Weird, when I pasted this in here, things were left out, so I had to make corrections.

Seems pretty well to me .No babbling and on point. I focused more on the writing and seems clear and a really nice effort.
If you want my advice go on making "small" sentences (as it seems you do already) and try to avoid unnecessary overanalysis and over explanations. Hit the reader direct. Keep on though.

Thanks for the input. It's appreciated.

Good, clear pellucid prose, Sam.

I'm not so much interested in whether you agree, although that's fine as a response, I'm more interested in your thinking about the writing. — Sam26

I don't have strong knowledge of or interest in linguistic analysis, so I'm going to make comments from the point of view of an editor.

General comments:

• I had a bit of trouble following how one idea lead to another and how they might all fit together. Do you have an outline. I think that would help. As you note, you plan to add more upfront to describe the goal of the writing. This might help address this issue when you add it.
• I don't think the first person plural point of view works very well here. It feels too informal for a serious and somewhat technical subject.
• I think there are a lot of unnecessary words here, i.e. words that don't add any information or insight, e.g. unneeded modifiers, "extremely important." It would make sense for you to go back and be fairly brutal about removing words you can't explicitly justify. In my own writing, I have found this tends to make the whole text clearer and easier to read.
• Check for awkward phrasing and grammar mistakes. I'll try to note any I see.

Specific comments:

First paragraph

Since language is the tool that allows us to make knowledge claims, it would follow that we should have a basic understanding of how language works. Specifically, how do we learn the meanings of our words or concepts? The importance of understanding how we learn the meaning of our concepts is crucial to understanding how concepts work. And, since much of what we will be examining in these musings is about knowledge claims, it is extremely important to be as accurate as possible about what it means to have knowledge. This brings us to the subject of linguistic analysis, and its relation to what it means to know. — Sam26

What do you mean by "knowledge claims?"
What do you mean by "linguistic analysis?"

Clarify. Maybe language is a tool that allows us to make knowledge claims, it isn't the only one. Are you saying that is the primary purpose of language to make knowledge claims? That doesn't seem right. If that's what you are trying to say, you should clarify and justify it.

There is a whole lot of work out there by linguists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, etc. that talks about how language is structured, how it works, and how people learn it. Are you familiar with that? That kind of information seems like it would be indispensable to this kind of discussion.

"Musings" is too chatty. Also unnecessary.

That's as far as I'm going to go unless you tell me that the kind of thing I'm providing is what you are looking for. If so, I can go through the rest. If not, we can leave it there.

That's exactly what I'm looking for. Thanks. I was wondering about the first person part, and I've also been trying to clean up some of the wordiness. There is going to be a complete section on what knowledge is, this part is specifically about linguistic analysis, but your point is well taken.

Thanks Tom.

Does anyone else have an opinion on writing this in the first person? This is meant to be read by the public, so I don't know if that makes a difference. I've read different opinions about first person writing.

That's exactly what I'm looking for. — Sam26

Ok, then I'll continue. Editing is something I enjoy.

Second Paragraph

In the twentieth century there are two philosophers who stand out in terms of their work in linguistic analysis, namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who taught at Cambridge, and J. L. Austin, who taught at Oxford. Wittgenstein’s seminal work, called, The Philosophical Investigations, contain his notes, which were published posthumously in 1953; and secondly, J. L. Austin’s lecture notes, which were also published posthumously, specifically in Sense and Sensibilia in 1962. In these pages we will be concentrating mostly on Wittgenstein’s ideas as a guide. — Sam26

Why are you mentioning Austin when you're not going to use him? Why are you using Wittgenstein rather than Austin? Is there anything else interesting to write about linguistic analysis to provide context? Was it just these two guys or was there a larger group? Alternatively, get rid of the reference to Austin and just jump into Wittgenstein [hypothetical] Although there were a small group of philosophers interested in linguistic analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein was the most prominent and influential. For that reason, this evaluation will focus on Wittgenstein's work.[/hypothetical]

I think something is missing here:

Wittgenstein’s seminal work, called, The Philosophical Investigations, contain his notes, which were published posthumously in 1953; and secondly, J. L. Austin’s lecture notes, which were also published posthumously, specifically in Sense and Sensibilia in 1962.

Third paragraph:

In order not to cause confusion, an important difference between linguistic analysis and the philosophy of language must be distinguished. Linguistic analysis refers to a method or technique used for philosophical inquiry, and is used for solving or clarifying philosophical problems. However, the philosophy of language refers to a specific branch of philosophy. So, linguistic analysis would fall under the heading of, the philosophy of language; and much of what we will be doing as we investigate what it means to know, is a linguistic analysis of the concept. — Sam26

This paragraph seems unnecessary, especially since you haven't told us what linguistic analysis is.

Fourth paragraph:

Understanding the history of meaning, and some of the mistakes made about what meaning amounts to, is very important to having a correct understanding of how the meaning of a word is acquired. This is not an easy topic. One reason it is not easy has to do with the nature of the grammar involved, that is, statements that look similarly structured, seem to be doing the same work in our language. — Sam26

It seems like jumping the gun to talk about the history of meaning when you haven't even told us what meaning is in the context of your analysis. It also seems like jumping the gun to talk about mistakes made about "what meaning amounts to." What does meaning amount to? This seems like a follow-on from the first paragraph, but I'm lost. I don't see how they fit together or where this is headed.

Fifth and sixth paragraphs

For example, “I believe in consciousness,” which has the same structural grammar as “I hammered the nail,” that is, we think that the relationship between “belief and consciousness” is similar to the relationship between the “hammer and nail.” It is this this kind of analogy that misleads us, namely, we think, consciously or not, that because “hammer and nail” has an instance in reality, that “believe and consciousness” has a similar instance, or a similar existence or ontology. This misleads us into a false picture of how the word believe is used in relation to the thing believed. As if what is believed points to a psychical thing, or mental object, in this case, consciousness. We confuse the ontology of these two statements, when the ontology is of a different kind. Hopefully, some of this will be clear as we progress through this subject, but it is not easy to follow.

So, there is a conceptual confusion about how mental phenomena should be talked about. And, as has already been pointed out, this has to do with the different realities between the physical and the mental, their existence (their ontology) are worlds apart. This goes to the heart of consciousness, and the nature of the self. The conceptual confusions about how we talk about mental things can be seen in much of the talk about the nature of consciousness. This is especially seen in our talk of our subjective awareness. — Sam26

I don't see what you're trying to achieve or how these paragraphs relate to the forth paragraph. What is "structural grammar?" What is "consciousness?" The two examples you give don't seem similar. The relationship between believe and consciousness does not seem to me to be the same as that between hammer and nail. What is an "instance in reality?" I got confused when you talked first about "consciousness" as a certain type of word, then consciousness as a mental phenomenon. I'm lost.

Seventh paragraph

Another reason it is difficult to understand the nature of meaning, is that language, by its very nature, is not given to the kind of exactness some of us might be looking for, especially in philosophy and science. However, this does not mean that we cannot come to an understanding of what it means to have knowledge. It just means that it takes a lot of work. Our attempt, in these pages, at understanding knowledge, is just an overview, and it not meant to be an in-depth analysis of the subject of epistemology, which would take us far beyond the scope of these writings. — Sam26

My first inclination is to suggest getting rid of this paragraph. I'm not sure what it adds. You talk about the meaning of "meaning" and the meaning of "knowledge." Again, you're talking about "meaning" the word and meaning the property. Knowledge and meaning are connected in some unspecified way, but then you talk about what it means to have knowledge. I'm confused again.

Eighth paragraph:

As part of the goal of these writings, we will attempt to answer some of these questions based on our understanding of Wittgenstein. It would be the height of arrogance though, to think our interpretation is something Wittgenstein would approve of, or even agree with. However, it would also be an error to neglect Wittgenstein’s writings in our attempt to understand the concepts we are using; especially since Wittgenstein’s work sheds so much light on language use. — Sam26

Again, this paragraph doesn't really add anything. I recommend removing. Alternative - use it as a place to summarize what you've said in previous paragraphs.

So, basically, what you're saying is that the writing is mediocre, and it's about as clear as mud. You may be right, and it's especially true if I'm trying to explain this material to people with no background in this area of philosophy. I don't mind the honesty. Let me give the next few paragraphs to see if it helps, with the caveat that none of this is written in stone, obviously.
________________________________

Before we get to the subject of epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects in reality can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922).

Again, just as our treatment of epistemology is just meant to be an overview, so is our look at Wittgenstein’s ideas only meant to be a glimpse at some of his ideas. This glimpse is mainly focused on his ideas about meaning; and to briefly contrast his ideas of meaning in terms of his early and later philosophy.

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics.

Apparently, his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work, called, The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege, who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So, it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy.

Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus, is a more traditional philosophical work. It is traditional in the sense of the kind of analysis he is doing. He digs into a proposition as if to find some essence that will logically connect it to the world. It is an a priori analysis of the proposition that shows how propositions picture (or mirror) the world of facts through a one-to-one correspondence between the proposition, and the fact it pictures (it is a picture theory of language). It is through this investigation that Wittgenstein hopes to find an exactness of meaning, or an exactness of expression. He accomplishes this by breaking down the proposition into what he believes are its essential parts, namely, elementary propositions, and even smaller parts, called names. So, according to Wittgenstein, “…propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221).” Names, again, being the smallest constituent part of the proposition. And, since Wittgenstein held to the traditional view of language, namely, that the meaning of a word is the object it refers to, or the object it denotes (T. 3.203). He then links the proposition, via a name, with an object, the smallest constituent part of a fact. Facts being broken down into atomic facts, then into objects. There is a direct connection from the name (the smallest component of the proposition) to the object it represents (the smallest component of the fact). In this way we have a direct link between the proposition and the world of facts. This brings us back to the traditional view of meaning, that the meaning of a word is its referent.

Wittgenstein’s analysis is much more complicated than what is presented here. My only point is to show how meaning was thought of in the traditional sense, and how Wittgenstein’s Tractatus continued this historical line of thinking in a much more exacting way. This is probably why Russell mistakenly thought Wittgenstein was trying to construct an ideal language. Because if Wittgenstein was correct in the way he thought of propositions, then you would have more precision based on the nature of the proposition, and how it pictured the world of facts.

Wittgenstein’s later work, in some ways, is continuous, namely, he continues to think of many of the problems of philosophy as misunderstandings of the logic of our language. It would be a mistake to think that his later philosophy completely repudiates his early philosophy. He mainly repudiates his method of analysis. This contrast of methods into the nature of the proposition, is what separates his early philosophy from his later philosophy. If there is a gap between the two periods of his thinking, it is a gap of method. One could say that the difference between these two investigations, is like comparing the a priori (independent of experience) with the a posteriori (dependent on experience).

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy starts when he meets both Bertrand Russell (1911), and Gottlob Frege (1912); and his later philosophy starts roughly around 1929. His later philosophy is most famously expounded in the Philosophical Investigations; and culminates in his final notes on the subject of what it means to know, called On Certainty. His final entry occurs two days before his death in April 1951.

It is important to understand the background of Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces in order to show the connection with Wittgenstein’s analysis of what it means to know, and the view of epistemology as presented in these musings.

So, basically, what you're saying is that the writing is mediocre — Sam26

I made a bunch of specific comments and recommendations. It's your job to decide which are useful and should be addressed and which don't need to be. I care about good writing and I take editing seriously. I've done it a lot and I think I'm good at it. I hope it's clear I'm trying to be helpful.

I understand, no worries. I had to repost the last post because I'm having a hard time with the cutting and pasting, it's leaving names of books out for some reason. Maybe that had something to do with using a unicode text converter.

First paragraph

Before we get to the subject of epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects in reality can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922). — Sam26

No comments.

Second paragraph

Again, just as our treatment of epistemology is just meant to be an overview, so is our look at Wittgenstein’s ideas only meant to be a glimpse at some of his ideas. This glimpse is mainly focused on his ideas about meaning; and to briefly contrast his ideas of meaning in terms of his early and later philosophy. — Sam26

This paragraph seems unnecessary and distracting to me. Not distracting, equivocating. It undercuts the authority of the first paragraph.

Third, forth, and fifth paragraphs

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics.

Apparently, his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work, called, The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege, who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So, it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy. — Sam26

I would pare these way down, only leaving in the bare bones of his path to linguistic analysis. This part is about mostly mathematics, so it seems important to know how the switch was made. Or maybe what's the connection.

Sixth and seventh paragraphs

Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus, is a more traditional philosophical work. It is traditional in the sense of the kind of analysis he is doing. He digs into a proposition as if to find some essence that will logically connect it to the world. It is an a priori analysis of the proposition that shows how propositions picture (or mirror) the world of facts through a one-to-one correspondence between the proposition, and the fact it pictures (it is a picture theory of language). It is through this investigation that Wittgenstein hopes to find an exactness of meaning, or an exactness of expression. He accomplishes this by breaking down the proposition into what he believes are its essential parts, namely, elementary propositions, and even smaller parts, called names. So, according to Wittgenstein, “…propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221).” Names, again, being the smallest constituent part of the proposition. And, since Wittgenstein held to the traditional view of language, namely, that the meaning of a word is the object it refers to, or the object it denotes (T. 3.203). He then links the proposition, via a name, with an object, the smallest constituent part of a fact. Facts being broken down into atomic facts, then into objects. There is a direct connection from the name (the smallest component of the proposition) to the object it represents (the smallest component of the fact). In this way we have a direct link between the proposition and the world of facts. This brings us back to the traditional view of meaning, that the meaning of a word is its referent.

Wittgenstein’s analysis is much more complicated than what is presented here. My only point is to show how meaning was thought of in the traditional sense, and how Wittgenstein’s Tractatus continued this historical line of thinking in a much more exacting way. This is probably why Russell mistakenly thought Wittgenstein was trying to construct an ideal language. Because if Wittgenstein was correct in the way he thought of propositions, then you would have more precision based on the nature of the proposition, and how it pictured the world of facts. — Sam26

You've gone from Wittgenstein's life history directly into the middle of his philosophy without showing how he got there. A big jump that breaks up the continuity. Where are you headed? Is it linguistic analysis you want to talk about? Is the stuff in these two paragraphs importantly connected to linguistic analysis? Do I need to understand these details to follow your story? If not, it really clutters things up. I think you're telling the story of how Wittgenstein got interested and involved with linguistic analysis. How much of this do you need in order to do that? Or if that's not what you're trying to do, what is?

The seventh paragraph seems really equivocal again. Sort of apologizing for the story you're telling. I don't think it's necessary.

Eighth paragraph

Wittgenstein’s later work, in some ways, is continuous, namely, he continues to think of many of the problems of philosophy as misunderstandings of the logic of our language. It would be a mistake to think that his later philosophy completely repudiates his early philosophy. He mainly repudiates his method of analysis. This contrast of methods into the nature of the proposition, is what separates his early philosophy from his later philosophy. If there is a gap between the two periods of his thinking, it is a gap of method. One could say that the difference between these two investigations, is like comparing the a priori (independent of experience) with the a posteriori (dependent on experience). — Sam26

I get no feel for how the work described here fits in with what was described in paragraphs six and seven, with Wittgenstein's philosophy generally, or with linguistic analysis.

Ninth paragraph

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy starts when he meets both Bertrand Russell (1911), and Gottlob Frege (1912); and his later philosophy starts roughly around 1929. His later philosophy is most famously expounded in the Philosophical Investigations; and culminates in his final notes on the subject of what it means to know, called On Certainty. His final entry occurs two days before his death in April 1951. — Sam26

Does this belong here? What does it have to do with linguistic analysis?

Tenth paragraph

It is important to understand the background of Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces in order to show the connection with Wittgenstein’s analysis of what it means to know, and the view of epistemology as presented in these musings. — Sam26

Again, I think this paragraph is apologetic and unnecessary.

General comment - It seems like this section ought to be a concise summary of Wittgenstein's philosophy and how it evolved towards linguistic analysis or a more detailed summary focusing specifically on linguistic analysis and leaving out other parts of his philosophy that aren't specifically relevant. As it is, it's neither and it seems a bit random. What is this section supposed to accomplish?

I think a lot of the problems I've discussed could be simplified with a good annotated outline laying out where you want your book to go and how you want to get there. Knowing where the text I've reviewed so far fits in to such an outline would help us figure out whether my comment are really relevant.

I've enjoyed this, but I've spent quite a bit of time on it. I'm not sure that what I've written will be useful for you.

I really appreciate the time spent looking over this material. It gives me some idea of what needs to be worked on, or at least improved upon. I'm hoping to get others to chime in, so I can get more feedback.

What I'm trying to do is show the process that leads up to my final argument, because I'm going to claim to know the conclusion follows; and that others can know too. This starts with understanding some of Wittgenstein's thinking about the meaning of our concepts, and some of the misunderstandings involved in our thinking about how we acquire knowledge. However, I need to be able to explain Wittgenstein so that people can understand it (this is the challenge). Maybe I'm biting off more than I can chew, but I think it can be done. It will just take a lot of work.

My intention is to start with the argument, which is what people are interested in, then if they want more they can go deeper into the book. Next would be epistemology, and finally, linguistic analysis, which is the most difficult part. So, the book will be in reverse order, because if I start with linguistic analysis, they may read a page or two, then give up. I have the outline in my head, i.e., I know how I want to proceed. I should write it down though.

Thanks again.

What I'm trying to do is show the process that leads up to my final argument, because I'm going to claim to know the conclusion follows; and that others can know too. This starts with understanding some of Wittgenstein's thinking about the meaning of our concepts, and some of the misunderstandings involved in our thinking about how we acquire knowledge. However, I need to be able to explain Wittgenstein so that people can understand it (this is the challenge). Maybe I'm biting off more than I can chew, but I think it can be done. It will just take a lot of work.

My intention is to start with the argument, which is what people are interested in, then if they want more they can go deeper into the book. Next would be epistemology, and finally, linguistic analysis, which is the most difficult part. So, the book will be in reverse order, because if I start with linguistic analysis, they may read a page or two, then give up. I have the outline in my head, i.e., I know how I want to proceed. I should write it down though. — Sam26

If I'd had the information you've provided here while I was editing your text, I think there would have been fewer comments.

Sorry, but I think some of the comments are still applicable. I'm still trying to decide about first person vs third person. First person is more intimate, but third person is more objective, and maybe more suited for this writing. I would like to be both.

Editing can be a brutal process.

What I would be interested in knowing is what is the aim of the book - in a couple of sentences? And have you written a chapter breakdown and mapped the content in dot points so you know where it is going?

I'm heading in the direction that my thread on "Does Consciousness Survive the Death of the Body" was headed, only I want to show the whole process leading up to the inductive argument.

No, I don't have a chapter breakdown, but I have a pretty clear idea of how I'm going to proceed. I agree that I should have an outline, so before going further I'll do that. I have about 40 pages written so far, which includes much of what will be in the linguistic analysis section; and I also have much of what will be in the epistemology section. I don't want anything long, so I'm going to keep the book length at about 100-120 pages. I figure it will take me about a year to complete the book. Your right about the editing, it's a real pain. Just changing everything written so far will take weeks.

I think maybe I'll keep the book in the first person. I was just looking over a book my philosophy professor wrote many years ago, which is similar to what I'm doing, and it was in the first person.

I'm mainly writing the book as something to accomplish before I pass away. I don't envision selling it or anything like that, it's just something I want to accomplish. It may only be read by a few friends and family members, so I don't think of it much beyond that.

What I would be interested in knowing is what is the aim of the book - in a couple of sentences? And have you written a chapter breakdown and mapped the content in dot points so you know where it is going? — Tom Storm

I agree.

I answered this question already, when I replied to Tom.

I re-wrote the opening paragraphs of one of the last chapters in the book. Hopefully this flows a bit better than what I wrote in the OP.
_______________________

Since language is the tool that allows us to make knowledge claims, it follows that having a basic understanding of how language works is important. Specifically, what is involved when we learn the meanings of our words or concepts? The importance of how the meaning of our concepts is learned is crucial to our understanding how concepts function. And, since much of this analysis is concerned with knowledge claims, it is important to be as accurate as possible about what it means to have knowledge. This leads to the subject of linguistic analysis, and its relation to the subject of epistemology.

In the twentieth century there are two philosophers who stand out in terms of their work in linguistic analysis, namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who taught at Cambridge, and J. L. Austin (1911-1960), who taught at Oxford. Our focus will be on Wittgenstein’s contribution, and how it relates to the subject of knowledge, or more specifically the study of epistemology. Two works of Wittgenstein stand out as pivotal to our understanding of epistemology, namely, The Philosophical Investigations (1953), and On Certainty (1969), both published posthumously. The Philosophical Investigations is important because of its sustained treatment of linguistic confusions, and its analysis of how meaning is learned. On Certainty is important because it focuses on the problem of what it means to know, using the methods of analysis from The Philosophical Investigations.

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria. He was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which led Wittgenstein to develop his own equations in an attempt to solve aeronautical problems; and while considering these equations with others, it led to philosophical questions about the nature of mathematics.

It was suggested to Wittgenstein that he read Bertrand Russell’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s book, called The Principia Mathematica; and as Wittgenstein continued down this philosophical path, he eventually met with Gottlob Frege, who was a German philosopher, mathematician, and logician. Frege apparently saw potential in Wittgenstein and suggested that he meet with Bertrand Russell at Cambridge. Wittgenstein took his advice, and they met in October of 1911. Thus began Wittgenstein’s obsession with linguistic analysis, prompted mostly by Russell’s early talks with Wittgenstein about mathematics, logic, and philosophy.

An important difference between linguistic analysis and the philosophy of language must be distinguished. Linguistic analysis refers to a method or technique used for philosophical inquiry, and is used for solving or clarifying philosophical problems. However, the philosophy of language refers to a specific branch of philosophy. So, linguistic analysis would fall under the heading of, the philosophy of language; and much of what we will be doing as we investigate what it means to know, is a linguistic analysis of the concept.

Before considering the subject of linguistic analysis and its relation to epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). Think of how we teach the word cup to a child, we point to the object, and say, cup. This model of learning, is called the ostensive definition model, which is learning a concept by pointing to objects associated with the word. The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922).

Does anyone else have an opinion on writing this in the first person? — Sam26

I think first person plural makes sense in the initial stages where you're talking to "us" about our collective philosophical issues, but when you get to the end, where you say

As part of the goal of these writings, we will attempt to answer some of these questions — Sam26

And the like, it feels out-dated in it's syntax. If there's a way to pivot gradually into the first person singular as the author yourself by the time you get around here, it would work, to my untrained eye.

First, thanks for the input. I have looked at other books that have been written, and some like the one I'm writing, are done in the first person. I guess an argument can be made about writing either way. Third person gives a more objective account though.

Can't you vacillate between first person plural and singular by distinguishing when you're talking to your audience as "we" and when you're referencing yourself as "I" as the author that's communicating the ideas? Especially if you're writing for a general audience, as you mentioned?

Edit, if that came out harsh, I just meant "isn't there a way to do that?"

I was wondering that myself. Just how much can you switch back and forth?

Maybe @TClark will chime in and give an answer.

At the least, here:

As part of the goal of these writings, we will attempt to answer some of these questions based on our understanding of Wittgenstein. It would be the height of arrogance though, to think our interpretation is something Wittgenstein would approve of, or even agree with. However, it would also be an error to neglect Wittgenstein’s writings in our attempt to understand the concepts we are using; especially since Wittgenstein’s work sheds so much light on language use. — Sam26

I would say, "As part of the goal of these writings, I [ you the author ] will attempt to answer some of these questions, etc.".

Did you see my latest change just above.