On a representationalist view, there is a separation of (subjective) experience from the (objective) world. The subjective experience has to be synthesized from the signals coming from the environment. Hence the binding problem.
Whereas on a non-representationalist view, what we perceive just is the world (which we have attendant thoughts and feelings about). The signals coming from the environment enable us to perceive what is there. — Andrew M
The brain and the mind are two sides of the same medal. — Raymond
As if an abstract non-entity can be a force. — Mww
How would your analysis differ if its object was (what is usually thought of as) a physical entity or process? — SophistiCat
If the mind is physical, then thoughts are physical. If a thought is physical, it consists of physical energy. If physical energy can be validly quantified as e = mc^2, then our physical thoughts, which consist of structured physical energy, then consist of physical mass multiplied by the speed of light squared. Ergo, our physical thoughts have physical mass.
Where's the logical fallacy in this? — javra
When I say "My mind is conscious", I am speaking in the third person as an outside observer of my mind. — RussellA
If I say that "I am my mind", then I am speaking as an inside observer of my mind. But this leads to the problem that the mind is discussing itself, leading to a circularity, in that the statement becomes either "I am I" or "my mind is my mind".
The statement "A is A" may be logically true, but it gives no information as to what "A" empirically is. — RussellA
We can discuss the mind without ever knowing whether it exists or not
If minds don't exist, we can still discuss them as we can discuss unicorns
If minds do exist, then the mind would be discussing itself, leading to the problem of circularity, meaning that the mind would be unable to determine the truth of its own existence. — RussellA
Yes, if I perceive mental content, I would say "I am conscious of the mental content", rather than "my mind is conscious of the mental content". — RussellA
Many things appear to exist, that do not consist of "physical energy". For instance: space, time, the surface area of a cube, the direction of a movement, a hole in the ground, an angle, 1 million dollars, the law of excluded middle, a novel, or the formula "e = mc^2". — Olivier5
"'I' (my self) is nothing other than my mind (whatever that is)". — SophistiCat
I reject the concept of “qualia” outright, as superfluous....
— Mww
Thanks! You omit those words (as superfluous) but, as I understand it, retain the underlying representationalist model. — Andrew M
It is really quite irrelevant that there is a quale representing a “feeling of what it is like”, if there is no aesthetic judgement made in relation to it. — Mww
If I want to understand the nature of the mind, I cannot look at the minds of others, which will forever be closed to me, in that I could never discover what beetles others have in their individual boxes. — RussellA
I have no problem with the concept that my mind can think about something outside itself, such as the range of the Cybertruck, but I have a problem with the concept of my mind thinking about itself. Does it mean that my mind is thinking about my mind thinking about my mind thinking about my mind, etc. As Schopenhauer wrote: “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of” — RussellA
They stand in relations and thus ground a structure of relations but qualia themselves are not relations and have no internal structure. — litewave
Many things appear to exist, that do not consist of "physical energy". — Olivier5
if I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at the minds of other, and I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at my own, then I will never be able to understand the nature of the mind. — RussellA
I agree that "I am my mind". — RussellA
Schopenhauer wrote: “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of” — RussellA
Many things appear to exist, that do not consist of "physical energy". For instance: space, time, the surface area of a cube, the direction of a movement, a hole in the ground, an angle, 1 million dollars, the law of excluded middle, a novel, or the formula "e = mc^2". — Olivier5
I really don't understand this problem with "mind thinking about itself." — SophistiCat
You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is the ātman. 1
The difference between the self or subject and any object of knowledge whatever is precisely that the self or subject is never an object of cognition as a matter of definition. — Wayfarer
The method of "postulating" what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. — Bertrand Russell
I'm in agreement with this, and is what I basically maintained in the context of this thread in regard to the mind and its contents. That it's absurd to maintain that "the idea that a unicorn, being an existent thought, is a mass / physical energy endowed physical thing that is not real" is one of the (acknowledgedly minor) points I somewhere hereabouts previously made. The point wasn't addressed. — javra
This idea is the subject of an interesting lecture by Michel Bitbol, philosopher of science, It is never known, but it is the knower. — Wayfarer
So I'm puzzled by statements like this:
"One cannot combine colour, form and dimensions into perceptions, just as one cannot put events into holes (sic) - this form of words makes no sense." — History of Cognitive Neuroscience, pp37-38,55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S. — Wayfarer
I'm not going to press the point, as I really don't have a lot of interest in deliving into all of the literature about a very complex problem in cognitive science. Suffice to say though I'm not at all persuaded by their dismissal of it, and nothing you've said conveys any sense that you've really gotten the point of the argument. It has nothing directly to do with 'qualia'. — Wayfarer
The subjective unity of perception
We will now address the deepest and most interesting variant of the NBP, the phenomenal unity of perception. There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole." — The neural binding problem(s) - Jerome Feldman
But even in the non-representationalist view we don't perceive a tree (an external object) directly but only as "marks" left by incoming photons in our nervous system and these "marks" are a representation of the tree, not the tree itself, so I don't understand why such a view would be called non-representationalist. — litewave
When an OCR machine recognizes an alphabet character or a self-driving vehicle recognizes a pedestrian crossing the street, does it do so via a representationalist method or a non-representationalist method? — litewave
This elaboration in effect twice removed qualia from Kantian metaphysics, — Mww
insofar as all experience has phenomenal ground, hence the notion of “superfluous”, and, experience doesn't even have “character” in the Enlightenment transcendental sense — Mww
while experience is certainly predicated on sense data given from objects of perception, feelings just as certainly are not. — Mww
One can hold with such representational model, while abstaining from incorporating qualia in it. — Mww
Taking "mind" in its ordinary sense, we certainly can have insight into other minds — SophistiCat
I really don't understand this problem with "mind thinking about itself." — SophistiCat
all experience has phenomenal ground.....
— Mww
So I'm curious whether you think that statement is compatible with the view that experience is grounded in the world, understood as that which we can point to around us..... — Andrew M
.....that which we can point to around us (and which do have characteristics, e.g., the red flower in the vase). — Andrew M
while experience is certainly predicated on sense data given from objects of perception.....
— Mww
And also whether that statement is compatible with saying that what we perceive are objects in the world..... — Andrew M
....objects in the world (which we have attendant thoughts and feelings about). — Andrew M
(I note that you mention "sense data", but also that it is not "sense data" that is perceived, since it is not an object of perception). — Andrew M
Color, form and dimensions are characteristics that objects have. Perception is the process by which we become aware of an object with such characteristics. It's not a process of purple, squareness and boxhood being synthesized in our minds or, alternatively, brains. — Andrew M
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.