However is this far, and what "logic is being suspended". If we are parts of a whole, why can't Schopenhauer view be "logical"? — KantDane21
You've described what an individual is as being both a knowing and willing subject. If the individual is an object in the world then the knowing subject is also in the world and not outside it. How do you know that the knowing subject is perceiving the willing subject and not the individual itself?An individual is the pure knowing subject.- that is, a disembodied subject, not an object in the world, but perceives the world ‘from outside’; the world of spatio‐temporal objects that are totally distinct from itself.
BUT
An individual is also a willing subject.- an embodied subject, subject that wills (desires, needs, wants, etc.)
Schopenhauer thinks that willing subject and knowing subject are identical. The identity of the willing and knowing subject, Schopenhauer claims in this work, is “the knot of the world” and therefore “inexplicable”. — KantDane21
Logic does not have to be suspended if you think of it as a causal feedback loop, where cause and effect create a loop of causation and cause and effect loose their identity as individuals because the effect becomes the cause and the cause becomes the effect.Scholar Julian Young states that Schopenhauer thinks (1) willing subject is known by being an object for the knowing subject, and (2) nothing which is an object for the knowing subject can
be identical with it, the willing subject cannot, according to Schopenhauer, be identical with
knowing subject.
In his above quote Schopenhauer, Young states, is suggesting that essentially "logic can be suspended, and two distinct things can be identical."
However is this far, and what "logic is being suspended". If we are parts of a whole, why can't Schopenhauer view be "logical"? — KantDane21
willing subject and not the individual itself? — Harry Hindu
a step removed from the thing-in-itself, — Manuel
I'm asking you what you meant by "individual" in your OP. You described an individual as being both the willing and knowing subjects. In what way does the subject know the individual as it is?by "individual itself" do you mean the object of perception? How would you distinguish that from the willing subject? — KantDane21
Think of writing a type of function in a program called a loop where you start with some input (an observation) that is processed (observation integrated with stored responses) in the loop and the output (the outcome of some behavior) then becomes the input for the next iteration of the loop. Now think of another function that monitors the process and interjects before some behavior is executed to prevent an error or mistake.this is the problem, and the passage you cited. If thing-in-itself is totally demarcated from human experience (in the way Kant says-- and Schopenhauer repeatedly stated will is Kant's thing-in-itself, how can we get nearer to the thing-in-itself? is it not an all-or-nothing type existent? — KantDane21
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