Or something very like them, along with general relativity or something very like it, along with the particular boundary conditions of our universe. At least, the idea hasn't been contradicted, and has been verified in all conceived and possible tests (out of-the-gaps window of opportunity). — Kenosha Kid

And probably eternal in both time directions. But... does this stuff determine us? Is our will determined by it? Is there a natural law keeping us by the balls. If you consider my wife a natural law, then yes. But a real existing law, like a god? Like genes playing puppeteers of our body, as I once saw depicted? This exists in the mind only.

Ok better put, how can determinism exist without a first cause? — john27

Determinism isn't an event though. Effects need prior causes. Determinism doesn't. It fits more into the role of characteristic of nature (although see below). In particular, it appears to be a time-independent characteristic of nature, therefore not requiring a history. There's lots of questions we could ask about that. For instance, is it really time-independent, or could effects become decreasingly correlated with causes over time? Does the possibility of determinism necessitate this particular determinism (time-independent or -dependent), or could different universes with different boundary conditions have different determinisms, or even no determinism at all? None of these necessitate a _prior_ cause of a particular determinism, although perhaps an eternal inflation type picture could allow for something like the exact conditions of a big bang to dictate causality.

An alternative to no cause at all and prior cause is underlying causes, and that's where the scientific orthodoxy lies. My background is quantum theory but I have a minority view about it so I'll take care to separate popular beliefs and my own. Most quantum theories have some kind of probabilistic collapse or branching mechanism: causes are sufficient but not necessary conditions for their effects. Copenhagen ontologists believe that nature selects from _possible_ effects in a weighted but otherwise random way. Many worlds enthusiasts believe that all possible effects co-exist independently, with the more probable ones having greater contribution to the whole. In short, whenever you do quantum theory with only one (initial) temporal boundary condition, you end up with multiple effects for every cause and therefore nature is only backwards deterministic, i.e. every effect is fully explained by it's causes, but those causes don't fully explain the effect.

So then why does the macroscopic universe appear deterministic at all? The answer is... the principle of least action! Determinism is a statistically emergent quality in this sort of QM. Because each particle in the stone you throw in a vacuum has a tiny probability of being located a centimetre off its expected trajectory, the stone as a whole has a negligible probability of being found a centimetre off its expected trajectory. Effectively, when you sum over the histories for each particle being a centimetre off in the same way, most of those histories undergo destructive interference, meaning that the total probability of the stone as a whole going off course is so tiny you wouldn't expect to see it happen once in the entire history of the universe. It's not an impossibility, just an overwhelming likelihood that the principle of least action as we know it holds true.

In this way, no prior cause is needed for determinism, as it's an emergent characteristic from another, more fundamental version of the principle of least action (sum over histories, essentially the integration of action over all possible paths).

Another possibility is that final, as well as initial, boundary conditions of systems should be specified, i.e. that time flies backwards as well as forwards, in the same way that space spans left as well as right. In relativity theory, time and space are on equal footing, and thus it is my view we should solve the equations accordingly: two spatial boundaries per spatial dimension, two temporal boundaries for the time dimension. The results are more or less the same, except that determinism occurs more fundamentally.

If you consider my wife a natural law, then yes. But a real existing law, like a god? — Raymond

I have heard she's a force of nature :rofl:

A law isn't like a god, it's more like a track.

Determinism isn't an event though. Effects need prior causes. Determinism doesn't. — Kenosha Kid

OK, but the second law of thermodynamics, is a practical view of determinism. Would then, the second law of thermodynamics necessitate a first cause?

In this way, no prior cause is needed for determinism, as it's an emergent characteristic from another, more fundamental version of the principle of least action (sum over histories, essentially the integration of action over all possible paths). — Kenosha Kid

I agree with you that determinism or this deeper fundamental law does not need a first cause in and of itself. However, It was in my belief that determinism does not determine the free will, it was the determinative aspect of the second law of thermodynamics, which does (or at least I think it does) need a supposed first cause to realize/become real. Therefore, determinism in its applicative aspect, does in some way necessitate a first cause.

Sorry Raymond, I didn't give you a very comprehensive response.

Like genes playing puppeteers of our body, as I once saw depicted? This exists in the mind only. — Raymond

Let me separate that into two parts because a puppeteer is not only controling the puppets, it's doing so consciously, with volition and purpose. As I said before, that's a metaphor that can help but also hinder. Determinism does not suggest a godlike overseer anymore: that's what science has done for us.

So... 1) does determinism control us, dictate our decisions for us? and 2) does this determinism itself suggest some sentient higher power?

On 1), putting aside twisty exotic definitions of will designed to give a preferred answer and taking it to mean the decision to act in a particular way toward a desired end, yes, I'd say will itself necessitates determinism. Otherwise I could decide that, because I am hungry, I wish to eat the apple before me and therefore choose to chop off my right hand with an axe. It wouldn't make a lot of sense and I don't think we'd have gotten far as a species if we were apt to behave in this way. I might tell people that I want to eat the apple then choose to chop off my right hand in an extreme and misguided demonstration of my free will but then my chosen outcome is "demonstrate free will by chopping own hand off" not "sate my hunger".

I assume this is true for you, but when I make a decision it's based on various considerations. I haven't eaten many vegetables recently. I am worried about my health. So what shall I eat for dinner tonight? I really fancy a burger with pulled pork fries. But I know I need vegetables, and lots of them. I have multiple options for outcomes: joyous gluttony or healthy body, and the thing that will select between them is... me! That's a good definition of free will in my book. But is it deterministic?

Well how do I choose? Today I chose healthy: a tasty vegetable stir fry. Was this random? Would it even be will if it were? No, I chose healthy because currently I feel bad about Christmas gluttony and I knew that I'd like myself more for choosing vegetables. Also, I knew that I'd physically benefit from it. Plus, I had the vegetables, so all the barriers to making it are removed. I find I have no reason to eat unhealthily other than gluttony and that's a bad reason.

But a few days ago, I had a bacon and brie sandwich for breakfast. That's not healthy. I thought I was all about being healthy as the moment!!! But then again I had the bacon, the brie, the bread. I didn't have anything healthy for breakfast that I like eating. And I was making breakfast for three people. I'm not going to make them bacon and brie and deny myself, that's borderline martyrdom.

Both choices make sense in the light of my state and situation even though they seem practically schizophrenic, which is to say that there are reasons I whittled down my options from many to one in the particular way I did. If I had wanted burger and pulled pork fries a bit more, or if I'd been out of noodles, or if my partner had been home and said "I really fancy that burger tonight, how about you?" then the deterministic whittling would likely have gone in the other direction. Likewise if my partner had asked me to make her a caprese for breakfast the other day and we had some nice fresh basil, fat and firm beef tomatoes, and some light mozzarella, then I'd probably have eaten healthily then instead. These aren't demonstrations of non-determinism, quite the opposite: if I could have listed the important factors without actually making a decision, my decision could easily be predicted.

As for (2), no, none of this requires a puppeteer imo. I simply need to be in a particular state, which I always am, in a particular environment, which I always am, and with the mental apparatus to weigh factors and desired outcomes, which I have. A good demonstration of this is what happens when we have no basis to choose one outcome or course of action over another. Sartre writes about this in his Sketch of a Theory of Emotions. Under experimental circumstances, when subjects are forced to choose between equally unattractive options, something weird happens: they become irrationally angry. Sartre's theory, which I believe and recognise in myself, is that this sort of emotionally violent reaction is a psychological trick to get us out of rational deadlocks. If, in our current situation, there are no particularly good options, change the situation. Fuck shit up. By the end, there will typically be a least bad option (usually: clean up the mess you just made), at which point you calm down again.

I think this exemplifies the deterministic nature of will, the idea that we choose a over b because, after consideration of all factors, it is clear to us that a > b is made most evident in the edge cases where a = b.

OK, but the second law of thermodynamics, is a practical view of determinism. Would then, the second law of thermodynamics necessitate a first cause? — john27

It's difficult to imagine it. Whatever the initial conditions, whatever the strength of gravity, if you have a partioned box with gas in one side and a vacuum in the other, and you remove the partition, there are many more configurations where the gas occupies the whole box than where it stays in its original side, and one would expect this equilibrium to be attained after a while. This would suggest that it is independent of first causes.

It might be dependent on reference frame though. It's one I think about a lot and have started a thread on a while back, the relationship between the initial conditions of the universe (infinite order), the second law, and determinism. It's possible that thermodynamics is a hangover from the initial state of the universe (infinite order).

All that proves that external factors play a role, a big role, in your decisions.

I am thinking of it like a dance. Our dance partner influences our dancing. As does the music, dance floor, aesthetics of dance hall, etc. However, who chose all the stuff that makes up the dance hall? Whoever runs the place. But what influenced them to make all the choices? To a large extent, whatever is popular at the time. And who determines what is popular at the time? Is that not a collective "decision"? Eventually we can trace all factors back to the supposed big bang where everything supposedly came from. If that is the case, then we are all equally victims of the first cause. No external factor in the environment is necessarily stronger then the influence we contribute to the collective. Life is a co-creative process.

It's difficult to imagine it. Whatever the initial conditions, whatever the strength of gravity, if you have a partioned box with gas in one side and a vacuum in the other, and you remove the partition, there are many more configurations where the gas occupies the whole box than where it stays in its original side, and one would expect this equilibrium to be attained after a while. This would suggest that it is independent of first causes — Kenosha Kid

Huh.

It might be dependent on reference frame though. — Kenosha Kid

What's reference frame?

Although we're all slaves of, and none of us masters to, causality! :scream: — Kenosha Kid

Dang. I want a refund. I don't remember reading being a slave to causality in the terms and conditions.:broken:

Is the stomach driven by external will or internal will? All will evolves. Some wills have a lust for power and constrain other forms of will. I think it's that what makes will free, not if they are determined by deterministic abstract entities apart from them, like a natural law or God. — Raymond

I'm not getting what you are saying makes will free. That it evolves? Sounds interesting.

It sounds about right, to me. Combine this with the fact that no other force, being, or object can be shown to cause or direct a person’s decisions but the person himself.

Another possibility is that final, as well as initial, boundary conditions of systems should be specified — Kenosha Kid

This is exactly what is done in the LAP. Two fixed positions in spacetime. It seems teleological in the sense that a particle seems to know the right path to choose. But it's us who vary the path, it's us who determine the track. It's not that the particle chooses it beforehand. more paths are in fact possible. With varying probabilities. The actual path in classical mechanics is one real history based on calculating the one with least action. For qft, all histories are actually existing, with various probabilities. But in both cases, for an actual situation, you calculate the histories a priori. Then afterwards you say the actual present history (yeah, right..., alas!), is determined by the principle, while it's actually determined by us.

Does determinism need a first cause? I think it does. At the BB singularity particles needed a first push to come in existence. Without such a first push, nothing could have come into existence.The initial pushes determined the subsequent development, which would result in life for a wide, maybe continuous and infinite set of initial conditions. Maybe these pushes were even determined by a previous big bang, where time has reached infinity (I tend to think that once the universe has accelerated away to infinity, this triggers a new big bang behind us). That's why, the initial conditions for a time reversed universe have to be infinitely precise, while these for the forward direction can be pretty carbitrary.

Determinism does not suggest a godlike overseer anymore: that's what science has done for us. — Kenosha Kid

Dunno. The overseer seems necessary for the actual existence of the universe. If he oversees or determines initial conditions, or even intervenes is an open question, with different people having different answers.
Science has no answers and basically does the same as placing a god behind it, but in seemingly objective language. There simply are no principles governing us or the universe.

Processes are not isolated, and a stone thrown seems to move reversibly, without one being able to say which direction time goes. In reality, there exist practically no reversible processes. Is there really a track leading us? There is only one path! That's the path given to us by our Divine Creator! Praise His Name, and, brothers and sisters of the holy sanctuary, let's hold hands and pray rejoicefully to the Rightful and Wise, blissfully acknowledging to be grateful of the Golden Light He allows us to bathe in!

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Well how do I choose? Today I chose healthy: a tasty vegetable stir fry. Was this random? — Kenosha Kid

True random choices are impossible to make, I think, though I have a vague recollection of someone who claimed he had found a mental procedure, though I doubt now he was right.

The will is a determined one. Will can't exist without determination. Determination doesn't rob the will from its freedom. The determined action of a will can impair the will of fellow men though. It's in this context that we can speak of a free will, or a free wont.

Whoever runs the place. But what influenced them to make all the choices? — Yohan

Follow the same procedure. Ask them what their options and restrictions where, what factors were overwhelming at the time, how they justified choosing one option over another... Likely they'll know the answers, which is to say that, while they were the ones who had to whittle down all possibilities to a single course of action (what will does), there were reasons for the particular choices they made. On which:

But maybe I'm just clinging to an excuse to believe I have some power over my life. — Yohan

I am certain I have power over my life. I am the thing that deterministically does that whittling. I'm in the equation, making myself known. It wouldn't help my ego one iota to know that there was anything non-deterministic involved. I wouldn't be able to describe that and claim it for my own. It's essential to me that my decisions are as rational as possible or, if irrational, I can at least explain them in retrospect. This has all the qualities of free will I'd want to preserve, the bits that matter. The whole "could do otherwise" thing is just a nonsense that was never on the table in the first place. One can never "do otherwise". One can only "do". Do the do. Doop doop dewoop.

:rofl:

What's reference frame? — john27

So it might be the case that the thermodynamic arrow of time is local and appears to point in one particular direction from a particular point of view, specifically the point of view of intelligent creatures who need the second law in order to learn things (including the second law). This is a homocentric bias: we believe that the thermodynamic arrow of time is privileged because we have a psychological arrow of time derived from it.

Getting out of our own egos, there's no particular reason why the psychological arrow of time should privilege anything. It's just as reasonable to say that order increases with time, but we're just seeing it back to front. This is a frame of reference: we point the time arrow in a particular direction, but it could just as well be in the opposite direction (constituting a different frame of reference). We can already do the same thing with space. Your forward is not my forward.

I wrote about it at length here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9506/cosmology-and-determinism

Note that this is merely illustrative, I'm not championing it, nor is it orthodox. The TL;DR version is that, yes, thermodynamics could be a consequence of the geometry of the universe, i.e.its initial and final conditions. In this curved space-time with time symmetry picture, there's no privileged ordering to events: an initial condition from one reference frame could be a final condition in another. As such, one could imagine many such boundaries, not just two.

But yes, essentially, thermodynamics could be caused by boundary conditions.

we do things in very inefficient ways, most of the times failing to take the shortest route between beginning (of a project) and its end — Agent Smith

The shortest route between A and B is not always the most efficient. There may be other factors that can be applied to evaluate efficiency. One of them is "cost". If we travel from Italy directly to London by plane may cost more than through Germany. The direct way can be called "time-efficient" and the indirect one "cost-efficient". So, if we mind more about the cost of travel than how long it takes, its more efficient to take the indirect route. Other criteria can be "quality", "pleasure", etc.

So, if I am not wrong, you tried to prove the existence of free will based on human inefficiency. Yet, the above examples I gave are better, I think, than inefficiency. The willingness to apply personal criteria of efficiency and decide on a different way than the default, easiest or shorter way to a destination or end purpose, is a better proof of free will than following the shorter, easier, safer, more comfortable or common path.

But it's us who vary the path, it's us who determine the track. It's not that the particle chooses it beforehand. more paths are in fact possible. — Raymond

I see what you're saying, but it's not like a hydrogen atom is figuring out the frequency it should oscillate at: it is constrained to aim toward a particular frequency by purely physical behaviour. That said, the best computer you could design for modelling the universe exactly would be... the universe. You could think of it that way.

More to the point, hydrogen is (not) figuring out what frequency to oscillate at whether we know what that frequency is our not, whether anything figures it out or not. I detect a desire here to see teleology in everything, but it's simply not justified. In the case of specifying initial and final boundaries, it's not like one is actualised and the system has to know how to reach the other. Rather there is a 4D worldline that is actualised as a whole, and we just experience one before the other. The system doesn't need to "know" either boundary, rather it's entire history is predicated on both.

Does determinism need a first cause? I think it does. At the BB singularity particles needed a first push to come in existence. Without such a first push, nothing could have come into existence.The initial pushes determined the subsequent development, which would result in life for a wide, maybe continuous and infinite set of initial conditions. Maybe these pushes were even determined by a previous big bang, where time has reached infinity (I tend to think that once the universe has accelerated away to infinity, this triggers a new big bang behind us). — Raymond

But again what you're describing here is sequences of events related by an overarching character of determinism, not the birth of determinism per se. In our local view, there's no 'before' the big bang to cause determinism. We'd need to be able to look at other universes to get a picture of whether determinism is optional or variable and we can't. It's not only perfectly viable but very likely that determinism is the same in all universes (if there are multiple) and even a characteristic of the multiverse, putting it well outside of time's domain, whether that's the statistically emergent determinism of QM or some harder, fixed version as per my view.

In reality, there exist practically no reversible processes. — Raymond

In reality, almost all elementary processes are reversible. That was the point of departure for the thread I linked to in my previous post.

The will is a determined one. Will can't exist without determination. Determination doesn't rob the will from its freedom. The determined action of a will can impair the will of fellow men though. It's in this context that we can speak of a free will, or a free wont. — Raymond

:up: :lol: I like free won't.

It's essential to me that my decisions are as rational as possible or, if irrational, I can at least explain them in retrospect. — Kenosha Kid

If you are honest, then I wonder how the hell you determined going to a philosophy forum is "as rational as possible."
That's like someone saying they care about good hygiene while covered in trash.
Or like someone who claims they want to know God while at the same time being religious.

I see what you're saying, but it's not like a hydrogen atom is figuring out the frequency it should oscillate at: it is constrained to aim toward a particular frequency by purely physical behaviour. That said, the best computer you could design for modelling the universe exactly would be... the universe. You could think of it that way. — Kenosha Kid

That's exactly what I say. It's us trying to figure out what history occurs by trying to calculate them all and assign them probabilities according to a principle. I don't think the universe computes all these different histories, assigns them complex probabilities, and ĺets these interfere. All these procedures are human inventions, not truly present in nature. That's only what we project. You could think of it that way, and that leads to the idea of a track being present.

In reality, almost all elementary processes are reversible. — Kenosha Kid

Well, in theory all processes are time reversible. Just reverse all motion present in the system... in practice this needs quite some effort, and the means you reverse all motion with go forward in time. You can mentally reverse all motion, but in practice this is not possible, and it's the reason time is irreversible. Processes could run in reverse though. If all motion would be magically reversed (evolution of the wavefunctions, collapses, expansion of space, spin), a time reversed universe is seen. Wavefunction evolution is not reversible in time though, and collapse would still occur, so even if the reversed process is possible, the reversed evolution of the wavefunction is not, as collapses are not reversed in superpositions. In practice, reversed processes can only occur if the momenta are reversed, and this can only be done in the bigger context of larger irrerversible processes, and an accidental reversal can also only occur in such a larger process, because else the whole had to reverse in its entirety, which obviously cannot happen.The funny thing is though that it are fundamental processes that are asymmetric in time. The weak force is involved here, as the weak force is left right asymmetric. Some particles (quark anti quarks) are CP asymmetric and thus T reversal shows a different partice, and time reversal can be identified. Somehow, space asymmetry necessitates a form of time asymmetry.

I'm not getting what you are saying makes will free. That it evolves? — Yohan

I'll give it a try. The academic approach to free will or wont is that their freedom is taken away by reference to a natural law, be it a statistical one, like QM, or a deterministic variant of it. In both cases the will seems to be "a victim" of determinism, be it a determined wave function with associated probabilistic collapse, or even a deeper deterministic substrate. It is claimed that the will is somehow the slave of deterministic or probabilistic processes, which denies the notion of a free will.

But how can an evolving process be "determined" by initial and boundary conditions or natural laws? Only if we litterally impose boundary or initial conditions, and project a natural law into it, it makes some sense to say the process is determined. But we can't impose these conditions into the inside of the process. Mentally we can project forces into the process and call these forces the determining entity. These forces though are caused by internal charges. These charges and forces are part of the process and the only thing really determining the process is the will inside it. There is a will even in two charged particles interacting, though I'm stepping her off the beaten track. The dynamics of charged particle fields is not determined by gauge fields but by the will particles have to interact. Physicists call this will charge. Because of this charge (its nature is not understood, not even by string theory, which shifts the problem of charge to vibrational modes of strings, which makes one wonder what causes this vibration) interaction occurs. The charge in a sense pushes the the particle fields, by means of gauge fields. Which is to say, we view it that way. We consider gauge fields the fields causing the dynamics of particle aggregates but can say just as well that the will, the mental, or however you call it, the cause of the dynamics. Two magnets pushing or pulling one another somehow seem to have a will.

Larger, more complicated processes, with complex structured charges moving, like charges running around on the neurons of our brain, involve more complex forms of will inside the body, like charge and colored charges in quarks and leptons or two even more fundamental particles. These charged contents constitute the will and consciousness and the freedom of this will can be constrained by other forms of will.

The will, or consciousness or charge, are not caused, nor do they cause. The will is an inherent property of nature, and so are charge and consciousness. The will can influence other processes. People have a will with eyes to see, ears to hear and mouths to scream. They have the great, and at the same time scary possibility to reign over the will of other people, the will to power. The will simply is, not determined but determined, not caused but causing.

So we are just charged bodies with faces, arms and legs to excercise our will, and an uncanny ability to direct our fellow beings in thought, action and story.

Great story...That's all it is, a bedtime lullaby... :cool:

It's the constriction of the will that should be part of ethics. The will is not "determined" by physical processes, it is just part of them, and they are a necessary a priori for the will even to exist. — Raymond

:up: And...

I'm not going to get drawn in to antiscientific new age guff about disorder being evil. The basis for the argument in your OP was a scientific one: the principle of least action. — Kenosha Kid

You mentioned the 2^nd law of thermodynamics

It sounds about right, to me. Combine this with the fact that no other force, being, or object can be shown to cause or direct a person’s decisions but the person himself. — NOS4A2

It's just a vague idea of mine. I'm glad that it made sense ro you, assuming you weren't being sarcastic.

The shortest route between A and B is not always the most efficient. There may be other factors that can be applied to evaluate efficiency. One of them is "cost". If we travel from Italy directly to London by plane may cost more than through Germany. The direct way can be called "time-efficient" and the indirect one "cost-efficient". So, if we mind more about the cost of travel than how long it takes, its more efficient to take the indirect route. Other criteria can be "quality", "pleasure", etc.

So, if I am not wrong, you tried to prove the existence of free will based on human inefficiency. Yet, the above examples I gave are better, I think, than inefficiency. The willingness to apply personal criteria of efficiency and decide on a different way than the default, easiest or shorter way to a destination or end purpose, is a better proof of free will than following the shorter, easier, safer, more comfortable or common path. — Alkis Piskas

As you can see, it all depends on keeping one of the many variables involved at a minimum. In your example, either time or cost, if possible both, must be kept as low as possible. That's why I used the principle of least action to make the case for free will. The point is we can take an unreasonable course of action - prolong our journey and pay a hefty sum - and that's what I feel is free will at work.

The point is we can take an unreasonable course of action - prolong our journey and pay a hefty sum - and that's what I feel is free will at work. — Agent Smith

It's not unreasonable if it's what I feel (determined) I really want. We are not going to take a vote on what I "should" choose. I can be "determined" by influences that you don't approve of.

It's not unreasonable if it's what I feel (determined) I really want. We are not going to take a vote on what I "should" choose. I can be "determined" by influences that you don't approve of. — Monitor

Why isn't it unreasonable? Do you mean everything is reasonable?

People who commit suicide, people who willfully let go of the railing and throw themselves into the abyss, for reasons, however irrational, however unreasonable they might be judged to be, are doing so because they think it is the right thing to do for right now. It is the priority. They are following the path of least resistance because to do anything else, to make any other decision offers more resistance (for them, right now) than letting go of the railing. They are jumping because to kill themselves any other way is more resistant. Thus they are finding the easiest way to do the hardest part. Thus they are taking the shortest route from A to B. I can think of no other way to convey it. If you are unable to see some validity to this, I won't bother you again.

The road leading from the cradle to the abyss, the overdose, the gun, or the pills though must have been one of maximum resistance...

Then how did they persist? Then why did they do it? Why didn't they stop? How did it succeed? When we talk about determinism we are talking about determined motives for human beings, not the abstract logic / math that "should be followed".

They are determined not to follow and suffer the resistance anymore. The path they followed in life was one of maximum resistance, not least.

it all depends on keeping one of the many variables involved at a minimum. — Agent Smith

Right, as far as time and cost are concerned. But we may want the opposite --increase the criterion to a maximum-- as in the example of "quality" and "pleasure". However, maximums can certainly create problems. E.g. drinking. That's why they also require setting llimits, whereas minimums don't.

The point is we can take an unreasonable course of action - prolong our journey and pay a hefty sum - and that's what I feel is free will at work. — Agent Smith

Right. That's why I mentioned setting "limits". Anyway, the essential point is that acting based on setting, deciding on and applying any criterion for any action is enough to prove the existence of free will.
That's why I can't see how can a large part of "thinking" people maintain that there's no free will!

The evil daemon is in possession of all what will happen in the universe. The evil daemon tells me what I'm about to do in a minute. I act in deep contrast to his evil prophecy. I have a free will!

Right, as far as time and cost are concerned — Alkis Piskas

More than that I'm afraid. Nature, I was told, is lazy.

llimits — Alkis Piskas

Limits are restrictions, restrictions are imposed, imposed implies absence of, not presence of, freedom.

If you are honest, then I wonder how the hell you determined going to a philosophy forum is "as rational as possible." — Yohan

Easy. The desired outcome was: discuss philosophy with people more knowledgeable about it than me. The chosen course of action -- to visit a philosophy forum -- was the optimal one.

I don't think the universe computes all these different histories, assigns them complex probabilities, and ĺets these interfere. All these procedures are human inventions, not truly present in nature. — Raymond

Well it's still all to play for, but by my reckoning, if it diffracts like a wave and it interferes like a wave, it's a wave. That's not to say the science is exact, but it would be weird if it was far from the truth given the sheer amount of testing it's undergone.

Well, in theory all processes are time reversible. Just reverse all motion present in the system... in practice this needs quite some effort, and the means you reverse all motion with go forward in time. — Raymond

At a macroscopic scale it's nigh on impossible because of pesky thermodynamics. But elementary processes are almost all reversible. A thing moving from A to B is a physical process. Reverse the footage: it moves from B to A, also a physical process. Atom A emits a photon which is absorbed by atom B. Reverse the footage: atom B emits a photon which is absorbed by atom A, an identical physical process. Throw a ball in a vacuum from point A, it follows a parabolic trajectory and lands at point B. Reverse the footage, and it follows a parabolic trajectory from point B to A. Same goes for strong and most weak forces.

The only weird one is particle decay. Most are reversible: neutron decay and electron capture, proton decay and positron capture, pair creation and annihilation.

You mentioned the 2nd law of thermodynamics — Agent Smith

You think that the 2nd law is antiscientific new age guff? Or was a rofl emoji warranted there?

You mentioned the 2nd law of thermodynamics
— Agent Smith

You think that the 2nd law is antiscientific new age guff? Or was a rofl emoji warranted there? — Kenosha Kid

What I meant to say was that the so-called laws of nature are such that they always tend to keep one/two variables at a minimum - nature's lazy. Humans, though sloth is sin we're all guilty of, can be, let's just say, extravagant to a point that makes zero sense in re the laws of nature (laziness).

More than that I'm afraid. Nature, I was told, is lazy — Agent Smith

I don't get that ... Example?

Limits are restrictions, restrictions are imposed, imposed implies absence of, not presence of, freedom. — Agent Smith

No, no. I am referring to the limits/restictions selected and applied by ourselves. Hence, free will.
Example: I set a limit for time of 2 hrs, a limit for cost of 1,000 euros. I decide that freelly and willingly.

If you want to distance yourself from Hitler, you don't go for a toithbrush moustache. Why muddy the already muddy waters?