What is the name of logical error committed in the second premise? — jancanc
but where do you see Atwell doing that? — jancanc
The term “non-monotonic logic” (in short, NML) covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference. Reasoners draw conclusions defeasibly when they reserve the right to retract them in the light of further information. Examples are numerous, reaching from inductive generalizations to reasoning to the best explanation to inferences on the basis of expert opinion, etc. We find defeasible inferences in everyday reasoning, in expert reasoning (e.g. medical diagnosis), and in scientific reasoning. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example.
What part of the effect of your action don't you know? Literally inifinite effects, of which you have infinite numbers that you don't know. — god must be atheist
The fallacy would simply be invalid premise. The full premise is implied, not explicit: We know that we always act directly/unconditionally. This according to Atwell is incorrect. — hypericin
I read your argument. To me you are saying that Atwell agrees that our actions are known to us, as long as they are not mediated by subject-object. But when they ARE mediated, then you bring in effect. The very act of considering the object of our action, nullifies the premise, and changes it. Can't you see that?Atwell is saying that, for Schopenhauer, the knowledge we have our our actions is unconditional insofar as it is not mediated by the subject-object relation. We have immediate access to our willing which is not conditioned by the PSR. Atwell is stating nothing regarding the effects of our actions, but only speaking of the knowledge we have of them. — jancanc
The very act of considering the object of our action, nullifies the premise, and changes it. Can't you see that? — god must be atheist
No I can't see that. — jancanc
Atwell is saying that Schopenhauer claims that our actions are known to us unconditionally from the inside, as will, that is, in a non-representational way since they are not subject to the PSR.
(we also know our actions externally, we observe our body and our acts as intuitive representations, as appearance).... but since we have this "inside" unconditional knowledge of our actions, and all appearances are conditioned on the PSR, then actions and appearances (not known in equivalent) are distinct — jancanc
The first type of enthymeme is a truncated syllogism, or a syllogism with an unstated premise.[2]
Here is an example of an enthymeme derived from a syllogism through truncation (shortening) of the syllogism:
"Socrates is mortal because he's human."The complete formal syllogism would be the classic:All humans are mortal. (major premise – unstated)Socrates is human. (minor premise – stated)Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (conclusion – stated)
While syllogisms lay out all of their premises and conclusion explicitly, these kinds of enthymemes keep at least one of the premises or the conclusion unstated. — Wikipedia
What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example. — god must be atheist
I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss. — Cuthbert
Not every fallacious reasoning has a name — god must be atheist
We know that we act directly/unconditionally (our actions are know to us in an unconditional way) — jancanc
What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example — god must be atheist
I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss. — Cuthbert
The getting insulted was the action by your boss. Your action was to insult a driver. It was not your action tha that the driver and your boss was one and the same person. — god must be atheist
Could have been Donalda Trump, could have been Pope Francis, — god must be atheist
If Schopenhauer had made an error in his argument, I'd say let's look at the fallacy of amphiboly. But he did not.f anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
We know that we act directly/unconditionally (our actions are know to us in an unconditional way)
Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.
Schop commentator John Atwell states that this argument is not valid.
The reason is that the second premise should state " We know that we can act directly/unconditionally". that is, Schopenhauer, Atwell thinks, does not show that when we act we cannot know that we act in some other way also.
What is the name of logical error committed in the second premise? — jancanc
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