It’s just really odd to say we can’t refer to the word physical because Newton’s contemporaries once associated the word to mean things in the world worked like wheels and clocks.

Did we throw away the concept of space and time because they weren’t what Kant imagined or throw away the concept of life because vitalism was abandoned? Do you think the meaning of the words have to be left fixed, that they have to be abandoned if they were initially tied to disproven ideas? The definition of life for instance is a continued debate so it’s not like we’re talking about concepts in science that have settled metaphysics, but no one seems to have a problem with knowing what is referenced anymore than when we talk about changed concepts like physical or causation.

Anyways the other point being that the reason why they believed physical explanations had to be abandoned because Newton’s contemporaries were convinced we could never understand the mechanisms for Action at a Distance, which they were wrong about. So again who cares how they used these concepts.

Exactly. As if, out of some misplaced sense of fealty, we owe these dead concepts and dead people an explanation of exactly why their dead concepts are just so dead - on pain of impugning our ability to understand the world. But these things have literally nothing to do with each other, and if the dead are dead then may they stay in their graves without it for one moment being a commentary on our ability to understand the world.

Materialism is just like anything we more or less understand -- it includes thinking, reasoning, etc. So we can't leave it behind until someone explains what it is. — Chomsky

I mean what is this nonsense? We can't leave it behind because it "is just like anything we more or less understand"? What is that even supposed to mean? There's no transitivity here. This reads like someone who has invested too much time in studying theology and then insisting that it is now everyone else's problem that his interests are dead.

For example, as I mentioned, an infant, presented with presentations which indicate that there's some kind of causality -- like when the ball rolls this way a light turns red or something -- they will invent a mechanical cause, and they don't care if it's not visible, because infants understand that most of what goes on is invisible but there's got to be some mechanical cause otherwise there's no way to influence anything else. So that does seem to be the way our minds work, and that tells us something about the limits of our understanding; in fact a classical, crucial case -- and it can go on to other cases — Chomsky

And what, if we can't square our most advanced concepts of understading to the intellectual standards of literal infants this is supposed to be a comment on our understanding other than the fact that infants are literally the stupidest variety of human on the planet? This is so sloppy and the fact that anyone takes it seriously is insane.

Nevermind. I don't want to get into endless debate.

There's no problem if people disagree, in fact, it's welcomed. Others can build ideas on disagreements.

I'll be here for anyone who has questions on the essay, or would like clarification or other sources, or would like to talk about any of the other topics raised in this essay, such as Strawson's panpsychism, Priestley's materialism or Descartes, Locke or anything else mentioned.

Anything Chomsky related, I'd be happy to help, minus the technical linguistic aspects, which are too technical for me.

There's no problem if people disagree, in fact, it's welcomed. Others can build ideas on disagreements. — Manuel

It’s okay, this particular subject is just among the ones where I digress from Chomsky the most. I agree and disagree with him on the wide array of subjects he covers, just like I do with other people.

:sweat:

I didn't have you in mind actually. No, of course, I perfectly well understand and respect disagreement with anyone, that's fine. If you aren't challenged, it's harder to learn.

I like Heidegger (Chomsky doesn't) and think that Chomsky at times uses the example of physics too frequently in other arguments, which I think is unsatisfactory.

More than anything is the rhetoric that bothers me a bit.

For instance, I really dislike Dennett's philosophy of mind because I think it is pretty wild. But I say that I don't like Dennett beforehand, and don't usually discuss much of it, because I just get mad and piss other people off.

On the other hand, when he says interesting things about neuroscience or says something useful about free will, I'll engage.

It's temperament related, but if I say something is "nonsense" or "idiotic", I usually let go of some of my rationality, because I expect a fiery reply. I reserve those for very specific occasions.

Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science. — Xtrix

Right, and from this he wants to draw the conclusion that there are some things in the world that will always escape us. Again, the latter stands as a perfectly reasonable position (that things will always escape us), but movement from A to C simply doesn't follow. If bodies and the physical don't have a place in today's science then they were always insignificant from the beginning other than as conceptual holding-patterns whose time is done. We owe them nothing and they speak to nothing.

That physical flux was the "least popular" explanation of causality around Leibniz's time is interesting, but I don't see the relevance here. — Xtrix

The point is that these ideas are throughly historical - they had a date of birth and they will have a date of death. The idea that these senses of causality are deeply held eternal metaphysical notions is just rear-guard parochialism. Even if infants develop certain ideas along a relatively stable developmental path, this might speak to nothing other than the fact, of, I dunno, the necessity of avoiding being eaten by lions. Which is, shall we say, a regional issue at best. Or else that infants hew to an incredibly diminished sense of intellection precisely on account of the fact that they are infants.

Oh come, hop in. I'm allowed to be mean to Chomsky he's not here.

:wink:

I think Xtrix will have a good time arguing with you.

I think you and I disagree on many, many things including most of philosophy and politics. Also in ways of expressing our opinions, I try to be a bit less intense. Not always. Doesn't make me better or worse, just a style.

That just makes the world go round.

I'm having a Dudeism vibe now, and I like it. By all means, fire away, I'll be having a metaphysical White Russian and chill.

Cheers.

Fair enough!

I've read the rest of the essay, and frankly I am still not sure what to think of it. That is, the impression that I got after reading about a third of it is still the same: these look like notes on things that Chomsky has read, written down without any plan, flow-of-consciousness style. The themes that he mainly deals with are: (1) 18th century natural philosophers and their struggles with reconceptualizing the physical world in light of Newtonian physics; (2) the mind-body problem as though of by those 18th century philosophers, especially Priestly, plus a few later philosophers, mainly Russell, Strawson Jr. and Stoljar in the end, with some notes of his own concerning language.

The essay is by no means a survey of the themes that it touches on. Compare, for instance, Chomsky's notes on physicalism with Stoljar's SEP article on the same: you will find the latter far more comprehensive and objective. Nor did I find much in the way of an original insight. Chomsky indicates where his sympathies lie: reductive physicalism, monism, opposing Strawson panpsychism and endorsing Stoljar's physicalism, but doesn't add much of his own. I couldn't make much of the brief note on language tucked in at the end, but that's because I have no familiarity with linguistics and Chomsky's work.

Where I encountered difficulty (other than the brief discussion of language) was in the end, in notes on Stoljar, but this could be best remedied by reading Stoljar himself.

Chomsky's not very hidden agenda: innate ideas.

The innate part is no trouble to his philosophical conscience, but the ideas part does seem to have been keeping him up. Innate brain shivers, no problem. I presume.

Yep. Buried in among the thirty pages of warbling is an apologia for his effective creationism about language. One suspects all the rest is just so much superstructure to excuse those few lines.

I'm interested in understanding Strawson's panpsychism. I don't understand why he wants to rule out strong emergence. Why would it have to be miraculous?

I read it as a response to those who approach the science of consciousness as if there's no need for a conceptual shift to deal with it.

That all this is mundane to you, suggests that you would criticize Dennett, for instance, for putting so much weight on our present conceptual schemes.

I didn't see much of a consistent agenda behind these rambling notes; I think people read into them whatever prejudices they happen to hold already: about materialism, philosophy of mind, Chomsky himself...

I couldn't make much of the brief note on language tucked in at the end, but that's because I have no familiarity with linguistics and Chomsky's work. — SophistiCat

Other animals, which have a communication system have a sound-to-object relation. So, for instance, if a monkey makes a particular sound, it means something "predator", "prey", "food", etc., the relation being one of a sound with an object in the external world (extra mental) world.

The case of human languages is different, the vast majority of times there is no relation between sound and object, for instance, now. The human case of language use is much more sophisticated than any animal, which includes things like recognizing that if I say "Boston is awesome", and you knew the context for which I'm using the word, you'd know I speaking of a band, not a city.

He uses this example inNew Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind:

"If I say that one of the things that concerns me is the average man and his foibles, or Joe Sixpack’s priorities, or the inner track that Raytheon has on the latest missile contract, does it follow that I believe that the actual world, or some mental model of mine, is constituted of such entities as the average man, foibles, Joe Sixpack, priorities and inner tracks?"

Etc.



What Chomsky would say is that there is something or a reason by which something emerges, such as experience, but we don't know what the reason is.

Strawson says that at bottom, whatever there is, must constitute or realize experience. In Strawson's case, then, it's not a huge puzzle as to how matter can be constituted to lead to consciousness in certain configurations, it was there all along.

I think people read into them whatever prejudices they happen to hold already: — SophistiCat

Sounds like philosophy of mind isn't your cuppa.

Thanks for the explanation, but to understand how this ties in with the present context, I would need to have a deeper understanding of the topic, and I cannot commit to that at the moment.

Why? Because I am not taking your side against Dennett?

Here is Stoljar's precis of his book Ignorance and Imagination, which Chomsky appears to endorse. Will read that later.

Why? Because I am not taking your side against Dennett? — SophistiCat

Irritable much?

Sure. If you want some more info on some later date on this topic, let me know.

Yes, Stoljar is interesting, but I've mainly focused on Strawson. So I can say less about him than others.

Yes, Stoljar is interesting, but I've mainly focused on Strawson. So I can say less about him than others. — Manuel

Read Stoljar's precis - that didn't help much... Probably because I am still having difficulties with qualia ("experiential truths") and the zombie argument ("conceivability argument"). Stawson & panpsychism don't interest me, to be honest.

Ah.

Sure. No problem. I don't agree with Strawson's panpsychism either, though he's pretty clear with the terms "experiential" and "non-experiential".

The zombie argument isn't particularly convincing, I don't think, I mean, we essentially have very similar examples in people who sleepwalk, or so it seems to me.

As for experiential truths, I can see why "truth", can be problematic. I suppose experiential events or manifest reality are, in some cases, less confusing.

people who sleepwalk, — Manuel

Aren't they dreaming?

From what I've seen, accounts vary. Sometimes they remember dreaming, other times, they don't. I'm guessing that it's the same as going to sleep every night, just that they move around and do stuff.

Some people say we actually dream every night, be we just don't remember. I'm skeptical, when I used to party, and went to sleep, I'm pretty confident I didn't dream anything.

It’s just really odd to say we can’t refer to the word physical because Newton’s contemporaries once associated the word to mean things in the world worked like wheels and clocks. — Saphsin

It's not that -- it's that no alternative has been proposed since. As a technical notion. Common-sense notions in everyday discourse is a different matter. Of course I know what you mean when you say "physical." I know what you mean when you say I'm going to "work." When it comes to science, however, that no longer applies. So the argument Chomsky is making is that there hasn't been a replacement.

The common sense-based notion of contact action, as a basis for "understanding" the world in terms of mechanics (mechanical philosophy), was abandoned and nothing has been proposed since.

And what, if we can't square our most advanced concepts of understading to the intellectual standards of literal infants this is supposed to be a comment on our understanding other than the fact that infants are literally the stupidest variety of human on the planet? — StreetlightX

You've missed the point entirely. It's not trying to square our technical notions in science with an infant. It's merely pointing out that, much like the moon illusion, or the stick in water that appears broken, this is simply how human beings see things. As adults we realize the moon isn't that big, that the stick isn't really broken, etc., and perhaps infants and children don't -- but we still see the world this way regardless.

These are "common sense" notions. Chomsky is arguing that common sense notions don't help when it comes to science, and in fact "physical" (in terms of contact action) was one of these common-sense based technical notions that was abandoned. Crucially, another technical notion to replace it has never been given. We just have new ways of understanding the world. But we go on seeing broken sticks and making assumptions about contact action nevertheless. That's why magicians can fool us so easily with slights of hand.

Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science.
— Xtrix

Right, and from this he wants to draw the conclusion that there are some things in the world that will always escape us. — StreetlightX

Maybe not "always," but yes -- he argues, as you know, over and over again that human beings have a scope and limit to their capacities. Again I think the rats in the prime number maze is a good example -- it's not easy to understand why they can't do it, perhaps, but they can't. Human beings also have their cognitive limits, and we learn something about what they are. Common sense ways of seeing the world and talking about the world -- some of which is just psychologically pre-determined -- fall apart when we study things scientifically. I mentioned the moon illusion, but there are many others. Likewise for our words -- common words like "work" mean something entirely different in everyday life compared to their use in physics.

Again, the latter stands as a perfectly reasonable position (that things will always escape us), but movement from A to C simply doesn't follow. If bodies and the physical don't have a place in today's science then they were always insignificant from the beginning other than as conceptual holding-patterns whose time is done. We owe them nothing and they speak to nothing. — StreetlightX

I think Chomsky is going from C to A, not A to C. In other words, he's not saying, as you put it, that because a 17th century notion of "physical" was abandoned (A), that this proves human beings have limits (C). Rather, he takes it as a truism that human beings have limits (C) and that this is a crucial example of our limits. Hence the claim that Newton inadvertently made a contribution to the "philosophy of mind."

So if you find the initial position a reasonable one, you're simply disagreeing that this a very good example. But I think that's partly because you've missed the point about infants and contact action mentioned above.

The point is that these ideas are throughly historical - they had a date of birth and they will have a date of death. The idea that these senses of causality are deeply held eternal metaphysical notions is just rear-guard parochialism. — StreetlightX

Are optical illusions "eternal metaphysical notions"? You're mixing categories here I think. On the one hand we, as human beings, have common-sense experiences and notions about contact action; on the other, we have the mechanical philosophy which tried to describe the world in terms of a causality based in this common experience.

Because the latter was abandoned says nothing about the former. It doesn't make the former go away, nor does it make it some eternal notion.

Even if infants develop certain ideas along a relatively stable developmental path, this might speak to nothing other than the fact, of, I dunno, the necessity of avoiding being eaten by lions. Which is, shall we say, a regional issue at best. — StreetlightX

Maybe object permanence is regional at best as well. Is this really an argument?

Chomsky's not very hidden agenda: innate ideas. — bongo fury

That the human capacity for language is genetically determined, yes. Is that really still "controversial"? He's looking at human beings like we look at any other biological organism. We have a genetic structure. That's basically a truism.

an apologia for his effective creationism about language — StreetlightX

"Effective"? Chomsky has never once, in my reading, questioned whether language evolved. That it came about rapidly instead of gradually, as some propose, yes. That's "effective creationism"?

This is going in circles because of this pick and respond at your convenience.

"Physical" (in terms of contact action) was one of these common-sense based technical notions that was abandoned. — Xtrix

Sorry but this is just an excuse for what is effectively conceptual chauvinism. There is nothing - nothing - about object permanence that makes physicalism or mechanism 'common-sense based technical notions'. Literally nothing. Again, trying to naturalize and retrofit a set of historical notions as something that is built-in - hey, much like Chomsky's rubbish linguistics - so as to argue for some kind of mysterianism is bad philosophy and worse history. There is no natural mapping from object-permanence to 'mechanism' and physicalism. Just as there is no natural mapping from the failure of the latter to the failure of our cognitive abilities.

I think Chomsky is going from C to A, not A to C. — Xtrix

To be fair, because the paper is such a rambling mess, I'm quite happy to grant that Chomsky wants it both ways. He does want the failure of mechanism to be an example of how our ability to grasp the world can fail, but he clearly wants it also to shore up the the idea to begin with. But again, the problem is that he says nothing - nothing at all - about what it means to have a grasp on the world in the first place in any independant manner. All he does is index the latter to the former and then say that because the former fails, the latter does too. But this begs the whole question, which is why the paper comes off as nothing more than a provincial dispute arrogated to the status of the universal.

In fact the undecidable shuttling back and forth between A and C exposes the effectively tautological nature of the essay: because Chomsky lacks any terms other than 'the physical' or the mechanical to grasp the world, the failure of his pet vocabulary must imply the failure of human understanding and vice versa. It's like the child who whines that because his toys are broken, no one else can have any toys either. The only appropriate response is to ignore the child, or laugh at it for being so irredeemably moronic.

"Effective"? Chomsky has never once, in my reading, questioned whether language evolved. That it came about rapidly instead of gradually, as some propose, yes. That's "effective creationism"? — Xtrix

Yeah it "evolved", but exactly how is just one of those mysterious things that we'll never know, because his vision of language is Platonic and basically theological. He wants to pretend that his understanding of language is scientific by paying lip service to the language, but then does literally everything he can to put it outside scientific explanation by - guess what - shrouding the mechanism of that evolution in mystery. "It's innate". lol. Sure. Just like mechanism is 'innate'. He's a priest in disguise.

I haven't read the article, I confess, though I've read the majority of this thread, still trying to determine whether it's worth reading. StreetlightX has pretty much convinced me that it is not. I agree with StreetlightX that a big part of the problem is that we're dealing with antiquated terms. However, unlike what Streetlight says above, I do not think that such terms die. What often happens is that once the conceptual relevance of a word becomes outdated, use of the term will continue, but move off into some realm of free, unbounded usage, where it may be used by anyone, in any way. In the case of scientific or technical terms, which have become antiquated, people will use them in the pretense of saying something important, pretending to know something which others don't, by creating confusion in the minds of others.

The word "matter" with its associated extensions, material, materialism, etc., is such a word. From Aristotle it is well defined as a representation of the unintelligible aspect of the world, "potential", that which neither is nor is not, violating the law of excluded middle. This is why the assumed reality of "matter" is fundamental to early Christian mysticism and fringe religions like Manichaeism. Western science, especially under the direction of Newton, moved to bring "matter" into the fold of intelligibility by assigning it a fundamental property, mass. Newton's laws are applicable to mass, and if mass is equated with matter, matter appears to become intelligible through the category error of making the property the thing itself. The problem though is that there is a multitude of properties, like inertia, and gravitation, which are grouped together under "mass", and the relationship between these properties remained somewhat unintelligible. So Newton had taken the unintelligibility out of "matter" rendering the word useless in its technical definition, and pushed that unintelligibility into aspect of reality more deeply hidden, more mysterious.

However, it is wrong to portray Newton as materialist. He remained fully committed to God and the reality of the immaterial. This is evident from the fact that he appealed to God as required to maintain the truth of his first law of motion. And, the nature of "force", such as gravity, as well as the relationship between light and matter (as a type of force) were maintained as immaterial. What you can see though, is that he inverted the terminology, making "matter" intelligible, and assigning unintelligible to the immaterial, "force". As a result, "matter" in its traditional use has been abandoned to float freely in random use (abuse), and the "immaterial", which had provided the foundation for intelligibility, has now been designated as unintelligible.

Newton was a materialist as pertaining to the physical world, the way the world works. In the essay, which I am now seeing many people not bother reading at all, which is strange for a reading group, you would see that Newton also believed in something called "spirit", which he thought permeated all of nature.

"In Newton’s own words, “spirit” may be the cause of all movement in nature, including the “power of moving our body by our thoughts” and “the same power in other living creatures, [though] how this is done and by what laws we do not know. We cannot say that all nature is not alive.”
pp. 168-169

Terms are only a part of it, it has to do with our innate faculties, the one's all human beings are born with. What's not being mentioned, in these discussions, which you pointed out - and thanks for that - is that "materialism" is part of the issue, the other was that these notions do not reach the domain of mind or soul (which includes more than mind).

But even putting aside the talk of Newton, Descartes, Locke and so on, it's that even today, we know almost nothing about the mental. Hence the misleading "hard problem" of consciousness.