What part of
cite where Chomsky clearly states what he Chomsky means by "understanding" and "mystery" and where he soundly demonstrates how he/we can understand whatever it is he/we "will never understand".
— 180 Proof
do you not understand, Xtrix? :roll: — 180 Proof

What part of the article don't you understand?

It's not offering "new" definitions for the words "understanding" or "mystery" -- and asking for such is, as I've said before, missing the entire point. Which you would know if you read it. He does talk at length about aspects of the world that appear to be incomprehensible to the human mind, in the same way that rat's can't run prime number mazes.

So take your rolling eyes and stop wasting time on a thread you never intended on engaging with. Go assign meaningless homework assignments elsewhere.

:eyes:

It may be abandoned in terms of being called the "hard problem", much like gravity's (or motion more generally) non-mechanistic effects had to be accepted: we'll have to accept the fact that matter thinks, without knowing why — Manuel

That's pretty much what he advocates, although some aspects of thinking can be reproduced mechanically, so the greater focus on the part we can't conceive of reproducing. It would seem miraculous to us to reproduce qualia. That's a sign that our conceptual scheme is failing us?

He tends to rely on quoting others, we interpret if we think he agrees with the person he's quoting.

Me personally, as I read this essay and say, Locke and heck, how I experience ordinary life it's pretty obvious to me (though I may be peculiar here), I don't have a clue how a colourless photon could create colour experience, or how sound waves could be interpreted as music, etc.

I mean, I know the phenomena happens, I can see the evidence. I can make no sense of it.

I mean, I know the phenomena happens, I can see the evidence. I can make no sense of it. — Manuel

Yep. Same for free will.

Exactly!

Actually, I remember posting this recently, I'll repost it here, it struck me as a very nice quote from Hume, proving your point. Putting aside the dualism implied in the quote, for Hume, free will, is clearly a mystery:

"Is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension."

- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

The purpose of this thread is to (hopefully), get a few people interested in reading this very important article by Chomsky: — Manuel

I am reading this essay (?), and finding it pretty frustrating. Not because it's difficult, but because it reads like unstructured reading notes interspersed with meandering musings. The themes and books that he touches on are interesting in their own right, but so far I don't see what this essay accomplishes, other than giving us a glimpse of Chomsky's intellectual interests.

:up:

It's now part of a book called What Kind of Creatures Are We? which speaks of different topics concerning human nature, it begins with an essay called What Can We Understand? What is Language? and What is the Common Good? ending up with this one.

Since I've read this essay, many, many times, I don't find it confusing, though it can be dense given how much he cites. If you have a more specific question, maybe I can help out. But I think the point here is to show how we've had to lower the standards of intelligibility in human enquiry, because we know much less than we thought.

I honestly can't help but find a note of arrogance in the essay - as if, if the world does not conform to the categories that we would like to impose upon it - especially the categories as dreamt up by dead 16th Century white men - then well, it really just must be unintelligible. We can't figure it out? Well, so much the worse for the world!

I know it's supposed to be the opposite - a certain sense of humility in the face of the world, but the essay's procedure belies this. It says: look at all these brilliant figures - not even they could figure it out, and if they couldn't do it, who are you to speak? I guess its this weird dialectic right - examine the knowers to figure out the limits of the known. But how human, all too human...

A more interesting - Spinozist - mysterianism would be one for which we don't yet know what we are capable of. A more self-reflexive mysterianism, all the better to defuse the all-too-certain mysterianism of the essay. This is why I think the lack of conceptual attention to intelligiblity or understanding per se - as @180 Proof rightly points out - really vitiates the entire essay.

If you have a more specific question, maybe I can help out. But I think the point here is to show how we've had to lower the standards of intelligibility in human enquiry, because we know much less than we thought. — Manuel

Thanks. I don't find any specific passage particularly confusing - I just don't see the big picture yet. So far it looks like preparatory notes for a future article or book (or two), rather than the finished thing.

For anyone not willing to read:



See in particular the question and answer section.

"It has become standard practice in recent years to describe the problem of consciousness as “the hard problem,” others being within our grasp, now or down the road.I think there are reasons for some skepticism, particularly when we recognize how sharply understanding declines beyond the simplest systems of nature."

p.177

"History also suggests caution. In early modern science, the nature of motion was the “hard problem.” “Springing or Elastic Motions” is the “hard rock in Philosophy,” Sir William Petty observed, proposing ideas resembling those soon developed much more richly by Newton. The “hard problem” was that bodies that seem to our senses to be at rest are in a “violent” state, with “a strong endeavor to fly off or recede from one another,” in Robert Boyle’s words."

178.

"The “hard problems” of the day were not solved; rather abandoned, as, over time, science turned to its more modest post-Newtonian course."

179.

Very arrogant...

Unless one thinks that mysterianism is either 1) not true in principle or 2) The we don't know yet argument, which misses the point the article is establishing.

Option 1 , suggests that we have no limits in principle: we can know everything there is to know, we just have to work hard enough at a problem. That removes us from biology and nature.

Aside from not understanding (intuitive understanding) how gravity works, we can point to other obvious mysteries: free will, how the world produces qualia, creativity in ordinary language use, imagination, how matter can think and so on.

One can deny free will, to make it less problematic, though no one alive would accept the practical consequences of denying such a thing. One can deny we have common sense intuitions, because we aren't biological creatures.

The we don't know yet, sure, a lot too. We don't know what dark matter/dark energy is, we could find out, or we could not. We don't know if the universe had a beginning or if it is eternal, we could find out, or not.

I think the arrogance is in the opposite view, that we can know everything, that's a theological view of human beings. We should be grateful that we can do what we already can.

What I said quite specifically was that the arrogance resides in procedures that Chomsky uses to get at the conclusions you nicely hightlight in bold. By doing a literature review of centuries old dead people with a historically specific vocabulary - some of which we just so happen to still use - and, finding that the world does not fit into these rather specific, historically situated concepts - which may or may not even exist as concepts sooner rather than later - then have the gall to suggest that the world is incomprehensible because of that. It's incrediblely unbelievable.

Aside from not understanding (intuitive understanding) how gravity works, we can point to other obvious mysteries: free will, how the world produces qualia, creativity in ordinary language use, imagination, how matter can think and so on. — Manuel

Like I said, imagine a post-scholastic Chomsky saying: "we don't know how essence, or attribute, or mode, or [insert outdated vocabulary which no one uses anymore here] works, and it's unlikely that we will ever know. We'll just likely 'move on'!". One would laugh. Of course we will move on. One does laugh.

People deny today that concepts such as 'qualia' are coherent. I think they are right. So too with 'free will'. To think that, because we 'don't know how they work', this tells us something about the universe? No, this tells us about a set of historically and geographically specific humans, and the idea of generalizing about the nature of the universe from their failures is silly - and arrogant.

If some Chinese Chomsky did a review of Chinese concepts that one had never heard of and concluded that those concepts have not fared so well in capturing the world, one would take that for a cute little bit of anthropology. Not some comment on the universe and its mysteries. In fact taking Chomsky's essay as anthropology is probably the best way to take it, and the best way to see its arrogance - intellectual historical anthropology mistaken for philosophy.

then have the gall to suggest that the world is incomprehensible because of that. It's incrediblely unbelievable. — StreetlightX

No. The gall is suggesting that mere animals can understand everything. We've gotten rid of God in most philosophy, but the idea of being all knowing still persists.

As far as I know, in a mere 300-400 years, our innate, inborn given natures have not changed. I may be wrong in that, we may have advanced conceptually by leaps and bounds, but the evidence suggests babies and children have the intuition that Descartes had about the physical world.

We can't get rid of our intuitions. You can't tell me you don't see the Sun rising in the east and setting in the west even if we know the Sun does no such thing, we can't help but see it.

Like I said, imagine a post-scholastic Chomsky saying: "we don't know how essence, or attribute, or mode, or [insert outdated vocabulary which no one uses anymore here] works, and it's unlikely that we will ever know. We'll just likely 'move on'!". One would laugh. One does laugh. — StreetlightX

Let's translate then. Essence to fundamental, attribute to property and mode to way of acting.

What's fundamental to matter? Many things, but if you want to be strict, you can say quantum fields, everything else is an illusion. That seems to leave out a lot of fundamental stuff, oh well.

Property. Can you explain to me how a photon turns to the colour we experience when we see an apple or the sky?

Way of acting. Depends on how it's applied, it seems to me that's what we study, how matter acts, not knowing what it is.

Laughable is the folly of creatures who think they have no limits. Literally.

This is more argument than Chomsky presented. And if it's really as simple as: "surely you can't believe you will know everything", then I didn't need a 30 page lit review to tell me that. But Chomsky, who knows this, is trying to link a particular and historically and culturally specific vocabulary and arrogate it to the conditions of understanding of the universe itself. But that is no better.

OK. :ok:

I'm just saying, if one has square holes, it's silly to say that because one has tried to fit the round pegs every which way and failed, that the square holes are unassailable.

Chomsky's argument though is even more parochial than that: if the world cannot be explained in the terms of these 16th century dead European guys, then it's likely no terms will ever do, forever.

Doubt.

then have the gall to suggest that the world is incomprehensible because of that. — StreetlightX

Where does Chomsky say the world is incomprehensible?

He's saying we have a much different understanding today, one not confined solely to mechanistic processes -- like contact action, which was what was once meant by "understanding."

He's saying we have a much different understanding today, one not confined solely to mechanistic processes -- like contact action, which was what was once meant by "understanding." — Xtrix

Would it be that he were just saying that. The failure of the mechanic philosophy - among other things - is Chomsky's license to conclude that there will be many things that will "remain in obscurity, impenetrable to human intelligence". There's nothing wrong with the latter idea per se. But the parochialism lies in the idea that it follows even minimally from the failure of the mechanic philosophy, which, in a word - who cares? As if the whole of the intelligible was at stake in the mechanic philosophy, and not some intellectual trend that will be forgotten in time as a footnote in some future philosophy textbook.

The failure to retrofit our 16th century concepts to what we (can?) know of the world is not a failure of the world. It is a failure of those 16th century concepts.

Or to put it differently again: Chomsky is probably right about two things: (1) the mechanical philosophy has exhausted itself; (2) We probably won't end up knowing everything. But that these things have anything whatsoever to do with each other is incredibly silly.

But the parochialism lies in the idea that it follows even minimally from the failure of the mechanic philosophy — StreetlightX

When it comes to the mind/body problem, he argues that there hasn’t been a conception of “body” since this time. So ideas about the “physical world” isn’t formulable. That’s one point. But in terms of what’s understood — plenty is understood. Knowledge isn’t impossible. We just have a different conception of “understanding” — one rooted more in theoretical formulation than contact action.

So what about mysteries? Chomsky has made the point, for decades, that human beings have a scope and limits to their cognitive capacities. The same applies here. Perhaps issues like will, the creative use of language, and understanding the world in “physical” terms demonstrate those limits. Maybe. Maybe it will be resurrected — but as of yet, that’s not the case. We still don’t have a conception of “material.”

I think the points are obvious. Of course we have limits. What’s interesting in this particular case — with Descartes, Newton, and the mind/body problem — is that what’s traditionally (and still to this day) been taken as a “scientific” understanding of the world was actually abandoned long ago, and was never resurrected. Thus, there can’t be a mind/body problem — we still have no sense of “body.”

Who cares? Well, I see plenty of threads on this very forum endlessly debating the mind/body issue, discussing the “physical” world, trying to bridge the gap between consciousness and the material world, etc. So I think it’s worth listening to someone claiming that’s all pretty much a waste of time.

As if the whole of the intelligible was at stake in the mechanic philosophy, — StreetlightX

That would be ridiculous, yeah. But I don’t see that being the claim. That mechanical philosophy is just one example— but an important one.

Chomsky is probably right about two things: (1) the mechanical philosophy has exhausted itself; (2) We probably won't end up knowing everything. But that these things have anything whatsoever to do with each other is incredibly silly. — StreetlightX

We may not know everything, and perhaps one example is understanding the world in terms of bodies, material, and physical.

That’s the claim, and I still don’t see how it’s silly. In fact if it’s true I think more should pay attention, as I mentioned above.

Thus, there can’t be a mind/body problem — we still have no sense of “body.” — Xtrix

So what? If this were a medieval internet, someone would complain that we still have no sense of 'substance'. But this would not be a comment on the mysteries of the world: this would be a comment on how useless substance is as a term. That Chomsky talks about bodies is nothing more than an anthropological fact. Its significance is cultural, nothing more - at least, in the absence of any argument otherwise.

We may not know everything, and perhaps one example is understanding the world in terms of bodies, material, and physical. — Xtrix

Would another set of examples be not understanding the world in terms of qi, or karma, or mana? What claim do 'bodies' or 'material' have which make them anything other than a limited European set of ideas that have been in vogue for some time? Why should the failure of those terms tell us anything at all? Because we are self-important? Because you are contingently situated in this moment of history and place? The elevation of anthropological fact to transcendental condition of intelligibility is - well it's ridiculous.

Again, why the failure to retrofit an outdated vocabulary speaks to something about the universe and not the paucity of European grammar is beyond me. It's like a village engineer with a hammer and a scythe complaining that because his tools are unsuited to fix the car (he's tried everything!), the car is therefore unfixable. What kind of self-assured arrogance is this? Chomsky's essay, is, as far as I can see, the villager's complaint.

A proper image would be even worse: there's people with entire car workshops with state of the art equipment, the the villager is complaining that yes, yes, the state-of-the-art equipment is very good and fixes the car just fine but how oh how is he to reconcile the scythe? No one seems to be able to able to do it! MyStErY. Maybe Chomsky could try just... moving on?

What claim do 'bodies' or 'material' have which make them anything other than a limited European set of ideas that have been in vogue for some time? — StreetlightX

I suppose we can argue that science is just a Western invention— and there’s something to that. But I’d argue it’s a better example of possible human limits than any of the many examples one could use.

But again, I don’t think the claim is that because one 17th century European conception is obsolete, that all of human intelligibility is lost. It’s that this is one example of something that may demonstrate limits — and a particularly interesting one. You’re saying it’s not particularly interesting — no more so than qi or karma or corpuscles or alchemy. Here again I’d simply say that I do think there’s something sui generis about science. But perhaps that’s another conversation.

I suppose we can argue that science is just a Western invention— and there’s something to that — Xtrix

Huh? You think science works or does not work because we can't conceptually retrofit things like 'bodies' and 'the physical'? Eliminate both and science will be just fine. The equations will turn out just the same; the predictions will be validated (or not) regardless. Again, the use of some particular vocabulary to characterise what is, in practice, a more or less entirely autonomous field says nothing about that field or its discoveries.

I didn’t make any claim about whether science works or not.

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property. It’s not culturally conditioned any more than the moon illusion is culturally conditioned, or object permanence is culturally conditioned.

Pointing out, as Chomsky does, that we can’t understand the world in this way — as was shown by Newton and others — is perhaps one example of the limits of human intelligibility. The claim that humans have scope and limits is essentially a truism.

I don’t see the relevance of “retrofitting.” No one is trying to retrofit our current understanding, concepts and knowledge to that of 18th century England.

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property. — Xtrix

But this is simply not true. Via Christian Kerslake's Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy:

The notion that now strikes us as the most sensible approach to causality, that finite substances are responsible for the changes they cause in other substances (then called the theory of physical influx), was at the time [that Leibniz was writing] the least popular. This was because the only way available to conceive the idea that a substance with a set of properties caused a change in another substance was through the explanation that there was a transmission of properties from the first to the second, which was held to be inconceivable. Therefore, the notions of occasionalism and pre-established harmony became popular among philosophers as elaborate avoidances of physical influx.

Like, our intuitions are useless. Forget them. They're trash and philosophically uninteresting other than a good historical and cultural tale. If you want to read how absolutely bonkers our (by which I only mean Western) schemes of causality really have been, check out Steven Nadler's editied collection on "Causation in Early Modern Philosophy" (you can find it on Libgen). And today, the most cutting-edge way we tend to think of causality today is in terms of counterfactuals (see Judea Pearl's work). Like, maybe bodies and 'the physical' have a place, but that would have to be argued, and not taken for granted - certainly not in the way that Chomsky does.

And even 'free will' and 'consciousness' are totally modern concepts that popped into existence not all that long ago. Like - these aren't some big eternal questions. These are, for the most part, cultural memes given institutional standing.

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property.
— Xtrix

But this is simply not true. — StreetlightX

That contact action is a human property, or that it was the common sense basis for the mechanical philosophy?

Your citation seems to be addressing the latter case. That physical flux was the "least popular" explanation of causality around Leibniz's time is interesting, but I don't see the relevance here. In other words, I don't see how it falsifies the claim that it (contact action) was the basis for the mechanical philosophy.

Like, our intuitions are useless. Forget them. They're trash and philosophically uninteresting other than a good historical and cultural tale. If you want to read how absolutely bonkers our (by which I only mean Western) schemes of causality really have been, check out Steven Nadler's editied collection on "Causation in Early Modern Philosophy" (you can find it on Libgen). — StreetlightX

Sure. But I don't understand why you apparently think I'm arguing the opposite of this. That's in fact the point about contact action being a "common sense" basis for the mechanical philosophy -- namely that intuition simply falls apart when trying to explain, for example, the force of gravity. Which is why Chomsky talks about Newton inadvertently making contributions to the philosophy of mind, since it (arguably) demonstrates an example of cognitive limits.

Like, maybe bodies and 'the physical' have a place, but that would have to be argued, and not taken for granted - certainly not in the way that Chomsky does. — StreetlightX

Again I don't quite understand this remark. Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science. I think the following will be helpful to clear away any misunderstanding (this is from Chomsky's lecture in Oslo, which I posted above and which I transcribed -- so any error is mine):

I don't think we can leave materialism behind until someone tells us what materialism is. There was a concept of materialism right through the early scientific revolution, right through Newton -- Newton still accepted it. In fact the great scientists of the next century still accepted it, LaGrange and others still tried to develop a material, mechanistic concept of the universe that went right through the 19th century -- ether theories and so on. It was finally given up in the 20th century. Finally recognized that 'we're never gonna get it.' And totally different ways of looking at things were developed, which have no relation to traditional materialism, if Friedrich Lange is correct -- and nobody has ever suggested another notion.

Materialism is just like anything we more or less understand -- it includes thinking, reasoning, etc. So we can't leave it behind until someone explains what it is. But there's no reason we can't study it. We can study what the human capacity of understanding is. We know some negative things. Like we can't understand how the world works, for example. Because our concept of understanding is too limited to incorporate what Newton described as an absurdity. Newton and Hume and Lock weren't idiots -- we should take them seriously. They regarded it as an absurdity for very good reasons, and modern cognitive science (which somehow tries to recapitulate some of this) finds pretty much that. For example, as I mentioned, an infant, presented with presentations which indicate that there's some kind of causality -- like when the ball rolls this way a light turns red or something -- they will invent a mechanical cause, and they don't care if it's not visible, because infants understand that most of what goes on is invisible but there's got to be some mechanical cause otherwise there's no way to influence anything else. So that does seem to be the way our minds work, and that tells us something about the limits of our understanding; in fact a classical, crucial case -- and it can go on to other cases.

At 1:02:00 on the video.

[Deleted]

:fire: