Feyerabend couldn't have said this any better. — 180 Proof

Except for one thing. He never would say something like this.

Aristotle’s “eternal circular motion” — Apollodorus

Aristotle was ahead of his time! He already contemplated the perfect clock, present in the state of the universe before inflation.

That's exactly the kind of argument that Fooloso4 would come up with. Apparently, we had to accept everything he said because he had "the degrees to show that he was right". :smile: — Apollodorus

I don't appeal to my "degrees" in my justification, I appeal to what has been written by respected authors, to justify my interpretation.

You have backed up your interpretation with nothing but more of your own baseless interpretations and opinions which, as others have noted, are pretty incoherent and make no sense. — Apollodorus

This statement completely contradicts what you have accused me of, interpreting Plato through Aristotle, and interpreting Aristotle through Aquinas. Obviously, if they were my "own baseless interpretations and opinions, your accusations that I interpret one through another, would hold no weight. So which is it that you believe? Do you think these are my own baseless interpretations? Or do you think that I interpretate through reference to others? Or is it just the case that you are irritated and incensed by the fact that I've validly demonstrated your interpretations to be off the mark, and now you have nothing but ad hominem to resort to?

As I already pointed out a few pages back (page 6), there is no reason why Aristotle’s “eternal circular motion” should be deemed less acceptable than the Christian idea of God as “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”, for example: — Apollodorus

I've yet to come across this Christian theology which talks about “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”. Care to provide a reference?

You chose not to answer my point (and many others) for the obvious reason that an honest and objective answer would have instantly demolished your untenable position. — Apollodorus

I didn't answer it because it's not part of any theology I've ever come across. And so I ignored it as a farce. Until you provide some respectable theology which portrays God in this way, I will continue to treat it as a totally ridiculous strawman.

The fact is that if Aristotle’s principles are “unacceptable” from a Thomist perspective, Aquinas’ principles may be equally unacceptable from other perspectives, e.g., of modern science, Marxism, or Islam. — Apollodorus

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. The reason given in that passage is that it is a spatial representation of something which is supposed to be immaterial. He also gives other reasons in that chapter, it's best if you read the entire chapter.

If you claim Aquinas' principles "may be equally unacceptable", then I'd expect you to give the reasons why. That is exactly what I did in my last post where I expressed my opinion that a particular principle stated by Aquinas appears to be wrong:

Aquinas chooses the latter on the basis of his understanding of "equality". He believed that the distinction between individual things proceeds directly from God, as matter is directly created by God. But I don't think his conclusion is sound. The reason for this, is that we need to account for the scale of higher or lower by which inequalities are judged to produce a hierarchy, higher or lower. If that scale is not related directly to God, rather than conceiving of it as relations between the various spiritual substances, then the relations become arbitrary, without a grounding principle. In other words, the "inequality" of being which proceeds directly from God, in His creation of matter, must have inherent within it, the principles for higher and lower because God as eternal, is the one principle which encompasses the whole of created being, or permanence. So the scale must be based in eternity or permanence, giving each spiritual substance a position relative to eternity, each constituting a distinct aeviternity as a mean between permanence and change, the points on the scale being each related to the overarching principle, rather than to each other.. — Metaphysician Undercover

You may call it “educated interpretation”, but I think objective observers can see it for what it is, namely anti-Platonist and anti-Aristotelian disinformation and propaganda. — Apollodorus

Say what you like, but I think it's obvious that you see my expressions as anti-Appolodorus propaganda, and that's what pisses you off.

He points to the ideas of Feyerband, including the claim about science, including '"Scientific rationality" may be no better, indeed it may be even worse as a general ideology for regulating the relations of people one to another and to the natural world than lay rationality.' — Jack Cummins

Now they are something else!

Of no real importance to the subject, but noteworthy nevertheless. Bohm's hidden variables were attacked, calling it:

"A communist-catholic conspiracy"
"Juvenile deviationism"
"A disquieting sign of primitive mentality"

Bohm himself was said to be "a fool", "a Trotskiyte"
or "a traitor"... He was considered "slayed, not only philosophically, but physical as well". I wonder if Stephen Hawking would agree.

I'll take Feyerabend's word for it (esp. re: Science in a Free Society & Farewell to Reason).

The words themselves, mmmh, maybe. In the analysis of how it's accepted or not. I I have the suspicion though that whoever wrote that piece you compare with, will subsequently use that knowledge to advice how we can get the scientific story established. Like the preacher can use this knowledge to get God established. Just replace Science by God, in the words you compare with F.

I appeal to what has been written by respected authors, to justify my interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aside from being an ad populum argument, that does not constitute evidence that your "interpretation" is correct.

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

This only shows that you got it all backward, which explains why you think that everyone else got it backward! :smile:

If you really were consistent in your criticism, you would also be critical of Aquinas. But you have this fixation with Aristotle’s “circular motion” to divert attention away from Aquinas’ – and your own – inconsistencies.

The fact is that the whole purpose of Aristotle’s writings is to present a unified vision of reality in which man belongs to the moving order of the universe.

By definition, the observable universe or cosmos (from Greek kosmeo, “to order, or arrange”) is an order. Another observable fact is the circular or cyclical motion of heavenly bodies - which are themselves spherical in shape, hence “harmony of spheres” - that forms the basis of the cosmic order.

This circular motion of the cosmic order may also be seen as analogous to the self-reflexive activity of intelligence or consciousness, both human and divine, which in turn is at the root of cognitive processes and ethical considerations alike. This is entirely in line with the Ancient Greek conception of the universe as “ruled by Intelligence”:

There is in the universe a by no means feeble Cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called Wisdom (sophia) and Intelligence (nous) … Now do not imagine that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that Intelligence (nous) always rules the universe (Philebus 30c-d).

Clearly, far from being “inconsistent”, Aristotle is perfectly consistent on this point throughout his writings as well as being consistent with Platonic and pre-Platonic (or Ur-Platonic) views which he does a very good job in harmonizing with his own.

In the final analysis, philosophy in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition serves a spiritual, ethical, and political purpose. In particular, what Plato and Aristotle are saying is that man can, and should, aim to attain higher knowledge or a higher state of consciousness on the basis of which he can have a better understanding of reality and of his role in the wider scheme of things.

In contrast, you are claiming that this is impossible and should not even be tried. Here is your own statement from page 6:

I do not seriously belief that man can, or ought to try, to elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was exactly Fooloso4’s position and the reason he went to extraordinary lengths to dismiss Plato, Aristotle, and anyone that had any views that deviated from materialism. And if, as suggested by @Wayfarer, you have been doing this since 2011, then I think it is fair to assume that you are doing it on purpose.

Anyway, IMO so long as Classical philosophy serves its stated purpose it is consistent with its own logic. There is no need for it to be absolutely consistent with strict logic.

If we were to apply strict logic to all philosophical systems, very few, if any, would be found to be without flaws. In fact, if we were to go by strict or pure logic alone, we would not get very far at all as not everything that is “logical” is also necessarily true, and vice versa.

This is precisely why we need science, philosophy, and even religion in addition to logic. And it is why Aristotle himself in Posterior Analytics clearly says that not every truth can be demonstrated. Some fundamental truths need to be grasped intuitively, with philosophy serving as nothing more than a pointer to those truths:

No other kind of knowledge (episteme) except intuition (nous) is more accurate than scientific knowledge. Also first principles are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge involves reason. It follows that there can be no scientific knowledge of the first principles; and since nothing can be more infallible than scientific knowledge except intuition, it must be intuition that apprehends the first principles.
This is evident not only from the foregoing considerations but also because the starting-point of demonstration is not itself demonstration, and so the starting-point of scientific knowledge is not itself scientific knowledge.
Therefore, since we possess no other infallible faculty besides scientific knowledge, the source from which knowledge starts must be intuition (nous). Thus it will be the primary source of scientific knowledge [i.e., nous] that apprehends the first principles, while scientific knowledge as a whole is similarly related to the whole world of facts (An. Post. 100b17)

It follows that the fault does not lie with Aristotle’s logic, but with those who lack the ability or willingness to apprehend its true meaning ....

Aristotle was ahead of his time! He already contemplated the perfect clock, present in the state of the universe before inflation. — Raymond

Well, I think the ancients were definitely far more knowledgeable than is nowadays assumed. It's just that we moderns like to believe that it was us who invented the wheel. And the clock. :smile:

Did he really talk about a never ending circular motion?

This only shows that you got it all backward, which explains why you think that everyone else got it backward! :smile: — Apollodorus

You obviously haven't read "De Anima" Bk1, Ch,3. I'll take your criticism seriously after you demonstrate that you've read and understood, what you are criticizing my interpretation of.

Did he really talk about a never ending circular motion? — Raymond

He does so in De Caelo or "On the Heavens."
He also makes reference to the cosmology in the Metaphysics.

Seems he even anticipated quantum mechanics!

Aristotle himself used this antinomy to develop his understanding of movement: it is a fluent continuum that he considers to be a whole. ... The claim of quantum mechanics is precisely that: movement is quantized; things move or change in non-reducible steps, the so-called quanta.

Did he really talk about a never ending circular motion? — Raymond

Well, Aristotle argues that time and motion are imperishable. And since any motion other than circular would have a beginning and end, imperishable motion must be circular and the cause of that motion must be some immaterial principle such as an “unmoved mover”.

Obviously, there are many ways Aristotle can be interpreted (and misinterpreted). But here is a good article that elucidates some of the points involved:

Aristotle's Circular Movement as a Logos Doctrine – JSTOR

Or, if you have the time and inclination for a broader perspective, you can try Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists.

Who are you quoting?

Ah sorry! Forgot. Look here

Does the link work?

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16265/1/Aristotle_and_Quantum_Mechanics.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjClNuQtsH1AhXWgnIEHWdKB6UQFnoECAQQBg&usg=AOvVaw3w6hUue67b4MdYIOLuSd6F

Aristotle and Other Platonists. — Apollodorus

Ha! Nice title!

Yep. Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years so there must have been some influence. Gerson argues that Aristotle was essentially a Platonist:

Francis Cornford famously wrote about the theory of Forms and the immortality of soul as the “twin-pillars of Platonism” … With the appropriate qualifications made, I think it is fair to conclude that the “twin pillars” also support Aristotle’s Platonism.
Is Aristotle just a Platonist? Certainly not. In this regard, I would not wish to underestimate the importance of the dispositional differences between Aristotle and Plato.
This dispositional difference is in part reflected in Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts. In working through the Aristotelian corpus with a mind open to the Neoplatonic assumption of harmony, I have found time and again that Aristotle was, it turns out, actually analyzing the Platonic position or making it more precise, not refuting it.
In addition, I do not discount in this regard the fundamental thesis, advanced by Harold Cherniss, that Aristotle is often criticizing philosophers other than Plato or deviant versions of Platonism. It is not a trivial fact that most of Aristotle’s writings came after Plato’s death and after Plato’s mantle as head of the Academy had passed to Speusippus and then to Xenocrates.
In my view, however, it would be a mistake to conclude that Aristotle in not au fond a Platonist. Even when Aristotle is criticizing Plato, as he does in De Anima, he is led, perhaps malgré lui to draw conclusions based on Platonic assumptions.
The main conclusion I draw from this long and involved study is that if one rigorously and honestly sought to remove these assumptions, the ‘Aristotelianism’ that would remain would be indefensible and incoherent. A comprehensive and scientifically grounded anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is, I suspect, a chimera (Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp. 289-290).

Thanks for the quote!

Can we say, very concisely, that the Platonic forms were sought on Earth, by Aristotle, instead of in out-wordly "mathematical heaven" where Plato positioned them?

This dispositional difference is in part reflected in Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts. In working through the Aristotelian corpus with a mind open to the Neoplatonic assumption of harmony, I have found time and again that Aristotle was, it turns out, actually analyzing the Platonic position or making it more precise, not refuting it. — Lloyd Gerson

Gerson's emphasis upon "who is a Platonist" here is misplaced. Aristotle's objections to Plato were not a "penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts." The "innovations" were serious attempts to advance the discussion beyond the terms expressed by Plato. The numerous places where Aristotle says something like "Plato was not wrong when he said X" are the places where he is saying Plato was wrong in how the idea was expressed. And that difference was the important matter to pay attention to.

If the differences were not really a difference, the whole trajectory of Aristotle's inquiry can be written off as some kind of poetry slam.

Can we say, very concisely, that the Platonic forms were sought on Earth, by Aristotle, instead of in out-wordly "mathematical heaven" where Plato positioned them? — Raymond

Couple of recent essays on Platonic/Aristotelian philosophy of math

https://aeon.co/essays/aristotle-was-right-about-mathematics-after-all

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-math-180975882/

In my view there is a huge amount of confusion about the sense in which forms, ideas, number, etc, exist. As I think I noted somewhere in this thread, Bertrand Russell points out that universals don't 'exist' but 'subsist'. They're attributes of the fabric of reality, not 'existent objects'. People seem extraordinarily confused about this distinction but it seems clear as day to me. There's some comment on that in the second of the above refs.

Think about, for example, 'the domain of natural numbers'. It would be odd to ask 'where is that?' because it's not literally some place. But there are numbers which are inside it, like 2, and those outside it, like the square root of -1, so there really is 'a domain' which includes some and excludes others. But what is its nature? In what sense is it real? That's the interesting question.

When I took a course on Aristotle's Metaphysics in university, the professor told us that it was debatable as to whether Aristotle actually wrote this part. He attributed the writing to some other (unknown) Neo-Platonist, and so we did not study it with the rest of the text. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you have any other evidence to support this observation?
One Neo-Platonist, Plotinus, specifically objected to Aristotle's view of the Unmoved Mover on this point:

Aristotle says that the first existence is separated form sense objects and is an intelligible existence. But when he says that "it thinks itself," he takes the first rank from it. He also asserts the existence of a plurality of other intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, so that each of them might have its principle of motion. About the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a doctrine different from Plato, and as he has no good reason for this change, he brings in necessity. Even if he had good reasons, one might well object that it seems more reasonable to suppose that the spheres as they are coordinated in a single system are directed towards one end, the supreme existence. — Ennead Vi,i, translated by Joseph Katz

In this passage, Plotinus seems to be ignoring the clear reference to the importance of necessity in Plato's Timaeus. Nonetheless, it does undercut the idea that the Metaphysics was advancing a view of the cosmos that the Neo-Platonists were eager to support.

the Unmoved Mover — Paine

This corresponds to the perfect clock present before the inflationary phase in big bang cosmology. His eternal circular motion is a related concept too. The unmoved mover is considered a person though. Considering his view on motion, he would have been a hot theoretical physicist in these days.

I am mulling the article you linked to. It is interesting in comparing ideas of motion and the first causes.
But the universe Aristotle thought he lived in is vastly different than what is being revealed now. It makes me less inclined to make certain connections than more.

Do you have any other evidence to support this observation? — Paine

It's common knowledge that Aristotle's "Metaphysics" is a compilation of writings put together after his death. The part which supports the idea of eternal circular motions and the divine mind, directly contradicts what is said in "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, where he devotes the entire chapter toward explaining why this idea, drawn from Plato's Timaeus, is unacceptable. Have you carefully read this section? It exposes and deals with the problems inherent in this conception, very explicitly.

The principal problem is the spatial representation of a "circle". Thought, Aristotle explains has a serial order, rather than a spatial order. It is evident to me, that "serial order" is based in "priority", which is substantiated by time. This is why there is a difference between cardinality (implying the spatial separation required for quantity), and ordinality (implying logical order) in modern mathematics. Therefore we must consider that "eternal", which is a description of the immaterial, relates to the material world through "time" rather than "space". (Did you read the passage from Aquinas on aeviternity which I referenced?) So the spatial representation of a circular motion, which is a material representation, is insufficient to describe an eternal being which is immaterial.

After explaining this problem, Aristotle proceeds to address the problems involved with the idea of a self-motion caused by self-thinking.

For all practical processes of thinking have limits---they all go on for the sake of something outside the process, and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way that the phrases in speech which express processes and the results of thinking. — De Anima Bk1, Ch3, 23

Notice the reference to Plato's "the good". Aristotle expresses "the good" as "that for the sake of which". When Plato describes "the good" as that which illuminates the intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates visible objects, it is because "the good" is what directs the process of thinking which causes the intelligible objects to become intelligible (discovered). (I bring this to your attention because Appollodorus accuses me of attacking Plato rather than accepting his principles).

The entire section "De Anima" Bk1 Ch3, is a refutation of the idea that the soul is a type of motion, or even a self-moving sort of thing. Motion is a spatial conception, consisting of a body (therefore matter), space, and time. If "the soul" is to be properly understood as the cause of existence of the material body, therefore prior in time to the body, and immaterial, it cannot be represented by a concept which is a material representation.

In this passage, Plotinus seems to be ignoring the clear reference to the importance of necessity in Plato's Timaeus. Nonetheless, it does undercut the idea that the Metaphysics was advancing a view of the cosmos that the Neo-Platonists were eager to support. — Paine

The "necessity", as I see it, is the logical necessity produced by Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, explicitly Bk9 "Meatphysics". Through this demonstration he shows that if it were ever the case that there was a pure, absolute, infinite, or eternal potential, there could never be anything actual. Something actual is required to actualize any potential, so such a pure potential could not actualize itself, and it would forever be, pure potential. Pure potential is contrary to empirical observations. What we observe is actual beings. Therefore such a pure potential is really impossible. This effectively refutes both Pythagorean idealism (because Aristotle has demonstrated the ideas to exist as potential prior to being discovered), and also materialism which assumes a prime matter (matter is defined as potential). Materialism and such idealism are one and the same in principle.

So the necessity implied, is the logically necessary actuality produced by the cosmological argument, (what we call God, as per Aquinas' five ways). It cannot be a material actuality (matter & form), because it is prior to matter, therefore an immaterial Form. It's a bit of a tricky sort of necessity to understand.
Because of its temporal base, it is not a two way street, but only one way, as the conception of dependent, or "contingent", demonstrates. An effect necessarily has a cause, and this necessity is solidly substantiated in observation. This is the nature of contingency, or contingent existence, a cause is required, as a necessity, for the existence of any contingent being. But when we take the perspective of the cause itself, adopt that position of being prior in time to the contingent thing (as the perspective of a free willing being for example), then the nature of potential allows that the contingent thing is not necessary. Therefore this "necessity" is only applicable in a backward way of looking at time.

Plotinus did not quite seem to grasp the necessity of Aristotle's cosmological argument. In my opinion, Plato actually dismissed Pythagorean idealism prior to Aristotle's cosmological argument, replacing "the One" with "the good". I discussed this extensively with Appollodorus in another thread. Appollodorus refused to accept that Plato classed "One" as a mathematical form, and placed the good as prior to all forms. Therefore we have a separation between the good and the One. Appollodorus equates these two.

In placing "the One" as the first principle, Plotinus maintains its status as an idea, and therefore a potential. The One then, is a pure, absolute potential. But this is no different from prime matter, because as much as he posits all immaterial Forms as emanating from, or proceeding from, the One, he has no first actuality. This actuality is what has been demonstrated by the cosmological argument, as the necessity which is required as the first cause. Looking backward in time this cause is a necessity. So Aquinas firmly establishes the first Form, God, as an actuality, absolving the Neo-Platonists from the misrepresentation they propagated.

This corresponds to the perfect clock present before the inflationary phase in big bang cosmology. His eternal circular motion is a related concept too. The unmoved mover is considered a person though. Considering his view on motion, he would have been a hot theoretical physicist in these days. — Raymond

You might compare the eternal circular motions to the Hartle-Hawking No Boundary proposal. It's a materialist/idealist representation which avoids the problem of having to accept a first cause to avoid infinite regress, through sophistry. It's really contradictory though, because it proposes a 'time' prior to time. So instead of going backward in time forever, we can talk of a cyclical repetition which makes the 'time' prior to time seem to dissolve into a different "time". This is the manifestation of the problem with representing the temporal concept "eternal" with a spatial representation, described by Aristotle at Bk1, Ch3, "De Anima". If time is not understood as prior to space, the problem cannot be resolved.

There are things I disagree with. The time in the Planck era volume can be considered not as a new clock but as a perfect clock by itself.

Can we say, very concisely, that the Platonic forms were sought on Earth, by Aristotle, instead of in out-wordly "mathematical heaven" where Plato positioned them? — Raymond

Briefly put, Aristotle’s arguments are as follows:

(A). Time and motion are imperishable.
(B). Therefore, they must have an imperishable cause.
(C). This cause is the Prime Unmoved Mover.
(D). To be a cause of imperishable motion, the Prime Unmoved Mover must be eternally in actuality and immaterial.
(E). That which is immaterial is incomposite.
(F). Therefore, the substance of the Prime Unmoved Mover is incomposite actuality or activity.
(G). That activity is thinking (noesis), i.e., the activity of an Intelligence or Intellect (nous).
(H). Therefore, the Prime Unmoved Mover is an Intelligence or Intellect or “thinking thinking about thinking”.
(I). That Intelligence thinks according to participation in the intelligible.
(J). Therefore, it also thinks about all intelligibles.
(K). Its activity is life.
(L ). Therefore, it is life and life belongs to it.
(M). Therefore, the Prime Unmoved Mover, which is Intelligence, is God and the first principle (arche) upon which the heavens, nature, and all other things depend.

If we consider the fact that Aristotle uses “intelligibles” (noeta) and “Forms” or “Ideas” (eide) synonymously, we can see that his “Unmoved Mover” is identical with Plato’s Creator-God (Demiurge) or Divine Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) whose content are Forms and which generates the universe using Forms as paradigms to give shape to matter. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s statement to the effect that intellect is determined by the essences that are its objects (Metaphysics 1072b22).

Aristotle’s argument that (A) God is thinking what is best, (B) God is best, (C) therefore God is thinking himself, does not mean that God is thinking only of himself. He is also thinking of intelligible objects (= Ideas or Forms).

Both Plato and Aristotle describe God (Demiurge/Unmoved Mover) as “good” or “most good”. And what Aristotle means by “prime” is that the Unmoved Mover is prior to sensible substance, i.e., it is the absolutely primary substance.

All we need to do now is to add Plato’s One or Good which is “above substance” (and thus above the Unmoved Mover or Creator God) and we obtain the same ontological hierarchy as that found in Plato:

(1). The Ineffable One (the Good).
(2). Creative Intellect (Unmoved Mover) containing Ideas or Forms.
(3). Ensouled Universe.

This is all the more the case if we recall that Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics says:

If our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends, it is clear that this must be the good, that is, the supreme good … Some, however, have held the view that over and above these particular goods there is another which is Good in itself and the cause of whatever goodness there is in all these others (Nicomachean Ethics. 1094a15-1095a30)

Obviously, Aristotle is fully aware that his metaphysical framework is largely identical with that of his teacher Plato. The apparent disagreement between them and resulting confusion is caused (1) by what Gerson calls “Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts” and (2) by Aristotle’s criticism of views held within the Academy that are thought to be Plato’s but in reality (as Gerson shows) are often those of Speusippus, the Pythagoreans, and others.

To return to Forms. In Plato, Forms are immaterial “paradigms” used by the Divine Creative Intelligence to generate the material world (Timaeus 28a7). This Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) is a form of consciousness, which is why Aristotle himself refers to it as "nous" and as "thinking" (noesis).

Though they are referred to as "objects of (divine) thought", the Forms, as @Wayfarer says, are NOT "objects" in the ordinary sense of the word, nor could they be as no such "objects" exist in the Divine Intellect.

This is why Forms can be grasped only intuitively, in an act of intuition or insight (noesis) which is different from the discursive thought (dianoesis) whose objects are, say, ideal geometrical shapes such as triangle.

The Form "Triangularity" is the principle that enables discursive thought to form the abstract concept of ideal triangle. The Form of "Triangularity" itself is grasped by the faculty of intuition or insight (nous) while the ideal triangle is conceived by the faculty of reason (logos or dianoia).

If we bear in mind the literal meaning of Greek eidos as "that which is seen (as a shape or form)" we can see that the Form or Idea is inextricably linked with the way in which what would otherwise be an indeterminate mass is shaped by the cognizing consciousness into objects of determinate cognition. The patterns according to which this "shaping" or "forming" occurs are the Forms.

So, essentially, Forms are principles of order which the Divine or Universal Consciousness uses to organize itself in order to generate determinate cognition and "project" the world into existence.

As determinate cognition exists, consciousness cannot remain in an indeterminate state.

Nor can it generate determinate cognition without organizing itself for the purpose.

And the principles according to which it organizes itself are Forms.

Aristotle need not define or describe Forms in every detail exactly as Plato does. But I think it is clear that their views are largely in harmony with one another.

So the spatial representation of a circular motion, which is a material representation, is insufficient to describe an eternal being which is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

This ignores the distinction between heavenly bodies and the "combined beings" of the sublunary sphere. The life of the latter is "ensouled" in a material basis that does not apply to eternal substances. The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. What the actuality is for living animals does not completely include how nous is an actuality for those creatures. Aristotle says that the soul, as what makes creatures alive, is not self-moving. Something else causes it. Nous is said to be different in a way that requires more than the celestial model of Timaeus to explain. As Aristotle says: "The case of the mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed."

In this section of Book 1, no mention is made of actuality and potentiality. That emerges when Aristotle begins his own inquiry after finishing discussing previous views. As the beginning of Book 2 says: "Let us start again, as it were from the beginning, and try to determine what the soul is and what would be its most comprehensive definition." Through his analysis on this basis, Aristotle recognizes the materiality of combined beings while also claiming that nous is not simply a property of such. In Book 3, Chapter 8 of DA, he lays out the boundaries. The following addresses the materiality you refer to:

Since there is no actual thing which has separate existence, apart as it seems from magnitudes which are objects of perception, the objects of thought are included among the forms which are objects of perception, both those spoken of as in abstraction and those which are dispositions and affectations of objects of perception. And for this reason unless one perceived things one would not learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates one must simultaneously contemplate an image; for images are like sense-perception, except that they are without matter. But imagination is different from assertion and denial; for truth and falsity involve a combination of thoughts. But what distinguishes the first thoughts from images? Surely neither these nor any other thoughts will be images, but they will not exist without images. — DA 432a3, translated by D.W. Hamlyn

This view does not conform to the either/or you see in Book 1. The insufficiency noted by Aristotle in Book 1 is now accounted for as a distinction of causes: These distinctions are used to clarify the different ways that desire and practical reason can said to move the living animal.

Plotinus did not quite seem to grasp the necessity of Aristotle's cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

That likely is the case. The observation does seem to support my doubt that Metaphysics Book Lamba is somehow a sneaky backstory for Neo-Platonists. Your description of Plotinus' argument puzzles me on a number of levels, I will refrain from going there because it gets closer to your vision of Aristotle that I don't understand.

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn’t say that. So you couldn’t have “quoted” it. You got it all backward as usual. :smile:

The truth of the matter is that Aristotle says that the heavens have an eternal and circular motion because circular motion is the only perfect and eternal one, as it has no beginning or end. What he objects to is (a) circular movement in an infinite body and (b) circular movement in soul.

In the De Caelo (Peri Ouranou) he says:

Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle, and by argument also we have determined that there is something to which circular movement belongs … an infinite circle being an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body (De Caelo 272a5, 272b20)

Therefore, it doesn't make sense to claim that he describes the “unacceptability of eternal circular motions” in De Anima or anywhere else.

What Aristotle does in De Anima is to criticize the idea that the motion is a property of the soul. He mentions the creation account in Plato’s Timaeus in which the Creator imposes circular motion on the universe “that it might move in harmonic revolutions”.

It is perfectly clear that Aristotle here does not object to eternal circular motion per se but only to that motion as a property of the soul, and he states in unambiguous terms that the soul causes the circular movement (without itself moving):

It is not clear [from the Timaeus account] why the heaven revolves in a circle; seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of soul [of the universe] nor due to body [of the universe]: on the contrary it is rather the soul which causes the motion of the body ... (De Anima 407b)

This is precisely why Aristotle introduces the idea of "Unmoved Mover". The Unmoved Mover (God) is unmoved yet is the cause of the movement of the universe ....

Aristotle believed in a highly abstract supreme God of pure form and pure self-awareness, who was the ultimate cause of movement and change in the universe but was himself unchanging. This idea was the result of his own philosophizing.

It's like the concept of charge nowadays. Charge is the cause of motion and it can be pure consciousness, or an fundamental form of it. His notion of the eternal circular motion is the predecessor of the modern concept of the ideal clock, which was the actually the pre-inflationary state of the universe. Add his pre quantum physics... Artistotle, my man! :cool:

This ignores the distinction between heavenly bodies and the "combined beings" of the sublunary sphere. The life of the latter is "ensouled" in a material basis that does not apply to eternal substances. The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. — Paine

This is not a distinction made by Aristotle in "De Anima". He is asking about how the soul is supposed to move its body. He describes the Platonic explanation of how the soul moves its body as being the same way that the heavenly bodies are supposed to be moved by a 'mind soul'.

3. We must begin our examination with movement; for, doubtless, not only is it false that the essence of the soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves (or is capable of moving) itself, but it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it. — Arostotle De Anima, Bk1, Ch3, 405b, 31

It is in the same fashion that the Timaeus also tries to give a physical account of how the soul moves its body; the soul, it is here said, is in movement, and so owing to their mutual implication moves the body also.
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All this implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movements of the heavens. — Arostotle De Anima, Bk1, Ch3, 406b, 26 - 407a,3

Notice that he describes the Platonic perspective as identifying the movement of the soul with the movement of the heavens. He is not trying to separate these two, make a distinction as you say, but to reject the entire description.

He does not deny the possibility that the same principle which acts as the soul in the living being could also be what acts as the cause of movement in the heavens. In fact, we can still make that comparison. The first actuality of the living body (the soul) is the cause of the material body, just like the first actuality demonstrated by the cosmological argument is the cause of the material universe.

So Aristotle is not making a distinction or separation, he is rejecting the whole idea, the description of the soul, as self-moved mover, and the cosmological description of eternal circular motions, which supports this description of the soul.

The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. What the actuality is for living animals does not completely include how nous is an actuality for those creatures. Aristotle says that the soul, as what makes creatures alive, is not self-moving. Something else causes it. Nous is said to be different in a way that requires more than the celestial model of Timaeus to explain. As Aristotle says: "The case of the mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed." — Paine

There is no such distinction being made. It is an imaginary one you are trying to force onto the interpretation. But if we assume such a distinction, for the sake of argument, then we'd have to look for the means by which the mind is implanted into the soul. We would now have something immutable, the mind, implanted into something, the soul, which cannot move or be moved i.e., is also immutable. And that makes no sense at all. If adding mind to soul makes no change to soul, then soul must always be united with mind as one mind soul. But this is exactly what you are claiming, that he is making a distinction between.

What Aristotle is showing here is that the Platonic conception of "soul" which has the soul move the body, in a way which is analogous to the way that the ancient Greeks believed that a "mind" moved the heavenly bodies, is mistaken. But we cannot proceed from this to make the distinction you claim.

This view does not conform to the either/or you see in Book 1. The insufficiency noted by Aristotle in Book 1 is now accounted for as a distinction of causes: These distinctions are used to clarify the different ways that desire and practical reason can said to move the living animal. — Paine

I can't see the point you are making here, Paine. Aristotle clearly says that thoughts are dependent on images. It's at the end of your quote. And images are derived from the senses. So we have no basis for a "nous" which is independent of the senses, sense organs, and material body. It's true that Aristotle, at some points alludes to the appearance of a separate, independent mind, but such a thing is inconsistent with the principles he clearly states.

He doesn’t say that. So you couldn’t have “quoted” it. You got it all backward as usual. :smile: — Apollodorus

Obviously you haven't read it yet. So I'm still waiting for an intelligent reply from you, concerning this.

Therefore, it doesn't make sense to claim that he describes the “unacceptability of eternal circular motions” in De Anima or anywhere else. — Apollodorus

What do you mean? Your quote does exactly that, describes an infinite circular motion as impossible: "an infinite circle being an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body". That is what he is proving here, the impossibility of an infinite circular motion. Notice in your quote: "Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle". That is a fundamental principle from Plato, knowledge derived through the senses can be misleading. So when logic demonstrates that something which the senses leads us to believe, is actually impossible, then we must reject what the senses are telling us.

The accepted principle of the day, was that the orbits of the planets were eternal circular motions. This was supposed to be empirically proven, scientific knowledge. But Socratic skepticism taught us to doubt any knowledge dependent on the senses. The Copernican revolution was spawned by the revelation that the orbits were not circular, but elliptical. The slight discrepancies in timing which until then could not be figured out, were figured out to be the result of elliptical orbits, and the truth was revealed. This simple revelation made the solar system intelligible, but it had to be figured out. The first step was to reject the accepted science, that the orbits are eternal circular motions.

t is perfectly clear that Aristotle here does not object to eternal circular motion per se but only to that motion as a property of the soul, and he states in unambiguous terms that the soul causes the circular movement (without itself moving):

It is not clear [from the Timaeus account] why the heaven revolves in a circle; seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of soul [of the universe] nor due to body [of the universe]: on the contrary it is rather the soul which causes the motion of the body ... (De Anima 407b)

This is precisely why Aristotle introduces the idea of "Unmoved Mover". The Unmoved Mover (God) is unmoved yet is the cause of the movement of the universe .... — Apollodorus

One big problem with your account is that the orbits of the heavens are not circular. And this idea, that they were eternal circular motions is what Aristotle was rejecting. Look at your quote, circular motion is neither implied by the soul nor by the body. We ought to conclude therefore that it is unjustified, and likely, a mistaken idea.