Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. — javra

Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position?

Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.

I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that.

Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Not one bit. I rather take issue with the notion that the linguistic expression of "my pain" has no relevant referent (this as per the beetle in a box argument).

Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.

I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:up: Fully agree.

I don't want to say this due to the can of worms that it is, but I will anyway: the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. There of course is the evolutionary conundrum to this and like telltales (e.g., shared central nervous system anatomy) to dispel such a view ... but it's not historically uncommon.

the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. — javra

So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc?

So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Seems to me to be the case, yes.

What do you bloody well expect? The Skinner accusation against Witti is pathetic, a lost cause and a waste of time. — Banno

There's plenty of scholarly writing on the link between Wittenstein and Skinner.

Seems to me to be the case, yes. — javra

Okay, thanks for your input. :smile:

Shoot. Any time.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul

Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language.

There's plenty of scholarly writing on the link between Wittenstein and Skinner. — ZzzoneiroCosm

And plenty arguing that Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist, which I find much more convincing.

So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I don’t know why it would be controversial to Wittgenstein. He famously wrote 'If a lion could speak, we could not understand him'. By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to.

And plenty arguing that Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist. — Joshs

Of course.

The SEP mentions him in the behaviorism article.

I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction. — javra

The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia).

By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to. — Joshs

And yet when a lion does its thing and roars with a certain tonality in a certain context, we non-lions get the gist of what its conveying well enough: the rough English translation being, “I’m the boss”. Going by their behaviors, so too do zebras and gazelles - or else competitors such as hyenas.

For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?

The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia). — Joshs

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
— creativesoul

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus? — Banno

Please address what I write and not some imaginary opponent that you make up in lieu thereof.

Diplodocus did not have items of furniture in their minds that could be properly described as beliefs. Rather they had behaviours that we can set out and explain in terms of beliefs and desires.

I dunno. This seems to be a fairly straight forward corollary of the beetle in the box. That folk with a decent grasp of Wittgenstein - yes, you , creativesoul - can't see this strikes me as quite odd. — Banno

Diplodocus are not prehistoric mammals. I chose my classification deliberately. I wish you would pay closer attention, I know you're capable of understanding this. There are no items of furniture inside of any skulls that I'm aware of, so the response is laughable... literally. You are arguing against your own imaginary opponents.

I've no issue at all with the idea that we can explain behaviours in terms of beliefs and desires.

As far as Witt's beetle goes, I am of the understanding that it's an argument against the idea of private language or private meaning of words. I agree with it actually. It's also irrelevant here. Language less creatures' belief does not consist of language or constructs thereof. Our reports of them do, but I'm not so naive as to conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting upon.

Trees, mice, and the spatiotemporal relationship between them that we characterize as one being behind the other do not need language to exist in their entirety exactly as they did when we coined the phrase "the mouse is behind the tree". I'm not arguing that the phrase is some private belief of a prehistoric mammal(say a cat). That's absurd. Rather, I'm saying that a prehistoric cat could have believed that a mouse was behind a tree long before we coined the phrase(call it whatever you want, it matters not).

...how do you see the relation between concepts and beliefs? — neomac

On my view, all concepts are linguistic constructs, whereas not all beliefs are. All concepts are existentially dependent upon language. Language creation and use is existentially dependent upon belief. Therefore, concepts are existentially dependent upon belief. I've no use for the notion of "concept", having found that talking in terms of beliefs, thoughts, and linguistic frameworks is much better than talking in terms of concepts or conceptual schemes.

Care to further discuss the topic, as compared/contrasted to my interlocutor?
— creativesoul

I don't see how we can further it. — neomac

Do you find the account I set out in the first three posts of the debate to be a complete one?

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I believe that it's better to arrive at that as a conclusion that is warranted by and follows from what we can know about our own thought and belief.

For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions? — javra

I agree that verbal language isn’t necessary for cognition, that is, for forming expectations that can be met or disappointed, which is the basis for belief in a very general sense, although obviously not belief as the structure of a verbal proposition.

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic. — javra

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense.

I believe that it's better to arrive at that as a conclusion that is warranted by and follows from what we can know about our own thought and belief. — creativesoul

Sure, infer sounds better than assume.

I did.

You accuse me of not addressing your posts, then mis-address mine.

The Diplodocus is hardly historical.

And that you fail to see the relation between this discussion and the private language argument is apparent.

So where does that leave this bloated reanimation of a thrice deceased thread. I dunno. Seems to me you missed something quite important, but...

Try this:

You are perhaps happy to say that red is seen by us in, say, a sunset or a cup, but that it is a secondary property; not to actually be found in the object.

I'm suggesting something analogous is the case with belief.

Edit: Ah, damn. I meant to write Diprotodon. My bad.

Or this:

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? What sort of thing is the belief?

You say it's not a thing in the mind of the cat. So what is it?

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense. — Joshs

This seems like a good summary to me. It points to how crucial historical usage is when it comes to the meaning of words, phrases, and other language constructs. It denies the equivalence often drawn between unspoken thought and 'private' thought. Dennet has at least one intuition pump that does much the same thing in "Quining Qualia", except he's arguing against the notion of private sensations or some such and using something like the private language argument to make the point of how socially constructed the notions actually are.

I highly recommend reading that to anyone who has not.

Seems to me you missed something quite important, but...

Try this:

You are perhaps happy to say that red is seen by us in, say, a sunset or a cup, but that it is a secondary property; not to actually be found in the object.

I'm suggesting something analogous is the case with belief. — Banno

Well then, perhaps we do agree on something basic. I'm not keen on the 'property' talk though. I'll try to tease out the analogy in as simple terms as I can, using ones with which I believe you'll be okay. I'll try to incorporate both, the private language argument and the secondary property gist, for they seem to be different kinds of objections.

So, seeing red always includes some creature or another, and what is meant by "seeing red" is entirely determined by language use, which is social. Thus, when one claims that their experience of seeing red cups or even thinking about red cups is some personal and private experience or thought, we can surely know that those thoughts and experiences cannot count as private matters at all, because they are the result of social constructs and historical language use, and that which is a social construct cannot be completely private.

I'll leave it there for now. Hopefully, this is the beginning of something more productive between us. It's been a while. If the above is palatable enough for you, could you elaborate on how belief is the same way. Don't get me wrong, I understand how our use of the term "belief" fits into the above so far as language use being social goes. Rather, I'm struggling to see how this is at all applicable and/or lends support to the claim that all belief content is propositional.

We build red out of our usage. Why shouldn't we think of belief in much the same way?

What is the referent of the belief in "the cat believes the bowl is empty"? — Banno

The question makes no sense on my view. Beliefs are not the sort of things used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else, or to refer to something else; beliefs are not names, do not function like names, although they are certainly necessary for any naming and descriptive practices to begin.

What sort of thing is the belief? — Banno

Beliefs are complex things composed of other things. They are a result of cognitive processes. All belief consists of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things. The complexity of any belief in particular(the correlational content) is congruent with the innate capabilities of the creature.

If the cat believes that the bowl is empty, it is as a result of looking and seeing that there was no food in it. There is no referent of the belief. As above, the cat's belief does not refer to anything. Rather, it's about a food source. It's about the bowl,, but is much more than just the empty bowl.

You say it's not a thing in the mind of the cat. So what is it? — Banno

The issue I have is with the use of "mind" as anything other than a loose reference to one's thoughts and beliefs. Layman speak for what are you thinking is "What's on your mind". "I have something in mind" does not mean that the mind is a place where things can be. Indeed, beliefs are the sorts of things that do not have a precise spatiotemporal location, for they are composed of entirely different otherwise seemingly disparate things, connected only by the correlations drawn between them by the believing creature.

The question makes no sense on my view. — creativesoul

Good. Nor to mine.

I suspect some fo our company might disagree.

. All belief consists of correlations — creativesoul

Oooo... I remember that from a few years ago. Warning bells.

If the cat believes that the bowl is empty, it is as a result of looking and seeing that there was no food in it. There is no referent of the belief. As above, the cat's belief does not refer to anything. Rather, it's about a food source. It's about the bowl,, but is much more than just the empty bowl. — creativesoul

Then what is it that is "had" by the cat, when it has a belief? Nothing, I say; it's just a way of setting out it's behaviour.

We build red out of our usage. Why shouldn't we think of belief in much the same way? — Banno

I think that that overstates the human influence regarding red things. Other language less creatures can also see red, so it is clear that seeing red does not require our language usage. However, more to your point, which I take on in agreement is...

Our usage determines what "seeing red" means. We cannot sensibly talk about seeing red cups unless we've been steeped in language. Our usage determines what "I believe that X" means(where X is some statement believed true). We cannot sensibly talk about our beliefs unless we've been steeped in language. In both cases, it is true that our understanding and knowledge of what those words mean depends entirely upon language use...

However, I would not say the same about all instances of seeing red or all instances of believing that a mouse ran behind a tree. Not all those depend upon language use.

...what is it that is "had" by the cat, when it has a belief? Nothing, I say; it's just a way of setting out it's behaviour. — Banno

It's a tough question to be sure. The belief is what is had by the cat. The cat draws correlations between different things. The bowl. Hunger pangs. The urge to eat, and seek food(gather resources). The belief that the bowl is empty could be accompanied by unsatisfied expectations, if she is expecting food to be there. There are numerous past events, each leaving an impression upon the cat such that it now goes to the bowl when it's hungry. After looking into the bowl, if it is empty, then the cat sees that the bowl is empty. Knowing what an empty food bowl looks like is not a mystery, nor is believing the bowl is empty when looking at an empty bowl. There is language necessary to make the bowl, but there's none necessary to look into it and see that it's empty, resulting in believing so.

We build red out of our usage. Why shouldn't we think of belief in much the same way? — Banno

The creature alone with the box can look and see if there is something in the box. The something in the box he can see and retain in memory and categorize alongside other things-seen without giving the thing in the box a name. I imagine the mind would do just fine with the categorization of nameless images. (You might imagine a dog's mind along these lines.) It's easy to imagine a mind running on nameless images (and emotions, smells, feelings, and so on). I suppose a name would make the image easier to categorize. But images are also easy to remember, manipulate, organize.

You may say we decide together how to organize these nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on. I don't think this can be known as enjoyable as it might be to know it.

Most of earthly existence has been languageless. Why get so hung up on language. It has a homocentric ring to it. We've had our Copernicus. We're not at the center anymore. Animals have minds too, the evidence insists: There are languageless creatures who can categorize nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on. There are nonlinguistic creatures who hold beliefs. The cat is assailed with nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on between the sound of the electric can opener and his dashing to the kitchen. Those nameless images, emotions, smells, feelings and so on,* are the cat's belief: belief that the sound of the electric can opener means there's something tasty in the kitchen.

*You would probably like to include the cat's behavior here but to me that's a weird way to talk. I wouldn't talk that way about myself or about you. I wouldn't call your behavior a part of your belief or my behavior a part of my belief. So what warrants this phraseology with the cat? Only a kind of Skinnerian reductionism. Never a wise move. The Skinnerian epoche is always a temptation but vacuous in the end. A distraction designed to postpone the acceptance of uncertainty.

"I have something in mind" does not mean that the mind is a place where things can be. Indeed, beliefs are the sorts of things that do not have a precise spatiotemporal location — creativesoul

Yes. The most wonderful and mysterious thing about the mind is that it has no location. A belief has no location. It's a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and a behavioral pattern and in the case of a linguistic creature a linguistic pattern.