Your emphatic insistence notwithstanding, Heidegger defines being as ". . . that on the basis of which entities are already understood." — Arne
And even if you want to stand on that, people who wish to understand Being and Time should still be aware that what is labeled as an introduction is clearly intended to be an introduction to a larger body of work. Surely you can see that? — Arne
Most of Being and Time, including the parts not finished, were eventually published in different works and were an outgrowth of lecture courses Heidegger gave in the 1920s. So both before and after 1927, you have plenty of material.
So it's not quite that simple, no. — Xtrix
Mulholland also argues that Heidegger's complete body of work is sufficient to consider the project complete. Taylor Carmen leans that way. I do not disagree. — Arne
Of course. But who doesn't see that? Is anyone out there thinking that because there's an introduction to the entire outline — Xtrix
And besides, if you agreed with me, then all you had to do was say so and we could have been doing other things. — Arne
For my part, I see the later writings as clarifications and further articulations of the earlier project , but found little additional enlightenment in Heidegger’s post-Being and Time work. — Joshs
I would have, but I don't agree with the statement about the introduction. It is not a mistake to refer to it as such. I hope you now concede that. — Xtrix
I absolutely do not concede that. I suspect that if Heidegger had continued with the work, the next publication would not have been called Being and Time with any sort of suffix and would likely have been called Time and Being. — Arne
Heidegger published what he needed to publish to get what he wanted to get. Had he not been forced to publish and under hurried circumstances, we would not even know his name. It is sloppy and students of Heidegger deserve better. — Arne
I read Heidegger and then I listen to lectures by Dreyfus, Kelly, or Carmen and then I read Heidegger and then I listen to lectures by Dreyfus, Kelly, or Carmen and then I read Heidegger. . . — Arne
But my all time favorite orienting mantra is being is that on the basis of which being is already understood.
I have wasted many a fine summer hour smoking a cigar while trying to understand what the hell that means. — Arne
Dasein is history.
...
Dasein, whiling away its own time in each case, is at the same time always a generation. So a specific interpretedness precedes every Dasein in the shape of the generation itself. What is preserved in the generation is itself the outcome of earlier views and disputes, earlier interpretations and past concerns.
...
The wellspring of such persistent elements lies in the past, but they continue to have such an impact in the present that their dominance is taken for granted and their development forgotten. Such a forgotten past is inherent in the prevailing interpretedness of being-together-with-one-another. To the extent that Dasein lives from (cares about) this past, it is this past itself.
...
The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.
...
One has a timeworn conceptuality at one's disposal. It provides the fore-concept for the interpretation. The interpretedness of a 'time' is strictly determined by these structural factors and the variable forms of their realization. And it is precisely the unobtrusiveness of these factors --the fact that one is not aware of them -- which gives public interpretedness its taken-for-granted character. However, the 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead, as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness. Guided by its interpretedness, expectant concern lives its own past. — Heidegger, first draft B & T, chap. 4, quotes in order
That is good stuff. It would be great to have a citation if it is easily available. I am not asking you to go and track it down. But I like it. — Arne
A definite sense of being guides every natural interpretation of beings. This sense does not need to be made catergorially explicit, and precisely when it is not, it possesses its genuine being and its authority…Precisely by its being inexplicit, it possesses a peculiar stubbornness...
The fundamental way of the being-there of the world, namely, having the world there with one another, is speaking…In the manner in which being-there in its world speaks about its way of dealing with its world, a self-interpretation of being-there is also given. It states how being-there specifically understands itself, what it takes itself to be...
One simple reason for that is if two beings wish to meet up, they have to be at around the same time (contemporary/coeval). — Agent Smith
Thus, it makes sense to view Being in time; hence, Being and Time — Agent Smith
In this sense time is 'there' in the world as a being, as the sun as a triggering signification. — ajar
temporality as transcendence and relevance.
— Joshs
Explain. — Agent Smith
The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.
...
One has a timeworn conceptuality at one's disposal. It provides the fore-concept for the interpretation. The interpretedness of a 'time' is strictly determined by these structural factors...And it is precisely the unobtrusiveness of these factors --the fact that one is not aware of them -- which gives public interpretedness its taken-for-granted character...The 'fore'-character in the structure of interpretedness shows us that it is none other than what has already been that jumps ahead, as it were, of a present time pervaded by interpretedness.
Guided by its interpretedness, expectant concern lives its own past. — Heidegger
The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past....the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. — Gendlin
Here's an edit of what I quoted above.
The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility. — ajar
frameworks of intelligibility aren’t stagnant. — Joshs
When I interpret a new experience by reference to such a frame , the frame is developed and articulated. — Joshs
the past that frames my present comes already altered by that present. — Joshs
Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and
ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon. — Heidegger
The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative…. To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing. — Heidegger
https://iep.utm.edu/gadamer/#SH4c[The] point is that in as much as tradition serves as the condition of one’s knowledge, the background that instigates all inquiry, one can never start from a tradition-free place. A tradition is what gives one a question or interest to begin with. Second, all successful efforts to enliven a tradition require changing it so as to make it relevant for the current context. To embrace a tradition is to make it one’s own by altering it. A passive acknowledgment of a tradition does not allow one to live within it. One must apply the tradition as one’s own. In other words, the importance of the terms, “prejudice” and “tradition,” for Gadamer’s hermeneutics lies in the way they indicate the active nature of understanding that produces something new. Tradition hands down certain interests, prejudices, questions, and problems, that incite knowledge. Tradition is less a conserving force than a provocative one. Even a revolution, Gadamer notes, is a response to the tradition that nonetheless makes use of that very same tradition.
...
Just as the literal horizon delimits one’s visual field, the epistemic horizon frames one’s situation in terms of what lies behind (that is, tradition, history), around (that is, present culture and society), and before (that is, expectations directed at the future) one. The concept of horizon thus connotes the way in which a located, perspectival knowing is yet a fecund one: without the limitation of a horizon there would be no seeing.
His talk about death is fascinating but eventually frustrating. I get the impression that he himself didn't quite know what he meant, that it was more of a feeling-clump than a thesis. — ajar
I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear. But at the same time, I tell you that there is no making an end of suffering and distress without reaching the end of the cosmos. Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception and intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos. — The Buddha, Rohitassa Sutta
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.