppose I would ask whether such an experience would be possible for a human that had never been enculturated at all. And the next question might be as to what a mystical experience, or any experience for that matter, could be thought to be absent any conceptual content at all. And then what could we possibly say about a mystical experience without introducing conceptual content; that seems to be the problem.

I think the tension is between the idea of the "absolute" and being a living human. One cannot escape being culturally or environmentally mediated. It's not a question of whether any instance of experience is specifically caused by culture, but more than one is inseperable from their own history.

Even in a pure moment of inspiration, I am still a result of the states which came before me. Without them, I would not be as I am. Not because in a different set of circumstances somoeone couldn't result in a similar experience of inspiration, but rather due to the such a person would not be me.

Whatever knowledge or experience I have, it cannot help be be culturally or environmentally mediated because I cannot be without my past.

I think it is arguable that the omniscient and omnibenevolent attributes cannot be derived from pure reason. 'God as nature' seems to be perhaps the maximum purely rational derivation. I mean nature is, considered as the totality of all that is, is, by definition, all-powerful, because there are no powers that could be outside it (of course this doesn't mean that nature could 'do whatever it wants', because there is no purely rational warrant to believe that it could "want" anything). And there is no purely rational warrant for believing that nature or God, is all-knowing (at least in the sense of knowing absolutely every detail about everything) or all-good (at least in the sense of being motivated by the good).

I think the conclusion is that there is no purely rational warrant for believing that God or nature, has agency, in the sense of being able to 'make up its/his mind' about anything, being affected by anything, or desiring anything. In fact, if anything, purely rational thought about it seems to point to the opposite conclusion. But then the problem is that attempting to determine the nature of God by purely rational means may be to objectify God, just as the attempt to determine the nature of the human by purely rational means may be to objectify the human. And objectification of the human seems to inevitably leave out all that is really important in the very idea of humanity. Perhaps the same is true of God.

Well, that's right. But recall what the meaning of 'ecstacy' is (not the drug!) - it means, 'ex-' 'stasis', outside normal experience. So, states of 'mystical rapture' are characterised by the dissolution of the sense of oneself as a separate subject, standing back from experience.

I noted when I did my thesis work on this subject, that 'experience' is a transitive verb - 'I experience it'. So there is an implicit dualism in that, which is part and parcel of consciousness itself. So, when mystics go into higher states, that sense of 'otherness' is precisely what is suspended - and with it, normal consciousness. That is behind the idea of the 'states of Dhyana' that are found in early Buddhist and Yoga texts. You also find that in references to the 'merging of the knower with the known'. (There were many such passages in Krishnamurti's Notebook, and there is also an explicit analysis of this in Buddhist philosophy, especially Yogācāra. But you don't find it in Western philosophy.)

There are many qualifications around this, however. The idea of complete 'loss of personal identity' in neoplatonist philosophy was referred to as 'henosis'. However later Christianity rejected that idea as being too 'oriental' and instead insists that the 'divine union' the person is still in some sense preserved.

I think my only point would be that the characteristic expression: 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God' (Matt 5:8) at least has a counterpart in the various other religious traditions. Whether that means that they're all the same experience is another question; I argued that in some sense, it's an impertinent question, because for an actual practitioner, they're only ever going to know one way, which is the way they have travelled.

Does God have many worlds to tend, and do they all have conversations like these?

The fact that it is arguable and that no one can agree on whether God exists or not is the basis of the OP's point. For example, if one of the ontological arguments work, it would show that such a being does exist.

I would also like to point out that this entire argument has a great deal to do with epistemology. For example, if Alvin Plantiga is right about his epistemology, then the common religious experience of God is properly basic belief, and, by extension, God is based in properly basic belief and is justified for the faithful. Other epistemologies would label a god concept without positive warrant to be, at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, effectively shown to be false.

What would it mean for an ontological argument to work? You seem to be saying that ontological arguments don't work. If so, on what grounds do you claim that?

Regarding what you said about Plantinga; the problem with personal religious experiences would seem to be that they cannot be intersubjectively corroborated; so I can't see how they could be "properly basic" to epistemology. If I had an experience of God that was so powerful that it left me with absolutely no doubt the He is real, then I think that would be a superlative reason for me to believe, but would my experience provide you with any justification for belief?

The same way any other argument works: the premises are all true and the conclusion follows from the premises. If one of the premises is highly questionable or the argument is invalid, then the argument fails.

There is no reason that "properly basic" beliefs have to be intersubjectively corroborated. I would say that perception is often "properly basic" to epistemology- if you cannot defend perception in any meaningful way as having any connection to reality, then the major thrust and purpose of epistemology is lost. At best, you might be able to get away with some general "armchair thinking" stuff, but that remains a dubious point. By the very nature of perception, it is subjective. This goes back to my point: not all good epistemic reasons are convincing reasons. My perceptions of me not committing a murder are good epistemic reasons for me to say, "I did not commit this murder," even if I acknowledge that, from a third-person perspective, the evidence looks like I committed the murder. Even if a jury would most likely convict me in a court of law based on the evidence, I would still be justified in believing that I did not convict the murder, all else being equal.

Many mansions, I have heard. Don't know what's said in them, though.

You can determine whether the argument is consistent but how would you determine whether the premises are true, much less prove that they are?

You appear to cut off in your post, but I think you are asking: how could we support and/or prove the premises or show the premises to be false? Well, that depends on the particular argument. Do you honestly want to go through them all?

The original point of bringing up the ontological argument is that we argue over them, but their soundness and validity would indicate the god of classical theism is real, as their entire point is to show the god of classical theism exists a priori. In other words, we can possibly use reason alone to show the god of classical theism exists.

The point is that the truth or falsity of premises cannot be demonstrated by the argument that consists of them, but must be established some other way, by some other argument for example. Since any other argument will have its own premises that will need a further argument to justify them, and so on ad infinitum, the only other way I can think of is to empirically demonstrate, but this is not applicable with the kinds of arguments we are discussing. If you want to bring in plausibility, well, that is a matter of opinion and /or fashion. So where does that leave us?

Thirdly, there is the God of the mystics; the God of intellectual intuition and/or mystical experience. Here it is a matter of direct experience or knowing, and not of belief. But the interesting thing here is that what is intellectually intuited or directly mystically known is not pure; it is culturally mediated. Here it is not so much a matter of belief, but of culture, as to how intuitions and experiences are interpreted. And this kind of intuition and experience can exist outside the context of theism, as it does, for example in Buddhism, and forms of Shamanism.

I agree with your point here, but with the nuance, which you do point out in a later post, that it is not the experience itself which is mediated, but rather the means of grasping it intellectually, mentally, even intuitively, in a way which is meaningful to the person of the mystic*.

I would point out though, which is probably covered by your use of the word Shamanism, that the contextual mediation does not have to be human in nature, but can be via another kingdom of nature, some other living arena within the biosphere. This is an important avenue for me, in which I commune with animals and plants, an approach which makes it easier to step outside the psychological baggage of humanity. For example in the life of St Francis.

* I am specifically referring here to the personality of the mystic, as a distinct aspect of the self. It is the mediated self, which is socially and culturally conditioned and itself acts as mediator between the mind and the being.

For me in my mystical practice I make a clear and important distinction between the different aspects of the self and work with and between(including their synthesis) them.

There is the soul, the mind, the personality, the being and the body. These are all distinct constituent parts of the self, with a presence within their own sphere of experience and dwelling.

Many mansions, I have heard. Don't know what's said in them, though.

The mansions could be the seen as the kingdoms of nature. So the kingdoms present in our world are accessible to us via communion.

I wouldn't read it naturalistically, myself, but I don't know if I want to get into Biblical exegesis.

It's one of my takes on it. What it means in the bible is I think uncertain and in reference to the being and nature of God. Something I wouldn't profess to understand.

Thanks for your interesting explanation Punshhh. I too have always been drawn to the natural world. the world of animals and plants. You might find these two books interesting and inspiring: I certainly did:

The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World

https://www.amazon.com/Spell-Sensuous-Perception-Language-More-Than-Human/dp/0679776397/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1490995258&sr=8-1&keywords=david+abrams

Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology

https://www.amazon.com/Becoming-Animal-Cosmology-David-Abram/dp/0375713697/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1490995258&sr=8-2&keywords=david+abrams

One of the reassuring aspects of being an animal is that you can set your sights low, and not worry too much about the 'existential angst' that plagues those pesky self-aware h. sapiens.

Unfortunately it's not that easy because I think the "existential angst" is an inevitable part of being a human animal. Sometimes I think the more troublesome aspect of being human, and one that can (and should) be left behind is the angst about the angst; or the guilt that is felt simply in virtue of being a human interacting with other humans. I think this latter is definitely socially inculcated; it is what Sartre refers to with his "Hell is other people", and in a way getting beyond that is the very point of being a natural human, of "becoming animal".

But, becoming animal cannot be an excuse for leaving ethics and moral considerations behind, and this is a very fine and subtle line to walk; and easily misunderstood, I think.

But, becoming animal cannot be an excuse for leaving ethics and moral considerations behind, and this is a very fine and subtle line to walk; and easily misunderstood, I think.

Yes, there is I think, in the human stage in evolution, an opportunity/necessity for responsible action. The biosphere has brought us to this point, with agency and intelligence, now it is our turn to act constructively and become custodians of the biosphere and secure its survival and development.

Also within the personal development of the individual there is a crisis of maturity, in which through experience the individual becomes a mature adult, with moral and ethical principles.

Thanks for the links to the books, they do look interesting. I do already speak meow and have a close affinity with and do commune(icate) with mammals and birds in particular. My perspective tends to be a spiritual esoteric one, in which I am contemplating the spirit of the animals and plants and regarding them as members divine spiritual kingdoms.

What I want to know is if you want God to exist and also your reason why you want God to exist or not. — TheMadFool

I might have voted yes, but I don't know if you have the sort of God in mind who creates a Hell. If we are talking about my version of good God, then, sure, why not? What if all suffering down here is something like a palate cleanser, intended to heighten enjoyment by contrast. We live in the apparent absence of God and in the presence of scarcity and violence and then "die" into the "real" world. This is just a nice dream, though, in my opinion. Hell yeah I want omnipotence on my side. If I can't be God, I'll settle for being one of his beloved children, a prince if not the king. I don't really think it's better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven, not if it's a real Hell and a real Heaven.

Sometimes I think the more troublesome aspect of being human, and one that can (and should) be left behind is the angst about the angst; or the guilt that is felt simply in virtue of being a human interacting with other humans. I think this latter is definitely socially inculcated; it is what Sartre refers to with his "Hell is other people", and in a way getting beyond that is the very point of being a natural human, of "becoming animal". — John

I think that our existential angst is another aspect of whatever gave rise to the dogma of the 'original sin'. I don't necessarily subscribe to the dogma, but I think it signifies a real fact about the human condition, as does the idea of the 'fall'. The Christian view of 'conscience' is that it is the part of you that responds to the call of higher truth.

Buddhists put it differently - it's 'dukkha', the etymology of which originally is a 'squeaky wheel', i.e. a wheel that doesn't turn around its axis properly. So we intuit a sense of absence or lack which nags at us, which we can neither ignore or satiate.

I don't think it's anything like what Sartre had in mind.

Interesting titles, by the way.

Yes, as I said above I think it is the "angst about the angst" that is what Sartre had in mind, not the angst itself, which is an ineliminable part of the human condition.

Of those two books, for me the really excellent one is The Spell of the Sensuous.