As a philosophical conception, Empiricism means a theory according to which there is no distinction of nature, but only of degree, between the senses and the intellect. As a result, human knowledge is simply sense-knowledge (or animal knowledge) more evolved and elaborated than in other mammals. And not only is human knowledge entirely encompassed in, and limited to, sense-experience... but to produce its achievements in the sphere of sense-experience human knowledge uses no other specific forces and means than the forces and means which are at play in sense-knowledge.
Now if it is true that reason differs specifically from senses, the paradox with which we are confronted is that Empiricism, in actual fact, uses reason while denying the power of reason, on the basis of a theory that reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals.
Hence, first, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency between what an Empiricist does -- he thinks as a man, he uses reason, a power superior in nature to senses -- and what he says -- he denies this very specificity of reason.
And second, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency even in what he says: for what the Empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients — sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism
To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on. — Wayfarer
To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on — Wayfarer
Computers are instruments of the mind. Nothing they do is meaningful in the absence of a mind — Wayfarer
↪Wayfarer I like that quote of Ed Feser a lot. — RogueAI
In the world, an apple "is" an apple, an apple "is not" an orange, an apple falls from the tree "because" of gravity, an apple "is the same as" an apple, an apple "is different from" an orange, etc. — RussellA
as logic exists in the physical world independently of any human mind, logic cannot be used as an argument to show that materialism is not true. — RussellA
In the world, an apple "is" an apple, an apple "is not" an orange, an apple falls from the tree "because" of gravity, an apple "is the same as" an apple, an apple "is different from" an orange, etc. — RussellA
You're simply repeating some basic logical relations, such as the law of identity and the rules of valid inference. — Wayfarer
So, for me identification is not identity; it is more primordial than the abstracted concept of identity, the idea of something being itself. — Janus
What is primordial, in my view, is difference. — Janus
Ok, but to me that's what the metaphysical law of identity, as with all other laws of thought, intends to capture: our inescapable, predetermined, "primordial" limitations / boundaries of thought. — javra
I don't get how there can be difference discerned without there being discerned difference between identified givens. Could you elaborate? — javra
It's really not. It's a well-established issue. It's a matter of empirical fact that the brain - for that matter, the entire human organism - comprises thousands of semi-autonomous sub-systems, all of which are subsidiary to the unified experience of being. You can't simply philosophise it out of existence. — Wayfarer
For the neural correlates, the various cells firing in the various locations of the 'visual' striate cortex, cannot be 'recombined', and do not need to be. The thought that the features a perceiver perceives must be correctly synthesized 'to form a separate object', the so-called 'binding problem', is confused. (For critical discussion see pp. 32-8.) To perceive is not to form an image of what is perceived, either in one's brain or in one's mind. What is perceived is the tree in the quad, not a representation of a tree in the quad. The brain does not have to synthesize a representation of the tree out of representations of its size, shape, colour and orientation - it has to enable the perceiver to see the tree and its features clearly. — History of Cognitive Neuroscience, p55 - Bennett, M. R., Hacker, P. M. S.
[There is no single, definitive "stream of consciousness," because there is no central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theater where "it all comes together" for the perusal of a Central Meaner....]
While everyone agrees that there is no such single point in the brain, reminiscent of Descartes's pineal gland, the implications of this have not been recognized, and are occasionally egregiously overlooked. For instance, incautious formulations of "the binding problem" in current neuroscientific research often presuppose that there must be some single representational space in the brain (smaller than the whole brain) where the results of all the various discriminations are put into registration with each other — marrying the sound track to the film, coloring in the shapes, filling in the blank parts. There are some careful formulations of the binding problem(s) that avoid this error, but the niceties often get overlooked. — Consciousness Explained, p257 - Daniel Dennett
I've been studying hylomorphism, and it's called a dualism. Why? Because it comprises two separate aspects of the intelligence - the sensory and the intelligible. According to Aristotelian dualism, the senses perceive the sensable form of the object, but the intellect perceives it's nature or essence. — Wayfarer
A form of this error was pointed out around 350 BC by Aristotle, who remarked that "to say that the soul [psuche] is angry is as if one were to say that the soul weaves or builds. For it is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns or thinks, but that a man does these with his soul" (De Anima 408 12-15) - doing something with one's soul being like doing something with one's talents. It is mistaken to ascribe to the soul of an animal attributes that are properly ascribable only to the animal as a whole. We might call this "Aristotle's principle". — Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language, pp131-2 - Bennett and Hacker
We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak.
— Andrew M
This is what I'm saying is naive realism - the contention that we perceive objects as they are 'in themselves'. The distinction I'm making is not a distinction between seeing an image, and seeing a real thing. What I'm pointing out is that when you say that 'you see the tree as it is in itself' then you're speaking from a naive realist point of view. — Wayfarer
And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, § 32
So saying, your system only works for extant knowledge, but is hopelessly futile for that of which we have no experience. Yet, there are multiple instances of perceiving information to which we can relate no object at all. — Mww
One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that. — Mww
I reject that we see only images (of unknown things), — Andrew M
According to Aristotle, both humans and lower animals perceive things, but humans have the further ability to abstract and reason about those things (hence the rational animal). That's an identification of a living being's capabilities, not an expression of dualism — Andrew M
Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — Joshua Hothschild, WHAT’S WRONG WITH OCKHAM? Reassessing the Role of Nominalism in the Dissolution of the West
There are some careful formulations of the binding problem(s) that avoid this error. — Consciousness Explained, p257 - Daniel Dennett
You need to show how the principles of logic can be derived from materialist principles. — Wayfarer
One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that.
— Mww
Indeed. A nice point of agreement to end with! — Andrew M
I reject that we see only images (of unknown things), hence the allusion to Kant: — Andrew M
the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. — RussellA
Independent of the mind, logic exists in the world. — RussellA
Consider an object having a physical existence independent of any observer....... — RussellA
.....such as an apple. — RussellA
stuff like.....the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. — Mww
You’re of the opinion that human thought is not anything to be taken seriously — Mww
A determined object cannot be independent of that which determines it. — Mww
The word "whiteness" exists as a physical object on the screen that you are currently reading. — RussellA
......because I believe that an object in the world cannot both exist and not exist at the same time then it follows that I also believe that human thought is not to be taken seriously. — RussellA
Perhaps one should think of the apple as a metaphor rather than something literal. — RussellA
Some scholars think that the passage "In the beginning was the word (logos) "is more accurately translated "In the beginning was logic" — RussellA
It is for those who don't believe that logic is intrinsic to reality to show a single instance whereby an object in the world exists at the same time as not existing. — RussellA
The word "whiteness" exists as a physical object on the screen that you are currently reading. — RussellA
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