Brain and mind are just two aspects of the same thing. The owner of the mind feels the content, the person looking from a safe distant will look at it from the outside, noting the material aspect only.

IE, the mind is not a cause of a new state of affairs, the "mind" is no more than a word used in language to describe the state of the brain that causes a new state of affairs. — RussellA

The brain and the mind are two sides of the same medal. You could just as well keep up that it's the mind that causes new states of the brain. Does the mind runs behind the brain state? Maybe it's the mind pulling the brain state. A charged particle is pulled by another charged particle. You can say with a just as happy face that charge pulls the particles. Like mind can pull the brain. If I'm angry, my ferocious mood can cause my thoughts to stagger in a blind alley.

What I can relate to, is the idea that forms exist universally and have causal efficacy. There is no matter without form (and vice versa). By "form" I mean the actual shapes that things take, not abstract forms.

Life appears to build on this, to be about form management, so to speak. Life uses codes, including hormones and DNA and all that jazz. And many species can collect and analyse information through neuronal networks. In this sense life -- even primitive life -- is already a language, a logos, and also a game. Almost a philosophy?

the mind is not a cause of a new state of affairs — RussellA

Finally.

As if an abstract non-entity can be a force.

The mind exists only as a part of language, not as part of the world — RussellA

How would your analysis differ if its object was (what is usually thought of as) a physical entity or process?

As if an abstract non-entity can be a force — Mww

The mind an abstract non-entity? It is as real an entity as the material processes you take for the real non-abstract entity. You can even say that the mind is the cause of the force that propagates material processes. Like charge inside matter is the cause for material processes to evolve. If you look at the brain materialistically it are the mental charges, the thoughts, or the (un)consciousness that cause the material processes to move their ass, like the charge inside particles is the cause for other charges inside matter to move. So you can consider the brain a materialistic process but the combined electric charges form a part of it. If you look at an object it triggers dellicately tuned electrictrically charged patterns with such a property that you see a colored object. The color is then explained not by a material process but by the charge that's in them. As these charges reside in you you are aware of them. You perceive the color red. Someone else looking at your brain from the outside will only see the outside of the material process, while the charged load of the process is color for you. So the explanation of color is that it's a structured form of electric charges on your neural network. Which can be called a materialistic explanation, which it's not in fact, as electric charge is not understood. It's manifestation as mental processes can be understood though, as we all know what the mental is. We all know what a dream is. From the outside it is seen as structured processes in the brain, lasting five minutes, but from the inside you experience an entire world lasting a lot longer (neurons fire faster, cortex neurons in the waking state fire about 0.16 times per second while in the dream state they do this up to 70 times, condensing hours in minutes).

The mind an abstract non-entity? — Raymond

What's 'an entity'? The definition is 'a thing with distinct and independent existence.' But the mind is not a thing, not an entity, not an object of any kind. Nevertheless, its reality is indubitable, as it is the pre-condition for speaking, writing and thinking or any kind of conscious activity.

Furthermore, your analytic metaphor of 'electrical charge' treats only of movement. By invoking the mechanism of 'electrical charges' and the firing of neurons, you're essentially treating the human subject as a kind of meccano set or model railway driven by electro-chemical reactions. But the mental faculty that this explanatory metaphor can't begin to explain is the faculty which grasps meaning and makes judgements. I don't think you can plausibly explain the elements of judgement in terms of physical interactions. But this doesn't entail the existence of 'spooky mind-stuff', which is a remnant of Cartesian dualism. Its analysis requires a change in perspective, an acknowledgement of the nature of mind as the ground of experience (hence the 'hard problem of consciousness'). And you can't seek to explain that ground in terms of higher-level abstractions, such as physics, as they themselves are inevitably dependent on the foundational activities of reason which are epistemically prior to any such observations (which I argue is the import of 'the observer problem' in physics.) In other words, all such explanations are inevitably question-begging, as they are always assuming what they're setting out to explain.

This is where the embodied cognition/enactivism framework has been particularly useful. I recommend becoming familiar with The Embodied Mind, Varela et al, revised edition 2015.

You can even say that the mind is the cause of the force that propagates material processes. — Raymond

Nahhhh....I can’t. Reeks of reification. Misplaced concreteness.

But you can if you like. I’ll wait for the peer review.

In our modern age, the idea of a soul as a conscious entity that can incarnate in a physical body and survive the physical body's death faces this dilemma: How can the soul interact with the physical body without being detected by scientists? In other words, if the soul interacted with the body via a very weak force, it might elude the observation of scientists but its influence on the body would seem insignificant; if on the other hand the soul interacted with the body via a relatively strong force, this force should be detectable by scientists.

How to resolve this dilemma? Well, there seems to be the possibility that the soul would interact significantly with the brain but it would elude detection because scientists would be unable to tell whether changes in brain activity that are measurable with contemporary brain scanning technology (fMRI, EEG) are or are not entirely caused by known particles or fields inside or outside the brain.

Still, if the soul was constituted by unknown particles or fields, why would such particles or fields not be detected in particle accelerators where they can be measured much more accurately than with brain scanning devices? For some reason, the soul would interact strongly with known particles in the brain (where it would be undetectable because of the complex brain processes and the limited resolution of our brain scanners) but it would interact only weakly with known particles in accelerators (where it would be undetectable because of the weakness of the interaction).

I don't know if this idea is viable but maybe the unknown particles that would constitute the soul normally interact only weakly with known particles (which makes them undetectable in accelerators) but their interaction with known particles in the brain is significantly amplified by resonance that can only occur between certain complex systems such as a soul and a brain (neural networks).

What's 'an entity'? The definition is 'a thing with distinct and independent existence.' But the mind is not a thing, not an entity, not an object of any kind. Nevertheless, its reality is indubitable, as it is the pre-condition for speaking, writing and thinking or any kind of conscious activity. — Wayfarer

Why can't the mind be a non-material thing contained in matter? Things don't have to be material. It can relate to the brain the same way charge relates to particles. It's mysterious in the sense that nobody knows what a particle is. You can call it an excitation of a particle field but just an outside description we project onto it. An excitation of a quantum field is just a way to describe the various states states a point particle is in at the same time. The very concept of a point particle is problematic. It's an abstraction from everyday life, where objects move around through space. A thing like charge is projected in it to account for it's interaction with other charged particles. But nobody knows exactly what it is. It is something contained in matter which enables matter with other chunks of matter. That same load of matter we eat and it gets transformed into brain matter where these charges are bundled on the neuron structures to holistically give rise to a consciousness. No mystery involved. A purely materialisic vision of the brain ignores the nature of this side of the dual medal. Which is non-explainable by science as it can't be known what charge is from the inside of a particle. But we do know it from the inside of our brain as we experience these charged structures directly. All of our consciousness, be it a thought, a vision, a sound, or a feeling can be directly linked to charged structures.

Why can't the mind be a non-material thing contained in matter? — Raymond

Got an example of a non-material thing?

I don't disagree with your depiction of neural changes as being 'thinking seen from the outside', but I don't know how much of an explanation that amounts to.

The realisation of the problematical nature of 'point-particles' (i.e. atoms) is one of the fundamental shifts that occured due to quantum physics, where previously it was believed by some that atoms were the fundamental constituents of nature. Their ambiguous nature as 'wave-particles' is one of the profound shifts that has occured in 20th century thinking, isn't it?

Take a look at this post.

Also this.

Got an example of a non-material thing? — Wayfarer

Like I said, the charge in particles. Two color charges, giving rise to colored quarks, and colorless electrons and neutrinos, and electric charges loading both quarks and electrons. Neutrinos posses only two colorless combinations of color charge, no electric charge. Charge structures carried by matter can cause (holistically) consciousness. But what charges are? That can't be explained materialisticaly. But we can feel it.

I don't think you can plausibly explain the elements of judgement in terms of physical interactions. — Wayfarer

Why not? We already have electronic devices that can recognize faces or other objects and act on that recognition. Or perform complicated logical operations and defeat humans in games like chess and go.

We already have electronic devices that can recognize faces or other objects and act on that recognition. Or perform complicated logical operations and defeat humans in games like chess and go — litewave

both of which are extensions of human sensibility, artifacts manufactured and programmed for just this purpose. But because modern man 'forgets being' then she forgets that these are her own invention and begins to regard them as substitutes for herself.

the charge in particles. — Raymond

That can be measured. As for the fact that we don't know what it really is, maybe we don't know what anything 'really is'.

In quantum field theory they are still considered point particles. As the wavefunction is a cross section of all the histories, also for QM they are considered so. This gives rise to infinities, as might be expected. Neatly wiped under the carpet.

through 'renormalisation', as I understand it.

Just wanted to add that!

both of which are extensions of human sensibility, artifacts manufactured and programmed for just this purpose. — Wayfarer

But they have intelligent behavior like object recognition and logical operations which is realized by physical interactions. The intelligent behavior of humans may have been programmed too - by natural evolution or by other intelligent beings.

The intelligent behavior of humans may have been programmed too - by natural evolution or by other intelligent beings. — litewave

Can you imagine? Evolution sweating buckets while programming our behavior? Human behavior is not programmed, though it certainly can look so.

Can you imagine? Evolution sweating buckets while programming our behavior? Human behavior is not programmed, though it certainly can look so. — Raymond

Programmed but not necessarily consciously, just blindly smashing simple things into aggregates and those that happen to have the properties needed to sustain themselves in complex environment will sustain themselves and maybe randomly mutate and take on additional structure and replicate themselves and so on.

I don't think if we are constructed by the blind watchmaker of evolution. Genetic evolution might just as well be structured by the organisms themselves. The higher level behavior of organisms is far removed from genes that produce proteins. The dynamics of complicated structured of of proteins, the whole organism, is bound, for sure, but within the limits of their possibilities the behavior is not programmed. It depends on what you call programmed. If you mean a program like a program you can write or describe the moves then no. Every animal shows similar behavior as their fellow species, sure. All gazelles will flee for a lion, but that can hardly be called programmed. If lion then run...

I mean programmed like learning machines. But initially the wouldbe organism has no goals (blind nature doesn't program any particular goal in it), it just exists and if it happens to have what it takes to survive, it will survive. If it doesn't have what it takes to survive, it will not survive. Those that are left will appear to have a "goal" of survival. But even those will decay over time. Some of them might happen to get the property to produce new copies of themselves and so they will continue to survive in their copies and will appear to have another goal: replication. As time passes they may change and get more properties and more goals, some of which may be subgoals to aid survival or replication, other goals may be irrelevant to survival or replication, and some goals may even be against survival or replication but if not too much they may not die out.

Survival and replication are contingent on life. Life itself is not programmed and uses survival and replication as a means to an end.

That can be measured. As for the fact that we don't know what it really is, maybe we don't know what anything 'really is'. — Wayfarer

We can measure distance and we see what it is. A charge can be measures by looking at the effects it has on the distance between particles. But the nature of charge is not known. It's something that causes matter particles to interact with other particles. Mind is sometimes referred as necessary for the interaction with the physical world. Both involve interaction. Mental charge as well as particle charge.

When we watch the sunset we're aware of the colours, the sounds, the wildlife, the trees, the clouds in the sky, our feelings, the thoughts in our mind, all as elements of a subjective whole, of watching the sunset. It's indubitable that I am a subject of that experience and that the experience is unified; I don't receive signals from my sensory organs in the third person and then work on integrating them. I see, hear, smell, feel, and reflect. The mind is integrating the data into a sense of aesthetic appreciation. — Wayfarer

As I see it, the issue is a difference of conceptual models.

On a representationalist view, there is a separation of (subjective) experience from the (objective) world. The subjective experience has to be synthesized from the signals coming from the environment. Hence the binding problem.

Whereas on a non-representationalist view, what we perceive just is the world (which we have attendant thoughts and feelings about). The signals coming from the environment enable us to perceive what is there.

To fill that out a bit, consider the following mathematical function that has a fixed-point:

$f(x) = x^2 - 2$

The number $2$ is a fixed point of function $f$ because $f(2) = 2$. That is, the output of the function in that case just is the input.

Note that what is output is not a representation or synthesis of the input (or its properties). It's just the input itself (despite the function applying transformations to that input).

A human being in a normally-lit environment can be analogized to that function. There's a tree in its environment (the input), then a causal process occurs (the function) culminating in one's perception of the tree in its environment (the output). It's the same tree - the output just is the input (with the additional effect that the person is now aware of it).

Why is it the same tree? Because that's how we've set up the language game (or conceptual model). We point at a tree and define that as the input to the function - that's what we mean when we say "tree". When we get the same thing out that we put in, then we say that we have seen a tree. Whereas if we find out that we got something different, we use different language to describe the situation (e.g., "No, I didn't see a tree, it was a rock that just looked like a tree from that location.").

Scientists can investigate the causal process to understand how it works. Analogous to a mathematician investigating a function to understand how it works. But, under the non-representationalist model, science can't show us that what we see is different to what is there any more than mathematics can show us that $2^2 - 2 \neq 2$.

The benefit of the non-representationalist model is that we get to identify things in the world with what we perceive. And so a binding problem doesn't arise under that model. If what is there is a unity (e.g., B&H's example of a 'square purple box'), then so is what is perceived, since they're just the same thing.

I only used the compounded terminology because that was how it was originally presented. All experience is subjective, in that any experience belongs only to the rational agent that reasons to it, therefore “subjective experience” is superfluous.

I reject the concept of “qualia” outright, as superfluous as well, insofar as the given senses of them are already accounted for in established metaphysics. That is not to say they are false, or don’t have their own predication, but only that such predication has earlier, and better, representation. — Mww

Thanks! You omit those words (as superfluous) but, as I understand it, retain the underlying representationalist model.

On a representationalist view, there is a separation of (subjective) experience from the (objective) world. The subjective experience has to be synthesized from the signals coming from the environment. Hence the binding problem.

Whereas on a non-representationalist view, what we perceive just is the world (which we have attendant thoughts and feelings about). The signals coming from the environment enable us to perceive what is there. — Andrew M

I don't think I hold to either of those views. Representationalism I associate with Locke, that ideas represent things. Then you have the whole problem of how they're related. And I think the non-representationalist view is basically naive realism. It is simply indubitale that subjective experience is in part constituted by sensory data, I can't see how that can plausibly be denied. But that doesn't necessarily entail representative realism.

It is simply indubitale that subjective experience is in part constituted by sensory data, I can't see how that can plausibly be denied. — Wayfarer

Maybe that's because you think in representationalist terms. ;-)

I can assure you that I don’t. I just don’t think Hacker and Bennett can explain away the issues of the neural binding problem with a brief bit of philosophical jargon.

I mentioned Andrew Brook above, a scholar who says that Kant is ‘the godfather of cognitive science’. I wonder what H&B would make of that?

//ps// Is Bennett a neuroscientist or a cognitive scientist?

I can assure you that I don’t. I just don’t think Hacker and Bennett can explain away the issues of the neural binding problem with a brief bit of philosophical jargon. — Wayfarer

They wrote the influential book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" so they've given these issues serious consideration. To make an analogy to another scientific field, perceived problems for some quantum interpretations (say, non-locality, or many worlds) do not necessarily arise for others. The conceptual model makes a difference.

I mentioned Andrew Brook above, a scholar who says that Kant is ‘the godfather of cognitive science’. I wonder what H&B would make of that? — Wayfarer

I don't know. They don't mention Kant in PFN.

//ps// Is Bennett a neuroscientist or a cognitive scientist? — Wayfarer

Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience and University Chair at the University of Sydney.

They wrote the influential book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" so they've given these issues serious consideration — Andrew M

Of course, well aware of that. I've only read some excepts and reviews, but overall I'm positive about them, I note they're generally opposed to neural reductionism. I read some of Peter Hacker's essays on his website, he's plainly a very eminent philosopher, although I'm not sure I follow his critique of Descartes.

But the point is, the conscious state really is a synthesis of numerous types of sensory and sensorimotor data combined with judgement which manifests as the conscious unity of being. I'm simply at a loss how this can be denied. It's got nothing to do with representative realism. So I'm puzzled by statements like this:

One cannot combine colour, form and dimensions into perceptions, just as one cannot put events into holes (sic) - this form of words makes no sense. — History of Cognitive Neuroscience, pp37-38,55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S.

Of course, 'one' doesn't do this as a deliberate act. It is the combined action of millions of cellular systems a lot of it done by automatic responses and the parasympathetic nervous system, the unconscious, subconscious, and so on. I have read studies that analyse this in detail, showing that the neural systems that capture sound, shape, size and colour information are discrete, most of which have been identified. What has not been identified, is the neural function which combines those disparate elements into a unified form.

I'm not going to press the point, as I really don't have a lot of interest in deliving into all of the literature about a very complex problem in cognitive science. Suffice to say though I'm not at all persuaded by their dismissal of it, and nothing you've said conveys any sense that you've really gotten the point of the argument. It has nothing directly to do with 'qualia'.

They don't mention Kant in PFN. — Andrew M

It's an oversight, I would think.