Aristotle expounded hylomorphic (matter-form) dualism. ‘Realism’ in relation to that means something completely different to ‘direct realism’. Understanding the distinction between Aristotelian/scholastic realism and modern realism is important.

Armstrong describes his philosophy as a form of scientific realism.

....The ultimate ontology of universals would only be realised with the completion of physical science.'

Good luck with that :rofl: — Wayfarer

That made me laugh, as I wondered: will the guy who completes physical science get all the Nobel prizes thereafter, year after year, or will they cancel the Nobel prizes once science is finished? ;-)

Nevertheless, and his naïve view of science as "finishable" notwithstanding, Amstrong here recognises the fundamental dualism of science: one does need to use universal laws and universal concepts to do science.

As I was trying to say upthread, geology is not a stone. It's not even a stone collection. It's a set of theories about stones.

one does need to use universal laws and universal concepts to do science. — Olivier5

Of course! You see it, and I see it, but so few people see it! This is one of the reasons that the Western tradition gave birth to science, which has unfortunately rejected its own heritage.

David Mamet Armstrong was the prof of the Department where I studied philosophy as an undergrad. He was a peculiar-looking fellow with a very large head. His magnum opus was called A Materialist Theory of Mind which I knew a priori was a crock so I never bothered to read it. He was one of a brace of aggressive materialist Australian philosophers from the 1960’s. Eventually I defected to the comparative religion department.

To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on. There’s no material or natural equivalent for ‘=‘, it’s a purely intellectual function, yet without it we’d have no maths, therefore no technology or anything related to it. That’s what makes a joke of the essay linked to the OP.

I am curious why Descartes only used thought to prove existence, and not feeling, which would seem to be a more obvious route. — RussellA

Because of the idea that even sense data (pain) could be deceiving, or doubted for the sake of the argument.

Even if Aristotle's Theory of Universals was true - whereby universals are understood by the intellect as only existing where they are instantiated in objects or things - the intellectual processing of information into concepts, such as tables and governments, can still be explained within materialism. — RussellA

It can be explained, but not explained away. It cannot be ignored, i e. a government or some multiplication table still matter within materialism. Or if you prefer, the only logical form of materialism is non-eliminative. Materialists have feelings too.

That’s what makes a joke of the essay linked to the OP. — Wayfarer

Yes. Greater exposure to the phenomenology tradition (beside Heidi) would help this place methinks. I mean, lets recognise pretheoretical human experience of being at the world (semi-)consciously as the primary condition and locus for science, as the source of all knowledge that one may tentatively built about the world, including scientific knowledge.

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common. — Mww

I would not say that "I am what thoughts and feelings have in common". I would say that "I am my subjective experiences. My subjective experiences include thoughts and feelings. What thoughts and feelings have in common is that they are part of my subjective experience"

For example, a car is an engine and wheels (simplifying). Engines and wheels have nothing in common. Therefore, cars are made up things that are not only different but have nothing in common. IE, we don't say that the essence of the car is what engines and wheels have in common.

Sorry for the delay. OK...fine. I totally missed this. My bad, because it was worth a response.

Descartes campaigned for a particular method of epistemology to be the benefactor of his establishment of the cogito. — Paine

Doubt is a negative truth claim, but is it a knowledge claim? Rather than a method of epistemology, I might go with a method of inference. This sorta fits, because establishment proper should follow from an ”ergo”, right? I mean.....”therefore” seems to indicate that which is established, as consequent, from some antecedent necessary truth.

How about this: Descartes campaigned for the establishment of “sum” as the benefactor of his particular method of inference.

Now, there is a particular method of epistemology that benefits from the establishment of “cogito”, but Descartes didn’t campaign, and wasn’t himself responsible, for it. Had to wait about 150 years for pure a priori cognitions to make the scene, which are the source of knowledge given from the thinking subject alone.

Minor technicality maybe, but still....should probably keep things in order.

There's no analogy for universals in the physical world — Wayfarer

Aristotle universals are incorporeal and exist only where they are instantiated in material things. If relations between objects have an ontological existence, then Aristotle's Universals have an ontological existence, and so are part of the material world.

FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of external relations.
However Russell dismissed Bradley’s argument on the grounds that philosophers who disbelieve in the reality of external relations cannot possibly interpret those numerous parts of sciences which appear to be committed to external relations.

So whether Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism or not depends on one's opinion as to the ontological existence of relations.

Because of the idea that even sense data (pain) could be deceiving, or doubted for the sake of the argument. — Olivier5

I may be deceived by a splitting headache but I can never doubt that I have one.

To say "I am my subjective experiences" means that "I am my subjective experiences of thoughts and feelings". — RussellA

My subjective experiences can include both thoughts and feelings. — RussellA

—————

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common.
— Mww

I would not say that "I am what thoughts and feelings have in common". — RussellA

Sorry. I figured there was no loss of truth value in my configuration of the statements as opposed to yours. Didn’t intend to flagrantly misinterpret.

The reason I said “it is usually enough” is because conventionally, it is. But technical metaphysical reductionism in the continental tradition denies that thoughts and feelings are experiences in the first place, so all that remains.....currently in vogue.....is the facility of convention, re: analytic language games.

thoughts and feelings — Mww

:smile: Maybe what we need is a conjunction between the thoughts of analytic philosophers and the feelings of continental philosophers. :smile:

conjunction between....analytic...and....continental philosophers. — RussellA

Oil and water!!!! Fire and ice!!! Mom’s apple pie and Tabasco!!!!

So whether Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism or not depends on one's opinion as to the ontological existence of relations. — RussellA

Indeed. There's a considerable amount of ambiguity around the way in which universals are said to exist. You can argue that they are only realised (made real) when they're instantiated in physical form, but that they are potentially real, or a part of the realm of possibility, even when they're not. I concur with Russell's analysis in Problems of Philosophy:

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, butthe act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.

We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being. — Bertrand Russell, World of Universals

Insofar as universals are real - which is, as Russell says, not to say that they exist - then it challenges materialism, which says that only material entities are real. And I say that this holds for vast areas of thought, such as pure mathematics, which is real but which is not material - which is why mathematical Platonism is nearly always rejected by current philosophers, even though many mathematicians remain platonist in their views. That number cannot be literally real is one of the principles dogmas of empiricism, even when mathematical reasoning is the literal backbone of the spectacular successes of science over the last three centuries.

... materialism, which says that only material entities are real. — Wayfarer

This is only true of vulgar materialism which is a caricature. :roll:

... pure mathematics, which is real but which is not material - which is why mathematical Platonism is nearly always rejected by current philosophers, ...

"Platonism", in the main, is founded on a both category mistake (territory in terms of maps (i.e. the material in terms of the formal)) and reification errors (maps sans territory (i.e. the formal sans the material)). Aristotle papered this over with his 'hylomorphism' and Kant with 'noumena as negation (limit) of phenomena' (which, IIRC, Schopenhauer's critical reformulation of Kant's 'noumenon' did much more coherently), and yet the Platonic fallacy still persists with e.g. Husselian phenomenology, logicist / formalist / structuralist metamathematics, ... as well as countless virulent strains of unexorcizeable perennialist woo. :mask:

This is only true of vulgar materialism which is a caricature. — 180 Proof

What's a materialist account of real abstract objects, then?

What's a materialist account of real abstract objects, then? — Wayfarer

Real abstract objects... as opposed to fake abstract objects? Counterfeit abstract objects? Imaginary abstract objects?

Back again to Austin's critique of universals, found in his paper "Are there a priori concepts?".

We use "grey" in order to classify together various quite different things. The presumption - one it seems that you also make, Wayfarer - is that therefore there must be a something that this word - grey - stands for which is common to all these cases.

But this argument depends on a hidden premiss; that words like "grey" are proper names. But why, if one identical word is used, must there be one identical object present which the word denotes?

Further, it is plain that we do use the word "grey" for different things. The grey of the poppies out the front is quite different for each poppy, and even across each petal; and certainly a different colour to the gunmetal grey of my chair.

Universals are no more than a useful way of talking.

What's a materialist account of real abstract objects, then? — Wayfarer

My (sketchy) account is this: abstractions (i.e. idealizations) are second-order generalizations from (i.e. maps of) arrangements, or expanses, of first-order materials (i.e. the territory). This view is gleaned from both Greek & Indian atomists, for instance, who emphasize that atomic configurations are only illusory 'objects' (maya), or ideas (phenomena) by which we perceive and categorize entities (e.g. Humean 'customs & habits of mind') but not actual entities themselves (re: swirling-swerving-atoms-and-encompassing-void (NB: the material, not "matter")). No doubt you know all this, Wayf, and long ago incorrigibly came to different conclusions.

No doubt you know all this, Wayf, and long ago incorrigibly came to different conclusions. — 180 Proof

Well, I have, but I think we have established sufficient rapport to at least debate it.

I'm investigating the relationship between scholastic realism and the argument from reason.

Real abstract objects... as opposed to fake abstract objects? Counterfeit abstract objects? Imaginary abstract objects? — Banno

Real numbers, for instance.

Universals are no more than a useful way of talking. — Banno

An exact definition of nominalism.

Everyone on this forum is nominalist, by default. Nominalism won the intellectual battle so long ago that the culture has forgotten what it means not to be nominalist.

Universals are no more than a useful way of talking. — Banno

:up: (like "essences")

Nominalism won the intellectual battle so long ago that the culture has forgotten what it means not to be nominalist. — Wayfarer

:up:

...the puzzle intentionality poses for materialism can be summarized this way: Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes.

... I maintain that the problem for materialism just described is insuperable. It shows that a materialist explanation of the mind is impossible in principle, a conceptual impossibility. And the reason has in part to do with the concept of matter to which materialists themselves are at least implicitly committed. — Ed Feser

So my brief sketch is that materialism identifies ideas, thought, and reason with neurobiology - that 'mind is what brain does'. That belief is so widespread as to be simply assumed by most people, as if there's nothing else it could be.

My argument against that is that the fundamental constituents of reason - 'is', 'is not', 'because', 'the same as', 'different from' as a minimalist example - can't be understood in neurological terms at all. Obviously we have to have the intelligence to understand those relations, but this doesn't make them the product of the brain; the law of the excluded middle didn't come into existence when h. sapiens evolved to the point of being able to recognise it. Instead these elements of reason are internal to thought, not 'the product of the brain' - indeed were they not internal to thought, then we would not have the necessary conceptual resources to even develop any science, let alone neuroscience.

So, what of 'universals'? I'm re-interpreting universals to signify all manner of intellectual principles, such as numbers, scientific laws, logic, and so on. The hallmark of all of them is that they can only be grasped by a rational intelligence, but are common to all who think. That is what constitutes an 'intelligible object' in my view. And it's compatible with Augustine's definition of intelligible objects.

But because of the over-riding acceptance of empiricist dogma, these intellectual constructs 'intelligible objects' (not actually 'objects' except analogically), which are the very ground of scientific thinking, are nevertheless subjectivised and relativised by modern philosophy, as 'the product of the brain'. As an excerpt from an essay last year on the nature of maths put it:

“I believe that the only way to make sense of mathematics is to believe that there are objective mathematical facts, and that they are discovered by mathematicians,” says James Robert Brown, a philosopher of science recently retired from the University of Toronto. “Working mathematicians overwhelmingly are Platonists. They don't always call themselves Platonists, but if you ask them relevant questions, it’s always the Platonistic answer that they give you.”

Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?

Why indeed! That's it, in a nutshell. Hence the conflict between Platonism and naturalism, as Lloyd Gerson points out in his series of books, culminating with the last.

What can’t be accounted for is the neural system that unifies them. So you’re actually begging the question, you’re assuming the very point at issue. — Wayfarer

Well, you're assuming there is a 'binding problem' to be solved, but this is an artefact of a representationalist scheme. See the photograph example below and also my last comment in this post to Mww.

That is naive realism, is it not? Doesn’t that simply bypass the requirement for critical reflection on the nature of experience? — Wayfarer

It's not naïve realism, which I think functions as one side of an artificial antithesis. The critical reflection is about whether what we are perceiving in a given instance is a representation of something else, or not.

Sometimes it is, such as when we see a portrait or a photograph. We can refer to a tree image in a photograph (e.g., the tree looks glossy) or the tree that the image is of (e.g., I used to climb that tree as a kid).

At other times it isn't, such as when we see a tree in the garden. So it's a natural distinction as opposed to an artificial antithesis where everything we perceive is representation, or nothing is.

‘The sunset’ signifies a particular time of day, saying it I can quite easily mentally picture a sunset. I don’t think that is problematical. — Wayfarer

Agreed. In this case, you're not perceiving a mental picture (cue the Cartesian theater), you're imagining a sunset. And that, in turn, is a different activity to perceiving a sunset.

--

Yet you’ve preface every one of those examples with “I”, the feeling of excitement, fond memory of the restaurant, more knowledge on the job. All of those belong to you alone, you said it yourself. So how can any of them be in the world if they are in you. If you’re right, I should go to that restaurant and experience your fondness for it. But it happened to be Thai and I hate Thai. — Mww

No accounting for taste I guess! Regardless, there are plenty of people out there who do share my fondness for Thai (and some that share your aversion).

When we both experience clouds, but I imagine a lion and you imagine a seagull in the same cloud formation......how do you explain those different experiences given from the exact same object? — Mww

Presumably if I looked just where you looked, I could pick out a lion shape too. If not, I'm sure there's a perfectly natural reason why not. Maybe you've just got a more vivid imagination than me.

But, yes, we are different people so we won't necessarily have the same experiences.

Even if he passes on mere information, doesn’t that still represent the perception? Otherwise he must pass on the red itself flower itself in itself a vase itself, which is quite absurd. — Mww

The red flower itself is not passed on, only information. That information allows us to perceive the object (in the world) in a particular form. That use of information and form can be compared to Aristotle's hylomorphism where the form is in the object, so to speak, which is why the object is perceptible.

This is just another way of saying that to perceive a red flower in a vase entails that there is a red flower in a vase (i.e., the logic of perception). So when we perceive the red flower, we're not perceiving a representation of the red flower (like a photograph), we're perceiving the object itself.

Thus there is no 'binding problem' that is not simply the problem of why things in the world (including the perceiving creatures themselves) have the relationships and character that they do.

Well, you're assuming there is a 'binding problem' to be solved, but this is an artefact of a representationalist scheme — Andrew M

It's really not. It's a well-established issue. It's a matter of empirical fact that the brain - for that matter, the entire human organism - comprises thousands of semi-autonomous sub-systems, all of which are subsidiary to the unified experience of being. You can't simply philosophise it out of existence.

That information allows us to perceive the object (in the world) in a particular form. That use of information and form can be compared to Aristotle's hylomorphism where the form is in the object, so to speak, which is why the object is perceptible. — Andrew M

I've been studying hylomorphism, and it's called a dualism. Why? Because it comprises two separate aspects of the intelligence - the sensory and the intelligible. According to Aristotelian dualism, the senses perceive the sensable form of the object, but the intellect perceives it's nature or essence. The form of the object is not its shape but the recognition of the type of thing that it is. Only a rational intellect is able to perceive the form, whereas non-rational intellect - animals - can percieve the sensable thing (I use 'sensable' to differentiate the meaning from 'sensible' which means something different.)

We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. — Andrew M

This is what I'm saying is naive realism - the contention that we perceive objects as they are 'in themselves'. The distinction I'm making is not a distinction between seeing an image, and seeing a real thing. What I'm pointing out is that when you say that 'you see the tree as it is in itself' then you're speaking from a naive realist point of view.

The form of the object is not its shape but the recognition of the type of thing that it is. — Wayfarer

What reason is there to think that one of the basic criteria for counting various things as being of the same kind is not that they are of similar shape? Add to that size. colour, kind of surface (visual and tactile texture and pattern), density, opacity, and other perceptible and/ or measurable characteristics; and you have all the criteria you need for recognition of type.

Whta reason is there to think that one of the basic criteria for counting various things of being of the same kind is not that they are off similar shape? — Janus

Things can be of the same type but entirely different forms for example a collection of musical instruments. A human as a rational agent will recognize that they’re all musical instruments due to grasping the idea of music which an animal would not. (I think a lot of people think ‘form’ means ‘shape’ when in this context it’s nearer to ‘principle’.)

universals — Wayfarer

Limiting myself to Russell's quoted text. In our minds are concepts such as whiteness, trees, government, two, time, space, etc. In what sense are concepts universal ?

Russell's text ignores the crucial role of language in universals
Russell's analysis is incomplete in his ignoring the crucial role of language in the world of universals. Below is a simplified example to illustrate how language underlies the world of universals.

The importance of language in universals
On one particular day, Tuesday 5th March, a group of people gather.
Over several occasions during the day they observe several examples of whiteness, and to each example is attached the same nominated public word "whiteness", such that each individual learns to associate their concept of whiteness with "whiteness".
The mental concept of whiteness has now been created in the individual minds of a group of people on this particular Tuesday 5th March.
As days follow, this group can now sensibly discuss "whiteness" using a common language.

Comments on Russell's text
Russell is correct when he says - "We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist". Within this group, the concept whiteness came into existence on Tuesday 5th March

Russell is correct when he says - " The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being". Within this group, the concept whiteness subsists through time, not only as the concept whiteness within their individual minds, but also as the word "whiteness" within their common language.

Russell is also correct, but besides the point, when he says - "That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them". It may well be that when I observe an object in the world labelled "whiteness", within my mind I may subjectively experience it as blueness, and in the mind of another person they may subjectively experience it as orangeness, but this is irrelevant in preventing any sensible discussion amongst a group of people as to objects labelled "whiteness".

Summary
IE, whiteness and "whiteness" came into existence on Tuesday the 5th March, and subsist through time within the minds of a group of people having a common language. Whiteness will remain a universal as long as the group having a common language survives.

As regards materialism, both the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. In my mind is the concept whiteness, and in the neurons of my brain the idea of whiteness is somehow stored. The question as to whether the the mind is a separate substance to the brain or an expression of the brain remains unanswered. Therefore, the question as to whether concepts as universals challenges materialism remains unanswered.

In what sense are concepts universal ? — RussellA

In the sense that everybody can use them, value them, ignore them, or consider them part of an objective reality.

Greetings everyone,

I'll be honest, I am a monist, but not the same kind of monist as the article presupposes. I recall there was a thread about monism in this forum but I forgot most of the contents of that thread, only that it seems to describe that all monism is the same, which is certainly interesting. Okay sorry for not answering the question directly. It seems yes, the article is implying that science has to be false for dualism to be true.

I am not an expert in dualism or what it actually claims, though I have a bare understanding that dualism means there are 2 kinds of fundamentals in reality. This I "agree" with. It is clear from reflection and contemplation that there are at least 2 fundamentals in this reality, that which is finite and that which is infinite. The finite, most represented by matter are by definition, finite. They have form which represents a finite existence across a greater infinite existence. The Infinite, most represented by God are by definition, infinite. It has no form which represents an infinitely "large" existence.

The author of that article may have misunderstood science or dualism or just doesn't understand both, which is okay, everyone develops at different paces. I don't see how science must be wrong if dualism is true. Science and dualism can be both true at the same time. The author doesn't even argue about why science has to be false if dualism is true. So I really have nothing to argue against. It is true that science has been plagued and ruled by materialism since a long time. However, it is also important to remember that Christianity, a dualistic system, plays a great role in developing science. So science is birthed out of dualism or something holding that idea. And the author wishes to say that dualism and science is against each other? I pray for his enlightenment.

there are plenty of people out there who do share my fondness for Thai — Andrew M

Categorically false.

Sufficiently true: you and many people out there have similar experiences of Thai food because all of the individual qualitative judgements made on it, are congruent with each other.
———-

Presumably..... — Andrew M

Metaphysics concerns itself with that which is true, under a given set of conditions, thereby eliminating presumptions. We don’t care about the conditions under which you presumably might (think/experience/know) later, but rather, the reasons why you don’t (think/experience/know) now.
———-

The red flower itself is not passed on, only information. That information allows us to perceive the object (in the world) in a particular form. — Andrew M

Obviously then, if red flower itself is not passed on, but information is, then red flower itself is not contained in the information. (Sounds familiar, donnit)

How did the perceived object in its particular form get to be the red flower we know? If the information in a particular form is the red flower, how is it that we didn’t have the red flower itself passed on?

You do realize, don’t you? That the only way we can know the information contained in the perception of a particular smell is the particular object “bacon”, is from experience? So saying, your system only works for extant knowledge, but is hopelessly futile for that of which we have no experience. Yet, there are multiple instances of perceiving information to which we can relate no object at all.

Nobody cares about what is known. The natural human proclivity is to learn what we don’t. And for that, we need to think. Talking is necessary for rote instruction, but hardly necessary for assimilating such instruction, and not even present in a purely personal experience, into a subjective consciousness.
————-

This is just another way of saying that to perceive a red flower in a vase entails that there is a red flower in a vase (i.e., the logic of perception). — Andrew M

A “...mere worthless sophism...”, as The Highly Esteemed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Koenigsberg would exclaim. To perceive a red flower in a vase presupposes knowledge of what a red flower in a vase entails. One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that.

This dialectical back-and-forth is endless, but at least it is something to do.

Things can be of the same type but entirely different forms for example a collection of musical instruments. A human as a rational agent will recognize that they’re all musical instruments due to grasping the idea of music which an animal would not. — Wayfarer

That is simply typing according to function, nothing to do with one particular kind of form, Dogs can recognize different kinds of bones, balls and food bowls, and know what to do with them. All animals are "rational" agents (capable of recognition and comparison) to different degrees. It is symbolic language which enables humans to abstract and elaborate.

I like that quote of Ed Feser a lot.