Its when the conclusion is made by an occurring first-person point of view that their own occurrence as a first-person point of view is a falsity (an illusion or whatnot: basically, not real) that the "cannot be taken seriously" issue comes into play. — javra
Respectfully, from my POV, you 'mysterions' (I dub thee such playfully) are trapped in the grammar of a word. — ajar
Facts are an interpretation. — Raymond
perhaps the time is at hand when it will be comprehended again...what actually was sufficient to furnish the cornerstone for such sublime and unconditional philosophers' edifices as the dogmatists have built so far—any old popular superstition from time immemorial (like the soul superstition which, in the form of the subject and ego superstition, has not even yet ceased to do mischief), some play on words perhaps, a seduction by grammar, or an audacious generalization of very narrow, very personal, very human, all too human facts. — Nietzsche
On what experiential or rational ground to you grant the first word no referent when, I presume, you do the second? — javra
But those who defend a radically immaterial 'private' I-know-not-what could suggest that charge-less mass could indeed be Conscious. The more the mysterions require an organic brain for and exclude calculators from 'conscious experience,' the more they demonstrate the parasitism of the sacred concept on our mental-and-physical-entangled ordinary life. In other words, saying that an organic brain is necessary for consciousness already 'defeats' or transgresses the hard problem and starts to explain-constrain-articulate consciousness, in terms of stuff we can all see. The true or consistent hardproblemer is or should be worried about stepping on cobblestones. — ajar
According to my description of consciousness: "I believe that the concurrent experience of these two perspectives (inner/external) is what we experience as consciousness. Our internal quasi-perceptual awareness combined with what we are able to perceive directly" I guess that any thing that can do this is conscious.
— Brock Harding
That sounds very panpsychist.
According to my description of consciousness: "I believe that the concurrent experience of these two perspectives (inner/external) is what we experience as consciousness. Our internal quasi-perceptual awareness combined with what we are able to perceive directly" I guess that any thing that can do this is conscious.
— Brock Harding
That sounds very panpsychist.
I don't see science answering these questions anytime soon, so I think the continued failure of science to say whether machine x is conscious or not is catastrophic to the question of whether science will ultimately explain how unconscious matter can produce conscious states. — RogueAI
There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience — Thomas Nagel, the Core of Mind and Cosmos
But it can be described from the perspective of function. — Hermeticus
consciousness consists of experience and in order to know consciousness, you must experience it. — Hermeticus
Would such reproduction, in the eyes of the advocates of a hard problem of consciousness, suffice to disprove this very problem? Or would there be any concerns left? — Hermeticus
While science has brought a pletora of evidence to the table that thoughts and consciousness corrospond to physical (electromagnetic) processes, — Hermeticus
All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, [those] very laws.... Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis
'First person point of view' is potentially just as innocent as 'conscious experience,' such as a novel being written in the first person point of view. — ajar
I think it is also interesting that consciousness combines two perspectives of ourselves; our inner view and external view. By combining these two perspectives we are able to identify our capabilities and competencies and the direction of how best to use these in order to meet the demands of our environment and gain a competitive advantage. — Brock Harding
And in order to even begin to explain and understand physical order, one must first have recourse to logic and rational inference, so in that sense logic has epistemic priority over physics as such. — Wayfarer
How can consciousness combine two perspectives if it's contained in one of them?
Consciousness is not one of the two perspectives. — Brock Harding
And how is a fictional first-person point of view an innocent ignorant assemblage of words? That we can all understand what a novel, fiction, written in the first-person point of view entails directly contradicts your affirmation. — javra
I was addressing an "occurring (i.e., actually happening) first person point of view". You were saying this assemblage of words has an unclear referent. — javra
Do they see the conscious as separate from matter? I mean, is it tied to it or can it escape, like the soul leaving the body when dead? — Raymond
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