a map, like an analogy, is an abstraction of formal aspects of the territory derived from some concrete aspects of the territory that is used to survey delineate and interpret some other concrete aspects of the territory (origami or "rhizomatic"-like); therefore, only in the sense of property dualism, Oliver, do I agree with you. — 180 Proof
He would, with the caveat that Kant is talking about the rational side of human mentality, but the brain having no representation of a visual scene, is the empirical side of brain mechanics. — Mww
Charge is attached to a particle. So both have to be at the same place. Always. They can't be pulled apart. So charge always has the same spatial relation to a particle. Which makes it non-spatial. — Raymond
it remains a fact that science implies a fundamental divide between nature as it is and our knowledge of nature. — Olivier5
If this were so, it seems to me, natural agents could not have any "knowledge of nature" because entities which are "fundamentally divided" from each other entail lacking any relation "between" them (re: interaction problem); and yet this is not the case – thus, we have (some) "knowledge of nature". Epistemic distinction, not ontic "divide". Otherwise, your unqualified "duality", Oliver, is too vague to make sense.In any case, it remains a fact that science implies a fundamental divide between nature as it is and our knowledge of nature. And thus it implies a duality. — Olivier5
A small infant doesn't see...... — Wayfarer
percepts however require concepts — Wayfarer
Um, right. That's because its not "attached to" it in a physical sense (again with the physical metaphor), charge is a property of a particle, and so its not meaningful to talk about "pulling it apart" any more than it would to talk of "pulling apart" the redness of an apple from the apple.Charge is attached to a particle... They can't be pulled apart. — Raymond
Because of the epistemic divide I am talking about. Any knowledge is an interpretation, and any interpretation involves an epistemic jump. The map is not the territory. — Olivier5
And in any case, charge is a physical property of a physical object- no mystery there. — Seppo
in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. ... Thinking [i.e. discursive reason] is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism
So, I would argue that Aquinas is, in his own way, a representative of the philosophia perennis. Perhaps one of the last outposts, by virtue of his relationship with the institution which preserved and carried forward his ideas. (I'm not writing this as a Catholic, by the way.) — Wayfarer
Charge is attached to a particle... They can't be pulled apart. — Raymond
Um, right. That's because its not "attached to" it in a physical sense (again with the physical metaphor), charge is a property of a particle, and so its not meaningful to talk about "pulling it apart" any more than it would to talk of "pulling apart" the redness of an apple from the apple.
And in any case, charge is a physical property of a physical object- no mystery there. The problem is the proposal that the mental "resides in" or "is attached to" the physical in the way that a physical property like charge does with a physical object, without itself being physical. In other words, the interaction problem, dualism's harder problem of consciousness. — Seppo
This leaves reality out of reach forever. The interpretation, the theory is the reality. — Raymond
You contradict yourself here, it seems to me. — Olivier5
Reality is what we think. A physicist sees fields of particles, a pantheist sees conscious entities everywhere, and a dualist like myself sees both approaches (not to an independent reality, in case you might think I contradict myself covertly...) combined., i.e, the basic ingredients of reality possess mental charge, as well as material properties. That's a different kind of dualism, I guess. — Raymond
Oxford introductory bibilography to contemporary hylomorphism. — Wayfarer
Is it implying that assuming dualism is a possibility that all science must be false in order for that to be the case? — TiredThinker
Isn't it simply a displacement (or universalisation) of the classical Cartesian human mind vs matter 'divide', in direction of panpsychism? — Olivier5
when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism
I simply think the mental and matter are connected, like the charge of an electron is attached to it, contained in it, or is a property of it.
— Raymond
That's panpsychism, too iffy for my taste. — Olivier5
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